A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION AND RECONCILIATION. Edinburgh: Printed by Thomas and Archibald Constable, FOR EDMONSTON AND DOUGLAS. LONDON HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO. CAMBRIDGE ; . • • MACMILLAN AND CO. GLASGOW .... JAMES MACLEHOSE. CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION AND RECONCILIATION. BY ALBRECHT RITSCHL, <3 PROFESSOR ORDINARIUS OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GOTTINGEN. •« -i n *> & ^ 1 1 U £ & ** TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN, WITH THE AUTHOR'S SANCTION, BY JOHN S. BLACK, M.A. < IUBRARY SI MARY'S COLLEGE EDINBUEGH EDMONSTON AND DOUGLAS 1872. DEDICATED TO THE KEY. GEOEGE EDWAED STEITZ, DOCTOR OF THEOLOGY AND ONE OF THE CITY MINISTERS IN FRANKFORT-ON-THE-MAIN MY DEAR BROTHER-IN-LAW, TRIED FRIEND, AND THEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATE. AUTHOK'S PREFACE. IT is now almost thirty years since, in the third session of my university course, I began clearly to perceive that the first prerequisite of theological cul- ture is a clear understanding of the Christian idea of Reconciliation. At that time I tried to get special help towards such an understanding, but failed to find what I sought ; and, as I now see, after methodical examination of the later German Theology, I had not any ground for expecting efficient aid towards the solution of the problem from any one at that time. Other problems came before me for scientific investi- gation ; but as soon as I had brought these to a con- clusion satisfactory to myself, I resumed the question of my youth in an independent way. Since 1857 my whole attention has, directly or indirectly, been de- voted to the doctrines of Justification and Reconcilia- tion, save in so far as I have been hindered by official duties and personal affairs. As result of these studies, I have already published a program, De Ira Dei (Bonn, 1859), as well as the following articles in the Jahr- bucher fur deutsche Theologie ; — " On A. Osiander's Doctrine of Justification" (1857, No. 4) ; " Studies on viii A UTHORS PREFA CE. the Ideas of Christ's Satisfaction and Merit" (1860, No. 4) ; " The Declarations of the New Testament upon the Saving Worth of the Death of Christ" (1863, Nos. 2 and 3) ; " Historical Studies on the Christian Doctrine of God" (in three articles, 1865, No. 2 ; 1868, Nos. 2 and 3). As a preparation, however, for the dogmatic presentation of these doctrines, I held it necessary to gain insight into their whole history from the beginning of the middle ages ; and on this account the present volume has been written. It is published because my Mends desire me to do so, and because I recognise their claim to share in my scientific acquire- ments. In a second volume I purpose to undertake the dogmatic presentation of the doctrines in question along with the necessary biblico-theological substruc- ture ; and for that volume I reserve many details which may seem to have been overlooked in the his- torical part. Where, however, certain germs or rela- tions of thought have not attained to any historical continuity in public teaching, I have for the present left them undiscussed, in order that the historical survey might not be burdened with their treatment. In so far as they deserve attention at all, they will be taken up in the theoretical presentation of the second volume. ALBEECHT KITSCHL. GOTTINGEN, Sept. 17, 1870. PKEFATOEY NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR THE work which in a translation is now laid before the British public has already been received in Germany with the keenest interest, alike by friends and opponents of the author's views ; and it has served to raise the previously high reputation of a theologian who is second to no University teacher of that country in dialectic acuteness and broad his- torical grasp of Keformed as well as Lutheran and Pre-Eefor- mation dogma. Dr. Eitschl is not altogether unknown even in this country ; and the favour with which his work, in its original form, has been already welcomed, leads to the hope that it may meet with still wider notice, and find still greater usefulness in its present shape. Those who are best acquainted with the literature of the History of Dogma will be the readiest to recognise its importance as a contribution to that branch of theological literature. I desire to acknowledge my obligations to my friend and fellow-student under Kitschl — the Eev. W. E. Smith, Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in the Free Church College, Aberdeen — for invaluable advice and assistance, gener- ously given throughout the whole course of my work, in the many difficulties inseparable from the task of translating from a language so rich in theological and metaphysical distinctions as that of Germany. I may add that both to him and to me the task has been one not of scientific interest merely, but also of gratitude for what we feel we owe to Professor Eitschl. JOHN S. BLACK. KIRKCALDY, May 16, 1872. CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. PAGE 1. The Subject defined, 1 2. Literature — Baur and Dorner, . . . . 10 3. The Idea of Justification and Eeconciliation in the Greek Theology of the Middle Ages, . . 19 CHAPTEE I. THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION THROUGH CHRIST ACCORDING ..'• . 167 28. Doctrine of Melanchthon and Luther on conversion by Law and Gospel, 180 29. Calvin's Doctrine of Justification through Christ by Faith, . .....,.;:<,:. . . 184 30. Calvin's relation to Melanchthon and Luther in regard to the practical consciousness of Justification and the Doctrine of Penance, i,;..' . . . . 189 CHAPTEE V. THE REFORMATION DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION CON- TRASTED IN ITS PRINCIPLES WITH THAT Of THE MIDDLE AGES, AND WITH OSIANDER'S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION. 31. The Death of Christ as a vicarious endurance of Punishment is necessary from God's Justice, . 196 32. This Thought as held by Zwingli, . . . . ., . 203 33. The Merit of Christ as presented by Calvin, . . 206 34. Christ's Passive and Active Obedience, . . . 209 35. Osiander's Doctrine of Justification, . . /.-/.•'• 214 36. Criticism of this Doctrine, . . . . . 218 37. Osiander's Influence on the teaching of the Lutheran Divines, ... . ^. . 226 CHAPTEE VI. THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE OF LUTHERAN AND REFORMED DIVINES ON RECONCILIATION AND JUSTIFICATION, AND ITS REJECTION BY FAUSTUS SOCINUS. 38. The Subject defined, 234 39. The Necessity of Christ's Penal Satisfaction arising out of the habitual Justice of God, . . . 242 40. Significance of the Active as compared with the Pas- xiv CONTENTS. PAGE sive Obedience of Christ. The Objections raised byPiscator, ... 248 41. Co-ordination of the Passive and Active Obedience of Christ in the Notion of His Satisfaction; and subordination of the former to the latter in the Notion of His Merit, . 256 42. The Doctrine of the applicatio gratia or efficacia meriti Christi. Divergence of the two Confessions, . 267 43. The Extent of Christ's Purpose of Salvation. Diver- gence of the two Confessions, . . . 280 44. The Idea of Keconciliation in general rejected by the Anabaptists, Mystics, Quakers, Socinians, . . 289 45. The Arguments of Faustus Socinus against the Ortho- dox Doctrine, 298 46. Criticism of these Arguments, . . . . 303 47. Doctrines of the Arminians, 309 CHAPTEE VII. COMPLETE DISINTEGRATION OP THE DOCTRINES OF RE- CONCILIATION AND JUSTIFICATION BY THE GERMAN THEOLOGIANS OF THE ILLUMINATION. 48. The General Causes of Rationalism and Naturalism, . 320 49. The Special Causes of the. Theological Illumination in the German Lutheran Church, . . . . 325 50. The Influence of Leibnitz. — Dippel and Canz, . . 331 51. The Influence of Wolf.— Character of the Illumination, 341 52. Tollner's Investigation of Christ's Active Obedience, 346 53. The Problem of Divine Punishments, . . . 355 54. Negative and Positive Interpretation of the Saving Efficacy of the Death of Christ by the Theologians of the Illumination, 366 55. The Half Orthodox Opponents of the Illumination, . 377 CONTENTS. xv CHAPTER VIII. THE PROBLEM OF RECONCILIATION DEFINED ANEW BY KANT ; REGRESS OF HIS DISCIPLES TO THE STANDPOINT OF THE ILLUMINATION. PAGE 5 6. Kant's Opposition to the Illumination in the Lemmata of the Idea of Reconciliation, . . . . 387 57. Kant's Critical Principles of Ethics dogmatically applied, 396 58. The Doctrines of Justification and Penal Satisfaction in Kant's Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, . 404 59. Tieftrunk's Practical Postulate of the Removal of Guilt, and its Theological Foundation, . . 416 60. Regress of the Kantians to the Illumination Stand- point, 426 61. De Wette's Interpretation of the Doctrine of Recon- ciliation, 434 CHAPTER IX. THE REVIVAL OF ABELARD'S TYPE OF DOCTRINE BY SCHLEIERMACHER AND HIS FOLLOWERS. 62. Schleiermacher's Significance for Theology, . . . 440 63. The Christian Religion as the Fellowship of Christ's Redemption, . . . . . . . 445 64. The Doctrine of Sin and of Evil, . . . . 452 65. The Doctrine of Redemption and Reconciliation through Christ, 466 66. Relation of this Doctrine to Dogmatic Tradition, . 476 67. The Doctrine of Justification, . . . . 485 68. The Followers of Schleiermacher, . . 493 xvi CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. THE COURSE OF PIETISM TILL THE REPRISTINATION OF LUTHERAN ORTHODOXY. PAGE 69. Character of Modern Pietism as distinguished from the Earlier, .... 513 70. The Doctrine of Reconciliation according to the earliest representatives of Modern Pietism, . . 523 71. The Earlier Pietism and the School of Bengel, . 529 72. Re-introduction in the School of Bengel of the Thought of Christ's Penal Satisfaction, . . . . 548 73. Modern Lutheran Orthodoxy, . . . . 557 74. Results and Problems, . . . . . . 571 CHAPTER XL THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION IN THE SPECULATIVE SCHOOL. ' 75. Schelling and his Followers, 578 76. Hegel and his Followers, 595 ERRATUM. Page 113, Jine 11 — After commendante insert the sentence : Sicut enim omnia hcec ad justificationem nostram, qucR tamen finaliter in solo consistit proposito Dei, ita etiam gloria nostra est in solo Deo suam in nobis caritatem com- mendante. INTRODUCTION. 1. THE Christian doctrine of Justification and Eeconciliation, which I purpose to unfold in a scientific manner, constitutes the real centre of the theological system. In it is developed the determinate and direct result of the historical revelation of God's purpose of grace through Christ — the result, namely, that the Church founded by Christ has freedom of religious inter- course with God, notwithstanding the fact of sin, and at the same time, in the exercise of that freedom, directs the workings of its own will in conformity with God's expressed design. To the religious discernment this implies in itself the moral restoration of man, and all religious blessedness. The title I have chosen certainly presents an unusual collo- cation and order of ideas, and so demands a preliminary explana- tion, although the adequate vindication of its suitableness to de- scribe the contemplated theme can result only from the full work- ing out of the subject to the end I have in view. In that part of the system of Christian doctrine to which these ideas belong, many other additional conceptions have been developed in the course of the history of theology ; while, on the other hand, the practice of theologians has not yet given them a fixed or self- consistent arrangement. Thus, while all other theological doc- trines are provided with distinct and definite titles, here, in the entire absence of a fixed terminology, we are not only warranted but compelled to exercise freedom of choice. At first sight it seems as if the difficulty could easily be got over if one were to have regard simply to the historical fact to which the above- mentioned saving operations and kindred ones are referred, and were to name it accordingly the doctrine of tlie death of Christ. In this way it would be left an open question what reference 1 2 INTRODUCTION. to God and what effects upon men might be grounded upon this fact, and upon which class of these references the emphasis ought to be laid. Yet weighty objections to such a title readily present themselves. While the apostles mastered the first im- pression of the death of their Lord by recognising in it His sacrificial act for the salvation of men, they included along with it, in this view, Christ's resurrection also, and referred to His death and resurrection together the effects resulting from the finished sacrifice. Further, in the doctrinal method of the Eeformation, value has been assigned not only to the suffering and death of Christ, but also to the whole compass of His active life as a ground of the saving operations in question. And, although this theory has not been permitted to pass unchallenged, it has gained so much weight that on account of it we must avoid making it appear as if the death of Christ were regarded only as an external and isolated event, so far as the salutary effects dependent upon it are concerned. But, further, I cannot help expressing my opinion that our reli- gious assurance of such results as are the justification and re- conciliation of men can be based upon the death of Christ only on condition that the value of His life and of His resurrection be taken into consideration in inseparable connexion with that fact. But on this account, the title, " Doctrine of the Death of Christ," would fail to convey clearly and completely all that ought to be denoted by it. On the other hand, such a title as "Doctrine of the saving work of Christ" would comprehend more than our intended subject. For it would embrace the whole sphere of the three offices of Christ, the prophetical, the priestly, and the kingly; but I have at present to do only with the exhibition of so much of the saving work of Christ as corresponds to His priestly office. It seems then as if this conception might furnish the appro- priate title for our task. As all know, it is derived from the Epistle to the Hebrews. Yet, we may with some propriety attribute to it a general currency in the New Testament : for the idea (common to the greater number of New Testament writers) of an offering for which Christ consecrated Himself necessarily involves the analogy of a priest. The biblico-theo- logical portion of the following treatise will show that I can appreciate to its full extent the constitutive importance of the THE SUBJECT DEFINED. 3 Old Testament conceptions of sacrifice and priesthood for the formation of a worthy view of the death and resurrection of Christ. I readily acknowledge also with Schleiermacher 1 that the threefold attributes of prophet, priest, and king, when taken together, do secure, in a special manner, completeness to our view of the saving work of Christ. At the same time I cannot get rid of the objections raised by Schleiermacher himself against the use of these metaphorical expressions in systematic theology. Schleiermacher pronounces for the continued use of these dogmatic terms in order to maintain continuity with the original modes of representation, inasmuch as the earliest Christian terminology proceeded upon the co-ordination of the new kingdom of heaven with the old. But the fact is, that neither our Lord Himself nor any one of the New Testament writers, has made use of the three offices as the comprehensive and only forms for expressing the saving operations of Christ, and that this use was not introduced into systematic theology until the Eeformation period.2 Besides, in the New Testament these official titles are in part superseded in their application to Christ by designations which are peculiar to it ; or where they are used, occur only in a metaphorical sense in such a way that the idea contained in them can also be conveyed independently of them. The character of Prophet, although Christ Himself lays claim to it, is surpassed by his designation as Son of Man and Son of God. His Kingship pertains to a sphere entirely differ- ent from that which is assigned to the expected Son of David. His Priesthood, corresponding to His sacrificial character, has, when viewed more closely, more of dissimilarity than of re- semblance to the type. And, therefore, although our solution of problems in biblical theology will be dependent on our con- sideration of these typical notions, the framing of our leading conceptions in systematic theology cannot be regulated by such regards. These conceptions must proceed throughout upon spe- cifically New Testament views, and not upon those which, being used in a tropical sense, are easily seen to be merely subsidiary representations so far as the New Testament sphere of thought is concerned. If the old school, in its mechanical use of Bible 1 Der Christliche Glaube, 3d Ed. § 102. 2 Eusebius, it is true, had already referred the three types to Christ. — Hist. Eccl i. 3. 4 INTRODUCTION. authority for its theological system, has disregarded this dis- tinction in the construction of New Testament thoughts, it has set us no example that we should imitate. Eather, inas- much as even the old school has in a great majority of instances fashioned its dogmatic heads of doctrine in accordance with the fully developed ideas of the New Testament, the introduction of the three offices of Christ as a head produces, even in the old theology, an inharmonious and strange impression which ought to serve as a warning against the continued use of such titles. For the designation of our task there remains only one other way of looking at it, namely this, — as a survey of the moral effects of the Life, Passion, Death, and Resurrection of Christ towards the founding of the Church In this understanding of it, only the notions of justification and reconciliation, which we have already mentioned, are sufficient. This affirmation, how- ever, proceeds upon such an understanding of the foundations of the doctrine in the New Testament, and of its progress in Church -theology, as cannot be had now except in hints and in a provisional way. Of course the New Testament itself, as well as the History of Dogmas, presents us with a rich abundance of conceptions that are closely connected with those already mentioned. Amongst these there occur in the New Testament the following : Sanctification, Bringing to God, Purchasing for God (ayopd^eiv), Purification, Eedemption. The last-mentioned of these seems especially to recommend itself, inasmuch as redemption expresses the whole compass of conceivable effects of the death of Christ, and is expressly used in this sense by Paul (Eom. iii. 24 ; Col. i. 14 ; Eph. i. 7). Moreover, the com- prehensive personal title of Christ as the Eedeemer has been sanctioned by the ordinary language of the Church. The word, however, is less suitable as a title on account of its purely negative meaning, and also from the circumstance, that in the period of Patristic theology (where the notion is an independent one) it received an erroneous, purely dramatic, thoroughly non- ethical application ; while, on the other hand, in the doctrinal system of the middle ages and of the Eeformation it comes up only in subordination to other notions ; and finally, in modem usage, is not employed as an exhaustive designation of the thing we now wish to denote by it. It is well known that a THE SUBJECT DEFINED. 5 number of Greek and Latin Church Fathers view the death of Christ as a transaction in which God (from the motive of His justice) delivered over the life of the God- man as a price to the devil, who is recognised as the rightful lord over sinful humanity, and who could be induced to make surrender of his rights only on condition of receiving that as an equivalent. In this theory sin is represented merely as a mechanical subjection to the devil, and the idea of redemption remains entirely out of relation to the notion of human will. Moreover, it is found in carrying out this thought, that the issue of the legal transaction comes into collision with the idea of God's justice which had led to it : for the price paid to the devil as an equivalent for man cannot, from the very nature of the case, remain in his posses- sion. The significance which in this connexion attaches to the resurrection of Christ from the dead is, that thereby the devil lost possession of the compensation which he had received. But while the supposition that the devil had been deceived as to the effects of the legal transaction he had entered into was inevitable, it was impossible to believe with regard to the other party to the transaction — the omniscient God — anything else than that He had intended the deception. But such an intention is inconsistent with the justice of God, which is presupposed; thus the theory is self- contradictory, and is therefore untrue.1 On this account even Gregory Nazian- zen wandered away from the fundamental idea of the theory, because, regarding the devil as the despoiler and oppressor of mankind, he did not consider him entitled to claim any price for the surrender, much less one of infinite value. But this consideration falls short of its full effect with him, because he was not able consistently to explain from what necessity arising out of the very nature of God it was needful that He should receive the life of Christ by His death as a ransom.2 The theologians of the middle ages were the first who succeeded in thoroughly uprooting the theory we have mentioned, while they at the same time lifted the problem of the saving efficacy of the death of Christ to a higher sphere — that in .which sin is viewed in its legal and moral aspects. Diverse as are the views of Anselm and Abelard on this question, it is at any 1 Compare Baur, Lehre von der Versohnung, pp. 30-87. 2 As above, pp. 87-90. 6 INTRODUCTION. rate conclusive as regards the position of the problem of the death of Christ in their theological discussions, that they wholly reject the idea that a redemption of mankind from the power of the devil was legally requisite. While Anselm repre- sents man's sin as an injury done to the honour of God, and explains the death of Christ as arising out of the need for satis- faction to be given to God, he denies that the devil has, as over against God, any independent sphere of right, from which alone any claim against God's justice for an equivalent of his peculiar property could be inferred. While Abelard regards the death of Christ as that demonstration of the love of God whereby men are awakened to reciprocal love, and so recon- ciled with God and freed from the slavery of sin, he excludes every reference in this to the devil, inasmuch as neither at any time had he the elect in his power, nor could he by his seduc- tion of mankind have acquired any rights over them. And even Bernard, although out of deference to theological tradi- tionalism he brands as heresy Abelard's repudiation of that theory, only so far gives adherence to it that he in the same breath superadds the altogether diverse thought of a satisfac- tion to God which Christ as the Head gave for the Body — the Church — when He bore its sins in His death.1 But it is decisive, so far as the theology of the middle ages is concerned, that Peter Lombard converted the mechanical idea of the devil's power into the idea of an ethical attachment to sin on man's part, and, following closely upon Abelard, explained the subjugation of the devil through the death of Christ, as mean- ing only that the reciprocal love of man to God, which is awakened by that death, cannot co-exist with a continuance in sin — the two being mutually exclusive.2 In the same sense Thomas Aquinas also recognises the redemption of men from sin and from the devil only as a consequence of the reconcilia- tion of men with God, which was brought about by means of Christ's death.3 The Reformation doctrine treats of the bear- ings of the redemption wrought in the death of Christ upon the wrath of God, as well as upon our sins, and upon the devil. But, as this combination is only placed alongside of the leading thought of the reconciliation of God with men, one sees that the 1 Ut supra, pp. 155, 191-194, 202. 2 Ut mpra^ p> 2Q9, et seq. 8 Summa Theol. P. III. qu. 49, art. 2. THE SUBJECT DEFINED. 7 notion of redemption is not treated in this quarter as an in- dependent one. For, being a negative notion, it could not, at the time of the special scientific elucidation of the problem of the death of Christ, acquire any independent significance. If, accordingly, I shall appear to be justified in refraining from the use of this term to designate my work, I shall be only strengthened in my resolution by the contrary procedure of Schleiermacher. He distinguishes redemption and reconcilia- tion, in the order in which I have placed them, as co-ordi- nate operations of Christ upon believers. By redemption he understands the taking up of believers into the powerful in- fluence of Christ's God-consciousness; by reconciliation, the taking up of believers into the participation of His uninter- rupted blessedness.1 But, inasmuch as he does not succeed in carrying out the co-ordination of the two ideas, the choice of these designations appears, when more closely viewed, to be merely an arbitrary adoption of expressions which in the New Testament and in theological tradition had other meanings, and were placed in a different relation to each other. Were the designation of our task to be determined by regard to New Testament usages of language alone, then, of all the above-mentioned notions, that of sanctification would seem to be the simplest, and, at the same time, the most comprehensive to denote the salutary fruits of the death and resurrection of Christ (John xvii. 19 ; 1 Cor. i. 30 ; Eph. v. 26 ; Heb. x. 10, 14, 29 ; xiii. 12 ; ii. 11) — the others, on nearer view, being seen to be synonymous. But then, as the notion of sanctification has in the theology of the Evangelical Church found its place in another part of the system, it would lead to the utmost con- fusion and misunderstanding if in our title we were to adhere only to the purism of the New Testament idiom. And further, in speaking more explicitly of sanctification through Christ's life, death, and resurrection, I might seem to be giving my adherence precisely to a phase of doctrinal development which I purpose to put aside as altogether indifferent in the moral aspect of the problem. I refer to the period of the patristic theology, where, in close connexion with the theory of redemp- tion from the power of the devil, there is to be found a series of suggestions and additions which Baur treats as "mystical 1 Der Christliche Qlaube, 2d Ed. § 100, 101. 3 INTRODUCTION. doctrine of reconciliation " preparatory to a later mode of appre- hending the problem.1 The defenders of the Divinity of Christ, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and others, lay stress upon this, that the Incarnate Word must needs have been like unto God, inasmuch as only a person of such dignity could have brought men to God, annihilated the death of men by His own death, and by His own resurrection raised mankind to immortal life. These designs in reference to man have really as little to do with the usual notion of reconciliation as, by Baur's own confes- sion,2 has the theory of redemption from the power of the devil. For a doctrine of reconciliation between man and God can be constructed only where a contrariety of will between the two, or on the part of the one against the other, is presupposed. The leading thought, in accordance with which the operations of the Divine Logos are estimated, and to which also the seemingly exaggerated expression of Athanasius is to be referred — that Christ has made man divine (OeoTroieiv) — is only the thought of sanctification, i.e. the setting apart of men for God. On this account Cyril of Alexandria finds himself constrained to account for this influence of Christ upon men by the communication of the Holy Ghost.3 Where, on the other hand, it is desired to make clear the immediate effect of the historical appearance of Christ in changing man and raising him up to God, then sanc- tification is earned back to the analogy of a chemical process of nature, while the human nature which undergoes it is regarded only as a natural unit. Hilary of Poictiers enables us to see this kernel of the " mystical atonement-doctrine,"4 as, generally speaking, the so-called mystical form of religious ideas is wont to rest upon the reduction of relations which pertain to the will, to the forms of a natural process. Now, in the selection of a title, I am led by this very consi- deration — that the bearing of Christ's saving work on the mutual relations between the Divine and human will must be expressed. For this purpose the notions of justification and reconciliation at once present themselves as specially adapted. For justification removes the guilt, and reconciliation the i Ui supra, p. 111. 2 Ut mpra^ p 89> 3 m supr^ p 117 4 De Trinitate, ii. 24. Humani generis causa Dei filius natus ex virgine eat et Spiritu sancto, — ut homo factus ex virgine naturam in se carnis acci- peret perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo universi generis humani corpus existeret. Compare Baur, as above, p. 116. THE SUBJECT DEFINED. 9 enmity, of sin towards God : both notions thus include in themselves an effect upon the human will just as certainly as guilt and enmity towards God can only be understood as be- longing to the human will. But now, since these effects must be conceived as proceeding from the Divine will through the instrumentality of the doing and suffering of Christ, our title does not preclude the view that Christ's work can be regarded as efficacious in the justification and reconciliation of men only in so far as we at the same time recognise a reference of that work to God. Nay rather, His saving operations upon men cannot be understood except it be presupposed that His doing and suffering for that end had also a value for God, whether that be expressed in the notions of satisfaction, merit, propitia^ tion, or somehow otherwise. Nevertheless, by this statement of the problem, I design to place myself in opposition to a cer- tain way of shaping the doctrine which some may look for. It does not seem to me accurate theology to limit to God — to the satisfaction He receives or to the propitiation of His wrath — the direct saving efficacy of the action and passion of Christ : and to deduce the forgiveness of men's sins, or their reconcilia- tion with God, merely as consequences from that result, and so to make the saving efficacy of Christ's work as regards man dependent only indirectly or secondarily upon His doing and suffering. This mode of putting the doctrine has indeed in its favour the weight of almost all the traditions of dogmatic theology; but it has against it the whole idiom and way of thinking of the New Testament. Moreover, it does not in the least degree suit the purpose which ought with peculiar dis- tinctness to lead every theologian in his doctrine of Christ — this, namely, of setting forth Christ as the direct Eevealer of God's saving purpose towards men, not merely in His words, but also in all His works. We come short of this task, if we refer the value of Christ's passion directly only to a pacifica- tion of God or change effected in His mind, and set forth in an altogether separate part of the system the saving graces of God which thereby were first made possible. Such a mode of pro- cedure tends towards a mutilation of the character of the Person of Christ as Eevealer. This method I renounce ; and along with the Reformers, particularly with Melanchthon, I attach justifi- cation and reconciliation to the doing and suffering of Christ as 10 INTRODUCTION. His direct operations, which are necessarily presupposed in order to the awakening in us of our consciousness as believers. It is true that since the beginning of the middle ages, history has for the most part treated of these doctrines in the reverse order — reconciliation of God and justification of men. But not invariably : for there is also tradition in favour of that manner of viewing the question which waives all inquiry as to a reconciliation of God, and finds in the manifestation, life, and obedient suffering of Christ the pledge of God's self-subsistent grace towards men. And even though this view makes its appearance after the Eeformation as the heterodox one, yet in the middle ages, for a much longer period, it had equal currency and equal recognition from the Church with that which alone finds place in the subsequent scheme of orthodox doctrine. Thus no well-founded objection to the title we have chosen can be derived, even from consideration of the way in which these doctrines have been presented in history. Their history, which we are just about to enter upon, would be too narrowly and therefore untruly apprehended were we to restrict it to the unfolding of the thoughts of reconciliation of God and justi- fication of men. 2. The discharge of my historical task brings me into con- tact with the work of Baur — The Christian Doctrine of Recon- ciliation in its Historical Development from the earliest to the, latest times (1838). This work has naturally lightened my labour by pointing out to me the literature that has been brought under review in it ; yet at no point have I been spared the necessity of thorough investigation of authorities. My willing recognition of the epoch-making importance of this book to the history of dogma, cannot prevent me from frankly saying that it has almost utterly failed to help me to an under- standing of the historical course of the doctrine of reconcilia- tion. I can very well appreciate the fact that it was Hegel's Philosophy of History that gave Baur the impulse and ability to conceive and execute on so grand a scale his great under- taking ; but I cannot doubt that such a standard for historical writing really involves failure of its end at the outset. And though it might be thought that, in spite of the untenableness of the general scheme of the work, its statements and judg- ments on particular matters would yet be found trustworthy, LITERA TURE—BA UR. 1 1 I can only say that my own expectation has not been realized in this, except in subordinate and comparatively unimportant parts of the work. In fact, even the grouping of its individual parts in the framework of the Philosophy of History not un- frequently falls short of the artistic style of division that might be expected from the writer. In particular, Baur has at times failed to take up the matters of which he has to treat in so exhaustive a way as is presup- posed in his arrangement of them ; and at other times he has included in his work and in his arrangement of subjects, matters which do not fall under his general title. The Christian notion of reconciliation can only be understood as a removal of the one- sided or mutual contrariety between the Divine and human will. Accordingly, the fancies of the Church Fathers (which we have already characterized) about the redemption of the human race from Satan, and about the deification of the human race as a natural unity, do not fall under that notion ; and, therefore, these views, along with that of Scotus Erigena. regarding the abolition through Christ of the distinction between Divine and created Being, ought at most to have been considered only by way of introduction to the history of the doctrine of reconciliation — not as particular parts of it. Taken by itself, this is precisely a part of the book which shows great learning and merit ; but it mars its orderly unity.1 And unity ought to be guaranteed in the distribution of subjects. Baur founds his mode of dividing his work on the following consideration (p. 12) : — "As the spirit throughout the whole of its development in time proceeds onwards from objectivity to subjectivity, and from subjectivity to objectivity, in order to raise itself, by means of the various tendencies by which its inner develop- ment is wrought out, from the unreflectiveness of natural being to true spiritual freedom, so the history of Christian dogma in general, and of each individual dogma in par- ticular, divides itself into various periods, according as the tendency to objectivity or that to subjectivity is the prevailing one, or both in the higher unity of the notion include and mutually interpenetrate each other." The Eeformation and 1 Baur himself half confesses this when he says that the first section con- tains, properly speaking, only the preparation and transition to the Theory of satisfaction. 12 'INTRODUCTION. the practical philosophy of Kant accordingly are indicated as the turning-points respectively to a mere subjectivity, and to a subjectivity which embodies the object in itself; and three periods are supposed : — that of predominant objectivity of doctrine, that of gradually prevailing subjectivity, and that of subjectivity returning to objectivity. But, according to this scheme of history, Baur was able to base the significance of the Keformation only on this, that the Eeformers took the doctrine of reconciliation into the service of the thought of justifica- tion by faith. It results from this that the doctrine of recon- ciliation could enter into such a scheme of distribution only on condition that the business of the historian should embrace at the same time the doctrine of justification. But, as no consideration is given to that doctrine in any direct or thorough- going way, the consequence is that the theme of the whole work is too narrow for the scheme proposed, and does not fill it up. Moreover, Baur cannot conceal, even from himself, the Tact that the Keformation circle of ideas by no means bears the stamp of mere subjectivity, especially in reference to the idea of reconciliation. On the one hand, he cannot deny (p. 13) that the Eeformation- theology defends the objective form of the atonement in a very energetic way; and, on the other hand, he confesses that faith, in the Eeformation-sense, is indeed the spirit's consciousness of its finitude and neediness, but also at the same time the expression of its infinite nature (p. 287). He might have discovered here, in the very heart of the development of thought which had to be surveyed, a manifestation of subjectivity interpenetrated with objectivity, on which the historical accuracy of his whole system breaks down. If he had further observed that the mediseval doctrines of Christ's satisfaction and merit are also accompanied by a doctrine of subjective justification, he would then have been compelled to confess that even the period of prevailing objec- tivity in the doctrine of reconciliation presents an aspect of subjectivity interpenetrated with objectivity as the realization of the task of Christianity. If, on the other hand, the doctrine of reconciliation should, in accordance with Baur's favourite principles of method, come to be expounded without regard to any doctrine of justification, then it is not the Eeformation but Socinianism that forms an epoch ; and that, too, just in so far as LITERA TURE—BA UR. 1 3 it comes most directly into conflict with the Eeformation theo- logy. But in that case it will be asked, whence is the material for our third period to be derived ? For the distance of Kant and his school from the "Illumination" which Socinianism introduced into Lutheran theology, seems slight enough accord- ing to Baur's own representation. Of Schleiermacher's view again, he judges that it is not essentially superior to that of Kant ; that it has its centre of gravity in the subjective con- sciousness, and only manifests an uncertain oscillation towards the pole of objectivity, by widening that consciousness into the spirit of church-fellowship ; while the development of the necessary consequences of the Hegelian philosophy by Strauss, which is approved of by Baur, presents us with nothing other than the absorption of the objectivity of God, and so also of the objective factor of the idea of reconcilia- tion, by the subjective self-consciousness in its elevation to absoluteness. These developments cannot properly be dis- joined from the movement that originated with Socinianism, and therefore the principal contents of the "third period" fall under the second when that is rightly defined. Thus neither does the material of the book fit itself into the dialectical and ostensibly historical framework which Baur brings with him to the examination of details ; nor can a justification for the method pursued be derived afterwards from the examination of the material. The historical presentation of this doctrine demands that the change or progression which is brought about in the mode of viewing Christ's atoning work by the taking up of new matter, or by the influence of new ideas, should in every case be estab- lished by means of a strict comparison of the successive schools of thought. This task also is for the most part unsatisfac- torily performed by Baur. I call attention, for example, to his whole investigation of the Eeformation-doctrine of recon- ciliation especially as laid down in the Formula Concordice, as compared with the doctrine of the Schoolmen, pp. 291-304. Not only is Baur satisfied with bringing forward for direct comparison only Anselm's theory, altogether disregarding the historically much more important teachings of Thomas and of Duns (although he again and again speaks in a general way of Anselm and the Scholastics), but he also contents himself with U INTRODUCTION. the utterly unmeaning phrase that the theory of satisfaction in the Formula Concordice is in one of its most essential concep- tions the "natural climax and completion" of the theory of Anselm (p. 291). Besides, the "sharper and more many-sided" definition which the idea of Satisfaction receives in the Formula Concordice, as compared with that of Anselm, is only hinted at in p. 296, and is not given till we come to the end of the whole excursus ; nay rather, attention is diverted from the discrepancy in the conceptions of satisfaction to the considera- tion of a difference between the things to which expiatory value is attached — in that Anselm gives weight only to the suffering of Christ, while the Formula Concordice brings into consideration, as contributing to this end, not only His suffer- ing but also His active obedience as well. One could never learn from Baur's book that the satisfaction of Christ was regarded by the Schoolmen as a necessity arising from the arbitrary will of a mighty possessor of private rights, while the Eeformers sought its explanation in the Public Law of the law- ordered community in which God and man are constituent parts, — that in the one case it is regarded as the arbitrary compensation for a personal injury, and in the other as the necessary punishment of a violation of law. The great critic, moreover, has in this work fallen short of the composure and clearness of view which are needful for the analysis of any set of ideas foreign to one's-self. His analyses are never directed towards the reconstruction of another man's train of thought out of its fundamental ideas. He never has patience to allow any inconsistencies that may exist in a theory to come to light in the course of such a reconstruction ; but he lays hold of every doctrinal statement at any point which seems to present a self-contradiction, and carries out his criticism in a line of argumentation which almost never bears with it the evidence of justice. Neither does the grouping of subjects in his intermediate divisions present so favourable a specimen of the art of expo- sition as one might fairly expect. If in the mediaeval period it is right to embrace in one chapter the two antipodes — Thomas and Duns, — then Abelard ought not to have been separated from Anselm, and classified with other teachers who came far short of his position as a leader in the theology of LITER A TURE—BA UR. 1 5 our subject. Piscator's contro version of the value of the active obedience of Christ as a satisfaction for sin does not deserve the honour of a special chapter, — an honour which is given to it, apparently because it is the only episode known to Baur in all the rich development of the doctrine of the atonement in the Keformed theology. Of course, when violently separated from that connexion, Piscator's peculiar teaching could not be introduced anywhere else as a secondary matter. Further, it is impossible to see why the theory of Grotius regarding the death of Christ as a penal example should be separated from the views of the other Arminians. But the chapter that fol- lows, in which the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf, and also incidentally the Mystics, are considered, presents a collocation which can be explained only by supposing that Baur was utterly at a loss what to do with these appearances in the course of history. The Mystics really belong to the same school as the Socinians ; the influences of Leibnitz and Wolf, on the contrary, ought to be connected with the theology of the " Illumination." It is impossible to understand either the history of man's spiritual life as a whole, or the history of the doctrine of the atonement, by means of the change of relation between the logical determinations of subject and object. The history of any single Christian doctrine must be based upon the history of Christian theology ; but this is influenced in its course just as much by the turns that are taken in the practical develop- ment of the Church, as by the influences which originate in the development of the general ethical tone of society and in free scientific culture, — particularly in the variety of philoso- phical systems. Thus one cannot carry through a history of the isolated doctrines of justification and reconciliation, with- out having a general understanding of the changing conditions of theology at each of the separate steps in the development. Now it betokens no very encouraging condition of our science, that I am not able to borrow from anybody the general points d'appui which the history of theology ought to have afforded me for the discharge of my special task, and find myself compelled, when they must be found, to seek them for myself. It is hard upon my esprit de corps as a theologian to be compelled to say that one is left in the lurch by everybody when one 16 INTRODUCTION. tries to ascertain, in a plain and intelligible way, how it is that the Eeformation, notwithstanding its antagonism to the mediaeval Church, is rooted in mediaeval Christianity; or to find out who was intellectually the author of the theological scholasticism and of the ecclesiastical particularism to which the Eeformation so soon fell a prey ; to discover what were the causes which led to the so-called " Illumination," or why again the magnificent impulse given by Kant spent itself in " Illumi- nation " philosophy and theology ; and finally, on what it is that Schleiermacher rests his claim to be leader of the German evangelical theology of this century, which is now being aim- lessly frittered away and so threatened with extinction. Dorner's History of Protestant Theology (1857) has also failed to present me with an answer to these questions. The course of his exposition follows in every essential point the same method as that of which Baur makes use. He tries to make us under- stand the history, in its changes and its oneness, by showing how two very thin threads of thought unloose themselves from their original connexion, and find it again in such a way as to acquire a peculiar strength. The logical regularity of this course is taken for a discovery of the law of the history, — in the recognition of which, therefore, the history comes to be under- stood. The difference, however, between the two theologians (related though they be) seems to be very strongly marked by this, that Dorner does not, like Baur, find the key to the history of theology in the logical scheme of subject and object, but in the theological principles of the Eeformation. Besides, he vin- dicates for the beginning of the development, that is, for a standpoint of the Eeformers, a character of completeness, and not one of elementary onesidedness. According to Dorner, the conception of justification by faith, and the exclusive authority of Scripture (the two principles with which he has to do), were linked together by the Eeformers with delicate tact as princi- ples of their theology, placed in a position where they mutually supported each other, and held with equal regard to the im- portance of both. But further, he continues, these mutually connected elements of a sound theology were separated again, from the beginning of the seventeenth century ; and by this separation a second period of development was introduced. This breaking up of the Eeformation synthesis was, according LITERATURE— DORNER. 17 to him, brought about " unwittingly " by what appeared to be a strengthening of the principle on its intellectual side. The consequence was a preponderance of the doctrinal element in theological scholastics, as in the school of Calixtus : and the reaction of Christianity on its practical side, in Pietism and Mysticism, does not restore the synthesis, but is only a testi- mony to the unfortunate consequences of its ever having been broken. Now, in order that the synthesis of Eeformation prin- ciples might be accomplished in free self-conscious command over the means employed — that is to say, in scientific perfection — it was still necessary that special conditions should be matured — namely, historical criticism and philosophical specu- lation. But these, in the first instance, ran their course in the eighteenth century with such a preponderance of subjectivity over the historical grounds of Christianity, that in the period of the " Illumination " there appeared points of resemblance to Pagan naturalism and Jewish legalism. Since, however, theology of this description does not claim to stand in any positive relation towards the principles of the Keformation, the consequence is either that it must be cut out from the history of Protestant theology as a heresy, or else that it proves the point of view which determined the distribution of periods to have been too narrow. This dilemma is resolved in favour of the second alternative by Dorner's own declaration that the problem how scientifically to unite the material and the formal, the subjective and objective principle of theology, is only a more concrete expression, in reference to the sphere of Christian religion, for the philosophical problem of subject and object, of thinking and being. In accordance with this, we find that in estimating Schleiermacher (whom Dorner considers to be the person who scientifically revived the Eeformation synthesis) no further thought is given to the question how he traced out the idea of justification by faith and the exclusive authority of Scripture in their relations of mutual dependence, and on this founda- tion built his system. On the contrary, in virtue of the very elastic interpretation which he puts upon the principles of the Reformation, it becomes possible for the historian to be con- tent with the following statement, in order to justify himself in recognising Schleiermacher as the finished theologian of his scheme : — " By his return to the fundamental views of the 2 18 INTRODUCTION. Eeformation he reconciles freedom with authority, personal appropriation with tradition, the ideal with the historical, upon the foundation of religion or faith in the evangelical sense of the word" (p. 790 [voL ii. p. 376, Eng. transL]). And again, " The actual experience of redemption through Christ accredits the authority ^of Holy Scripture, so that by the help of Scripture we believe in Christ, and again for Chrises sake believe in the divine authority of Holy Scripture" (p. 807 [vol. ii. p. 387, Eng. transl.]) I do not at present discuss the questions whether it be his- torically accurate to assume the above-mentioned material and formal principles of the Eeformation, and whether Schleier- macher's importance as a theologian depends on the conformity of his theology with them. I venture simply to point out that the divergence as to historical method between Dorner and Baur, which I have spoken of above, is only seeming and super- ficial. Were it the case that the theological principles, of which Doruer speaks, are only equivalent to more concrete expressions for the logical scheme of subject and object, of thinking and being, the unification of which is the aim and issue of philo- sophical knowledge, then theology loses all its independence, and the unquestionable fact, that religion is a thing quite by itself, is denied in this estimate of the theological knowledge which has religion for its foundation and object. But this is just Baur's standpoint, and that of the Hegelian philosophy of religion ! And although it may be useful for finding one's bearings at the beginning of the investigation to assume in the alternation of periods such variations as that in the seven- teenth century the factor of the authority of Scripture has a preponderating weight over the doctrine of justification by faith, which had previously stood in equipoise with it, yet it is the task of the historian to trace to all its sources the error into which people at that time universally and " unwittingly " fell, and which assuredly is not sufficiently accounted for by the intellectual striving after a firm basis for systematic theology ; for certainly every change in theology presupposes changes in the religious and church consciousness. Although these influences may have been hidden from people then, it is the business of history to reveal them to us now. On this point Dorner has altogether neglected his task; and his contri- DOCTRINE OF THE GREEK CHURCH. 19 butions towards an explanation of the other important turning- point in theology — the appearance of the theological " Illumi- nation"— again by no means exhaust the historian's task. The Wolfian philosophy is responsible for this phase of thought in virtue not of its logic, but of its individualistic ethics : but Leibnitz in his Theodicte gave the first impulse in that direction. When, then, Dorner says no more of this philosopher than that he took a very friendly attitude towards theology, it is clear that he must have read that work with an artlessness of which every historian ought at the very outset to divest himself. But he utterly abandons the procedure proper to a writer of history, when at the outset he teleologically heralds in the historical and philosophical tendencies of that epoch of theology as the pre- liminary conditions of a happy solution of the theological problem, yet all the while gives no explanation whatever of that subjective tendency in which the peculiar defect of the "Illumination" lay. Historical investigation is one thing, philosophy of history is another. 3. The history of the doctrines of justification and reconciliation has its sphere within the Western Church alone. The theology of the Greek Church has not, as a whole, set before itself the problem which is involved in these ideas. In particular, John of Damascus contents himself with stringing together the results of patristic theology, upon which we have already touched — namely, the so-called mystical atonement theory, and the theory of re- demption as modified by putting death in the place of the devil. In common with Gregory Nazianzen, John strongly repudi- ates the customary reference to the devil, the unlawful lord of men, of the redemption price that was paid on the death of Christ ; and explains that death, in so far as it had the character of an offering and ransom, to have related to the Father, against whom men had sinned, and from whose condemnation they needed deliverance. But he gives no further grounding whatever to this connexion of ideas. He rather supplements it off-hand by a mythical mode of representation, borrowed from Cyril of Alexandria,1 and presenting features derived from the theory of a fraud practised on the devil, to the effect that death, as he eagerly seized the body of Christ, was caught as by a bait upon the hook of God, and in tasting the sinless and, life-giving body 1 Baur, ut supra, p. 102. 20 INTRODUCTION. was destroyed, whereupon he again gave up all those whom formerly he had devoured.1 Moreover, John carries out in all rhetorical fulness of detail the thought that the Son of God became man in order by grace to restore man to that destiny unto which he had been created, namely, the image of God, that had been lost by sin. The Son of God, by His participa- tion of human nature, has raised men to the sphere of the incor- ruptible and abiding; by and in Himself has renewed in them the image of God ; has, by His resurrection, delivered us from the realm of the transitory ; and finally, by awakening the know- ledge of God in us, as well as by His discipline and patience and meekness has redeemed us from the power of the deviL2 In the circle of the Greek theology of the middle ages, we certainly find indications that men were not altogether secluded from the influence of the ideas which the theologians of the West were engaged in working out in reference to the problem now before us. Nicolaos Kabasilas, archbishop of Thessalonica in the fourteenth century, interprets the significance of Christ's suffering unto death for the deliverance of men at one time as a satisfaction due to the honour of God, and, at another time, also as a vicarious punishment — that is, under points of view which could hardly have been derived from any others than Anselm of Canterbury and Peter the Lombard. Of course we must not expect to find incorporated with the rhetorical representations of Nicolaos' book Trepl rrjs ev XpurTw £0)779, that process of proof in which more particularly the first -mentioned thought is worked out by Anselin. Nevertheless, from two passages of this work (i. 78, et seq., iv. 18, et seq.) we gather the follow- ing train of reasoning : — That men by themselves were neither able to do away with their guilt before God, nor yet to make re- paration to His injured honour. Men had no power to do so : God, who had the power, did not as God lie under the obliga- tion that fell on men, for which cause it fell to Him in whom both natures met to discharge these functions towards God.3 1 Hcpl TTJS 6p0o86t-ov irlffrews, iii. 27. 2 Ut supra, iii. 31. 3 Compare Gass : Die Myatik des Nikolaos Kabasilas, p. 77.— Gass (I.e.) in agreement with Ullmann (Die Dogmatik der griechischen Kirche im 12. Jahrhundert.—Stud. u. Kr. 1833, Part 3, p. 736, seq.) finds also in Nicolaos of Methone coincidences with the theory of Anselm, which however Ullmann limits to this point, that the necessity of the Incarnation in reference to the atonement is indicated, while the Greek is thinking not of a satisfaction rendered to God, but of a redemption out of the power of death. But this theory NICOLA 08 KABASILAS. 2 1 But the following sequence of thoughts (unnoticed by Gass) is more closely thought out (i. 57-59): "We have been de- clared just in the first place as having been freed from prison and accusation, inasmuch as He who had done no wrong vindi- cated us by His death on the cross, whereon He bore the pun- ishment for our violation of the law : in the second place we are represented as friends of God and as righteous persons on account of that death. For not only did the Saviour free us, and reconcile us with the Father when He died ; but He also imparted to us the power of becoming children of God — the former, inasmuch as He united our nature to Himself through the flesh which He destroyed, — the latter, inasmuch as He unites each one of us to His own flesh through the power of the sacraments." The latter part of this paragraph certainly has a thoroughly catholic ring. But the justification of indi- viduals through the sacraments is here grounded on a justification and reconciliation of the Church with God, which justification is immediately connected with the bearing of punishment by Christ in His death. To be sure, the course of thought is by no means clear and unambiguous, for it is not dialectically arranged. Nevertheless, in the Byzantine's apprehension of the matter, a tendency which goes beyond the mediaeval develop- ment of the doctrine finds expression. In my historical studies, preparatory to the particular inves- tigation I have in hatid, however, I do not occupy myself with such casual and rhetorical formulae as have not been thought out in an independent manner, even although they should have an appearance of riper development. I take up only those trains of thought which have been actually worked out in a methodical way, and which strive after conclusions which are logically necessary. But such trains of thought have been constructed only by the theologians of the West. The doctrines of reconciliation and justification are precisely those which have found their development exclusively in this portion of the Church. Whereby we may discern — what indeed is a conclu- sion warranted by everything else — that Western Christianity in general stands on a different niveau from that of the East, and that the separation of fellowship between the two groups has not its explanation in politics alone. has no historical connexion with Anselm, but is derived from the tract (at- tributed to Athanasius) De incarnatione Verbi Dei : compare Baur, p. 94, f. CHAPTER I. THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION THROUGH CHRIST ACCORDING TO ANSELM AND ABELARD. 4. WHEN the theologians of the West raised the problem of reconciliation into the sphere of legal and ethical consideration, the free movement of their thought was not hampered by any fixed decision of the Church. Consequently there followed, one upon another, a series of diverse and even antagonistic attempts at a solution of the problem, of which, however, none, during the middle ages, gained the sanction of the Church's authority. On the contrary, at the very height of the theological develop- ment of that time, Thomas Aquinas bears witness that the antagonistic hypotheses of earlier teachers were allowed to pass current side by side in the Church. This fact is not without importance towards our understanding of the different mediaeval theories, when we bear in mind, on the other hand, that these same theories, as soon as they are transplanted, with certain modifications, to the Eeformation period, are immediately looked upon as too sharply opposed to exist side by side, and exercise a separating influence upon the Church. The quite opposite attitude assumed in the middle ages towards theories bearing on the idea of reconciliation, depends on the fact that people were under the impression, even with regard to the most conflicting essays in this department, rather that they were mutually complementary, or that they only differed from one another as varieties of one species. In other words, the pro- blem was still at that time regarded as exclusively an affair of the School within the Church. When we reflect that since the Eeformation the theories which formerly might be taught side by side have been brought into direct collision, — that about the method of reconciliation between God and man there has been stirred up the irreconcileable conflict of church against 22 ANSELM AND ABELARD. 23 church, of church against school, of school against church, we may well contemplate with sympathetic joy the peace- ful course which this development of thought took in the Church of the middle ages : — and yet we ought to be on our guard against supposing that the subsequent conflict of views was in itself a fault. For the new form which men's interest in the doctrine assumed, simply shows that it was the Eeform- ation that first gave rise to a lively perception of the peculiar importance of this doctrine, as being that on which turns the question whether Christianity is to be a thing of the Church, or only of the sect and of the school ; whether or no Christianity is the broad common basis of a scheme of life which shall be at once religious and moral. The mediaeval attempts at a con- struction of this doctrine were uninfluenced by interests of that sort. This explains at once the fact that divergent and even conflicting hypotheses draw together in order to support and sup- plement one another, and also the fact that the first attempts have an appearance of fortuitousness of which even the later ones, which stand connected with the development of complete theological systems, do not entirely divest themselves. But it seems to be especially incumbent on us to take together, in the way of direct comparison, the theories of Anselm and Abelard, which were the earliest, chronologically, while their tendencies pointed in exactly opposite directions. If we were not to do so, it would not be possible for us rightly to discern the im- portance of their views to the theology of the middle ages ; and the conventional and unhistorical over-estimation of Anselm's theory would receive a continuance of support which I think it right to withdraw from it. For the modern pietistic tendency in theology, which in this century is reacting against rationalism, has shown a partiality for the theory of Anselm which is quite misdirected ; and has made that theory appear as if it were a model for everybody — which it was not con- sidered to be, either in the middle ages or in the period of Reformation orthodoxy.1 And Baur, too, both by his presen- tation of the theory itself, and by his classification of other 1 The first who to my knowledge, without any qualification, identified the Protestant view of satisfaction with that of Anselm, is Steinbart [System der reinen Philosophic oder Glilckseligkeitslehre des Christenthums, 2d Ed. 1780, p. 144], a man who does not in other respects rank among the authorities of " believing " theology, and whose learning, also, is by no means exemplary. 24 ANSELM AND ABELARD. analogous attempts of mediaeval theologians, has given counte- nance to this opinion. Now unless the history of the doctrine of reconciliation is at the very outset to lead us in the interests of a party, we certainly ought not to overlook the fact that, in the middle ages themselves, through the influence of Peter the Lombard, the preference is given to Abelard over Anselm. But further, apart from the fact that they were almost contem- poraries,1 their kinship in this question is manifest both in their common opposition to the theory of a buying of men out of the power of the devil (see above, p. 6), and also in their respective ways of treating the question, which, though at first sight directly antagonistic, yet are not without traces of mutual rela- tionship. For Anselm develops the thought of a reconciliation of God in the death of Christ by means of legal conceptions — Abelard the thought of a reconciliation of men with God, in re- spect to the moral disposition of the parties towards each other. But Anselm after all transfers the consideration of the relation between man and God to the sphere of moral judgment ; and Abelard does not forget to point out that Christ's work in the act of reconciliation has also an important bearing on God. Now if Anselm has the advantage of Abelard in artistic exposi- tion of his theory, the latter certainly excels his elder contem- porary in that he elevates the problem into a higher sphere than that of law, and indicates fruitful points of view which the positions of the former never come up to. Finally, it should also be premised that the one comes only indirectly, and the other, as it were, accidentally, to set forth the theory of the atonement: Anselm, namely, in the answer to the question cur Deus homo; Abelard, in the Exposition of Paul's Epistle to the Eomans. But in connexion with this, again, the characteristic difference shows itself, that fundamentally the doctrine of Anselm has no relation to Scripture, but moves entirely amid considerations of the natural reason,2 while on the other hand Abelard's doctrine, on certain sides of it, bears the direct Pauline or Biblical stamp. Anselm develops the traditional idea of redemption into that 1 Anselm born 1033, died 1109. Abelard born 1079, died 1142. 2 Cur Deus homo, ii. 22 : sic probas Deum fieri hominem ex necessitate ut etiam si removeantur pauca, quae de nostris libris posuisti (ut quod de tribus personis Dei et de Adam tetigisti) non solum Judseis sed etiam paganis sola ratione satisfacias. ANSEllfS DOCTRINE OF SATISFACTION. 25 of atonement, or legal propitiation of God. He controverts the patristic treatment of the death of Christ as a ransom paid to the devil, inasmuch as neither he nor sinful humanity has any right outside of the power and will of God (i. 7, see above, p. 6). Now, while Gregory Nazianzen had already re- ferred to God the payment of the ransom involved in Christ's death, yet without either clearly explaining his idea, or vin- dicating its necessity, Anselm among the various possible re- ferences of the thought of redemption 'as from sin, from hell, from the power of the devil, from the wrath of God or His will to punish sinners, gives prominence to the last point of view as the decisive one (i. 6). Following this line of thought, he develops the idea that God is reconciled to sinful man, and that His will, which had declared itself for his punishment and condemnation, is changed into a purpose of grace, through the satisfaction rendered to Him by the God-man Christ.1 This thought is methodically unfolded, so that the necessity of such a satisfaction is shown to arise generally from the honour and glory of God, and specially from His justice, — the possibility of it is discerned in the peculiar Personality of the God-man, and the reality of it is traced to the relation between His death on the one hand, and the value of His Person and voluntary Passion on the other. As an attribute, the glory of God expressly implies the un- conditional subordination of every rational created will to the Divine will and sovereignty. The glory of God is our guarantee that the order of the universe shall issue in the destination of the rational creature to a state of blessedness in the love and contemplation of Him. The glory of God should thus come to be recognised by men as their absolute end, which it is their bounden duty to follow, by fulfilling all the commands and requirements of God. On the other hand, sin, as being the contrary of what we owe to God, involves an infringement of His honour. Accordingly, as in the path of duty blessedness 1 Simply in order that the admirers of Anselm may not complain of any omission, 1 here mention his assertion (which is quite unimportant to the theory of satisfaction), that mankind was created in. room of the angels that had fallen, and that, when man also fell into sin, not merely was a number corresponding to the fallen angels elected and redeemed through the satisfac- tion of Christ, but also a few more (ii. 16-18). This supposition is essentially taken from Augustine (De Civ. Dei, xxii. 1, Enchiridion, cap. 29); only the last clause does not belong to him. 26 ANSELM AND ABELARD. would have been attained, so the honour of God makes it necessary that in consideration of its universal sin, the human race should be punished by the withdrawal of blessedness — by condemnation. For in suffering punishment men would, how- ever unwillingly, be brought to acknowledge that they are completely subject to God's will and purpose. Further, the honour of God does not permit Him to forgive sinners out of His pity ; for thereby not only would the unrighteous be made equal to the righteous, and all order in His kingdom over- thrown, but even unrighteousness itself would be put upon a level with God, if, like Him, exempted from the authority of the law. So that, the government of God being so conditioned in conformity with His honour, the fact of human sin would frustrate the completion of the Divine world-plan, unless by some other means the penal annihilation of men should be rendered unnecessary, and at the same time satisfaction on behalf of sinners given to the honour of God. Such means must be devised in conformity with the rule of God's justice, that " man should or could receive from God absolutely nothing that he had resolved to give him, unless he previously restore to God all that of which he had deprived Him, so that just as God suffered loss by him, even so by him He may receive amends" (i. 23). That is to say, men as sin- ners having offended the honour of God, their deliverance from the punishment of condemnation depends upon the restoration of that honour. But for such an end it does not suffice that sinners should cease to do despite to the honour of God, and that they henceforward should fulfil their duty towards God in its utmost extent. For the rendering of dutiful service is a matter of course as regards God's honour, and can never there- fore compensate Him for previous neglect of this service. To make amends to Him, there is needful rather some perform- ance that shall be well pleasing to Him, and in excess of the requirements of mere duty — something which God could not constitutionally have demanded had the violation of His honour by sin noj occurred. But the sinful human race is not able to give this satisfaction prescribed by Divine justice. For all the good works, by means of which it might perhaps be sought to make satisfaction for bygone sins, pertain to that service which is already due to the honour of God. But further, since it ANSELM'S DOCTRINE OF SATISFACTION. 27 would be unlawful to commit even the smallest sin to preserve the whole world, since therefore the smallest sin, not to speak of the whole mass of sins, is of as great moment as the world ; since, accordingly, the satisfaction given for sin must excel the whole world in value, man is plainly in no condition for such a task, even irrespective of his sins. But this inability is by no means a reason why God should waive his claim to satisfaction for the sins of men. When regard is had to the firmly main- tained purpose of bringing sinful men to the state of blessed- ness, satisfaction to God is necessary — generally, on account of His honour : particularly, on account of His justice. Since then satisfaction to the honour of God cannot originate with man, God from His side proceeds to render it possible in the person of the God-man. If the value of the satisfaction is to exceed in value the whole universe, that is to say; the whole of that which is not God, then the satisfaction must be given by One who Himself is greater than the universe. But only God Himself is greater than all that which is not God ; where- fore God alone can give the satisfaction. But inasmuch as, properly speaking, man ought to give it, it can on that account only be achieved by God as Man, or by Him who is at once perfect God and perfect man, without mingling or changing of the two natures in the peculiarity of the person. Now this is realized in the incarnate Word of God.1 The act in which the God-man achieves satisfaction must, in the first place, be a voluntary one ; in the second place, it must 1 The question, cur Deus homo, properly speaking, had been already thrown out by Augustine : it was not however answered from the Divine demand for a satisfaction in order to the sinner's restoration to blessedness, but directly from this purpose of making the sinner blessed. Compare De Civi- tate Dei, ix. 15. Si omnes homines, quamdiu mortales sunt, etiam miseri sint necesse est, quaerendus est medius, qui non solum homo, verum etiam Deus sit, ut homines ex mortali miseria ad beatam immortalitatem hujus medii beata mortalitas interveniendo perducat. — In the writings of Augustine the elements of most diverse theories of atonement are to be found ; but these are, for the most part, so entangled one with another, and marked off from each other with so little precision, that they can be compared with the theo- logical questions that have been under discussion since the beginning of the middle ages, merely in respect of their subject-matter, but not in respect of their form. On that account I have purposely abstained from undertaking an exposition of them in my work. Were it not that in every way a treat- ment of Augustine's theology as a whole is an urgent necessity, I might call attention in particular to the fact that the notice taken by Baur of Augus- tine's ideas respecting the atonement is as unsatisfactory as could well be imagined. 28 ANSELM AND ABELARD. not come under the category of duty ; and finally, it must be such as to embody the full value of the Personality that out- weighs the whole universe. Now, that endurance of death for the honour of God, which Christ undertook, meets all these demands. For it was voluntary, and not imposed upon Him by way of duty. Christ, that is to say, as a rational being, was bound to all positive obedience towards God ; but not to die, since as sinless man He was not liable to death. His endurance of death is, however, more than equivalent to that which sin had rendered due. For as it is a greater sin to take away the life of the God-man than are even all the sins that we can think of, so the complete surrender of this life unto death for God's sake is an action which outweighs the sins of all men. So that in it is contained that satisfaction for the sins of men which was necessary to the honour of God. On account of that satisfaction God, out of His pity, forgives those sios, and permits men to attain their final blessedness in accordance with His honour. The immediate effect of Christ's endurance of death is thus confined to God alone. His satisfaction for the sins of the human race, in removing the obstacle which had hindered God in that work of perfecting mankind which was a necessity to Him (ii. 4), affords the condition by which the glory of God immediately becomes again operative towards the beatification of men. Nevertheless, the prospect of the attainment of this end does not disclose itself at this point without a further condition. This is made clear in a general way by the consi- deration that if men were to go on sinning, the satisfaction already made for them could not determine God to pardon them the injury done by them to His honour. Accordingly, the act of Christ which, looked at from the side of God, is satisfaction, must also exercise an influence on the side of man, apart from which the satisfaction avails him nothing. This is accomplished in that the suffering of Christ affords to men an example how, under all the ills that befall them, they should adhere to that righteous conduct which they owe to God ; in particular, how they should give back to God their own life when occasion requires it. As now we must presuppose that all men do not take this example, it follows that the validity of the satisfaction which Christ made for the whole race of CRITICISM OF ANSELM'S DOCTRINE. 29 men restricts itself to those persons who seek conformity to Christ, or who, according to the similitude in Mark iii. 35, are his parents and brethren (ii. 19). 5. Intending to come back upon a peculiar line of thought which is involved in this concluding part of Anselm's treatise, I now apply myself to the elucidation of the notion of satis- faction in relation to the two leading ideas of the glory and justice of God. The glory of God expresses the absolute chief end of man in such a way as to imply his destiny to blessed- ness, to the love and enjoyment of God. On this account the glory of God does not, as appears at first sight, stand in exactly the same relation to the beatification of the obedient as to the damnation of the disobedient. On the contrary, from that point of view it necessarily flows from the nature of God, that He should accomplish even in sinners that destiny of man which He began to work out at his original creation ; and if this is not otherwise possible, it must be accomplished by means of the satisfaction to be devised by Himself. Of course God is free : in this sense, that He is not subject to any law, but that whatsoever He wills is right and proper. But this free- dom is not independent of the notion of moral propriety, and nothing that is improper, if God were to will it, would on that account become right. Accordingly it lies entirely within Anselm's range of vision, that the idea of God's glory as the ultimate end guarantees the order of the moral world only in so far as the end proposed — blessedness in the enjoyment of God — is common to Him and to men. Furthermore, on the presupposition of human sin, it would be inconsistent with that which is proper or necessary in God, inconsistent therefore with the glory of God, if He were to exercise His pity in an arbitrary way in the forgiveness of sins ; because thereby sin would be withdrawn from the law's authority and put upon a level with God. But now, in so far as satisfaction is thought of as the only method which adjusts man's need of forgiveness with God's glory, the idea of satisfaction is not regulated directly by the honour of God, but by His justice. But this conception denotes a narrower and even (as shall be shown) differently conditioned relation of God to men. When Anselm expresses the rule of this justice as implying that man can receive from God his LIBRARY ST. MARY'S COLLEGE 30 ANSELM AND ABELARD. purposed gift only after he has restored to God what he has taken away from Him, this principle belongs solely to the sphere of private right. It is the principle in accordance with which the creditor treats a doubtful debtor who applies for a new loan, in order to secure his individual right to the debt that remains unpaid. Now, private law regulates the exchange of things or of personal services in matters material, in so far as these serve as means towards the respective private ends of in- dividuals ; and the persons who have these private ends are quite on an equality in the form of contract which is regulated by private law. Thus, in Anselm's theory we come upon features that are logically incompatible. The relation of men to God cannot be determined at once by the glory of God, in which God is the superior of the latter (as containing within Himself the absolute end of man), and, at the same time, by the justice of God implying a legal co-ordination between man and God. If from the glory of God there follows as consequence only this, — that the forgiveness of sins cannot be granted to men by God without further condition : if, again, the positive condition of satisfac- tion— as the only possible means towards that end — follows only from the altogether disparate idea of God's justice, then it is conceivable that in relation to the idea of the honour of God there might be discovered yet another condition of the forgive- ness of sins than that already mentioned. Thus, Anselm's theory has already broken down. Still, we must not consider our elucidation of the meaning of the theory which we have entered upon to be exhausted by this. Tor, though Anselm did not see the inconsistency which we have shown between his deductions from God's justice and the conception of the honour of God, it is still worthy of notice how the relation of private right between God and man which he asserts is modified by the predominance given by him to the view-point of honour. For that rule of private right is applied not to decide a suit about a material claim or individual act of service, but in a question turning on the value of this personal attribute of honour. Thus reparation to the injured honour of God is analogically compared to a civil action for damages, or referred to the method whereby the com- pensation that might perhaps have been got by an action is fixed by mutual understanding of the parties, and given on that CRITICISM OF ANSELM B DOCTRINE. 31 ground. But this only shows more clearly that, by this rule of justice which has been set up, and from which the necessity of satisfaction has been deduced, God is brought down to a co- ordination in point of law with man. For compensation — be it by money payment, be it by spontaneous apology and begging of pardon for the offence committed, be it by pledging one's own life for it— is only conceivable as towards a private person who has been injured in his honour, but to whom one stands in no regular or definite relation of subordination. On the other hand, insult to the majesty of a sovereign, to whom universal obedience is due, cannot be wiped out by satisfaction, but, as a public crime, necessarily involves punishment. As then Anselm, at the outset, sets God over man as Him to whom the absolute end of man looks, and asserts man's universal obligation to obedience, and his liability to punishment in the case of dis- obedience, he ought to have concluded not merely that sinners are not capable of giving any satisfaction to God, but also that the idea of satisfaction cannot be admitted at all in this relation. Still, while he establishes the necessity of satisfaction by means of the altogether different conception of God's justice, Anselm is certainly quite self- consistent when he argues, that if men were not capable of giving satisfac- tion, it was in that case competent to another to undertake it. For when a compensation for injury to a private person is fixed by mutual agreement, it also depends upon the pleasure of the parties to determine what arrangement they shall make as to the nature and form of the satisfaction. In this way the injured party may allow that a third party should ask pardon in behalf of the aggressor, or should stake his life in single combat with him. If, then, satisfaction to God is altogether satisfac- torily explained by the presupposed private relation between Him and mankind, then Christ's undertaking of that satisfaction is also quite rational. If, on the other hand, the conception of the justice of God is not consistent with that of His honour, then the solution of the problem by the idea of satisfaction is altogether irrational. The satisfaction of the God-man consists, according to Anselm, in an act which was free, and which went beyond His own proper obligation — the yielding up unto death of His life as a good which outweighs the evil of all sin, being superior to 32 ANSELM AND ABELARD. it in value. Here surely is denoted a moral personal act, and not a mere external material prestation. On this account Anselin's idea falls away from the analogy of the Wergeld, or " blood-money," which, in the German crimi- nal law of his time, is admitted as an expedient for the expia- tion of murder — an institution by means of which it has been occasionally thought that one might understand the theory in question. But now it becomes clear, that if the giving up of His life unto death is to be regarded as a performance on Christ's part to which He was not in duty bound, then it can- not be conceived as a personal payment, but only as a material one ; but, on the other hand, if it is conceived as personal, it must be regarded as a matter of duty. That is to say, we must not stop merely at the superficial impression of the equation — that all men by reason of their sins had become justly liable to death, but Christ as the Sinless One not ; that on that ac- count His voluntary dying was an equivalent for the death of sinners that was due, and therefore for the act of satisfaction that was needful. For death is in the case of sinners ad in- teritum, but in the case of Christ ad honorem Dei (ii. 11). Christ was not bound to die in the way that sinners are ; i.e. He the Sinless One had of course no personal relation to death ad interitum, to death as the punishment of sin, in the way that sinners in the consciousness of their guilt have the assurance that to suffer death is for them a penal infliction personally due. If then death as penal has the value of a personal prestation, and if Christ was not bound to undergo it as such — if there- fore, in particular, it was impossible that His purpose to die should be determined by this idea of death, then His death was no personal payment, but only a material one, and its equiva- lency to the sinner's punishment is only of a material sort. Whereas if Christ's death is, on the contrary, ad honorem Dei, and if it is this purpose that secures to His prestation the character of free will and personality, then it is not an opus supererogationis going beyond the sphere of His own obligation to God. For the God-man is constantly bound, even on Anselm's own assumption, to the honour of God : and since He as the sinless one was exempt from death only so far as it is the pun- ishment of sin, then nothing more is required in order to make out the necessity of His death as due to the honour of God, THE MERIT OF CHRIST. 33 than a right definition of the duties of Christ flowing from His peculiar vocation. Not only, then, are the premisses which lead to the conception of satisfaction, namely, the honour and the justice of God, in contradiction to each other, but also the marks hy which (according to Anselm) we are to recognise in Christ's death the veritable act of satisfaction, namely, personal voluntariness and exemption from the idea of duty, are irre- concileable with each other. This criticism on Anselm's theory receives important confir- mation from Anselm himself. For towards the close of his book (ii. 19), where he undertakes to exhibit the efficacy of the death of Christ towards the salvation of man, he exchanges the idea of satisfaction for the altogether different idea of merit. In the doctrine of satisfaction by Christ, there is im- plicitly contained as a consequence the thought, that, after this previous condition of the forgiveness of sins was fulfilled, God for His own glory's sake would lead, in the way of blessedness, those men who follow the example of Christ in His self-surrender to God. But yet, instead of this, Anselm gives expression to the idea that it was proper for God to meet by a reward the great and spontaneous gift of Christ ; but that Christ, in His Godhead, not having need of anything, applied this fruit and reward of His death to men, for whose salvation He had become man, but who could not possibly be His followers unless at the outset they had a share in His merit. This representation is not understood in Anselm's sense, if his meaning is assumed to be that Christ's death as satisfactory has taken away sin in general, but as meritorious determines God to impute to indi- viduals the wiping-out of sin that has been accomplished.1 For we are now speaking of the whole number of followers or kins- men of Christ, who only, as partakers of His merit, could follow His example : and in this connexion we are not now any longer treating of satisfaction and the Divine honour. Now, by the idea of merit, the importance of Christ towards the end of ren- dering mankind blessed is enhanced, and a more intimate rela- tion between Him and mankind is indicated than would follow from the doctrine of satisfaction. For in the latter it is laid down that the death of Christ, as an act of satisfaction, relates to God only, and on the other side concerns men merely as an 1 Hasse : A nselm von Canterbury, ii. p. 606. 3 34 ANSELM AND ABELARD. exemplary act. That the satisfaction made to God should be valid for men, it was not necessary that they should be aware of this meaning of the death of Christ : all that was necessary was their imitation of that self-surrender to God which was perfectly realized in Him. The forgiveness of sins on the part of God, which follows upon the satisfaction made, does not come through the very person who made the satisfaction, but it comes, so to speak, alongside of him. On the other hand, when Christ's action is considered as merit, He is then also shown to be the direct procurer of the forgiveness of sins for men. That is to say, the many individual men who take example by Him are taken together as a whole, under the collective appellation of His spiritual kinsmen, just in so far as by their recognition of Christ's merit towards God they become partakers of the same. It would be impossible for them to pass as His followers, , except they previously had from Him the forgiveness of sins which He has merited for them. The divergence of these two lines of thought lies here then : that the satisfaction of Christ only denotes the condition under which the original motive of the beatification of men — God's honour — again takes effect even in sinners : while, on the contrary, in the merit of Christ, the condition of the forgiveness of sins is itself regarded as God's motive thereto. Thus, if the latter line of thought means that the purpose of the forgiveness of sins is called forth only by Christ's action, then it follows that this purpose can also take effect on men only according as the motive that prevails with God is recognised by them as such. This is not the place for a thorough review of the conception of merit in this application ; but it does not admit of doubt that in the fore- going train of Anselm's thought it serves to transfer the ques- tion from the forensic to the ethical manner of treatment, and at the same time to bring into greater prominence the value of Christ's death for the Church than was otherwise possible. And in the feeling of this lies no doubt the reason why Anselm took the point off his doctrine of Christ's satisfaction ; and thereby himself indirectly characterized it as unsatisfactory. Although then Boso, Anselm's interlocutor, should be quite correct in saying that Anselm's proof satisfies the demands of Jews and Pagans for a rational explanation of the necessity of God's incarnation, we may still venture as an offset to this opinion to ABELARD'S DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION. 35 say, that his explanation of Christ's death as an act of satisfac- tion that was necessary for God, does not satisfy the Christian reason any better than it satisfies Anselm's own perception of the value of Christ's death for the Church. 6. As even Anselm advances from the thought of the re- conciliation of God to the beatification of men in such a way as to substitute the ethical for the juridical manner of treat- ment, it will therefore be the less surprising that Abelard,1 who directs his attention principally to the subject of justification and reconciliation of men, confines himself entirely to ethical ideas. He does not, in the first instance, inquire how God's honour and justice can be satisfied with reference at once to the purpose of beatification of mankind, and also to the fact of human sin : his problem is to find how it is that the God- man by His perfect life and by His death has accomplished the justification and reconciliation of believers, who, as sinners, could not have attained this result by previous merits. For he is led to take up this subject by the text, Eom. iii. 22-26. Moreover, since Abelard does not, like Anselm, first go in search of the auxiliary notion of the incarnation, but already pos- sesses it in the recognition of Christ ; since, accordingly, he expresses the distinctly Christian view, and does not set him- self to find a merely rational concatenation, it follows that the limits of the problem are otherwise defined by him than by the older theologian. Instead of the honour of God and His legal conservation of His rights in relation to man, Abelard holds fast by the love and ethical righteousness of God ; and instead of taking into view the whole human race that misses its blessed destiny by reason of sin, he, from the beginning, limits his con- sideration to "us" who are chosen of God unto blessedness and sooner or later believe in the atonement through the God- man. Thus estimating God's leading purpose of grace by the conditional result of His work of salvation, he gains a balance in the intermediate connexion, the want of which in the theory of Anselm avenges itself by the harsh alternation between the two points of view — the satisfaction and the merit of Christ. Abelard explains the above-mentioned text of Paul by para- 1 Oommentariorum super S. Pauli Epistolam ad Romanos libri V. (Petri Abaelardi et Heloisae opera. Paris, 1616.) 36 ANSELM AND ABELARD. phrasing it in the following way (pp. 548, 549) : — Inasmuch as no one can be justified before God by fulfilment of the cere- monial law, God has accordingly by His alliance with human nature in Christ, and by the surrender of Him to suffering and death, given proof of the highest love towards us, and awakens in those who by faith discern, or have in former times waited for this deed of reconciliation, such a degree of love to God and their fellow-men as forms an indissoluble bond of union with God, and constitutes the ground of forgiveness of sins formerly committed.1 Now Abelard certainly starts the question by what necessity it was that God took this way — the incarnation and death of Christ — for our reconciliation ; why it is that He has showed towards us this greater degree of grace, when, as it would appear, He might have been able to forgive us our sins with a less degree of grace without such means (pp. 550, 552). But the solution of this question, and others connected with it, which naturally could not be accomplished in the Commentary, is not to be met with in any of his writings that have come down to us. Only this may be further adverted to, that he in- cidentally controverts the idea of redemption out of the power of the devil by the death of Christ, not only on the ground that Satan has not acquired any right over mankind which had to be provided for by an equivalent, but also on the ground that redemption by Christ is valid only for the elect, who as such could never in any way have been in the devil's power. Since, accordingly, in justification and reconciliation through Christ, it is only this class of men that is treated of, Abelard allows the said operation of the highest love of God to be conditioned by the free reciprocal love of individual believers. 1 Compare Augustinus de catechizandis rudibus, cap. 4 : Qnse major causa est adventus Domini, nisi ut ostenderet Deus dilectionem suam in nobis, quia cum adhuc inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Hoc autem ideo, ut et nos invicem diligamus, et, quemadmodum ille pro nobis animam posuit, sic et nos pro fratribus animam ponamus, et ipsum Deum, quoniam prior dilexit nos et filio suo unico non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tra- didit eum, si amare pigebat, saltern nunc redamare non pigeat. Nulla est enim major ad amorem invitatio, quam prse venire amando." For subsequent sins Abelard lays down the usual church-rule, that they are covered by patni- tentia and satisfactio, inasmuch as the eventual consequence, punishment in hell, is averted by the former, while the purifying pains of purgatory are averted by the latter. Abelard's expression with regard to this (p. 558) has been utterly misunderstood by Baur (as above, pp. 195, 196), because he thinks that this disciplinary sense of satisfactio is similar to the use of the idea by Anselm. ABELARD'S DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION. 37 Had Abelard set himself to show that the process of recon- ciliation of men, actually adopted, possesses a necessary charac- ter, even for God, then perhaps we might be able to detect a weakness in the chain of thought, in so far as the operation of the love of God remains dependent on a voluntary and contin- gent requital by the love of men. Yet, even in this respect, Abelard's view is at no disadvan- tage when compared with that of Anselm. For, inasmuch as the satisfaction made by Christ to God avails only for those who take example to themselves from Christ's free self-sur- render to God, Anselm, too, counts upon the free contingent decision of men, in order to the realization of their re-estab- lished happiness. The appearance of dissimilarity between the two in this respect arises merely from the circumstance, that the point referred to falls, with Anselm, into the background in comparison with his elaborate theory of satisfaction, which has reference to God alone ; while the same point immediately comes into notice in connexion with Abelard's simple declara- tion of the love of God. But Abelard himself suggests to us, by his own view of the matter, that we should regard the free choice which is necessary for personal appropriation of the reconciling act, under the same point of view which he has taken in controverting the combination of redemption with a pretended right of the devil, namely, that Christ has freed only the elect. Herein we have at least a hint of the religious view, that the men who are to be reconciled, although their resolu- tion to love God be free, are yet from the very first the objects of the Divine decree of salvation. To this, however, we must add the following further line of thought (p. 590) which Abelard links on to the antithesis between Adam and Christ : — " God, by the incarnation of His Son, has brought it to pass that not only His pity but also His justice should through Him come to the aid of sinners, and that what is impossible by reason of our transgression, should be supplied by His righteousness. That is to say, when God caused His Son to become man, He made Him subject to that law which is common to all men. He thus was bound by Divine command to love His neighbour as Himself, and to exercise towards us His loving grace, whether by instruction or by intercession for us. Thus by God's command He was 38 ANSELM AND ABELARD : constrained to pray for us (sinners), and especially for those who cling to Him in love. But the highest justice of God demanded that in nothing should His prayer meet with a repulse, since His Godhead did not permit anything in Him, except what it was His duty to will or to do.1 "What was wanting in our merits he supplied from His own. And as He was alone in holiness, so was He also alone in procuring the salvation of others." This argument chiefly proves that though the love of God, by awakening counter love in men, is the ground of their justification, yet the justice of God is not without influence on the objects of His grace. For so far as their displays of love arising out of the love of God are imper- fect, and therefore unsatisfactory to the justice of God, they are supplemented in the judgment of God by Christ's merit : that is, the value of the atoning work of Christ does not limit itself to the fact that it is the occasion of meritorious works wrought by the elect in return ; but it shows its supereminent power herein — that it accompanies the counter works through- out their whole duration, and, by supplementing them, makes their value with God to be possible. That is much more than what Anselm has expressed in the idea of satisfaction to God. The idea of God's justice, which is the dominant one in this connexion, is now also of an ethical and not legal sort — does not stand in opposition to grace, but is subordinated to it ; on which account, too, it does not need to be reconciled with the grace (honour) of God as Anselm reconciles it by means of the idea of Christ's satisfaction. But this thought lies beyond Abelard's sphere of vision, because he does not conjecture any obstacle in the way of God's exercise of reconciling love towards His own elect. And not less weighty is the thought which gives a wider import to the work of Christ in accom- plishing the reconciliation of believers, than is implied merely in His having by His incarnation and death been the represen- tative of the love of God towards us. By His never fruitless intercession for us, who required reconciliation with God and who by means of love are united to Christ, He has at the same time been our representative before God. As the mediator 1 The same thought occurs in another application in Tertullian (De Pcenit : 10), to explain that the intercession of the Church united to Christ is suffi- cient to restore an excommunicated person. THEIR TEACHINGS COMPARED. 39 of our reconciliation He assumes a double function that oper- ates on both parties. Anselm, indeed, also indicates such a function, inasmuch as he recognises in Christ's surrender of life for the honour of God, at once the value of satisfaction to God and that of example for men. But the relation of the two parts of the double function to each other is expressed by the two theologians in opposite ways. The part of Christ's work that relates to God is ranked by Anselm above that which relates to men. But, in Abelard's view, God's love towards men as displayed in Christ — in His incarnation, in His teach- ing, in His passion — is the leading thought upon which depends the effect of the intercession directed to God by the incarnate God. Further, these momenta have in Abelard's thoughts a more harmonious relation to each other than is the case with Anselm. In the twofold function of Christ towards the two parties, Abelard brings together ethical effects : Anselm, if we consider simply his proper intention of working out the idea of satisfaction, and not his divergence into the idea of merit, brings together a legal effect upon God and an ethical one upon men. Further, while, according to Anselm, the satisfaction to God is valid for the whole sinful race, whereas the example of Christ is only efficacious upon his "kinsfolk," Abelard's view of Christ's twofold work fixes our attention exclusively upon the number of the elect. Lastly, the following advantage of Abelard's view over that of Anselm is also worthy of notice : the former in establishing the idea of reconciliation gives value to the whole life, doing and suffering, of Christ, just in so far as all these are comprehended in His duty to God ; while the latter, on the other hand, takes into account, towards the satis- faction and example of Christ, only the opus supererogationis of His death, which was not a matter of duty. To be sure, all Abelard's positions, as they lie before us, are merely assertions, supported but slightly on exegetical grounds, not at all made good by necessary presuppositions concerning God's nature and will, and concerning the nature, destiny, and actual condition of man. In point of form his theses come far behind the theory of Anselm, although Abelard also had the ability to give an artistic dialectical exposition to his apprehen- sion of the matter. But as Anselm diverged from his elabor- ated conception of Christ's satisfaction into the idea of Christ's 40 ANSELM AND ABELARD. merit, without defining or establishing that more accurately, it seems to me impossible to avoid the opinion that he himself characterized his skilfully wrought work as unsatisfying, even before it was completed. And in that case his suggestions about the merit of Christ and its results, the meaning of which I have ascertained above (p. 33), are at most on a level with Abelard's lucubrations; for Anselm, too, by them places the saving work of Christ in the sphere of moral relations. But we do not need a complete definition of the idea of merit in order to see clearly that the love of God gives a much richer moral motive towards the beatification of men, than does the merit of Christ. In like manner, that intercession, the pre- valence of which with God is founded upon the Divine Nature of Christ, is a guarantee that raises the salvation of men to a far higher degree of security than does a merit which God is pleased to accept as such. In fine, if we for the present leave out of account the circumstance that both determine the appropriation of the saving work of Christ in the Catholic way, by making practical love or imitation of Christ's righteousness serve to that end, it appears that the advantage in respect of typical character is to be ascribed to Abelard's view, and not to that of Anselm. CHAPTEE II. THE IDEAS OF CHKIST'S SATISFACTION AND MERIT ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS. 7. THE special result of mediaeval theology as regards the problem of reconciliation between God and men, is found only in one aspect of it in the line which Anselm and Abelard de- liberately entered upon. The effect of the death of Christ upon men — which they both virtually unite in describing as counter- love, and as imitation of His surrender of Himself to God — is laid down in the Catholic doctrine of justification, with the aim of conserving, in the Divine work of grace, the claims of moral freedom and of human spontaneity. But, when the idea of reconciliation is followed out in its reference to God, the thought of Christ's merit, which Anselm and Abelard had em- ployed only in a cursory way, becomes the predominant one. It is manifest that Anselm was not distinctly aware of the diversity of that thought from the idea of satisfaction, for he exchanges the one for the other ; still, the rupture with his own premisses at the critical point of his theory indicates a feeling on his part that the idea of Christ's merit would be a more serviceable one than that of His satisfaction. Although, therefore, the latter idea was taken up by Hugo of St. Victor,1 on the authority of Anselm, it is highly significant for the culminating point or scientific acme which the scholastic theology reached in Duns, that Peter Lombard, in his Book of Sentences, the leading manual of that time, exhibits the death of Christ under all possible categories, except that of a satisfaction to God, while he attributes the chief importance to the idea of merit. This procedure is, of course, quite in accordance with the fact that Anselm could not be reckoned among the fathers of Church doctrine ; and certainly, therefore, does not imply the intention 1 Compare Baur ui supra, p. 207. 42 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. of combating his theory. Yet, if the use of the idea of satis- faction was not suppressed by the ascendency of the Lombard's text-book, at least that of the idea of Christ's merit was favoured thereby. Doubtless, it is in consequence of this that Thomas felt himself led to distinguish the two ideas. But Duns in methodically perfecting that distinction declared for the idea of merit as against that of satisfaction, which still has the pre- ponderance with Thomas. This relation of succession between the two men suggests the convenience of considering their teachings in conjunction. The very attitude which the Lombard assumed towards the problem secured for its treatment the utmost possible scientific freedom (see above, p. 22). In the third book of the Sentences (List, xviii. xix.), side by side with the point of view of merit whereby Christ has earned grace for us, he also gives a place to the thought of redemption from the power of the devil. The latter head was recommended to him by the unanimous testi- mony of all Christian antiquity, the former by the authorities of Augustine and Ambrose. In his representation of the trans- action with the devil, he does not shrink from stating, without any circumlocution, the intentional fraud practised upon him, in the death of Christ. This, however, is merely by the way. The Lombard's main view is that redemption from the devil depends upon liberation from sin ; but this he carries back in Abelard's style to the idea that Christ's death, as a proof of God's love, justifies by awakening the counter-love which ex- cludes sin. This is only the one side of Abelard's view, which was foreshadowed by Augustine ; the other side of it has exercised no influence on the doctrinal tradition of the Church. In direct connexion with Augustine too (De Trinitate, xiii. 11. 16), he repudiates the representation as if Christ by His death appeased the wrath of the Father, who was thereby first induced to love us. On the contrary, he continues, God had loved us before from all eternity; and since sins were hostile to God, the suitable way was to forgive this enmity (Christ covering the sins from God's notice), and to reconcile the sinner by justifica- tion. But in connexion with this the Lombard hints, at one time, that Christ in His death was the sufficient sacrifice for our reconciliation, at another time that He bore in Himself the punishment of our sins — :certainly without adding any explana- PETER LOMBARD. 43 tion of the way in which these thoughts are connected. Christ's position as Mediator he refers back to the fact that He was of human nature ; but then that only means that His suffering and dying could not be predicated of His Divine nature. For the rest, he makes it emphatic that Christ, by His righteousness, stood just in as close a relation to God as that in which He stood to men by His suffering and dying ; and declares that the reconciliation of men with God would not have been possible through Him, had it not been for the union between the Divine and human natures in Him. Here the Lombard takes up a line adopted by Anselm only because he is following Augustine. For he again abandons the former, in order to affirm with Augustine (De Trin. xiii. 10) that some other method for our deliverance from sin than that by the death of Christ might also have been possible to God, but that a better method cannot be supposed to exist (Dist. xx.). He makes use of this proposition, indeed, only again to throw light upon the transaction with the devil, by showing that it was planned and determined not merely by Divine power but also by Divine justice ; the thought, how- ever, has a more extended influence on the development of the doctrine in the middle ages. In common with the Lombard, Thomas Aquinas recognises all these points of view for the interpretation of the death of Christ, and besides these, that of satisfaction. But in their distribution he distinguishes their relative importance, and par- ticularly presents some as mere corollaries of others. In the first rank, according to him, stands the value of the suffering of Christ in relation to God as merit, as satisfaction, as sacrifice, as redemption-price (Summa Theologice, Pars iii. Qu. 48, art. 1-4). And, after that, he treats of the relation of Christ's death to men and to the devil. With regard to its effect upon men, he repeats the dictum of Abelard and the Lombard, that the death of Christ stirred men up to that love which works the forgiveness of sins ; but at the same time he makes this effect dependent upon the fact that the death of Christ is the redemp- tion price paid to God (Qu. 49, art. 1). But the effect upon the devil he, in common with the Lombard, describes as the indirect consequence of the forgiveness of sins which is con- nected with Christ's death (art. 2), without prosecuting further (as the other did) the mythico-dramatic exposition of the 44 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS: thought. But further, he brings back the thought of the re- demption price to that of satisfaction to God, and that of sacrifice to the idea of merit. With regard to redemption, that is, he says that in so far as the Passion of Christ was satisfaction for the sins and punishment of the human race, it was the price, as it were, whereby we have been released from that double obliga- tion (Qu. 48, art. 4). But Christ's quality as a sacrifice in which God's hatred against sinners is appeased and He is reconciled to men, depends upon the freeness of the love and obedience of Christ; which last, however, rank as specific tokens of His merit towards God (Qu. 47, art. 2 ; Qu. 48, art. 3 ; Qu. 49, art. 4). Thus, in the end, Thomas has to deal only with the two heads of satisfaction and merit. 8. The application of these notions to the relation of Christ's Passion to God depends quite essentially upon the general definition of the idea of God. However obvious this maxim may seem to be, it is by no means made use of by the recognised masters of historico-critical analysis of theological systems — Baur and Schneckenburger. Baur's History of the Christian Doctrine of the Atonement, leaving out of account its nihilistic conclusion, would have been much more instructive than it is if the course of his delineation had been accompanied by constant attention to developments or changes in the doctrine of God. Schneckenburger's labours towards an understanding of the Lutheran and Eeformed doctrines (though, in other respects, they bear evidence of an incomparably greater historical sense and more loving devotion to the subject of investigation than all Baur's contributions to the history of dogma put together) still suffer from the erroneous notion (shared as regards the matter by Baur also1), that the root of systems is to be found only in subjective dispositions, needs, and aspirations. While Schweizer would, at least, have the deterministic acceptation of the idea of God to be recognised as the principle of the Ee- formed system of doctrine, this element in the Eeformed theology has, according to Schneckenburger, only the importance of a subsidiary notion, by means of which the practical impulse of the Eeformed subjectivity guards itself against deviation into 1 Ueber Princip und Character des Lehrbegriffs der reformirten Kirche. — Theol Jahrb., 1847, pp. 309-390. " The fundamental principle of Protestant- ism is the self -consciousness of the subject at peace as regards its eternal welfare" (p. 376). THEIR IDEAS OF GOD. 45 a false feeling of freedom : while, according to Baur, it denotes even a corruption and enfeeblement of the common Protestant principle of subjectivity. Still more distinctly does Schnecken- burger's method display itself in the criticism of Socinianism, when he explains its conception of God merely as the reflection of the moral standpoint of this system, in which the human will is paramount.1 A man so acute, doubtless, laid hold of this method in order to secure the separation of the theological systems which found religious parties from the construction of philosophical knowledge, and to guard against that intellectual- istic misapprehension of the theological problem — that con- fusion of it with the problem of philosophy — which was becoming so prevalent in his time. Yet, without intending it, he has thereby promoted that opinion of Feuerbach concerning religion — that the idea of God is in all cases only the fantastic image of the subjective self- consciousness of man, and of the subjective needs of man. If, now, we are to avoid all appear- ance of this ; if, too, the history of theology and of the theo- logically distinct tendencies and parties in the Church is not to be resolved into an incoherent atomistic succession of impulses which have their origin and method only in subjectivity — nay more, if, in the understanding of the history of theology, a pledge is to be given that its individual systematic products, particularly in so far as they lead to the formation of parties, shall be ranked in subordination to the purpose and develop- ment of the religious commonwealth — then we must count upon the tradition of the idea of God (which of course does not necessarily exclude the possibility of an eventual change in it) as upon a decisive factor which all along will stand en rapport with the subjective needs and dispositions of the period when these press forward into activity. The aspects of theological knowledge which lie before us in history will be preserved in all their separateness from philosophical knowledge, if we give heed to the religious need that lies at their root. But at the same time the claim to objective truth on behalf of the products of theological knowledge will be secured, and the coincidence of historical criticism upon theological systems with Feuerbach's misapprehension of religion will be prevented, if we establish it as a fixed position, that we are never in any case conscious 1 Vorlesungen uber die Tdeineren protestantischen Kirchenparteien (p. 40). 46 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS : of a subjectively religious disposition as active towards the production of particular theological knowledge, except under the influence of the previously established idea of God, which has been handed down in the Church, and gives form, and measure, and aim to all our discussions. Thus it is certain, for example, that in all forms of the doctrine of reconciliation, the common Christian subjective craving after assurance of the forgiveness of sins, as also of growing sanctification, is at work ; but it would be perfectly absurd if on this account one were to describe this craving, the feeling of which conditions our subjective persuasion of the value of reconciliation, as the sufficient cause of the doctrine and of the satisfaction of the craving which is implied in the truth of that doctrine. A confusion between condition and cause — the sophistry of which is obvious to every one when the relation between the craving after sustenance of the bodily life, and the means or causes of its satisfaction are spoken of — is equally sophistical when it is extended to the facts of our spiritual life. It is the conception of God current in the tradition of the Christian Church, which constitutes the ground of the form of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation : — the conception, namely, in which the Divine purpose of forgiveness, or also of sanctifica- tion of believers, is placed in connexion with the means suitable thereto — to wit, the peculiar personality of Christ at the least, and its twofold relation to God and man. Now it will certainly be possible to make out that the particular theological inter- pretation of the contents of that Divine purpose, and of the standard according to which the person and work of Christ are subservient to it, will be modified just in proportion as the feeling of the evil of sin appears to be slighter or deeper. But this change never appears in history in such a way as to be plainly recognisable as the previous occasion of alteration in the idea of God; nay, rather even the converse assumption may be made — that the sense of the greater or less evil of sin is regulated by the higher or lower estimate of God's authority. The latter will have to be regarded as the rule, at all events in those cases where that subjective feeling comes so definitely into consciousness as to admit of being expressed at all. So much the more may we venture to assert that although the genetic occasion of a train of theological thinking may indeed THEIR IDEAS OF GOD. 47 be afforded by a peculiar subjective disposition of the theo- logian, yet the definite idea of God always contains in itself the leading ground and standard of the knowledge that actually results. The doctrines of Thomas and of Duns concerning God are, accordingly, the standards to which their respective doctrines of reconciliation must be referred. Both start from the tradi- tion of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite ; and both modify it by means of the conception of the relative will founded upon the Aristotelian notion of final cause.1 When that abstraction from the world, which passes with the Areopagite as the right notion of God, dominates the structure of our doctrines con- cerning God, the absolute transcendence of God over the world is thereby secured, yet only in an essentially negative way. Moreover, that indeterminate Being which had to be regarded as in itself indifferent towards the world, is at the same time described as the Spirit which takes knowledge of itself, and in itself knows every other possible entity, and as the will which causes another entity to arise out of nothing ; and thus the world, its existence, and arrangement, are derived from God. But then, as this side of the idea of God, which regards the world, is dominated by His fundamental transcendence, the consequence is that in the works of both of these school- men God's relation to the world, and to all that which in the world is ordered by God, bears the aspect of contingency. In carrying out this thought, however, they differ from each other in the degree of boldness and comprehensiveness with which that contingency in the ordering of the world is asserted. Thomas subordinates the whole extent and connexion of these purposes which, when realized, form the universe, to the good pleasure of God, who must be the original object of His own volition (Summa Theol. P. i. Qu. 19, art. 1, 2). God wills Himself to be the ultimate end ; everything else He wills as means to that end. But on this account the whole existence and course of the world, which God wills, is to Him nothing necessary. For means to an end are necessary objects of His will only when it is seen that there is no alternative — that without the particular means the end cannot be realized 1 Compare my Geschiclitl. Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gfott, Art. I., Jahrb.f. deutsche Theol Bd. x. (1865) pp. 277-318. 48 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS : (art. 3). But for Thomas it is no matter for investigation whether, perhaps, in the course of the world, such conditiones sine quibus non must be recognised ; for it is at the very outset a fixed condition with him that God, who would be perfect even if there were no world, whose good pleasure is immeasur- ably above all the ends proposed in the world (Qu. 25, art. 5), and to whom no perfection accrues from the world, brings nothing to pass in the world, and in the course thereof that were necessary and not merely contingent to Him. God's absolute freedom, according to Thomas, shows itself hereby, that He is in a position to do something different from what He actually does ; and this (negative) independence of God in relation to the world is his highest point of view, and had to be maintained as such, out of deference to the Areopagite. In this way the incarnation of the Logos, as well as the reconcili- ation through the death of the God-man, have in the world's course the significance of only relatively necessary events. It is only a deceptive appearance1 when Thomas would fain exclude God's incarnation from the region of His free choice. It is quite true that he characterizes that act as befitting (convenient) to God, just as thinking befits a rational creature. According to Thomas, it befits the highest goodness, of God that He should unite Himself with the creature in the highest way (P. iii. Qu. 1, art. 1). But he limits the pur- pose of the incarnation to the taking away of sin — but sin is contingent in the world, and thus also the means used by God for taking it away can only be contingent. In this view he also denies that the incarnation was necessary for the taking away of sin as a conditio sine qua non, and concedes to it in this regard only the appropriateness of an expedient, per quod melius et convenientius pervenitur adfinem (art. 2). Finally, on the question whether the incarnation would have taken place if Adam had not sinned, Thomas decides against this hypo- thesis— founding his conclusion on Scripture — and while he admits that God had the power to become man even if sin had not entered, he thereby at once excludes the idea that this relation had any necessary foundation in the being of God 1 By which Baur has allowed himself to be misled ( Versohnungslehre, p. 267 : Trinildislehre, ii. p. 789), completely ignoring that aspect of Thomas's conception of God which is divergent from the Areopagite's view, and amounts to arbitrary freedom. Cp. Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie, x. p. 297, f. THEIE IDEAS OF GOD. 49 (art. 3). In accordance with this Thomas conies to the con- clusion also that the giving of satisfaction to God by the death of Christ is to be considered only as the most suitable course, but not as the course which, to the exclusion of all others, was necessary ; inasmuch as the very justice of God, in relation to which Christ's satisfaction is necessary, is no unchangeable and essential characteristic of God, but is simply dependent on His free will A judge indeed who has to punish the fault that has been committed against another, cannot rightly let a crime pass unpunished. But God has no superiors; on the contrary, is the chief and general good of the whole universe ; on which account He would commit no unrighteousness if He were to forgive a fault committed against Himself ; just as a man acts mercifully but not unjustly, when, without receiving satisfaction, he forgives a fault committed against himself (Qu. 46, arts. 1, 2). From this view of Christ's satisfaction it will be seen that though Thomas in words attributes the force of & punishment to the death of Christ, and sees in it the fulfilment of the law of the old covenant (Qu. 47, arts. 2, 3), he yet does this only in a superficial and unconcerned manner, and does not come near the sense in which the Eeformers assert both these positions. For the doctrine that God's good pleasure is immeasurably superior to all the institutions of the universe excludes the Ee- formers' assumption that the public institution of the moral law (for the honour of which Christ had to endure the punish- ment that had been merited by men, and accomplish the fulfil- ment that had been obligatory on them) corresponds just as fully to the Being of God as to the destiny of men to become images of God. But, by laying the chief emphasis on God's arbitrary will as the point of view from which the value of Christ's satisfaction ought to be regarded, Thomas puts himself also in opposition to Anselm ; and the teachings of these two, therefore, although nominally the same, are really quite differ- ent. The thought in favour of which Thomas pronounces, that God, since He has no superior, could have forgiven sins even without satisfaction out of His pity, is expressed in Anselm's work by Boso. Hereupon Anselm admits that God is subject to no law, or rather that everything right and proper is so be- cause God wills it; thus letting us see that this thought, towards 4 50 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. which the subsequent theology of the middle ages gravitates more and more strongly, had already in his time the preposses- sions of men in its favour. But for the case before him he sets about such a limitation of the fundamental proposition as takes away its meaning. He says (Cur Deus Homo, I. 1 2) that God's freedom of will and God's goodness are apprehended in a reason- able way only when they are not placed in conflict with God's dignity. That freedom has reference only to that which is profitable and seemly, and that goodness would cease if it were to do anything unworthy of God. The dictum that a thing is right because God wills it, is not to be so understood as if in the case of God willing something improper it would therefore be right. God, for example, cannot will to lie. Thus the righteous- ness of what is willed by God does not extend itself to that which would in any case be unbecoming in God. And in this last category Anselm places the idea of an arbitrary forgiveness of sin. Thus satisfaction is regarded by him as a condition of the forgiveness of sins which is necessary on account of the nature of God. Against this line of thought the authority of the Lombard (p. 43) had already pronounced ; but the thought of God's arbitrary freedom is expressed still more strongly by Duns than by Thomas, and is used as a thorough-going prin- ciple for criticism of the doctrine of reconciliation. Duns (Qucestiones in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum) at the outset conceives of God as a Will that works contingently. For as he presupposes that there is such a thing as contingency in the world, his presupposition would be null if it were to be assumed that God works necessarily and in a predetermined direction. Thus God in all cases works only contingently, and, therefore, as Will Wherefore God has ideas, anticipatory knowledge of His own operations, only on the ground of His willing ; and on that account He thinks even of that which is opposite to the actual course of the world as possible for Him- self and His working. We ought not to seek in God for a ground or motive of the direction which the will of God actu- ally takes, or any explanation why a world the very opposite of that which actually exists has not been brought into being. Even the contents of the law prescribed to men are entirely dependent on the arbitrary will of God, and have no necessary standard in God Himself. Accordingly the affirmative answer DOCTRINE OF SATISFACTION IN THOMAS. 51 of Duns (in opposition to Thomas) upon the question whether God would have become man even if sin had not entered the world, does not rise beyond the sphere where the arbitrary choice of God has its place,1 and is very far from expressing any necessary relation between God and mankind. Finally the idea of merit (which is preferred by Duns) serves also to place the reconciliation connected with the death of Christ in the light of the full freeness of God's choice. Indeed it is just in this highly consistent development of the conception of God peculiar to the Catholic middle ages that a tendency is disclosed which will ultimately broadly deny the reality of Christ's divinity as well as the importance of the idea of reconciliation. 9. To that arbitrary choice of God, to which Thomas sub- ordinated his view of the doctrine of reconciliation, corresponds in a certain measure the arbitrariness of Thomas himself, with which he decides between two modes of viewing sin, which are referred to by him, in order, by means of that decision, to establish the one presupposition that is requisite to the con- ception of satisfaction by the death of Christ. "In sin are comprised two things : on the one hand it implies departure from the unchanging and infinite good, wherefore sin is in one aspect infinite ; on the other hand, it implies a disorderly devo- tion to the changeable good, and in this respect sin is finite, especially because even the devotion itself is something finite. For the acts of the creature as such cannot be infinite " (P. ii Prima, Qu. 87, art. 4). Now, under, the last point of view, it would certainly be impossible to show that satisfaction is a necessary condition of the forgiveness of sins, or at least it would be impossible to show that there was need for the God- man in order to give it. This will appear in the system of Duns, who judges sin to be a finite thing, and rejects the other view for reasons given. But Thomas declares for assuming the infinite import of sin, because to him the truth of the satis- faction by the God-man was a thing decided, and the presup- position had to be established in a way suitable to this proposed consequence. His declaration, therefore, is made thus vaguely, — that sin as committed against God has a "sort of" infinitude according to the infinitude of the Divine Majesty ; for certainly an offence is all the graver according to the greatness of him 1 Compare Baur, Trinitatslehre, ii. p. 834, /. 52 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. against whom it is committed (P. iii. qu. 1, art. 2). The " sort of" infinitude (qucedam infinitas) of sin appears all the more clearly to be surreptitiously introduced into this argument, because it is not reconciled with the fact recognised by Thomas himself, that sin as an act, i.e. in its essence, and at all events in a more important respect, is finite. The infinitude of sin in respect of its merit or demerit, as assumed by Thomas, does not prevent him from holding that as offence against God it is finite, or at least is not pronounced to be of the highest con- ceivable gravity. This, of course, results from the relation of indifference which is assumed to subsist between God and the moral order of the world. In other words, if it is acknowledged that God can forgive sins without anything further, because He, as the highest good, is subordinated to no universal ordinance of law, and thus is justified like any private individual in for- giving an offence committed against Him (p. 49), then there is attributed to sin, even as it comes into collision with the infinite God, the character not of crime against the public order of morally-ordered society, but only of violation of the personal rights of a subject of higher rank, which violation can, at the option of the latter, be withdrawn from the sphere of public litigation. The sin which, as injury to God, has the " sort of" infinitude which immeasurably transcends the idea of crime, nevertheless as injury to God, who can at pleasure overlook it, or also can suffer it to be wiped out by means of a satisfaction to be appointed by Himself, comes far short of the idea of crime. Now, Thomas assumes that, with a view to the forgiveness of sins, God chooses the latter procedure as the more suitable. He decrees to grant to the sinful human race the forgiveness of sins only on condition that satisfaction be given Him for the injury He has endured — which satisfaction must consist of something which the injured person loves as much as and more than he hates the injury (Qu. 48, art. 2). Now, Thomas distinguishes between the possible degrees of congruity between a satisfaction and the judgment of God. " If the satisfaction is to be complete, i.e. suitable (condigna), by reason of a ' certain* adaptation for compensation of the fault committed, then the satisfaction offered by a mere man is not sufficient, inasmuch as the whole of human nature is destroyed by sin, and the goodness of one person, or of several, cannot make up for the DOCTRINE OF SATISFACTION IN THOMAS. 53 injury which has been caused by the whole race. For this, a prestation of infinite efficacy alone suffices, i.e. such a one as only the God-man can accomplish. But, on the other hand, if satisfaction of an imperfect sort were to be sufficient through the acceptance (acceptatio) of him who is satisfied with it, not- withstanding its insufficiency in itself, then would the satis- faction of a mere man be adequate" (Qu. 1, art. 2). Thomas, however, in deciding, just as Anselm does, in favour of the validity of the perfect sort of satisfaction as given by the God-man, did not bar the way to that opposite view which we see Duns afterwards adopting. In this distinction, it fares with Thomas just in that other one regarding the infinite or finite gravity of sin. Precisely as by his decision in favour of the latter he by no means renders the former altogether untenable ; so in like manner his recognition of the complete satisfaction which must be given by the God-man, but which even yet includes in itself only a " sort of" compensation for the fault committed against God, leaves open the conclusion that here too must come in the " acceptation " of God, wherein he over- looks the deficiency wherein the satisfaction falls short of per- fection ; that is to say, the two sorts of satisfaction distinguished by Thomas have no fixed mark of distinction between them. While Thomas in these premisses to his doctrine follows in Anselm's track indeed, and yet in the above-stated vague declarations regarding the idea of sin and of satisfaction in general, abandons the close dialectical style of his predecessor, thus inviting and preparing the way for the loosening of all the joints of the doctrine by Duns, his successor, he in so doing brings out on one point of divergence from Anselm a thought which is of great importance. It is this : the God-man being considered to be, in virtue of the infinitude of His Divine Nature, properly qualified to give such a satisfaction as would be a full compensation for infinite sin, Anselm had held it was sufficient that He should be at the same time designated as member of the human race, so as to represent that race in His atoning passion. The value of His work for man thus arose, according to this view, only from His Divine nature, which separated Him from men, and was the ground of His sinlessness and of the specific value to God of His death. So that in order to explain the operation of this satisfaction for men, Anselm had to resort at one time to the thought that the God- 54 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. man had thereby given the example of surrender to God ; at another time, to a substitution of the idea of merit in room of that of satisfaction (p. 33). Thomas escapes these difficulties by at once designating the God-man, both in so far as He gives satisfaction and in so far as He acquires merit, as the Head of the human race that is to be renewed, i.e. of the Church.1 " As a natural body is a unity, so is the Church, the mystical body of Christ, reckoned along with Christ her Head as one Person " (Qu. 49, art. 1; Qu. 48, art. 1). By this definition of the Person of Christ as the subject of the expiatory Passion, it becomes possible to comprehend in one act the double efficacy of that passion towards God and towards men. 10. Complete satisfaction for the injury to God implied in the sin of the human race is thus given, according to Thomas, by the suffering and death of the God-man. This Person does not merely belong to the human race in virtue of His nature ; even before His exaltation He was already also the ruling Head of the Church — of that portion of the human race upon which the Divine forgiveness of sins actually comes to take effect. This Person possesses, at the same time, in His God- head that infinite value which counterweighs or rather over- weighs the demerit of sin, although the Godhead of Christ as being incapable of suffering does not directly take part in His Passion (Qu. 46, art. 12). But it is not merely on this estimate of the value of His Person, it is also on the motive which led Christ to endure suffering, on His love and obedience, and finally, also on the extent of the pain endured by Him that Thomas grounds the expiatory work of Christ (Qu. 48, art. 2). Thus Thomas is in this matter essentially at one with Anselm (p. 28). Nor is there any surprising innovation in the assertion made by Thomas that Christ's Passion was non solum sufficiens sed etiam superabundans satisfactio pro peccatis humani generis. Rather this follows as a necessary consequence from the accessories of the idea of satisfaction, and of the ap- plication of that idea to Christ. Tor if satisfaction implies 1 In this he follows St. Bernard, Tractatm contra errores Abaelardi, cap. vi. 15. Si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortal sant (2 Cor. v. 14), ut videlicet satisfactio unius omnibus imputetur, sicut omnium peccata unus ille portavit, nee alter jam inveniatur qui forefecit, alter, qui satisfecit, quia caput et corpus unus est Christus. Satisfecit ergo caput pro membris, corpus pro visceribus suis. CRITICISM OF THOMAS'S VIEWS. 55 the giving of such a thing as the injured party loves as much as or even more than he hates the injury, as Thomas says ; and if the passion of the God-man is fitted to give satisfaction to God because it outweighs the evil of sin, as Anselm says, then it follows very naturally that the required perfection of that satisfaction evinces itself not merely in a "sort of" compensa- tion of the injury done, but also in an excess of God's com- placency over His displeasure on account of sin. This becomes clear, according to the premisses of Thomas, from the circum- stance that Christ's Person (by virtue of His Godhead), and the love and obedience shown by Him, possess a really infinite value, while only a "sort of" infinity is attributed to sin. It should not, however, be overlooked that a modification upon Anselm's view is, after all, involved in the doctrine of the super- abundance of Christ's satisfaction, which is laid down for the first time by Thomas. For Thomas expressly says that the voluntariness of Christ's Passion rendered to God more than would have been needed as compensation for all sins. But Anselm had given prominence to this very circumstance as just the condition of the equivalence of that satisfaction. Now, Thomas in this way succeeds in keeping quite clear of an in- consistency in which Anselm got involved. It has already been pointed out (p. 32) that Anselm connects Christ's satis- faction with His Passion in so far as that was personally spon- taneous, and in so far as it was not a matter of duty ; but that either the personally spontaneous character of the action implies its obligatoriness, or the circumstance of its not having been a matter of duty, excludes its personal value. But Thomas pro- ceeds with logical consistency ; for in any satisfaction what- ever he counts only upon an equivalence of material value, thus recognising in the voluntariness of Christ's Passion (which was not matter of duty) something in excess of the satisfaction which would have been equivalent. But now the idea of satis- faction has really its natural force only when it bears the stamp of equivalence. When this is excluded in the parti- cular instance before us by the assertion of Christ's satisfactio superdbundans, the circumstance proves that the idea of satis- faction does not occupy any fixed position at all amongst the various aspects of Christ's death which were brought into com- parison with each other. I refer back to a criticism which has 56 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. already been made upon the applicability of the idea d, propos of the theory of Anselm (p. 30), and now give prominence only to the fact that the lawfulness and regularity of God's procedure with a view to the forgiveness of sins, though seem- ingly arrived at by means of that idea, are traversed at every point by the premisses of Thomas. Thomas, it is true, like Anselm, traces the demand for satisfaction on account of injury caused by sin to the relation which is assumed to exist between God and man as private parties ; but then Thomas admits (what Anselm had repudiated) that God might have forgiven injuries even without receiving satisfaction. Now, even Thomas is con- cerned to prove a perfect satisfaction, the adequacy of which to the injury should be grounded on the nature of the thing ; but inasmuch as he does not venture to affirm more than " a sort of" equivalence in these, he makes out no fixed distinction between perfect and imperfect satisfaction (p. 53) ; and hence also his assertion of the perfection of Christ's satisfaction leaves us to infer that its deficiency is to be supplemented by the assertion of God's arbitrary acceptation, which, of course, is an element in the imperfect sort of satisfaction. Thomas, to be sure, does not avow this as his doctrine ; but, on the other hand, the un- suitableness of the idea of satisfaction to the end proposed is involuntarily admitted in his recognition of superabundant satisfaction founded upon the voluntariness of Christ's work. In all these combinations of ideas there betrays itself a hesitancy in carrying out the legal manner of viewing the subject which is intended in the idea of satisfaction. From this, as I think* we can see an inner longing on the part of Thomas to maintain regard to the justice of God in the forgiveness of sins by some other method. This he now undertakes to accomplish by applying to the life and passion of Christ the idea of merit — an idea laid to his hand by tradition. " If any one," says he, " out of a just will deprive himself of that which he was entitled to possess, he then deserves that something should be superadded to him as the reward of his just will (justce voluntatis). But Christ in His Passion humbled Himself beneath His dignity, wherefore by His Passion He merited exaltation" (Qu. 49, art. 6). But " Christ received grace not so much as a single person, But rather as Head of the Church, in order that grace might be extended NOTION OF CHRIST'S MERIT. 57 from Him to His members. Every one standing in grace who suffers for righteousness, merits salvation for himself. Where- fore, Christ by His Passion merited salvation not merely for Himself, but also for all His members. Christ from the moment of His conception merited for us everlasting salvation ; but on our side there were obstacles in the way which hindered the efficacy upon us of His first merits, wherefore, in order to remove these, it was necessary that Christ should suffer" (Qu. 48, art. 1). To this we must now append the general explication of the idea of merit taken from P. ii. Prima, Qu. 114. " Merit and reward (merces) are interchangeable ideas founded on the idea of justice. As in justice (simpliciter justitia) the price is according to the goods received, so the reward is according to the work. But this rule is valid only for the relation between such persons as stand over against each other with equal rights ; on the other hand justice is modified (justitia secundum quid) where this is not the case. Between parties of equal rights, therefore, the relation of merit and reward holds good simply and uncondi- tionally ; but between parties who are not of equal rights this relation holds good only on condition that regard be had to justice, as in the case of a slave who acquires merit towards his master, or a son (who by Eoman law is subject to fhepatria potestas in the family) towards his father. Now, between God and man there subsists the greatest, yea, infinite dissimilarity ; therefore, between the two no right holds good in the proper sense of the word, but only according to a certain measure, so far as each works after his own fashion. Now the manner and measure of man's strength both come from God; and thus merit of man towards God is possible only on condition of a Divine arrangement, so that man by his efforts obtains as reward that for which God has given him strength. So that in as far as man on this presupposition acts freely and to the glory of God, his works have that which we mean by merit ; but God assigns their reward to them not as if He were man's debtor, but, so to speak, as debtor to Himself, in order that His own arrangement may be carried out" (art. 1). Now the special point under consideration is, the manner in which eternal life is gained. The merit which earns this as a reward is only pos- sible under the previous assumption that the free will (or love as its principal power) shall be operative in accordance with the 58 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. previously received grace of the Holy Ghost. Only under this condition does the " condignity " of merit find any place, for without it there would be the greatest disparity between man and God. Through the supply of grace man becomes partaker of the Divine nature, and is adopted as God's son ; thus put in parity with God, in virtue of which parity the reward follows the merit according to strict justice. Out of a state of grace, on the other hand, a voluntary act has only the character of meritum de congriw, which, on account of the existing disparity, can only expect some sort of consideration from the reasonable- ness of God (art. 3). Since now this fundamental grace cannot be merited on account of its distance from human nature (art. 5), it is connected as a result with the merit of Christ, who having merited ex condigno exaltation for Himself, did, at the same time, as Head of the Church, earn for its members ever- lasting life (art. 6). In explaining Christ's work as merit, Thomas describes it in a manner that differs little from the way of viewing it as a satisfaction. Even as merit, it has not for God a purely ethical, but only a legal value. Nevertheless this explanation of the fact to be explained secures certain advantages in the presentation of it which were not gained by means of the idea of satisfaction. In the first place, its spontaneousness on Christ's part, which in the judgment of Thomas exceeds the limits of the idea of satisfaction, is included in His merit as its distinguishing mark. Further, under this name, the whole life of Christ acquires its proper significance for the beatification of the Church, while under the idea of satisfaction in the writ- ings of Thomas, as well as in those of Anselm, the death of Christ is isolated from Mis life, and put in contrast with the value of it. Lastly, the idea serves to carry out to the positive bestowal of everlasting life upon the Church, the merely negative result of forgiveness of sins which is obtained by satisfaction. Yet we must not omit to notice how insecure is the footing on which the idea of merit in relation to God is placed. Merit ex condigno, as it is conceded through the bestowal of Divine grace on Christ's account, and afterwards on account of believers themselves, is regarded as a claim for the highest conceivable reward, according to that justice which presupposes an equality in point of law between the parties, in the very same way as DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S MERIT IN DUNS. 59 such equality is implied in the legal transactions of private individuals. But yet the possibility of such a valuation of merit in accordance with the rules of private transactions, has been created by God Himself through the bestowal of that grace in which alone has any one, according to Thomas, the ability to acquire merit. How dull is the dialectic which allows judgment on the effect to be isolated from consideration of the cause ! which would have us imagine a parity between parties of which the one stands in absolute ethical dependence on the other ! Is that justice — is it not rather arbitrariness of God — which concedes parity with God in point of law to him, who, in the grace bestowed on him, ever carries within him the evidence of dependence upon God — and thus of disparity with Him ? Can, then, the specific superiority of God over Christ and over Christ's people be got rid of on these terms ? This is possible only with the same degree of truth as that wherewith Thomas deduces from the purely negative conception of God's independence as the supreme good, the inference that God can forgive sin without receiving satisfaction, just as a man who, in forgiving injuries at pleasure, acts mercifully but not unjustly (p. 49). If the deduction be right, " God being the Supreme Good can therefore act as a private individual," then we may also consider it to be a convincing argument that God bestows grace on men to the end that, in rewarding their voluntary good works thereby rendered possible, He may be fulfilling an obligation of private law ; and that He proceeds on the same principle in rewarding Christ's merit by the exaltation of His person, and by the bestowal of grace upon His Church. 11. Nothing more clearly shows the want of close reasoning in the declarations made by Thomas upon the satisfaction and merit of Christ, than comparison with the consistency of infer- ence which distinguishes the teaching of John Duns Scotus on the latter point. Like Thomas, he gives the supreme place to the free choice of God as the determining cause of the saving work connected with Christ's death : while by means of that view of sin which Thomas states as a possible one — thus not repudiating it though he did not adopt it, — and by accurately defining the idea of merit, he reaches a result, which in details is at variance with the opinions of Thomas, but yet, as a whole, carries out the tendency that lies in the views of that theo- 60 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. logian. The attitude assumed by Catholic Christendom in the middle ages towards our problem is therefore seen much more clearly in the scientifically rounded doctrine of Duns than in the doctrine of Thomas, which, although it has been received by the Church, cannot thereby conceal the arbitrariness of the distinctions and the lameness of the definitions by means of which it has been established. Thomas had admitted that sin as a turning towards change- able good, and as the act of the creature, is finite. But for the doctrine of satisfaction he had availed himself of the other view, that as a turning away from the unchanging good, and as injury to God, it has a sort of infinitude (p. 51). Now Duns lays hold of the first thought and tries it against the other (Comm. in Sent. Lib. iii. dist. 19, qu. i, sect. 13) : — " If thou sayest that sin is infinite, and intendest thereby that evil, according to the very idea of it, is intrinsically infinite, then that is untrue ; for in that case it would be necessary to assume a supreme evil and a Manichaean God. And if thou allegest in proof, that sin is just as great as He against whom it is com- mitted, then that is untrue if intrinsic equality in magnitude is ascribed to the notions of the two things compared. Although, in respect of the object from which sin revolts, it may be called infinite in a superficial sort of sense, it notwithstanding is still in itself, according to its idea, a finite act. That is to say, sin against God is graver than sin against any other being, just as sin against an earthly king is greater than sin against his soldier; but it is impossible that there should exist an evil infinite according to its very idea. In like manner (sect. 14) is the punishment of mortal sin infinite only in the superficial sense, if the will persist unchanged in sin : not in any sense implying that God could not punish sin in any other way." These considerations show the assumption by Thomas of a " sort of " infinitude of sin to be simply a mode of expression, and refute that way of looking at the question whereby Anselm and Thomas established the necessity of a satisfaction of infinite value on account of sin. Duns, moreover, completes and alters the idea of merit, both in general and in its application to Christ, far beyond the line taken by Thomas, in a perfectly convincing manner. Thomas had thought of the essence of merit as consisting in the marks DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S MERIT IN DUNS. 61 of spontaneousness, and an intention of honouring God; but had grounded the correspondence between merit ex condigno and the reward upon the objective parity in law between the parties (p. 57), upon which Duns comments as follows (Dist. xviii. qu. 1, sect. 5) : — " Merit as the good act of the will has its root in an affection of the will by justice ; not in an affection of the will by utility, or by justice, in so far as that ordains what is advantageous. This is clear, inasmuch as the first object in respect to which one acquires merit for himself is God Him- self, in so far as one through an affection of justice wills that which is good for God. But the will which is determined by the thought of utility, strives after its own good. Where- fore merit is that deliberate movement of the will whereby one strives after good for God, and also, respect to the circumstances being had, after this end that one by one's-self or in connexion with others, should be allied to God." " So far as Christ in a certain sense was a pilgrim, and capable of suffering in His feelings and in the inferior part of His will, there were a mul- titude of objects, corresponding to His faculty of feeling and desiring, from which He was able to turn away His will contrary to His advantage. Wherefore, by fasting, watching, prayer, and many other such acts, He was able to acquire merit, either by the practice of these, or by intention of them for God's sake." Then over-against the objective legal view of the idea of merit he sets the moral subjective standard in the definition Meritum est aliquid acceptatum (sect. 4). " Merit is anything which is accepted as merit, and for which he who accepts it as such is in a certain sense bound to give something in return." This definition to which Duns carries back his judgment upon Christ's work, calls for supplementary notions which Duns has omitted to develop. Yet these readily occur to one on comparing the analogous thoughts of Thomas, which he certainly tries hard to keep away from any application to Christ. For Thomas also recognised acceptatio as the mark of imperfect satisfaction with which he that receives it expresses himself satisfied, even although it be not materially adequate — no equivalent for the injury (p. 53), and it is by this sub- jective arbitrariness in the judgment of the value of what is offered, that he explains the value of a merit ex congruo (p. 58). As the standard for this arbitrary judgment he points to that 62 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. relative justice (justitia secundum quid) in which the idea of " reasonableness " had to be admitted. Now it is plainly this very mode of viewing the matter that is made by Duns to be the foundation of his general idea of merit. And so far as ordinary clear use of language is fitted to influence our under- standing of such thoughts, Duns, in his opposition to the ex- ceptions and saving clauses of Thomas, certainly has reason on his side. By a merit is never understood a performance which is estimated according to the standard of a legal contract, as Thomas asserts of merit ex condigno. On the contrary, a per- formance is thought of as meritorious, just in proportion as it does not admit of being tried by that standard. Nor do we ever understand by merit a performance for judging of which a fixed objective standard is presupposed as available, but only a performance which, in so far as it is merit, is judged of according to one's good pleasure secundum acceptationem. And certainly our judgment, in so far as it recognises a merit, is fixed upon a moral value of the performance, though originally perhaps in a given instance that performance may have origi- nated in a legal contract. Let us suppose that a certain ser- vice has been fixed by stipulation, and at the outset brought under the standard of law by previous agreement upon equi- valent reward. If that service be given under circumstances which manifest the special regard of him who renders it to the interests of the recipient, then the latter will recognise in these moral accompaniments of the legal performance a merit to- wards himself which he is impelled to reciprocate by a special recognition. But then, as it may also happen that through a deficiency in moral delicacy of feeling, a man may disregard this consideration, as a man is not bound to take notice of a favour as such, the recognition of merit is thus laid upon the good pleasure, and more particularly the reasonableness, of men. The judgment of reasonableness can be applied only however to the ethical value of such acts as, from the circumstances of the case, do not come under the notion of moral duty — do not come under that point of view according to which a man's every action in his intercourse with his fellows ought to be directed to the good of his neighbour. In other words, a deed done from ethical motives can be recognised as meritorious only in cases where an exclusively legal relation is assumed to FINITUDE OF CHRIST'S MERIT. 63 exist between two parties, or where we take for granted a com- plete ethical indifference between him who acquires for him- self a merit and him who recognises it as such. Where, on the other hand, two persons stand morally related to each other, in such a manner that the one is superior and the other subordinate — in such a manner that the one has nothing but rights, the other nothing but duties — then, according to our ideas, the assumption of a merit can find no place. In view of this, our judgment is entirely opposed to the opinion of Thomas, that a son can possess any merit ex congruo towards a father (p. 60). We assume without any question that the son lies under unconditional moral obligations to the father ; and in this we follow the unambiguous meaning of the Christian principles of social life. Thomas was led to the opposite opinion, because he assumed the absolute legal subordination of son to father, as that is laid down in Roman law, to be the sole positive rela- tion between the two, thus supposing to subsist between them in all other respects an ethical indifference, which is, in a mea- sure, qualified only by the merit of the son and reasonableness of the father respectively. 12. In harmony with the doctrine of the finitude of sin and with the subjective standard of merit, is the doctrine also of the finitude of the merit of Christ. As Duns does not con- sider the Divine nature of Christ to be the subject of suffering and of merit, any more than Thomas did, he therefore restricts Christ's capability of either to his human nature ; and in fact does so in such a way that neither the one nor the other can for a moment be predicated of the higher spiritual powers, in- asmuch as these are connected with the Divine nature — for in this Christ from the very beginning was in the enjoyment of blessedness — but only of the lower faculties of His soul, according as these were ordered and appropriated by His will to the service of God. But on this account "the merit of Christ is finite ; for it essentially depends on a principle which is itself finite, even if we take it in all its bearings, whether in respect of the Divine Word that entered into the constitution of the person of Christ, or in respect of the end that was pro- posed by it. Or else (if the principle were infinite) there could be no merit at all ; for merit can be attributed only to the created will, but not to the uncreated will of the Word. 64 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. What then was the value of that merit in respect of its suffi- ciency ? Since everything that is distinct from God is good in virtue of its having been willed by God, so is that merit good just to the extent to which it was accepted by God as such. It was ideo meritum quia, acceptatum. In its very idea it could not be accepted as infinite in itself and for an infinite number of persons, but only as available for certain persons limited as regards number. Yet from the circum- stances of the suffering and meriting subject, and from a rea- sonable regard to that subject Himself, the God-man, there was, according to Duns, a certain external respect, according to which God was able to accept it as infinite in regard to its extension to an infinite (innumerable) number. "But as is the number of those on behalf of whom God chose to accept that passion or that good- will, so great is the number of those for whom it is sufficient. Yet, according to the idea of the thing to be accepted, when regarded in itself, it did not admit of being accepted on behalf of an infinite number, as it was not in itself infinite" (Dist. 19, qu. 1, sect. 7). The transition in these last sentences, and their conditional tone, make it clear that Duns assigns to Christ's merit a limited effect, just as he assigns to it a limited power ; and that here, as in his judg- ment on sin (p. 60), it is only superficially, and with an important difference of meaning, that he accommodates him- self to the Thomist formulse of the infinitude of sin and of Christ's satisfaction. Thomas understood the infinitude of Christ's satisfaction to arise from the intrinsic value of his work as estimated by the Divine standard. Duns understands the infinitude of Christ's merit to arise from the unmeasurable- ness of its outward efficacy when estimated by the human standard. In this way Duns finds himself unable to concur in the statement of Thomas, that the sufficientia of Christ's work exceeds the efficacia, its intrinsic value counterbalancing the sins of the whole world, while yet its operation is restricted to believers (Summa, P. iii. qu. 49, art. 3.) Duns, logically carrying out to its consequences his assumption that the Divine Incarnation, as having relation to those who had been elected unto salvation, would have taken place even if sin had not entered into the world, decides against this opinion of Thomas (p. 51). On this view, not the entire human race, as FINITUDE OF CHRIST'S MERIT. 65 an apparently unlimited natural unit, but the Church of the elect, limited as to number by the will of God, forms the body to which God looked from the first, in determining, on the sup- position of sin, the operation of Christ's merit. " The Incar- nation of Christ was not foreseen by God as an incidental occurrence (occasionaliter), but as the ultimate End was imme- diately and from all eternity contemplated by Him, so Christ, in His human nature, as standing in immediate contact with that ultimate end, was foreordained earlier (in the logical order) than the rest. As then the elect are predestined before the passion of Christ is foreseen as a means of saving them after their fall into sin, it follows that the whole Trinity chose the elect unto grace and blessedness in view of the execution of this decree, before foreseeing the passion of Christ as a means of salvation that was to be accepted on behalf of the elect who fell through Adam. Thus the whole Trinity actually accepted Christ's passion on behalf of these ; and for no other has that passion been made effectual, or from all eternity been accepted. Wherefore, so far as the efficacy of His merit is con- cerned, Christ earned initial grace (gratia prima) only for those who are predestinated to eternal blessedness" (Dist. 19, qu. 1, sect. 6). " As the merit in itself was finite, so the reward in accordance with the justice that awarded it was also finite. Wherefore also Christ did not earn merit for an infinite number of persons in respect of the sufficiency of that merit to be accepted by God " (sect. 4). In this representation also Duns succeeds in giving the religious view of the universe in a more precise form than does Thomas in his corresponding positions. The declaration of the latter, that Christ's satisfaction and merit proceed from Him as Head of the Church, is indeed a very significant one. It means that even in the setting forth of Christ, as the personal instrumentality on whom God makes the work of reconciliation to depend, regard is had to the result which actually, as matter of experience, does ensue — this, namely, that reconciliation is not actually brought about in the case of all men individually, but takes effect only upon the narrower circle of Christ's Church. If then Thomas's dis- tinction between the infinite value and the limited efficacy of Christ's satisfaction has no practical application to that line 5 66 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. of reasoning in which what actually in experience takes place supplies a test for our knowledge of God's purpose, it would seem to follow that the assertion of the infinite value of Christ's satisfaction is superfluous when taken along with the fact of its limited efficacy. But it appears, moreover, to be even questionable, if we consider that all the conclusions of Thomas respecting the infinitude of the human race, of sin, of Christ's satisfaction, do not rest upon any positive meaning attached by him to the idea of infinity, but only upon the negative ground that we men cannot measure either the extent of the human race, or what is contained in that divine essence, which is pre- supposed to be in Christ, and which causes such a degree of demerit to be assigned to sin. , As however this remark passes beyond that circle of vision which is common to Thomas and to Duns in their idea of God, the divergence of the latter from the former, on the point immediately under consideration, is seen to amount to this, that Duns represents God's revelation of salvation to be limited by Him both in respect of its end (the Church), and in respect of the means employed (Christ's merit), while Thomas seeks to 'gain a guarantee of the divine- ness of that revelation of salvation by involving the possible end and the power of the means in the nimbus of an infinitude, the assertion of which, however, implies only the limited nature of our knowledge of God. Duns does not say plainly that it is as Head of the Church that Christ earns merit, and he by no means comes up to the full meaning of this thought of Thomas, when (like Anselm, p. 33) he declares, that since Christ, being already perfect, did not stand in need of the reward of His merit, He earned that merit for the benefit of others, and the reward due to Himself is applied to them (Dist. 18, qu. 1, sect. 4). Of course by these " others" must naturally be understood the predestinated, the community of those who believe in Christ. But he does not see at all more clearly than does Anselm, that as matter of course Christ must be conceived of, on that account, as having at the very outset that general character in relation to them. According to Duns, they are first of all united to Him by His merit (Dist. 19, qu. 1, sect. 5). As we proceed we shall also see the reasons for which he did not adopt this thought of Thomas, which seem- ingly lay so to his hand. Duns, in this connexion, is thinking FINITUDE OF CHRIST'S MERIT. 67 of Christ only as of a divine-human individual, denying (on ac- count of the blessedness which Christ had from the beginning) that His merit earned blessedness for Himself, and declaring that He merited for Himself only the glorification of His body, namely, the removal of that impediment which in His earthly life checked the overflow to His body of the blessedness of His soul (Dist. 18, qu. 1, sects. 12-15). But now, if the whole rela- tion between merit and reward is made to depend on the good pleasure of the party who accepts that merit, we at once under- stand why it is that Duns does not consider it a thing to be proved, or a matter for closer examination, either that the reward of Christ's merit accrues to others than Himself, or that the greatness of the reward — which is the blessedness of the pre- destinate— exceeds in value that degree of merit which has its ground only in the lower powers of the soul of Christ. Both are simply asserted by him as facts (Dist. 18, qu. 1, sect. 4; Dist. 19, qu. 1, sect. 8).. As, moreover, Duns applies- to Christ the idea of merit only, but not that of satisfaction,, the result for those who are Christ's is consequently represented as being not the negative benefit of forgiveness of sins, but the positive benefit of grace and the prospect of glory (opening of Paradise). The respective con- nexions of these references will at once be obvious. When an action is judged to be a merit on the ground of its moral value (ethical indifference and legal equality being presupposed to have existed up to that point between him who merits and him who rewards), the reward of that merit can be represented only as a positive good, but not as the cancelling of a legal obliga- tion, the idea of the existence of which is excluded by the previous conditions of merit which have just been specified. It is quite true that if the reward of the meritorious person result in the good of other parties who lie under an uncancelled legal obligation to the rewarder, then the positive reward can in that case be made to consist in the cancelling of a pressing legal obligation towards the rewarder : thus, in the instance before us, the forgiveness of sins can come in as a result of the prima gratia merited by Christ. This sequence of thought, however, throws a peculiar light upon the position of the ideas of merit and satisfaction in the system of Thomas, and also in that of Anselm. It now begins to be seen why it was that neither the 68 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. one nor the other of these was able to work with the single idea of Christ's satisfaction without having resort to that of His merit. For satisfaction denotes merely the means whereby the formerly subsisting legal obligation of sinners towards God is taken away, but it does not lay the foundation for the establishment of such a relation between man and God as shall render impossible the recurrence of the old complication be- tween human sin and divine right. The conception of such a positively and ethically- ordered fellowship is reached by means of the idea of merit, in the application of which the divergency between Thomas and Duns, in their estimate of that idea, is unimportant. This particularly confirms the criticism already made above (p. 34), when it was said that Anselm withdrew his laboriously developed theory of satisfaction, and substituted for it the thought of Christ's merit, because he was unable to reach by the other theory the idea of the Church, which, in the forgiveness of sins through Christ, gains a standing-ground whereon the contrariety, which formerly prevailed between human sin and divine right, shall no more find any place, be- cause the legal standard, formerly applicable to the relation between the Christian and God, has now been completely merged in the moral. But since, finally, it is clear that the idea of Christ's merit practically amounts to the founding of the community of believers as the supernatural development of humanity, and since therein is suggested Duns' thought that such a result can only correspond to the eternal purpose of God (ultimum in executione primum in intentione), the genius of Abelard is put before us in a strong light. His short hints (p. 39) point in the direction of this line of thought, and they even reach beyond it, so far as it has been developed by Thomas and by Duns. 13. That good pleasure of God to which Duns attributes the acceptance of Christ's merit, and the rewarding of it upon those who receive initial grace, is regarded by him in accord- ance with His premisses, as the sole ground for the necessity of redemption through the God-man. In his twentieth dis- tinction (Qu. 1, sect. 10), which is specially directed against Anselm's theory, Duns explains that " everything performed by Christ in order to our redemption, is to be regarded as having been necessary only on the previous understanding that God CONTINGENCY OF CHRIST'S MERIT. 69 had ordained that it should so fall out. And accordingly His passion was necessary only in virtue of its place in the chain of events ; but the whole chain — that is to say, the previous decree of God along with its results — was purely contingent." That this is the state of the case, he proves to his own satis- faction by the assertion that not merely a good angel but even a mere man, had he been conceived without sin and furnished with the utmost grace, would have been able to merit the abolition of sin and the bestowal of all blessedness for men (sect. 9). For it depends simply on the question, how highly will God be pleased to appreciate as merits the performances that are well-pleasing to Him, which are rendered by such subjects as those that have been mentioned ; and what reward He in His reasonableness will be pleased to render them. Anselm, arguing to prove that a satisfaction required to be given by the God-man, had controverted the admissibleness of either of the cases supposed, on the ground that we should then owe to creatures those obligations which are due only unto God. Yet Duns effectually repels this objection by pointing out that the duty of thankfulness for such deeds would still be referable to God alone, who should accept as meritorious for the end proposed the performances of those creatures. If the achievement of redemption by the God-man be thus a fact merely, but no necessity grounded in the nature of God and in the moral destiny of men, then the indifference of Duns to the thought of Thomas, that the God-man is the subject of merit as being Head of the Church, becomes very easy of explana- tion. Duns goes even further. He declares it to be possible that, if to each man initial grace had been given even without merit, each might then have been able to earn for himself the remission of sins (sect. 9). Nay more, as it was not necessary that satisfaction for the sin of the first man should, in its very idea, exceed the whole creation in greatness and perfectness (it being enough to offer to God a greater good than was the evil of the sin of that man), Duns goes on to say, " If Adam, by means of the gifts of grace and love, had exercised one or more acts of love to God for God's sake, with a stronger impulse of the free will than was that which he had experienced in sin- ning, such love would accordingly have sufficed for the forgive- ness of his sins. So that just as by love of a less worthy 70 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. object he had sinned infinitely, so also might he by love of a more worthy object, have given an infinite satisfaction : and this would have sufficed ; that is to say, possibly, if God had willed to have it so " (sect. 8). These conjectures are by no means designed to weaken or destroy the common belief of the Church in the fact of re- demption by the God-man. As hypothetical deductions from the fundamental idea of the freedom of the Divine will with reference to its own determinations, they were intended in the first instance to maintain this theological principle in scientific security. Still, inasmuch as that principle was established by the Lombard in opposition to Anselm (p. 43), and received currency from Thomas and Duns (who are essentially at one on this question), the principle that lay at the foundation of scholastic theology in the most flourishing period of its history indicates also what was the religious interest of the Christian middle ages. Those expressions of Duns may indeed have a questionable sound therefore to ears that have been disciplined under Keformation influences, and yet they are quite correct when judged according to the principles of mediaeval religion. We are led by this to remark, however, that the theological interpretation of the reconciliation wrought by Christ which Thomas and Duns give, has no firm foundation in that idea of God which we have mentioned. A beginning is made with the absolute elevation of God, not only above the world, but also above everything which God does therein, and yet in ex- plaining the atonement, God's position with regard to man is reduced to the standard of a relation of equality between pri- vate persons, or of a relation regulated by " reasonableness/' such as holds good only in the ethical relations of private life. It is true that we take higher ground in looking at the matter as determined by reasonableness, than we do when we regard it as determined by private law ; for in the former case we move at least within the sphere of directly ethical ideas. But even the notion of reasonableness can here lay claim only to a limited application, and not to the subsumption under it of all conceivable ethical relations. The moral ordering of human actions in general is accomplished by means of the moral law and the idea of moral duty ; in which last the inward compul- sion exercised by social feeling arid moral law harmonizes with CONTINGENCY OF C HEIST'S MERIT. 71 the spontaneousness and unselfishness which are the distinctive marks of moral action. If now it is the task of theology to take up the relation which subsists between God and man, and treat it in accordance with the highest standards of life which are recognised for men ; and if the atoning work of Christ must also be viewed in conformity with that standard ; then it can- not be conceded to the mediaeval system of doctrine that it has adequately solved the problem of reconciliation through Christ with reference to this end. In the application of his idea of merit to Christ, Thomas does not at all get beyond the idea of religious relations regulated by the principles of private law ; and Duns finds the moral standard for all that is ex- pressed by the word " merit " in the good pleasure of God (for which there is no rule), as if he were a reasonable private person. Surely it is possible to develop the doctrine of atone- ment in other forms than these ! The fact that the Eoman Catholic Church, since the time of the counter Reformation, has expressly favoured Thomism as regards the doctrine we are now speaking of, while, as a pub- licly acknowledged form of doctrine, Scotism has been set aside, does not hinder me from affirming that Duns has only logically carried out the premisses which were common to both, and at the same* time replaced the uncertain and vacillating assertions of Thomas with precise expositions that cannot be misunderstood ; and that if, in regard to this doctrine, Thomas represents the interests of the Catholic Church, Duns does not at least override them in any way. His greater scientific pre- cision accordingly enables us to recognise more clearly in his view of reconciliation through Christ than in that of Thomas, what was the mediaeval type of doctrine. Between this medi- seval type of the doctrine and that of the Reformation there exists a complete difference in kind. We can therefore on this point perceive no influence of the mediaeval school of doctrine upon that of the Keformation save in the formal re- ception of the ideas of satisfaction and merit. There is cer- tainly, however, a real connexion between the medieval type of the doctrine of reconciliation as that is apprehended by Duns Scotus, and the entire rejection by the Socinians of the doctrine of reconciliation through Christ. In the Socinian school, the Scotist notion of God is so carried out as to exhibit 72 THOMAS AQUINAS AND DUNS SCOTUS. the clear characteristics of finite restricted arbitrariness; and amongst the possibilities stated by Duns this one also is sug- gested, that God, had He so chosen, might have allowed each man to merit the forgiveness of sins for himself (p. 69). This possibility could first indeed present itself to the Socinian as being the actual state of the case only under conditions which cannot yet be fully expounded here. For the present we desire only to call attention to the department of Church his- tory in which we are to look for the consequences of the mediaeval doctrine of reconciliation, if we consider the influ- ence it has exerted beyond the limits of Roman Catholicism. CHAPTEE III. THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. 14. THAT change in the attitude of God towards the sinful human race, which Anselm had explained by pointing to the merit earned by the God-man in His work, was subsequently limited by the thought that it took place only with regard to those men who, through imitation of the active self-surrender of Christ, should evince themselves to be His spiritual kinsmen. But men could be thought of under this category only in so far as they should recognise the forgiveness of sins applied to them by Christ, to be the ground of their connexion with Him (p. 33). Still more directly had Abelard connected the reconcilia- tion of men unto God through Christ with their own spon- taneous activity, in so far as the proof of God's love which He has given in the manifestation and passion of Christ has stirred men up to such counter-love, as forms an indissoluble bond to unite them to God, and brings in its train forgiveness of the sins they had formerly committed. Since, however, according to him, this spontaneous activity is realized only in the case of the elect, we see also that Abelard regards it as governed by the special act of God's grace (p. 37). However diverse, then, these theories of the theologians on the threshold of the middle ages may be, they yet coincide with one another in this point, that while they connect the thought of the individual appro- priation of redemption with the specific ethical action of the individual, they yet at the same time make this to depend on a definite form of the grace of God. Tor, by the self- surrender to God, of which Anselm speaks as an example given by Christ to be followed by all His spiritual kinsmen, we can only understand a life of practical religion ; and the counter-love in which, according ,to Abelard, the elect are to gain that forgiveness of their sins, which by the love of God is 74 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. pledged to them in Christ, necessarily includes the active exer- cise of love towards their fellow- men. But as Anselm views that attitude of Christ's spiritual kinsmen as arising only out the forgiveness of sins granted to them by Christ, and con- sciously felt by them, while Abelard assigns the active love which results in the forgiveness of sins to the elect only, there is postulated in both cases the dependence of man's activity upon God's antecedent work of grace. These two elements, then, are taken together in the mediaeval doctrine of justification, which ought to be considered as the completion of the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction and merit, although through the influence exercised by the arrangement followed in the Lombard's manual, it is wrought out quite separately, and indeed precedes the doctrine which dominates it, not only in the commentaries on the Sentences, but even in the systematical form of the Summa Theologica. The idea of justification is understood to mean — in the sense sanctioned by Augustine, and accordant with the Latin etymology — that God by His grace makes righteous the unrighteous man — the sinner, and really or substantially changes him. In subordi- nation to this leading view, there is recognised by Augustine himself, in the idea of merit, a measure of spontaneous activity conducive to salvation in the subject that is made righteous. The dialectic of the schoolmen subsequently fixed in a special way the relation of these two ideas to each other. It suffices for my present purpose to unfold the doctrines of Thomas and Duns, the realists, and those of Occam and Biel, the nominalists, in order afterwards to bring into contrast with them that mode of looking at the matter which, while it belongs to the middle ages, yet does not fit in with the mediaeval scheme of doctrine, but lies in the line of thought which was subsequently worked out by the Eeformers. Thomas's doctrine of justification, which is set forth in the Summa Theologica at the close of the prima secundce, is led up to not merely by an exposition of the idea of grace, but even from the very beginning, by a definition of the idea of freedom. The principal ideas are as follows : — The actions which are peculiar to man as such, and which distinguish him from the other creatures, have it as their distinctive feature that they are elicited by the deliberate contemplation of an end. DOCTRINE OF THOMAS. 75 Herein lies the condition under which man is the master of his own actions or is free in them. Liberum arbitrium dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Quce rationem habent se ipsa movent adfinem cum cognoscant rationem finis. By the contem- plation of an end is meant that man directs his energies to- wards a general aim and towards good in general (bonum univer- sal), or that he regulates his action by the thought of an ultimate end, even in cases where the thing which he is imme- diately pursuing is a particular end, even in cases where he mistakes the value of an end, or of the good which he pro- poses to himself. The irrational creatures, on the other hand, are only impelled towards particular ends as such, though, of course, under the guidance and protection of the divine reason which thereby designs the general good (Qu. 1, arts. 1, 2, 7). But neither is the spontaneous effort of man towards his ulti- mate end in the perfection of his own being excepted from the sphere of divine guidance ; on the contrary, the ground of its possibility rests wholly in God. Tor man reaches his highest, his perfect self-satisfaction — that is blessedness — in the con- templation of. the Being of God (Qu. 3, art. 8). But inas- much as this transcends the sphere of created being, it can be granted only by God (Qu. 5, art. 6). Yet since man's final end demands at the same time the exercise of his own activity, that blessedness which ultimately rests on God's gift is attained only by means of a number of performances called merits rendered by man himself (art. 7). It is obvious that the attribute of spontaneity is inseparably connected, so far as man is concerned, with the distinguishing mark of movement towards the deliberately recognised end. But this does not mean that knowledge is the sole basis of volition; rather knowledge moves the will only in respect of the particular activity, while, on the other hand, it is the will that stirs up all the faculties (and consequently also that of knowledge) to their general activity. But if the will of the creature alternates between capability unexercised and activity, then the latter pre- supposes as a universal law that the human will is set in motion ab extra just like the mechanism of material nature. Since, however, no movement can be originated in the last- mentioned sphere, unless the outward cause stand in some sort of con- nexion with the universal cause of all nature, in like manner 76 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. the movement of the will can arise from no outward cause other than that which is the cause of the will as a whole. This then is God : on the one hand as Creator, or the universal operating cause of all things, but on the other hand as the highest final cause, as that universal good which puts the will in motion in the manner appropriate to it (Qu. 9. art. 1, 6,) in so much as it necessarily strives after the highest good (Qu. 10, art. 1), while only as respects the particular good which it sets before it as such does it possess freedom of choice (Qu. 1 3, art. 2). Amongst these general postulates upon the relation between God and free will, there is introduced as a third, under the name of grace, that influence of God upon men which is laid down as indispensable for the bestowal of blessedness. Since now that end — blessedness in the contemplation of the essence of God — lies far beyond the limits of what is attainable by man in virtue of his actual destiny and powers, Thomas asserts the necessity of grace for men from the very nature of the case, and quite irrespective of the fact of sin. Reason is sufficient only for knowledge of such intelligible beings as man comes to know by sense-perception. The human reason can rise higher only when supplemented by the light of grace, as by something which is superadded to the being of man (Qu. 109, art. 1). So that even before the fall man was by him- self capable only of attaining the good proportionate to his pro- per nature, which is the good of virtios acquisita ; but for that higher good, which is the good of virtics infma, whereof the ground is love,1 he required grace over and above as the donum superadditum. Much more is this needful to sinful humanity, which looks to the grace of God, first for healing and thereafter for that movement towards supernatural virtue, which is meri- torious (art. 2). So that, unsupported by gratia gratuita, man can neither merit everlasting life, nor yet forsake sin, nor yet of his own strength prepare himself to receive grace (arts. 5, 6, 7). 1 This distinction is explained, even if not rendered more intelligible to us, by art. 4, in which it is said, Tmplere mandata legis contingit dupliciter. Uno raodo quantum ad substantiam operum et hoc rnodo homo in statu naturae integrae potuit omnia mandata legis implere ; alioquin homo non potuisset in illo statu non peccare. Alio modo . . . etiam quantum ad modum agendi, ut scilicet ex caritate fiant, et sic ne in statu naturae inte- grae quidem potest homo absque gratia implere legis mandata. As if the fulfilment of the moral law did not necessarily depend upon having love for its motive ! DOCTRINE OF THOMAS. 77 Now grace, in the first instance, is that special love of God whereby He draws man out beyond the restrictions of his natural being into participation of the divine good ; it is that permanent eternal act of predestination which is not deter- mined by any consideration of merit. But the result which is wrought in men by this act, that supernatural gift which is infused into the soul and becomes in it a habit or quality, is also called grace. For, as God's working upon His creatures in general is not atomistic — as, on the contraiy, their move- ments are brought about by God by means of fixed forms and definite properties, so also, with a view to the attainment of the good that is above nature, He bestows upon men certain forms and properties, in accordance with which they are gently and promptly (suaviter et prompte) impelled towards that end. In this sense is the gift of grace a quality of man (Qu. 110, arts. 1, 2). Another distinction is that between gratia operans et cooperans, and this applies to both sides of the distinction which has just been drawn. In so far as grace is represented as an act of God's love, or as that which moves the will towards the end proposed ; and also in so far as grace is understood to mean a human habit as the power which heals and justifies, grace is in either case operans. But in so far as the soul stirred by God's act of grace is represented in a particular action as at the same time bestirring itself, and also in so far as the habit of grace is stated to be the ground of a meritorious work proceeding from the free will, grace is in either case co- operans. For in the domain of will we must distinguish between the inward and the outward act. In the inward act the will maintains a passive attitude, inasmuch as it is moved by God, especially when the will that had formerly been evil begins to will the good ; but in the outward act the free will dominates the means of its accomplishment, and although it is God who in this case also upholds the power of the will, and prepares the external conditions of its exertion, yet, nevertheless, His grace therein is only cooperans (Qu. Ill, art. 2). The glimpse given in this distinction of a measure of co-ordination between the human will and the grace of God is certainly kept in sight only in a limited degree. Thomas has it in view to establish on as wide a basis as possible the supremacy of the thought of gratia operans. In accordance with his fundamental position, 78 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. that no form can become active in a material that has not been previously prepared to receive it, it might appear as if it were necessary that man should dispose himself to receive gratia habitualis. But the act of free will whereby the gift of grace is appropriated, that is, faith whereby we turn to God, can itself be traced back only to an impulse from God (Qu. 112, art. 2; Qu. 113, art. 4). That habitual grace which is implanted in men by God's gracious act is justification, as being the proper regulation of our spiritual powers in subjection to the divine reason, that is, love. In him who formerly had been a sinner, this process takes place through the forgiveness of sins. But inasmuch as a movement can be better denoted by reference to the terminus ad quern than by reference to the terminus a quo, this change in the sinner is better called justificatio than remissio pecca- torum. For remission of sins never takes place without grace being at the same time infused ; so that, in conjunction with the ideal change in man's position as before God, there is simultaneously wrought a real change in his personal charac- teristics (Qu. 113, art. 1). This connexion of gratia habitualis with the forgiveness of sins is shown by Thomas in the succeed- ing article to result necessarily from the relations of God's love to men. The forgiveness of sins is God's pacification with us ; this last means the Divine love towards us. But (Qu. 110, art. 1) gratia habitualis was recognised to be the effect in us of God's love. Ideo non posset intelligi remissio culpce si non adesset infusio gratice (Qu. 113, art 2). From our point of view we must fully recognise that in the concrete instance before us no forgiveness of sins can be thought of apart from regenera- tion. But then, from the way in which Thomas had begun his elucidation of the idea of justification there should have been given in the first article under this question a proof of the pro- position that transmutatio a statu injustitice results per remissio- nem peccatorum. But this connexion of ideas 1 is not brought out when it is only shown that the two must appear together where the love of God asserts itself. Instead, however, of remedy- ing the defectiveness of this scientific procedure, the develop- 1 Which is in some measure suggested by Augustine (de Trin. xiii. 14) : Justificamur in Christi sanguine, cum per remissionem peccatorum eruimur a diaboli potestate. DOCTRINE OF THOMAS. 79 ment of ideas which follows is rather a divergence from the problem itself as it had been originally apprehended. In the first place, for example, the circumstances of justification are described without the forgiveness of sins being taken into account at all as the specific instrumentality; the sinner's being made righteous, results because God moves man to righteousness. Now God moves all things in a manner suited to their special nature; and man is endowed with free will. God accordingly infuses the gift of justifying grace in such a way as at the same time to set the free will in motion towards the receiving of this gift (art. 3). And while man is made righteous by that motion of his free will that was elicited by God, he abandons sin with loathing, and through desire draws near to righteousness (art. 5). In justification, therefore, four points are involved — the infusion of grace ; the movement of the free will towards God through the awakening of faith ; the movement of the free will against sin; the remission of guilt as completion of justification (art. 6, 8). So that the component momenta of the idea take at the end of the discussion an order just the reverse of that in which they were presented at its beginning. But besides, the position due to the idea of grace is shown in the subsequent doctrine of merit by the plain declaration of Thomas : si gratia consideratur secundum rationem gratuiti doni, omne meritum repugnat gratice (Qu. 114, art. 5). If, notwithstanding this the doctrine of merit (p. 57) proceeds on the assumption that by virtue of God's appointment the acts of free will and of love proceeding from the gratia hdbitualis bestowed by God are in justice repaid with a reward (art. 1), and that accordingly the justified person can merit to have his love increased, and finally can merit life everlasting (art. 8) : all this is possible only because the whole of the life of man in the state of grace which, properly speaking, can be thought of rightly only under the idea of gratia operans, is conceived under the laxer notion of gratia cooperans. But in this there is implied a characteristic shifting of the relative position of the idea of grace. As the unconditioned principle of justification, as the power which stirs up the free will to strive after the supreme good, it is (in the synthesis we have mentioned) the form, while the will is the matter. But as a habit and quality in men, as love infused, grace is represented as the matter, 80 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. as this very phrase "infused" indicates; while the will, which is set in motion by means of justification, and yet at the same time, by its very nature, moves itself, is represented as the form. It is impossible to avoid looking at the matter alternately from the one side and from the other, from the reli- gious point of view, and from the empirico-ethical ; but every- thing depends on the amount of prominence we give to the latter as distinguished from the former, and on the question whether the necessary dependence of the latter on the former is secured by clearly defined conceptions. Thomas has not taken any care about this. After he had made preparation for the particular doctrine of grace, by com* pletely putting the will in a position of dependence on divine influence, we might have expected him to specify what are the distinguishing marks of the movement of the will that is brought about through grace. The general subjection of the human will to God had been recognised as twofold — He is the operat- ing cause and also the final cause, the universal good (p. 76). The relation of grace to the will is not however so expressed by Thomas as would suit the latter higher point of view ; it is merely indicated to be the operating cause. But under this idea the freedom of the will does not get full justice. If it is to be maintained we must, by means of the distinction between gratia cooperans and operans, tone down into a conditio sine qua non that which was at first stated to be the sole operating cause ; but in doing so we have no theoretical principle to guide us in accentuating these two thoughts alternately. When ac- cordingly practical motives came into play for laying the em- phasis on the point of view of gratia cooperans and of human merit, those Augustinian premisses (to which on the whole the mediaeval theology remained faithful) were not strong enough effectually to counteract the conclusions developed in an oppo- site direction, which Augustine himself had already formulated.1 1 For those who judge of Augustine merely by his doctrines of original sin and of predestination, and who on that account regard him principally as the patron of the Reformation system, it is not unnecessary to say that, taken as a whole, he is the patron and even the immediate founder of Western Catholicism, more particularly that from him comes all the material for the mediaeval doctrines of grace and freedom, of justification and merit ; and that the deductions drawn by the Reformers from his doctrines of sin and of predestination, as also their doctrine of justification, had never once occurred to him. This is not to deny that the Reformation is the logical result of that highest standard of piety which Augustine upholds. DUNS AND THE NOMINALISTS. 81 The second objection that must be raised against the doctrine of Thomas is that he has treated the doctrine of justification out of all connexion with the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction and merit, and on that account has failed to make use of the means for the correction of his idea of justification which are offered by his own apprehension of these notions. Superficially considered this de- fect is occasioned by the circumstance that Thomas, even in the professedly systematic arrangement of the Summa Theological^. not abandon the plan of Lombard's " Sentences," and on that account took up the doctrine of justification before that of Christ's work. But what is the use of the latter doctrine if the thought of the justification and bestowal of grace upon the in- dividual is introduced and disposed of without any attention whatever being paid to the facts that Christ is the procurer of grace, above all of the grace of forgiveness of sins, and indeed in such a sort that, as Head of the Church, He has rendered satisfaction for it, and earned merit ? These are considerations by reference to which the bald notion of grace, as a mere operating cause, would necessarily have been qualified and cgmpleted ; by due attention to which the commanding import- ance of the forgiveness of sins before the imparting of actual righteousness would have been maintained. And finally, some- thing else would probably have been made of the position held by the Church of the redeemed constituted by the work of Christ, in reference to the bestowal of grace on the individual, than the doctrine that the sacraments as administered by the clergy are the instrumental causes of grace (Pars. iii. qu. 62, art. 1), and are so, as being the means which are best adapted to man's sensuous constitution (Qu. 61, art. 1). 15. Duns Scotus explains the ideas of justification and of the merit consequent thereupon for the purpose of controverting the idea, which seemed to be expressed by the Lombard in his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, that he is in men the immediate cause of the meritorious action of the will1 In opposition to this he maintains the common mediaeval opinion (which he then makes out to be the Lombard's meaning also) that the love which in man is the source of meritorious actions is a habit in- 1 Sent. L. i. dist. 17, B. " Spiritus sanctus amor est Patris et Filii quo se invicem amant et nos. Ipse idem Spiritus sanctus est amor sive caritas qua nos diligimus Deum et proximum." 6 82 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. wrought by God. While by the assumption of this gratia habi- tualis or justitia infusa he combats the validity of the first inter- pretation of the Lombard, he vindicates that assumption and defines the ideas of it as follows (In Sent. Qucestiones, L. i. dist. 1 7, qu. 3) : Since unrighteousness is essentially a negation, it can be done away with only by means of the opposite habit. Thus he who from being an unrighteous person has been made into a righteous person, takes on the habit that is op- posite to that negation. Moreover, God admits to everlasting life not the sinner, but the righteous person. To admit one to everlasting life, means that God finds one to be worthy of that reward by reason of his present disposition whom formerly He did not find to be worthy of it. Now this change cannot have its origin in the will of God, for that is unchangeable : it can arise therefore only from a change on the part of man. We must accordingly trace it to God's eternal fore-ordination (which had been already postulated by Duns, as the effectual ground of the validity of a merit) that justification takes place as something essentially new, as a real change in man ; and that too not in the subjective forms of faith and hope (for these continue to be exercised even where justification has been lost), but as love towards God and towards one's neighbour. Secondly, a re- futation of the Lombard's doctrine follows from^the idea of merit. As meritorious acting is a thing of the will, it follows that the essence of merit consists in the thing in virtue of which one acts meritoriously. But this cannot be mere human nature, for in saying so one would fall into the error of Pelagius ; something supernatural therefore is required, that is love, and not faith or hope, which continue to exist even in the sinner. This habit now, according to the already mentioned view of Duns (p. 61), lies at the foundation of all merit, as the ground on which God in His reasonableness accepts the appropriate action pro- ceeding from it, and allows it to be considered as worthy to be rewarded with eternal life. It is as a habit, that is to say, that grace inclines the will to particular actions. Although, accordingly, Duns does not bring the synthesis of grace and human will under the category of gratia operans (on the elucidation of which idea he does not enter at its appro- priate place in the Sentences : Lib. ii. dist. 26), still he is un- able to avoid the thought of it when he recognises gratia DUNS AND THE NOMINALISTS. 83 halitualis as being the forma operationis meritorice. But this mode of viewing the matter emerges only in a casual way. What he is really driving at is rather to make us see that in the joint operation of actus and habitus, the former idea is the superior one. Tor this purpose it is that he propounds, pre- vious to the above-mentioned determination in the third ques- tion regarding justification and merit, the second question, which is, utrum habitus sit principium activum circa actum, while the third question is specially directed to this, an habitus moralis, in quantum virtus, sit principium activum respectu bonitatis in actu. He decides negatively on both points. As against Henry of Ghent,., who answers the first question affirmatively, he remarks that if the will operates through habit, it has no higher dignity than the wood which warms by means of the heat that accidentally inheres in it; but thus the idea of will would be altogether nullified. Moreover, habit would operate on the will as a natural force, and so the action of the will would not be free. And if love were once implanted in men, it would (on that supposition) be no longer possible for men to< sin — an inadmissible assump- tion. Nor is it more allowable to consider will and habit as both partial causes of the action, as Thomas does. For they are not similar in kind, one must needs,. therefore, be superior to the other. Now, habit seems to be the highest cause, inas- much as it determines and inclines the power of the will to act. But then the will makes use of the habit, and not vice versd ; for the habit would be power, if it were the highest cause. Against this, therefore, Duns affirms that the position of supremacy belongs to the power of will, for it does not ab- solutely need habit in order to act: without habit the will merely operates less perfectly than with it. The four distinc- tive marks of habit, which are that by means of it one acts easily, pleasantly, surely, and quickly — are explained simply by the inclination which habit imparts to the will as capacity for action. He compares moral habit especially to gravity, which as an attribute of the body is not the sufficient reason of its motion, although by it is expressed the tendency of the body in a downward direction. As accordingly the motive power must come from some other quarter, it further follows that goodness, as a habit, makes the action good only if there 84 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. be conjoined with it the habit of wisdom, or the act of just moral judgment. But in that case also all depends upon the act ; for wisdom, as a habit, imparts to the act its Tightness only in virtue of a special act of wisdom. Starting from these principles, Duns decides that, as regards the relation of gratia habitualis to the will as the potentia operans, the former is not (as he had previously admitted) the first cause of a merit ; because it is the power that makes use of the habit, and not vice versa ; and also because grace would operate as a physical force, and the will would not be free. And although the idea of merit compels him to tag on to this declaration a sort of qualifying counterpoise, he is yet skilful enough to protect his practical interests in the freedom of the will against that limitation. Merit, he says, of course, has not its root in any natural quality of man, for it first comes to be anything at all only through God's acceptance; it is thus grounded entirely in the association of reward with a human act by the will of God. " It is true that merit is attainable by me upon the general conditions that I have the use of free will, and that I possess grace. But complete realization of the idea of merit is not in my power, except by Divine institution. The principal thing in merit thus proceeds from God, though this is not equivalent to saying that it is God Himself who merits. For merit is an act of the free power of volition, elicited by gracious inclination, well-pleasing to God, so as to be worthy of the reward of blessedness ; but such an act is not possible for God. Thus the principal thing in merit proceeds from God, if by the principal thing is meant its final comple- ment. But if the principal thing means the first or more per- fect actuality, then the assertion that it proceeds from God must be negatived, for the act is an absolute thing, and by its very nature takes precedence of the passive acceptation, and is something more real than it.1 As regards Duns' idea of justification, the following diver- gence from Thomas is also worthy of notice. Whilst the latter regards the forgiveness of sins primarily as the means of justi- 1 Lib. i. dist. 17, qu. 3, § 25. Saltern principalius in merito est a Deo. Respondeo ; si principalius dicatur ultimum completivum, concedatur ; si vero dicatur prima realitas sive perfectior realitas, negetur, quia actus est absolutum quid et prius natura i.sta acceptatione divina, et magis ens ea. DUNS AND THE NOMINALISTS. 85 fication, but afterwards as a consequence of it, Duns treats it as an indifferent circumstance preceding the effectual bestowal of grace (i. 17, 3, sect. 19.) Further on (iv. dist. 1.6, qu. 2, sect. 6, 7) he explains as follows : " The taking away of guilt and the bestowal of grace do not constitute one real change, for the former is not a real change at all They would, it is true, possess that oneness, were actual sin an essential corruption of nature, or the negation of anything properly positive in man. In that case the removal of guilt would be equivalent to the restoration of that reality which had been taken away by guilt. But sin does not take away any existent good thing, it only does away with what ought to have existed : thus also the liability to punishment on account of guilt is nothing actual in the soul after the act has been committed, but is only an ideal relation (relatio rationis) in the object as it is willed (as it ought to be). Hence also deliverance from that liability is no actual change. For confirmation of this line of thought, use is made of Duns' declaration (arising out of his idea of the origi- nally unlimited power of God), that God in virtue of that power could have forgiven sins without bestowing habitual grace (i. 17, 3, sect. 29 ; iv. 1, 6, sect. 7, 9). But thereby nothing' positive would be acquired. For he who through pardon of an injury is no longer an enemy, still is not on that account a friend, but only indifferent. And he who through forgiveness of sins is reconciled with God, still is not in virtue of that acceptable to Him, as being in a special state of grace, as was the case with man in the original state of nature. This consideration, however, serves the purpose only of bringing out clearly the difference between the merely negative and ideal abolition of guilt, and the positive real change on man in the state of grace. According to that regulated power of God which follows laws that have been fixed by His wisdom and His will, and which may be ascertained from Holy Scripture and the utterances of the saints, God cannot free any one from guilt on whom He does not bestow effectual grace. Although this doctrine is not placed in any immediate con- nexion with that of Christ's merit, it is nevertheless unmistak- ably in strict harmony with it. For while the idea of satisfaction proceeds upon the negative conception of forgiveness of sins as the chief thing, the thought of Christ's merit, on the other hand 86 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. (which alone is maintained by Duns), requires that a positive value be assigned to it in the complementary idea of reward. Now, inasmuch as from the circumstances of the case the reward earned by Christ is transferred to the elect, on behalf of whom Christ acquired merit, it is the inevitable consequence of Duns' view that we should think of the bestowal of grace on indi- viduals as being a real positive qualification for eternal life, and, in particular, for the merits that lead thereto (p. 82). The for- giveness of sins, at the same time, has a place in this view as a subordinate preliminary, since those on whom the merit of Christ comes to be positively effectual had previously to be freed from the debt due to God. As in all the instances that have hitherto been noticed, so here also on this point of doc- trine Duns stands in opposition to Thomas, and at the same time excels him in the strict logical accuracy of his thinking. For it was certainly involved in Thomas's doctrine of satisfac- tion and merit that, as he himself says, real justification was to be accounted for by the forgiveness of sins as the means (p. 78) ; but he has not told us how, and consequently the forgiveness of sins is placed in a subordinate position behind justification. I would also point out, at the same time, that the Catholic inter- ests involved in a realistic conception of justification are theo- retically much more securely placed by Duns than by Thomas ; for the distinction which the latter draws between satisfaction and merit, in such a way as to make the former idea the supe- rior one, is calculated on the assumption that, on their applica- tion to individuals, absolution from sin dominates the real change to a state of grace wrought in individuals, or their actual qualification for eternal life. In the consideration of human merit, for which the justified person appears to be qualified by the general appointment of God and the bestowal of gratia habitualis, but yet by means of which he is in a position also to increase his state of grace, Duns shows a higher measure of practical interest in the spontaneity of man than does Thomas. Theoretically, he was unable to escape the admission that it is the supernatural habit of love that is the ground of merit (p. 83). But as he does not avail himself of the conception of gratia operans (which, as one of Thomas's premisses, properly speaking, excludes any idea of merit), the principal stress, so far as Duns is concerned, lies DUNS AND THE NOMINALISTS. 87 theoretically upon the consideration of grace as the matter, and free will as the form of merit. And what is the praxis in view when the consciousness of the person who is seeking to achieve merit is regulated by belief that the will that acts is always something unconditioned and something more real than the acceptation, which also, as the corresponding act on God's part, recognises only the preponderance of the will over the habit ? In this dictum of Duns is asserted that claim to righteous- ness through works, against the prevalence of which in the religious life the Eeformers declared war, and that, too, simply on behalf of those views of Divine grace which had been laid down by the mediaeval theologians themselves. The impulse given by Duns Scotus took effect on the theo- retical views of that school of Nominalists that is dependent upon him. The following sentences contain a resumtf of what William of Occam began in the fourteenth century, and Gabriel Biel1 after him, set forth in full logical consecutiveness : — Since the idea of merit essentially rests upon the free and optional ac- ceptation of a good work by God, it appears that so far as God's absolute omnipotence is concerned, no supernatural habit of love, no gift of grace, no forma inhcerens would be indispensable for the acquirement of merit. In virtue of the law laid down by God, however, no one can be acceptable to Him, so as to have eternal life conferred upon him, unless he possess infused love. It certainly cannot be made to appear by natural reason that there is any such thing as an infused habit, but the fact stands established by Holy Writ. But, even upon this condi- tion, the bestowal of eternal life upon the recipient of grace is a free and contingent act of God, which might be left undone without any injustice; yea, rather, as He infuses grace in free goodness, He bestows blessedness under this condition purely out of His pity (Lib. i. dist. 17, qu. 1). This line of thought is modified, however, after Duns' fashion, in the second question. Nothing is meritorious which is not in the entire control of our will. But free will does not spring from habit ; firstly, because habit is a natural cause ; there- fore the essence of merit, so far as we are concerned, con- sists principaliter in will ; secondly, because no habit in itself 1 Epitoma et collectorium circa quatuor sententiarum libros. Lugduni, 1514. 88 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. is worthy of praise (for neither also is it in itself blameworthy) — not the acquired habit, much less the infused habit, which, still less than the other, lies under the control of the will. The ground of this view of the free will is that God has full power to accept, as meritorious unto everlasting life, a voluntary act of love to Him, even though a habit be not presupposed. For here also the dictum holds good, quod sine gratia nullus actus potest esse meritorius ; not, of course, in the sense of grace as a habit in the creature, but in the sense of uncreated grace, the active mercy of God, which alone is the essential basis of merit. The two lines of thought pursued in the first and second ques- tions respectively are placed (outwardly) in equipoise by the dictum (Qu. 3, dub. 2,responsio), that in a meritorious work two things have to be considered, substantia actus et ratio meriti. Quantum ad substantiam meritum est principaliter a wluntate libere producente, quantum ad rationem meriti est principaliter a caritate (infusa) ex divina ordinatione. Pmncipalissime tamen est vere a Deo libere acceptante. In order to the acquirement of merit, therefore, the complete fulfilment of the law is by no means necessary ; all that is required is merely that any one command or counsel whatever be carried out, and that no law be trans- gressed (Qu. 2). Good works, which are brought forth by means of free will and the state of grace, are merita de condigno — they merit the reward of eternal life, in accordance with the justice of God, wherein He fulfils His promise of that reward. This sort of obligation is in no way inconsistent with the entire free- dom of God ; for, His will being the first rule of all righteous- ness, He wills and performs everything righteously, and yet not as being bound to any one. Moreover, it is possible by the act of the free will, aided by grace, to merit de condigno the increase of the latter. Quia habens gratiam habet unde potest proficere in merito prcemii beatifici, ergo etiam habet, unde potest proficere in gratia. Prima gratia, on the other hand — the bestowal of grace — one can merit only de congruo, in so far as God, out of His liberality, accepts, unto the bestowal of initial grace, a good act of the man who does what lies in his power (Lib. ii dist. 27). For (as is developed in the following distinction — the 28th) free will has the power to produce of its own nature works morally good, to avoid mortal sins, and to fulfil the commandments of God — not, indeed, according to the intention of the Lawgiver DUNS AND THE NOMINALISTS. 89 (directed as it is to the achievement of our salvation), but yet so far as the essence of the action is concerned. From these representations Biel (Lib. iii. dist. 19, concl. 5) draws the appropriate conclusion. Alihoughprincipaliter Christ's passion merited salvation for all Adam's posterity, the activity of the subjects of salvation was nevertheless co-operative either as meritum de congruo or de condigno. For in order that any one, through the merits of Christ's passion, may have his sins forgiven and grace infused into him — whether the grace which virtually makes righteous, or the grace which follows upon the first and increases it — there is requisite, in the case of adults, a good disposition of the will, and a good motion towards God, either incipient or complete repentance for the sins of past life, or love towards God and longing after salvation, or voluntary receiving of the sacraments — all which are merita de congruo — or for the increase of grace, there is requisite a good activity proceeding from previous grace ; and this is meritum de condigno. But in the case of children and of those who are not in the use of reason, it is not possible to be cleansed from original sin without the sacrament ; there is necessary, therefore, the co-operation of those who present the child and administer the sacrament, and their action is meritum de congruo. Hence it follows that, even although Christ's passion is the chief merit in virtue of which grace and blessedness are bestowed, it is yet never the only and the complete meritorious cause. For there is always operative in conjunction with the merit of Christ, either as meritum de congruo or de condigno, some activity on the part of him who is the recipient of grace and blessedness, as merit of his own if he be an adult, as merit of other persons if he is not yet in the exercise of reason. This view, which in point of clearness leaves nothing to be wished for, separates itself in form from the mode of treat- ment employed by the earlier theologians, in that it brings the doctrine of justification into direct connexion with that of the merit of Christ. But this circumstance gave rise to a diver- gence from preceding theqlogians, rendering it not possible to assert the merit of Christ as the sole and sufficient cause of salvation, but only as the chief one which had to be supple- mented with merita de condigno, even if they, in virtue of their origin in the gift of grace, are subordinate to Christ's merit. 90 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. Here the dilemma which the Eealists were unwilling to look in the face must be resolved. Either grace is to be taken strictly as the cause of Christ's work and of the justification of the individual, in which case the idea of merita de condigno has no place and no meaning; or else we are to admit the idea of merita de condigno, and in that case the bestowal of blessedness is not to be attributed exclusively to grace and the merit of Christ, but to that and to the merits of believers. Biel, in deciding for the latter alternative, only affirmed plainly what Thomas in making the opposite assertion did not really wish to exclude. But, over and above this, the Nominalists exceed deliberate tendency of the Eealists, by their assertions that merita de congruo have their value towards the acquisition of gratia prima. It was not Thomas alone who had found it to be inconceivable (the distance between human nature and God being too great) that from the mere power of the will without the aid of grace, merits fit to be regarded by God's reasonable- ness should proceed (p. 58) : Duns also regards it as improbable that God in His absolute omnipotence should accept works per- formed in puris naturalibus as merita de congruo; for such an opinion would be an approach to the error of Pelagianism (Lib. i. dist, 17, qu. 3, sect. 29). The Nominalists overcame this timidity. Of course, therefore, their doctrine on this subject is removed as far as possible from being the common doctrine of the mediaeval Church ; it is merely the tenet of a particular school of theology. Yet, since after a little fruitless opposition that school was not prevented by the Church from propagating its view, the Catholic Church of the middle ages has a share in the responsibility for this theory, and for the practical con- sequences involved in it, and even bears it as a distinctive feature that this view could have had currency within it for so long a period. 16. We shall on the other hand search in vain to find in any theologian of the middle ages the Eeformation idea of justifica- tion— the deliberate distinction between justification and re- generation. Instances indeed occur in which, by the word justification is specially meant the Divine sentence of absolu- tion from sins — particularly when certain unambiguous ex- pressions of the apostle Paul are laid hold of;1 but we must 1 Bernardi Tractatus de erroribus Abaelardi (Opp. ed. Mabillon, Paris, 1690, ANTICIPATIONS OF REFORMATION IDEAS. 91 not lay stress upon these instances so as to fancy in them an anticipation of the conscious thought of the Eeformers. Their deliberate treatment of the idea of justification proceeds rather on the principle that a real change in the sinner is thought of as involved in it;1 in other words, the Eeformation distinction between the two ideas is at the outset rejected, and the explan- ation of justification in the forensic sense is seen to be only a preliminary statement that requires to be corrected and filled out. But this implies an essential difference of meaning in those formulse in which mediaeval theologians seem to utter the watclword of the Eeformers, and the work of collecting such utterances with a view to the defence of the doctrine of the Eeformation, — such an attempt, for example, as may be seen in John Gerhard's Confessio Catholica — exposes him who undertakes it to a strong suspicion of having suffered himself to be misled by careless observation. It was understood in the middle ages that faith alone pertains to justification ; that justification is bestowed freely by grace; that it does not depend on merita de congruo as conditions : it is only the Nominalistic theory that forsakes these positions ; nevertheless, from a theological point of view, what is meant by them is something entirely different from what is meant by the formulse of the Eeformers that sound so like them. In the time of the Eeformation itself men had occasion to learn that contradictory senses could be attached by the conflicting parties to words that had the same sound. vol. i. p. 655), cap. viii. 20 : Ubi reconciliatio, ibi remissio peccatorum. Et quid ipsa, nisi justificatio ? Sivi igitur reconciliatio, sive remissio peccatorum, sive justificatio sit, sive etiam redemtio, intercedente morte unigeniti obtine- mus, justificati gratis in sanguine ipsius. In Cantica, senno xxii. 6 (/. c. p. 1336) : Christus est factus nobis sapientia, justitia, sanctificatio, redemtio. Sapientia in prsedicatione, justitia in absolutione peccatorum, sanctificatio in conversatione, quam habuit cum peccatoribus, redemtio in passione. 1 De error. Abael. cap. vi. 16 : Alius, qui peccatorem constituit, alius, qui justificat a peccato ; alter in semine, alter in sanguine. . . . Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Si infectus ex illo originali concupiscantia, etiam Christi gratia spirituali perfusus sum. Quid mihi plus imputatur de prsevaricatore ? si generatio, regenerationem oppono. . . . Sane pervenit delictum ad me, sed pervenit et gratia. . . . Terrena nativitas perdit me, et non multo magis generatio ccelestis conservat me ? Nee vereor sic erutus de potestate tenebrarum repelli a patre luminum, justificatus gratis in sanguine filii ejus. Nempe ipse, qui justificat, quis est, qui condemnat? Non condemnabit justum, qui misertus est peccatori. Justum me dixerim, sed illius justitia. Quse ergo mihi justitia facta est, mea non est ? Si mea traducta culpa, cur non et mea indulta justitia? 92 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. Notwithstanding this, the leading thought of the Eeformers regarding the conditions of justification rests upon a broad basis in the Church. Marked anticipations of it are to be met with in trains of thought expressed and indeed deliberately em- phasised by certain men of the middle ages, and even by men who deliberately and unambiguously professed their adherence to the Catholic doctrine of justification.1 For in the thought of justi- fication, so far as the Eeformers are concerned, what is aimed at primarily and chiefly is by no means an objective doctrine of systematic theology, but simply a supreme standard whereby the subject who is a member of the Christian Church, and who, as such, is active in good works by the influence of the Holy Spirit, may judge for himself of his true religious condi- tion. And what in fact the Keformers wish to establish is that the regenerate person does not owe his position before God and his assurance of salvation to the good works which he really does perform, but to the grace of God, which to his believing confidence pledges his justification through Christ. This as- sertion, which will be proved in the following chapter, I am compelled to make here by anticipation, in order to test by this criterion these expressions of mediaeval piety which are justly regarded as offering analogies to the religious standpoint of the Eeformers and which in the same proportion overpass the limits of the Catholic doctrine of justification and of the doc- trine of merit mixed up with it. It is certain that theologians, from Augustine onwards, al- ways assume only the causal connexion between grace as jus- tification on the one hand, and merit on the other. Nowhere do we find it stated that justification must be just what it is according to their doctrine, in order that merit may be possible. I cannot, however, fully account for the practical interest in that dogma displayed by those of the Eoman Catholic confes- sion, except on the understanding that the causal relation which in their doctrine is affirmed to subsist between justifica- tion and merit is at the same time a relation of purpose. For 1 This qualifies the similar assertion made by Melanchthon, — Apol. Conf. Aug. p. 99. Antonius, Bernhardus, Dominions, Franciscus et alii sancti patres elegerunt certum vitse genus, vel propter stadium vel propter alia utilia exercitia. Interim sentiebant se fide propter Christum justos reputari et habere propitium Deum, non propter ilia propria exercitia. Yet just this last statement finds its warrant in the following exposition. ANTICIPATIONS OF REFORMATION IDEAS. 93 it is only the impression (even though it be an unconscious one) of relations of purpose that dominates the feelings as an imme- diate motive of practical conduct. When, accordingly, in that positive religious interest which invariably controls all negations of opposing theologoumena, justification is asserted in the Catholic sense, it is in the full belief that merits avail with God. The sinner must not only be really changed into a good man ; he must also act by the freedom of his own will if he would attain to merit. With respect to both these points the Catholic con- ception of justification is fitted to be the appropriate premiss for the consciousness of merit, and especially inasmuch as, ac- cording to it, it is possible for the justified person to merit an increase of grace; while the Eeformation distinction between justification and regeneration, and the placing of the former over the latter, renders entirely inadmissible the idea of merit. But then the idea even in the Catholic system itself holds an am- biguous position. For the thought of grace, whereby merit first becomes possible, excludes, when taken in a strict sense, the meritorious value of all works proceeding from grace, for it directly denies the independence of the regenerate man in his relation to God. Si gratia consideratur secundum rationem gratui doni, omne meritum repugnat gratice, says Thomas. Now this view of the entirely derivative character of all the moral and Christian worth of our person and our works is the properly religious one. It is inevitable therefore, that as soon as a man living within the sphere of Catholic Christianity gains such a stage of development as to try himself by the purely religious standard, the idea of merit so laboriously wrought out in the theory is without further consideration at once set aside. The countless expressions that have been uttered by Augustine with this tendency have naturally been no less operative in the Western Church than has been the connexion assumed by him in theory, to exist between grace and merit. Wherever, then, in the middle ages, devotion, so far as it has found articulate expression, rises to the level of the thought, that the value of the Christian life, even where it is fruitful of good works, is grounded not upon these as human merits, but upon the mercy of God, inasmuch as by it are these good works first rendered possible, while also by it must the guilt of remaining sin be taken away; wherever this immediate 94 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. assurance of the grace of God in the domain of the Christian Church is realized as the title of believers, which rises above all conceivable or actually existing means of grace — then the same line of thought is entered on as that in which the religious con- sciousness common to Luther and Zwingli was able effectually to break through the connexion which up to their time had sub- sisted between the Catholic doctrine and the Church institutions for the application of salvation. That this estimate of self by the religious standard, which denies merit and affirms grace exclusively, had throughout the centuries of the middle ages, a continuous and constant existence in the public consciousness cannot certainly be proved by documentary evidence. Only, just as surely as the Catholic Church of the middle ages was strictly and properly attached to Augustine's school, there must have continued to exist within her along with the theory that turns upon grace and merit, a marked tendency also to the devotional feeling which relies exclusively upon God's grace. We must not, however, expect to find that this tendency always realized itself fully, for we shall see that there were causes at work which were able in some instances to keep piety down below the level of the position just described, and in other instances to exaggerate it far beyond that limit. And, after all, the appreciation of themselves arrived at, even when grace was exclusively kept in view by those men of the middle ages, in whom such an appreciation can be traced at all, is as far as possible removed from being of a Eeformation character. It had not with them the result of shaking a single part of the officially recognised doctrinal system or Church constitution; it neither leads them to suspect the doctrine of justification, nor does it enable them to dispense with the sacrament of penance, or with obedience to the Pope. But that this religious estimate of self, which practically denies to merit that value which is theoretically affirmed, should ap- pear in a very pronounced form among the heroes of the medi - seval church, serves to show that the same way of thinking when adapted by the Eeformers was a product of the Church ; and that the Eeformation use of that line of thought, to bring about a complete change in the doctrine and ordinances of the Western Church, is simply a logical result of the idea of grace which came to be practically operative on all hands when the time came and the proper men were raised up. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX. 95 1 7. The first both in time and importance to be considered in this connexion is St. Bernard of Clairvaux. He is in theory, as is shown by a passage cited above (p. 91), a Catholic of a thoroughly correct type; but not only do we very fre- quently find in his sermons expressions of the sense of absolute dependence on God that go far beyond the limits of Catholic do^ma ; but even in his treatise De gratia et liber o arbitrio he addresses himself to the task of neutralizing the conventionally received idea of merit, by practical appreciation of the exclusive value of grace. Some one had objected that Bernard, by laying stress upon grace as the immanent principle of the entire Chris- tian life, had done away with the idea of merit. This opponent had emphasized the then current Catholic apprehension of the matter, according to which grace gives the impulse and begin- ning to man's own activity, whereby the continuance of the gifts of grace is merited even unto perfection. Da, inquit, gloriam Deo, qui gratis te prcevenit, excitavit, initiavit, et vive digne de cetero, quo te probes perceptis beneficiis non ingratum et percipien- dis idoneum. The discussion which Bernard raises in opposition to this principle proceeds entirely in the line of the traditional dogmas of Catholicism, in so far as it asserts the state of grace to be based upon the concurrence of grace and human freedom. It is the free will that is saved by grace. Tolle liberum arbi- trium et non erit quod salvetur ; tolle gratiam, non erit, unde salvetur. Since thus it is the free will that is the recipient of grace, the bestowal of grace is brought about through the active consent of the will. Ita gratice operanti salutem cooperari dici- tur liberum arbitrium dum consentit, hoc est, dum sahatur. Gon- sentire enim salvari est (cap. i. 2). If now grace be indispensably necessary in order that man may have a good will, it is at the same time implied in the very nature of free will, that the good acts of the will are merits by means of which good men enter into blessedness (vi. 18). Looked at as originating in grace, merits are themselves also gifts of God bestowed upon men out of His eternal decree, but yet they are called by the name of merits too, and deserve to be rewarded with blessedness on ac- count of the co-operation of the free will with grace. Deus namque ante secula, cum operatus est salutem in medio terrce, dona sua, quce dedit liominibus, in merita divisit et prcemia, ut et prcesentia per liberam possessionem nostra interim' fierent merita, et futura per 9G THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. gratuitam sponsionem exspectaremus,imo expeteremus ut debita. . . . Ibi itaque Deus homini benigna merita constitute, ubiper ipsum et cum ipso boni quippiam operari dignanter instituit (xiii. 43, 45). The claims of Catholic dogma once satisfied, however, by this method of rhetorical antitheses — a method for which the model was offered by Augustine — Bernard, by the help of the same master, rises to the purely religious view of the entire practical life of the Christian as a continuous work of Divine grace. Although, indeed, the meritorious character of a good work depends, so far as man is concerned, on the concurrence of his will with grace, yet even that act of concurrence is not, properly speaking, one that comes of man, cum ne cogitare aliquid a ndbis quasi ex nobis sufficientes sumus. . . . Si ergo Deus bonum cogitare, velle, perficere operatur in nobis, primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos facit. . . . ltd tamen, quod a sola gratia cceptum est,pariter ab utroque perftcitur ut mixtim, non singillatim, simul, non vicissim per singulos pro- fectus operentur. Non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium, sed totum singula opere individuo peragunt. Totum quidem hoc, et totum ilia, sed ut totum in illo, sic totum ex ilia (xiv. 46, 47). In these sentences the religious insight passes beyond the limits within which the Catholic theory moves, the scheme of an in- dissoluble continguity of grace and freedom, which contiguity always at the same time, however, implies and expresses their separateness. Putting this view aside, Bernard refers the good work in its entirety to God's grace when viewed from the reli- gious point of view, and to the freedom of the will rendered free by grace when viewed from the moral point of view. He has intuititively seized the twofold thought upon which evangelical Christianity is practically based, and in which evan- gelical theology must ever recognise it as her task to show the harmony, or at least non-contradictoriness, of its two members. For as religiously we attribute the goodness of our will entirely to God, and give it no scope for meritorious value towards God, on that very account we become conscious of our position of moral independence as towards any tutelage that is not divine, and therefore, especially, as towards that of the hierarchy. The quotations just made from Bernard betoken a temporary elevation above that sphere of vision in which the idea of merit has its place. He soons recurs to the recognition of this idea BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX. 97 in such antitheses as those we have already seen. Fasts and vigils, continence and deeds of benevolence, and all the other exercises of virtue wherein the inner man is renewed from day to day, are gifts of God as being produced in us through the operation of His Spirit ; but, as being wrought with the concurrence of our wills, they are merits. In God's justice they merit blessedness ; that justice, however, proceeds more upon the free promise of the reward of grace which God has made than upon any absolutely binding obligation on His part towards men. Yet even on this point Bernard at the close of his treatise reverts to that purely religious manner of think- ing, which does away with the idea of merit. Si proprie appel- lentur ea, quce dicimus nostra merita, spei qucedam sunt semi- nar ia, caritatis incentiva, occultce prcedestinationis indicia, futures felicitatis prcesagia, VIA REGNI NON CAUSA REGNANDI. Denique quos justificavit, non quos justos invenit, hos et magnificavit (xiv. 49, 50, 51). The fact that Bernard was able to reach this thought, while yet he did not repudiate in its favour the Catholic doctrine, but, on the contrary, always recurred to it, is to be explained by the circumstance that in this particular work he waived that characteristic point of the Catholic doctrine which was insisted on by his opponent. He completely disregards the supposition that by those who are in the state of grace the continuance and increase of grace are merited. For as soon as this inference is drawn from the then prevalent scheme of grace and freedom, it is no longer possible fully to carry out that superiority of grace above freedom which results from a reli- gious estimate of self; nor is it possible to neutralize, in a practical way, the freedom that is theoretically conceded to be the formal cause of the state of grace. And as matter of fact, the anti- evangelical tendency of Catholicism, as commonly taught, does not originate in the idea of merit as a whole ; for, as even Thomas shows, that idea can at any moment be caused to disappear by falling back on the strict conception of grace : the main root of that tendency is rather the bearing that merit is supposed to have upon the increase of grace. That supposition inevitably imparts to the consciousness that allows itself to be possessed by it, the impression of a reciprocal action between ;grace and free-will ; and the human tendency to self-assertion that corresponds to such a supposition will rise in rebellion 7 98 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. against the dominion of the general notion of grace as long as the idea prevails that the possession of special grace is dependent on the meritorious effort of its own will. In Bernard's sermons 1 passages are to be found that har- monize with the views laid down in the tractate we have just been considering. The 105th, de diversis, distinguishes between justification and glorification as degrees in the state of grace. Neque enim poterit obtineri magnificatio, nisi justificatio prceces- serit, cum ista meritum, ilia prcemium sit. Both are wrought by God ; but beatification exceeds our powers, while justification directly demands them. Sic enim adimpletur justificatio dum db interdictis vitiis abstinent, et bona, quce prcecepta sunt, fideliter exercent. In his sermon in octava Epiphanice Bernard exhorts adimplere omnem justitiam in order that the joy of beatification may be attained. For that is the reward, justitia vero meritum et materia. . . . Nunc videtur laboriosa justitia, sed veniet quando sine omni labore fruemur justitia. ... In the fourth sermon pro Dom. 1 Novemb. he interprets the aspect of the seraphim, who cover their faces and feet with their wings, and thus suffer only the middle part of their bodies to be seen, as indicating that the beginning and completion of the state of grace are exclusively works of the grace of God, but that in the interval between them the free will has a measure of efficacy meriti gratia. Thus currency is given to that idea, although what purpose it serves does not appear, when at the same moment it is declared that the accomplishment of salvation is purely the effect of grace, nee est mihi in hac parte vel cum gratia sive in ea gloriari, quasi coadjutor videar aut cooperator. This does not prevent him in another place (in Quadragesima, sermo 4) from recommending the practice of fasting as a means of averting eternal punishment: — non solum oltinet veniam sed et pro- meretur gratiam, non solum delet peccata quce commisimus, sed et repellit futura, quce committere poteramus. Notwithstanding these fundamental views (which are genu- inely Catholic), Bernard is very far indeed in his sermons from countenancing any trust in the present works of the free will aided by grace. Nay rather, while taking for granted that his hearers are actually busying themselves in good and meritorious works, he is constantly exhorting them simply to disregard 1 Sermones de tempore, de sanctis ac de diversis. Opp. vol. i. BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX. 99 their own contributions to these merits, and to take into account only the operation of God's grace in them, or, gene- rally, to direct their attention away from these particular works to God as the founder of every hope of salvation.1 Paradoxi- cally, he says that the humility which renounces all claim to merit, and trusts in God alone, is the only merit which has any value.2 But not only does he affirm God's grace to be the sole sufficient foundation on which the state of grace depends in all its stages, in order to counteract every temptation to self- righteousness ; he gives prominence also to the mercy of God, in the sense that it alone in the constant imperfection of all good works and merits can be a ground of confidence that we are in a state of grace.3 In this matter Bernard reaches precisely 1 In psalm, xci., sermo 1. 1 : Timeo ne forte sit in nobis, qui non habitat in adjutorio altissimi, sed confidat in virtute sua et in multitudiiie divitiamm suarum. Forte enira fervorem habet aliquis potens in vigiliis, in jejuniis, in labore, et in caeteris hujusmodi, aut etiam multorum, ut sibi videtur, divitias meritorum longo tempore acquisivit, et in his confidens remissior est in timore Dei. . . . Tanto siquidem amplius timere Deum et magis sollicitus esse debuerat, quanto majora ejus munera jam percepit. Neque enim, quae habemus ab eo, servare aut tenere possumus sine eo. — Sermo 9. 1 : Quid quod bona omnia non modo propter eum constat fieri, sed per eum ? Deus enim est, qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere pro bona voluntate. 5. Prsetendat alter meritum, sustinere se jactet pondus diei et sestus, jejunare bis in sabbato dicat, postremo non esse sicut ceteros hominum glorietur; mihi autem adhserere Deo bonum est, ponere in Deo meo spem meam. — In octava Paschse, sermo 1. 2 : Quoties tentationi resistis, quoties vincis malig- num, noli propriis tribuere viribus, noli in te sed magis in domino gloriari. — In festo annuntiationis Marias, sermo 1. 1 : Testimonium spiritus in tribus consistere credo. Necesse est enim primo omnium credere, quod remissionem peccatorum habere non possis, nisi per indulgentiam Dei ; deinde, quod nihil prorsus habere queas operis boni, nisi et hoc dederit ipse, postremo, quod seternam vitam nullis potes operibus promereri, nisi gratis tibi detur et ilia. 2 De diversis, sermo 26. 1 : Insipiens est et insanus, quicunque in aliis vitse meritis, quicunque in alia religione seu sapientia nisi in sola humilitate confidit. Apud Dominum jus habere non possumus, quoniam in multis offendimus omnes, sed nee fallere eum ; ipse enim novit abscondita cordis, quanto magis opera manifesta. . . . Quid ergo restat, nisi ad humilitatis remedia tota mente confugere, et quidquid in aliis minus habemus, de ea supplere. — In psalm, xci., sermo 15. 5 : Hoctotum hominis meritum, si totam spem suam ponit in eo, qui totum hominem salvum facit. 3 In vigilia nativitatis Dom., sermo 2. 4 : Nolite timere, si perfectionem, quam desideratis, nondum potestis adipisci ; sed quod minus habet imper- fectio conversationis, suppleat humilitas confessionis, et imperfectum vestrum viderunt oculi Dei. Propterea enim mandata sua mandavit custodiri minis, ut videntes imperfectionem nostram deficere, et non posse implere, quod debet, fugiamus ad misericordiam, et qui non possumus in vestitu innocentise seu justitise, appareamus vestiti confessione. Confessio enim est pulcritudo in conspectu Domini, si tamen sit non oris tantum sed etiam totius hominis, ut omnia ossa nostra dicant ; Domine, quis similis tibi, idque solius pacis intuitu et desiderio reconciliationis ad Deum. — In Epiphan. Dom., sermo 1. 1 1 100 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. the way of thinking that is habitual with Luther, who fixes his attention rather on the relative imperfection than on the rela- tive perfection of the works attainable by the regenerate, while Bernard, as has been seen, plainly pronounces an unvarying decision for the exclusive value of God's grace alike from either side of the question. It is of course implied in the very nature of the case that greater stress should be laid upon grace, when the believer calls to remembrance the imperfection of all his works, and impresses himself with the contrast they present to the requirements of God's law, than when by going back from his performances to divine grace he realizes to himself the sequence of its operations. So much the more strongly on that account does the conviction arise in the former case that believing confidence is the organ whereby the pardoning grace or mercy of God is appropriated.1 In this view of faith Ber- Quisquis consolationem ignorat necessariam, superest, ut non habeat Dei gratiam. 3. Quid agerem audiens Dominum venientem ? Numquid non fugerem, sicut Adam, nonne desperarem, audiens quia ille venit, cujus legem sic prsevaricatus sum, cujus patientia sic abusus sum, cujus beneficio tarn ingratus inventus sum ? Quse vero major consolatio poterat esse, quam in dulci vocabulo, in nomine consolatorio. Propterea et ipse dicit, quia non venit films, ut judicet mundum, sed ut salvetur mundus per ipsum. Jam confidenter accedo, jam supplico fiducialiter. Quid enim timeam, quando salvator venit in domum meam? Ei soli peccavi, donatum erit, quidquid indulserit ille. Deus est, qui justificat ; quis est, qui condemnet ? Aut quis accusabit adversus electos Dei? Propterea gaudere nos oportet, quod in nostra venerit; nunc enim facilis ad indulgentiam erit. — In psalm, xci., sermo 16. 1 : Speravit in me, liberabo eum. . . . Non dicit, dignus fuit, Justus et rectus fuit, innocens manibus et mundo corde, propterea liberabo, protegam et exaudiam eum. Si enim hsec et similia diceret, quis non dif- fideret? Quis gloriabitur, castum se habere cor? Nunc autem apud te propitiatio est, et propter hanc legem tuam sustinui te, Domine. Dulcis lex, quae meritum exauditionis in clamore constituit postulationis. — In Dominica vi. post Pentecosten, sermo 3. 4 : Liberaliter agit Deus, ignoscit plenarie, ita ut propter fiduciain peccatorum sed poenitentium, ubi abundavit delictum, soleat et gratia superabundare. 6. Tria considero, in quibus tota spes mea consistit, caritatem adoptionis, veritatem promissionis, potestatem redditionis. Murmuret jam, quantum voluerit, insipiens cogitatio mea dicens ; quis es tu aut quanta est ilia gloria quibus ve meritis hanc obtinere speras? Et ego fiducialiter respondebo : scio cui credidi, et certus sum, quia in caritate nimia adoptavit me, quia verax in promissione, quia potens in exhibitione. — In festo omnium sanctorum, sermo 1. 11 : Quid potest omnis justitia nostra coram Deo ? Nonne juxta prophetam velut pannus menstruates reputabitur et si districte judicetur, injusta invenietur omnis justitia nostra? Propterea tota humilitate ad misericordiam recurramus, quee sola potest salvare animas nostras. 1 In vigil, nat. Dom., sermo 5. 5 : Ante omnia fides quserenda est. Crede ergo te Deo, committe te ei, jacta in eum cogitatum tuum, et ipse te enutriet, ut fiducialiter dicas : deus sollicitus est mei. Is vere fidelis est, qui nee sibi credit, nee in se sperat, factus sibi tanquam vas perditum, sed sic perdens THE MENDICANT ORDERS. 101 nard again necessarily rises to the level of Luther's thought; for mere intellectual belief and the faith that is formed by love alike fall short of what these statements express; and the confusion between faith and hope which is occasionally made in treating of this question has not here the effect of relegating the com- passionate grace of God from the present to the future. It is true that Bernard occasionally brings the general thought of God's grace into connexion with the contemplation of the passion of Christ;1 in this matter, however, he by no means comes up to the clear view of the Eeformers, but entirely con- fines himself to a variety of figurative and fanciful expressions which have their closest analogues in the writings of Zinzendorf. This circumstance, however, does not affect the coincidence which, as we have seen, is to be found between Bernard and the Eeformers, in so far as in common they regarded the moral self- consciousness of the regenerate as being modified and con- trolled by being referred to the religious standard of the grace of God. 18. St. Bernard's influence is seen throughout the whole ascetic and homiletic literature of the Middle Ages ; but traces of the line of thought we have been describing are much more rarely to be met with than might have been expected from that circumstance. This, however, is accounted for by the fact, that the impulse towards a practical imitation of Christ's poverty, given by the two mendicant orders, came to have a central place in religion. In it is carried out the scheme of salvation briefly indicated by Anselm and Abelard, which re- presents, in the stricter sense, the Catholic view of Christianity. Poverty is the ascetic imitation of Christ, and the direct reci- procation of His self-sacrificing love of men. Of course it animam suam, ut in vitam aeternam custodiat earn. — In Epiph. Dom., sermo 3. 7 : Secure credamus in eum, secure credamus ei nos, cui nee potestas deest salvandi nos, cum sit verus Deus et Dei Filius, nee bona voluntas, cum sit tanquam unus ex nobis verus homo et hominis films. — In festo annuntia- tionis Mariae, sermo 3. 3 : Sola spes apud te miserationis obtinet locum, nee oleum misericordiae nisi in vase fiduciae ponis. . . . Dicat quisque in pavore suo : vadam ad portas inferi, ut jam nonnisi in sola Dei misericordia respire- mus. Hasc vera hominis fiducia, a se deficientis et innitentis Domino suo. Hsec, inquam, vera fiducia, cui misericordia non denegatur. 1 In Cantica, sermo 43. 3 : Pro acervo meritorum, quae mihi deesse sciebam, hunc mihi fasciculum colligare volui collectum ex omnibus anxietatibus et amaritudinibus Domini mei. — Sermo 61. 3 : Ubi tuta firmaque infirmis secn- ritas et requies nisi in vulneribus salvatoris ? 102 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. claims to be the gospel type of piety, and to be on that account the peculiarly Catholic one. Nor did it confine itself within the limits of the Franciscan and Dominican orders, properly so called ; rather by means of that activity in preaching, which constituted the principal business of these orders, and by the institution of the Tertiary orders, it gained a widely diffused influence throughout the whole ecclesiastical world. The real tendency of the gospel was not, however, carried out in this way. Since there was no clear idea of the positive conditions under which the world should be changed into the kingdom of God, the purpose of drawing it aside to the life of the cloister coifld not fail to be ineffectual so far as the world was con- cerned, and, at the same time, ultimately ruinous to the monas- ticism of the mendicant orders. In both orders the practical impulse found in mystical contemplation its complement and, also, its correction ; for the sense of having done meritoriously, when aroused, had immediately to be put aside, along with everything pertaining to the creature, in rising to contemplation of the infinitude of God. Mystical contemplation, however, has a different purpose, and proceeds upon conditions and pos- tulates other than those which regulate the religious estimate of one's own moral value by reference to the conception of grace revealed in Christ. The former seems to reach a higher level than the latter, and for this reason, perhaps, at the time when the mendicant orders flourished most, it might seem that the lower could be dispensed with where the higher was be- lieved to be attainable. The particular tendency of the mendi- cant orders, on the one hand, to the practice of meritorious works, and, on the other hand, to mystical contemplation, was not counteracted by means of the study of the Bible, although the attention paid to it at that time was considerable ; — the expla- nation of which is, that to the men of that time the Bible did not open up the immediate satisfaction of their religious needs in the passion and death of Christ as the basis of the reconcilia- tion of mankind, because they were wont to use the empirico- practical notion of individual imitation of His poverty as the true key to the understanding of the life of Christ. The barrenness of such an attempt at imitation had first, therefore, to be experimentally proved before the general significance of Christ's passion as the basis of the covenant of grace, which FRANCIS OF ASSIST. 103 involves in it the forgiveness of sins, could rank higher than its particular significance as an ascetic pattern for individual believers. Further, it was necessary that the aspiration after a mystical exaltation into the infinite and boundless being of God should be first discovered in a practical way to be illusory, before men could again get hold of that concrete love which God has openly shown in Christ, as the means of correcting personal moral imperfection. We can now understand why it is that the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries offer so few instances of the religious esti- mate of self, which Bernard exemplifies. But this deficiency is compensated for in a remarkable way by the very man who led the prevailing religious tendencies of those centuries — Saint Francis of Assisi. He was able to give to his contem- poraries, and to succeeding generations, that grand impulse to the imitation of Christ's poverty, because his own religious genius surrendered itself unreservedly, without the slightest consciousness of merit in his works, to the assured persuasion of the grace of God. The whole structure of his life accords with that mode of thought whereby Bernard was able to rise above the catholic theological scheme of divine grace and human freedom. If Bernard, in spite of his theological training, was able to rise above all thought of merit towards God, Francis, by virtue of his very deficiency in theological educa- tion, was fitted for idealizing his strenuous activity in imitation of Christ's poverty and bearing of His cross by a complete renunciation of all pretension to personal merit in himself. Hereby he religiously ennobled the original simplicity of his nature in such a measure, that the sincerity and uprightness of his humility outweigh everything which by an appearance of constrained mannerism might tend to estrange us from him. Should it be necessary to show this otherwise than by refer- ence to the attractive sketch of his life for which we are indebted to Hase,1 I would simply point to those expressions in which Francis not only refers all that he did to God's grace and wisdom, but speaks of himself as sinful and worthless without these.2 1 Franciscus von Assisi. Eln HeiligenUld. 1856. See particularly p. 109, and following pages. 2 Francisci Asxisiatis et Antonii Paduani Opera, ed. de la Haye. Pedeponti 104 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. Amongst the Franciscans and Dominicans who are eminent in the following centuries as practical and mystical preachers, it will not be possible to find traces of the prevalence of a piety of this stamp. In some cases there prevails stricter regard to the Catholic dogma, strengthened by the attribution of value to the practice of a life of poverty and humility ; in other cases what is most insisted on is constant resort to the sacra- ments of penance and the eucharist ;'in other cases still, mystical elevation out of and above the sphere of created life into the infinity of the Divine Being (whereby the influences of semi- pelagianism are escaped). Yet even in these circles isolated hints of Bernard's way of thinking occasionally reveal them- selves. On the one hand, Antony of Padua, a Franciscan, is explicit in declaring, in words avowedly borrowed from Bernard, that the blood of Christ is so strong a proof of the mercy of God, that no one is shut out from a share in its influence, and conversely, that he only is genuinely humble who neither suffers himself to be praised for his good works, nor permits himself to be called humble : but in relation to the grace of God within him is determined to pass for simply nothing.1 In the sermons of John Tauler, a Dominican, on the other hand, there crops up once and again this same view of Bernard's, although, as is truly remarked by one who has made this pro- vince of history peculiarly his own,2 the ideas of reconciliation 1739. Colloquium 4 (p. 71) : In veritate dico vobis, domine episcope, nullum tan turn mihi concessisse honorem, sicut tu hodie. Alii sanctum, alii beatum me in Dei operibus proclamant, mihi, non Deo, honorem et gloriam tribuentes ; sed tu hodie pro tua sapientia vere me honorasti, Deo, quse sua sunt, laudem et gloriam tribuens ; pretiosum a vtii separasti, Deo sapientiam et virtutem, mihi inscitiam et vilitatem appropriasti. — Coll. 11 (p. 73) : Videor, ait, mihi maximus pecuatomm. Cui cum frater diceret ex adverse : Hoc non potes, pater, sana conscientia dicere nee sentire, subjunxit : Si quantumcunque sceleratum hominem tanta fuisset Christus inisericordia prosecutus, arbitror sane, quod multo, quam ego, Deo gratior esset. 1 In the edition of his works cited above, Sermones dominicales et de tempore, pag. 2 : Sanguis Christi clamat misericordiam. Securum, o homo, habes accessum ad Deum, ubi habes matrem ante filium, et filium ante patrem. Mater ostendit filio pectus et ubera, films ostendit patri latus et vulnera. Nulla ergo ibi erit repulsa, ubi tot caritatis occurrunt insignia. Pag. 18 : — Vere humilis non elevatur, cum de bouse vitse odore laudatur, verus (inquit Bernhardus) humilis vult vilis haberi et non humilis prsedicari. 2 Charles Schmidt : Etudes sur le mystidsme allemand au odv. siecle (Paris 1847), pp. 142, 143. See Tauler's Sermons (Augsburg, 1508), fol. 85 : " Worth never proceeds from man's works or merits, but solely from the grace and merit of our Lord Jesus Christ, flowing at the same time from God.'? —Fol. 124 : " Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst come under my roof THE GERMAN MYSTICS. 105 and justification through Christ are of minor importance in Tauler's writings when compared with the striving after mystic union with God, and after the imitation of Christ. It is a very common assumption with evangelical theolo- gians that the mysticism which proceeds from the school of the Dominican Eckhart, as it is also represented by Tauler, Suso, and the compiler of the so-called deutsche Theologie, is in part a pre-Eeformation exhibition of Eeformation ways of thinking, and in part, through the last-mentioned book, the very source where Luther found his Eeformation principles. To come to details — I do not think I am mistaken when I say that Ullmann has given important support to that belief by his assertion that in the deutsche Theologie are contained the essential constituent elements of the Eeformation way of thinking.1 A judgment so decided, even although it be rash and unsupported, could not fail to make a deeper impression than the more careful and guarded statement made by Ullmann at a later point (p. 279 f.), as to the general analogy between German mysticism and the Eeformation movement. And accordingly it is received as an axiom of Church History, even by those who are worthy of every confidence in their own proper field.2 If it be indeed true that the deutsche Theologie embodies the essentials of the Eeformation doctrine, then the whole of the mysticism of the school of Eckhart is of a Eeformation character. Eor the pan- theistic principles of the school are not differently expressed in it than by Eckhart and Tauler ; and the main problem of mysticism, which is the annihilation of the personality of the creature, in order to union with God, is asserted by the Frank- fort priest of the German order in the very hyper- ethical meta- physical sense of his predecessors. So that, if we take literally the assertion of Luther that to the deutsche Theologie, next to the Bible and Augustine, he is most indebted for what he has learned about " God, Christ, man, and all things/' 3 we have into my heart ; but I come to that privilege through thy inexhaustible mercy, and the rich treasures of thy worthy merit. If I stand in need of repentance, love, and grace, I find it all in Thee, where virtue, desire, or longing and goodness are to be found." 1 Heformatoren vor der Reformation. II. Band. (1842) p. 253. 2 e.g. Weingarten : Revolutionskirchen Englands, p. 2. 3 In Luther's preface to the complete edition of that work published in 1518. In Walch's edition xiv. p. 204, the date 1516 is wrongly given. That is the date of the shorter preface, along with which Luther at first 106 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. no reason for withholding from the older mystical theologians, beginning with Eckhart, the honour transferred to their servile follower, of having been the fathers of the German Eeforma- tion. But Luther's declaration ought not to be used in this way if we would avoid a hurtful misapprehension. Between the problem which the mystics seek to solve, and that of the Eeformers, there undeniably exists a certain analogy, in virtue whereof Luther was able to sympathize with particular isolated assertions and exhortations of theirs when isolated from their premisses in the system, and understood in his own sense. But the problem how to get rid of one's personal individuality, as created, in order to attain to union with God, and absorption in His Being, is quite distinct from the problem how to renounce one's own merit in order to gain by confidence in Christ's merit a standing before God, and peace of conscience in spite of the sense of sin. The two problems differ not merely in compass but also in kind. It is not that the mys- tical consciousness merely aims higher than the other, so that the latter, perhaps, might be regarded as tacitly included in the former. The two standpoints are essentially distinct. For the religious task of the mystic is based upon a comparison between the Creator and the creature, metaphysically considered, and is designed to do away with the distance that the fact of creation establishes between the two. The religious task of the Eeformer proceeds upon the moral contrast between the man who, while actually in the state of grace, is yet imperfect and sinful, on the one hand, and the lawgiver, on the other, and has for its object that revelation of God's grace in Christ, which is both the ground and the rule of all consciousness of salvation that is possible to the Church. In the one case it is sought to extirpate the indi- viduality of man altogether ; in the other case, what is desired is the maintenance of his ethical personality in the strictest sense.1 published only a portion of the book, under the title, "The Old and the New Man — what they are." This preface is to be found in Walch, p. 207. Compare the preface, pp. x. xi. in Pfeiffer's edition of the Theologie deutsch. (2d Ed. 1855). As for the above-mentioned declaration of Luther, con- sidered in itself, we must distinguish between two different ways of learn- ing from books — learning by appropriation, and learning by suggestion. As Luther did not appropriate the peculiar circle of thought developed in this book, his interest in it must be referred to the stimulus he derived from it. 1 Dorner in the main coincides. — Hist. Prot. TheoL p. 215. THE GERMAN MYSTICS. 107 This is the reason why the consciousness of justification, when it awoke at the Eeformation, could develop force enough to contend against the institutions of the Church of Eome, while the mystics acquiesced in them all. Nor did they even pave the way for the Eeformation by developing that free inner life, that subjectivity and individuality, which, according to Ullmann (p. 280), were entirely confined to them during the Middle Ages. For their fundamental principle is really an exhortation to the utter extirpation of individuality, and the amount of thought and perseverance they devote to this ab- surd task does not exceed the measure of thoughtfulness and depth of feeling which could very well be associated with the scholastic style, and were indeed demanded by it. It is a sur- prising mistake, that one should for a moment imagine that the scholastic theology lays the foundation of a dead legality of life, and that the development of depth of subjective feeling lies quite beyond its scope ; for the declaration common to all the schoolmen is precisely this, that justification through grace consists in the infusion of love. And surely, within the limits of Protestantism itself there are tendencies which, without in the least degree intending to break loose from the Eeformation, yet check the development of free inner life, of subjectivity and individuality ; the weak and conventional " illumination" does so as well as the dry orthodoxy of the school. The mystics of the fourteenth century can never be made out to be anything but thoroughly mediaeval figures. They are not lifted out of their ecclesiastical surroundings in any specific way by the peculiarity of their religious principle, and whoever assigns to them a Eeformation character abandons history just as much as those do who assign to the old Catholic Church an Ebionitic character and origin. In particular, we cannot assign the origin of the Eeformation to the mystic school for these among other reasons : that notoriously the revolutionary re- formation by the Anabaptists originated from the mystic type of piety, and that it is impossible to treat the Eeformation fairly except by maintaining that specific distinction between it and the Anabaptist revolution of which the Eeformers them- selves were convinced. It is therefore radically wrong to seek within the sphere of the German mysticism of the fourteenth century for the mediaeval basis of the fundamental concep- 108 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. tion of the Eeformation as set forth by Luther and Zwingli. These anticipations of that manner of estimating self, brought into prominence by the Eeformers, which are certainly to be found in the sentences quoted from Tauler, are not at all characteristic of mysticism, and on that account are so trifling in compass and importance as to be almost lost sight of amongst the mystical tendencies of that preacher. 19. A return to that immediate consciousness of the grace of God which we have seen in Bernard was first made in the fifteenth century, when on the one hand the productivity of mysticism had exhausted itself, and on the other the practi- cal impulse given by the mendicant orders in the direction of a humble imitation of Christ's life of poverty had been transformed by the theology of Dans the Franciscan and his nominalist fol- lowers into a prevailing tendency towards meritorious action.1 In that age of dry logic and common sense, in which even mysticism was maintained as a publicly taught system of doc- trine only by the nominalist John Gerson, who discusses the conditions of the intuition of God as a part of the theory of knowledge — John Staupitz discovered in the distinct effort of reflection upon God's grace and love that very counterpoise to the pretensions of work-righteousness as ordinarily practised in the Western Church which corresponds to the model of Augustine and Bernard. Staupitz is in direct historical con- nexion with Luther as a master ; but whether he himself owes his own style of thought to the influence of particular persons it is impossible to ascertain.2 His writings, however, leave the impression of no small originality, and it were much to be 1 I purposely refrain here from using the catchword Pelagianism, which I might perhaps be expected to use. The word certainly is very applicable to the nominalistic recognition of merita de congruo, but that is a theory to which no practice can directly adapt itself. In the Christian world of bap- tized persons merita de congruo could only occur in the contritio of those who had fallen from grace. Though an assumption apparently warranted by Duns, it has been disputed even by Biel, and has no formal recognition. The portion of the nominalistic theory which comes under consideration at this point is the assertion that Christ's merit and the merita de condigno which thereby first became possible are each partially and both of them together the causes of salvation (p. 92). This however is not Pelagian, because grace is postulated for the idea of merit. 2 Compare C. L. Wilibald. Grimm, De Joanne Stoupitio, ejiisque in sacrorum i)istaurationem merito. In^llgen'sZeitschriftf.Jiistor.TheoL 1837. Perhaps his predecessor in office as Vicar of the Augustinian order for Gemany, An- dreas Proles, had some influence upon him. JOHN STA UPITZ. 109 wished that Luther had attached himself theologically to his adviser and friend still more closely than he actually did. Staupitz's book, De exseeutione ceternce prcedestinationis (1517), which, viewed as a systematic work, is a very important one, in fact counts kindred more with Zwingli's De providentia Dei anemnema than with Luther's tract directed against Erasmus. Now Staupitz separates himself from the mystical theologians of the fourteenth century definitely and specifically by estab- lishing the concrete personal idea of love as an element of our idea of God ; here again, therefore, it leads to nothing but error when Ullmann (p. 256) makes him out to be the congenial successor of the mystics. For mysticism, properly speaking, in the first instance consists in that style of pious meditation dominated by the Areopagite's conception of God, wherein it is sought as something attainable even in the present earthly state to pass beyond all intervening objects until the individual consciousness be lost in the undifferentiated Being of God ; the schoolmen on the other hand conceived of this as only possible in the life after death. Mystical theology is ac- cordingly in the French school this pious contemplation put into a psychological theory ; in the German school of Eckhart it is the theory, identical with that pious view, which discerns all things in the indeterminate oneness .of the Divine Being ; it is the theory of Pantheism, which only seemingly or only in virtue of inconsequence maintains itself in harmony with the Catholic dogma. With this theory Staupitz has nothing in common. But in the tractate Von der Liele Gottes (1518) he undoubtedly makes statements of a mystical character, to the effect that by perfect love towards God man comes to be merged in Him so as to have no choice or activity of his own, that then the human spirit cleaves fast to God in such a manner as to be called one spirit, and that thereby man shakes himself free of himself and of every created thing.1 But it would be wrong to make use ef these expressions as if they were normal. For in the tractate Vom christlichen Glauben (chap. 1 0) he reserves for the life be- yond the grave that unspeakable union, and thus puts himself in opposition to the mystics. But even were this not so, it no more follows from his assertion of the unio mystica that the theo- logy of Staupitz is essentially mystical than that the Lutheran 1 Staupitii Opera, ed Kriaake, vol. i. pp. 106, 118. . 110 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. theology is to be classed as such on account of a similar assertion. Staupitz, in fact, in such of his writings as we possess, de- clares himself, distinctly and without circumlocution, theologi- cally to uphold the Catholic idea of justification. " The sinner is justified by regeneration. In this new birth God is the father, the will is the mother, the quickening seed is the merit of Christ. Wherever these three things concur, the Son of God is brought forth, justified and quickened through faith which worketh by love."1 He accordingly adopts also the idea of merits rewarded by God with blessedness ; but he hastens to add that, since grace is the ground of good works, God there- fore rewards in the justified person His own works. For as God is the last operative cause in all operations, so also in us He has special works — the works of the faith formed in us. These proceed from Christ and return to Christ (as their end), and are therefore, in a particular sense, called works of Christ, although formally they are in man, and not God's, except in a merely external sense, for in themselves they are finite in nature and extent. Since now they belong to a finite person and in their nature are finite, it is therefore impossible that any right- eousness of infinite merit, to which an infinite reward were due, should be founded on them. If, then, God has determined to bestow Himself as their reward, it comes of grace, not of debt. Since justification is a grace, and the acceptance of the works wrought in grace is also a grace which makes them meritorious (this with Duns as against Thomas), and since the merit of Christ is also ours through grace, the whole Christian's life is fitly brought under the idea of grace, and there is easily merged in that idea what is usually attributed to the reason- able creature, namely, the mastery or proper control of his own works from their beginning to their ending. For the beginning of the work of the Christian man is in Providence, the middle of it is justification, the ending of it is glorification or exaltation, which are works of grace and not of nature.2 In like manner also in his treatise Von der Liebe Gottes, Staupitz is wholly intent on subordinating all human action under antecedent 1 De prcedcst.inationis exsecutione, in Christopher Scheurl's translation ; Sec. 34, 35, 36, as above, p. 145. 2 Sec. 38, 40, 43, 52, as above, pp. 146-150. JOHN WESSEL. Ill Divine love. Our hope is built in no manner of way upon the love which we bear toward God, but upon the love which God' has towards us — upon the works which God works in us (p. 101). He therefore declares against the folly of those men who flatter themselves that they are able, by their good deed, to move God at their pleasure, and to win Him to them with their devoutness, as a sparrow-hawk is drawn to carrion. These claim precedence over God's mercy, bring to market filthy rags, would fain buy gold with filth and be made blessed by means of their own righteousness, and, to vindicate their folly, make use of the teachings of holy masters whom they do not understand (p. 108). Although now the love inwrought in us by God at one time increases and at another time diminishes in degree, it is not without special consolation to know that the love which God bears towards us neither diminishes nor increases, and often, without our knowing it, does the very best for us when we least think it. So that we feel the greater confidence in God just as we lose confidence in ourselves, and no longer trusting to our own powers, look to the cross of Christ alone (p.110).1 The same theological adherence to the Catholic doctrine of justification in conjunction with a similar elevation of devotional feeling and of religious estimation of self, in attributing ex- clusive value to God's grace, had been already observable at an earlier period in the case of John Wessel. I can hardly understand how it is that Ullmann could assert2 that, with regard to the material principle of the Eeformation, in " carrying back the Christian life to the redemption and justification that is in Christ, to the exclusion of all other means of salvation that are merely of man's appointment," Wessel was at one with Luther and the contemporaries of Luther. In so far as such language can be applied with justice to Weasel's doctrine, it is 1 I naturally refrain from laying stress here upon the tractate of Staupitz, Von dem heiiigen rechten christlichen Glauben. For it was published in 1525, after his death (ob. 28 Dec. 1524), and bears unmistakeable traces of Luther's influence in the mode of apprehending the ideas of faith and of justi- fication or redemption in Christ, as also in the inferior position given to the sacrament of penance in comparison \vith faith ; although it was composed by Staupitz when he was Abbot of Saint Peter's, in Salzburg, whither he had withdrawn in order to continue at peace with the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church. 2 Heformatoren vor der Reformation, ii. p. 659. 112 THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. very far from accurately expressing the distinguishing charac- teristics of the Reformation teaching. And further, it is purely and explicitly the Romish doctrine which Ullmann himself (p. 514) reproduces in the following quotation from Wessel : " The taking away of sin is nothing else than the possession, of justifying love ; for he who is without that, abides in sin. In order that Christ, therefore, may take away our sins, He must needs infuse righteousness." It is indeed true, on the other hand, that Wessel, like Staupitz, lays the chief stress on Christ's objective working for the accomplishment of this end, and not upon the instrumentality of human freedom. For he proceeds, " Christ is thus, in His assumed humanity, the operat- ing cause of the justification of the ungodly, of grace and wisdom, of judgment and love, of their progress unto perfection, and of the completion of those who have been made perfect, that is, of beatification." * Both aspects of his teaching are to be found also further on in the book. Wessel proceeds to say that men are not made righteous by the works of the law, since, being sinners, they do not accomplish these with the requisite degree of perfection (cap. 45, 46). Sinners are accordingly made righteous through faith in Christ — that faith, namely, which worketh by love. Faith has not, of course, a value which comes up to the active perfection of the angels ; yet it pleased God to grant to believers greater righteousness than to the angels, the righteousness, to wit, of the priestly functions of Christ, whereby believers are righteous even if they do not work righteousness perfectly (cap. 45). Or, as it is expressed in another connexion, it is not our faith that is our righteousness, but the purpose of God, who, in the sacrifice of Christ, ac- cepts our sacrifice. In the blood of Christ there is not merely the forgiveness of sins, but justification also and blessedness (cap. 44). Our works and spiritual sacrifices are in themselves unable to stand the judgment of God ; but since by faith we have part in Christ's perfect sacrifice, we shall stand as right- 1 De magnitud ine paasionis, cap. 7. Opera, Amstelod. 1617. I may remark that Wessel was a nominalist in metaphysics indeed, but not in theology. As a theologian, moreover, he makes use not of the scholastic, but of the rhetorical form, which is well adapted to his tendency to a brilliant use of figures. It is of course impossible to attain to any fixed theological ideas by such a method, still Wessel also in this respect follows in the track of thie realist tendencies of the Catholic doctrine. GOGH AND WESEL. .113 eous before God's strict judgment, by means of that participation and by means of our own spiritual sacrifices (cap. 39). But in spite of these sound Catholic views, Wessel is not disposed to lay weight upon the proper works and performances of those who are in Christ : his whole feeling relies upon the cross of Christ alone, and the gracious purpose of God. Vere dignum etjustum in cruce Christi gloriari, ex qua maxime nostra dignitas innotescit, per quam secura ndbis fiducia et pignus datur ad nos- tram illam dignitatem, quce ndbis per crucem innotuit certissime reditura (cap. 42). Super omnia gloriemur in Deo, per Christum suam in ndbis caritatem commendante^cap. 44). Qui evangelium / audiens credit, — prceterea amat evangelisatum justificantem et leatificantem, quantalibet pro consequendo faciat et patiatur, non sua opera, non se operantem extollit, sed propensus in eum quern amat, — nihil sibi ipsi tribuit, qui scit niliil habere ex se. Scit ergo, si nihil habet, nisi quod acceperit, non de suo gloriandum, quasi non acceperit sed in eo gloriandum, qui donat. Vere omnes justitice nostrce velut pannus menstruatce, — ut vere non turn justi, sed mere injusti plectendique convincamur (cap 46). Finally, I would point to his Exempla scalce meditationis, three very elaborate tracts, in which the pedantic arrangement and rhetorical style do not affect the definiteness with which Wessel places his whole assurance of salvation in that love which Christ showed in giving up His life for us. Besides Wessel, Ullmann has represented two other men of the fifteenth century, John von Goch and John von Wesel, as having been " Eeformers previous to the Eeformation." If we leave out of sight the general conception of what constitutes a " reformation " character as stated in the book that bears that title, — a conception so vague as to assign that character not merely to those chiefly practical and biblical theologians, but also to phenomena so completely heterogeneous and thoroughly mediaeval as are pantheistic mysticism and scholastic nominal- ism,— then the connexion of these men with the Eeformation amounts merely to this, that they disputed one or two of the in- stitutions of the Eomish Church — the vows, for example, and in- dulgences. Ullmann tries, however, to make too much of the value of that opposition of theirs. As in the case of Wessel, so here also his doing so can only be accounted for by his strangely defective understanding of the Catholic as well as of the Eeforma- 8 114 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. tion doctrines of salvation. In speaking of Goch, indeed, he does not go so far as to maintain that he coincided with the Ee- formers in their doctrine of justification ; he concedes that " the doctrine of justification through faith alone does not as yet come into prominence as the central point dominating everything, in the same measure as with the Eeformers." 1 But Ullmann's own excerpts from the writings of Goch (from p. 77 onwards) show that that author holds nothing different from the regular Eomish doctrine of justification. Ullmann finds this besides to praise specially in Goch, that he strictly excluded all human merit. His own excerpts, however, prove only that Goch, like Staupitz, controverted Thomas's conception of merit by means of that of Duns and the Nominalists. Nor does John von Wesel stand in any closer connexion with the Eeformers upon the decisive question of justification. For what Ullmann 2 alleges as a proof that he did so stand, is, in fact, a Catholic doctrine ; — this, namely, that Christ is our righteousness, in so far as we are guided by the Holy Ghost, and the love of God (towards God) is shed abroad in our hearts. The same want of knowledge of the Catholic doctrine is shared also by the biographer of another so-called forerunner of the Eeformation. Of Hieronymus Savonarola it is certified by Charles Meier,3 that he " clearly apprehended the real core of the Eeformation — the doctrine of justification without the merit of works, through grace, in faith," — and yet, from the subsequent sketch of his doctrine, it is established indubitably that he was a Thomist ! 4 Of John Wyclif, too, Lechler 5 brings it forward as something special, that " although his mode of expression is not without a scholastic character, particularly in the recogni- tion of merits, he is yet far removed from holding the theory of work-righteousness, and rather inclines to hold by the free grace God in Christ. He declares the notion of meritum de congruo to be a fabrication. He accentuates, on the other hand, the truth 1 As above, i. p. 90. 2 As above, i. pp. 324, 325. 3 Girolamo Savonarola (1836), pp. 215, 269-281. 4 It must be conceded that Savonarola also gives expression to the religious estimate of self, after the manner of Bernard, in his exposition of the 51st Psalm, which was recommended by Luther : " Quot justi, tot miserationes. Nullus gloriari potest in semetipso. Veniant omnes justi et interrogemus eos coram Deo, an sua virtute salvi facti sint ? Certe omnes respondebunt, Non nobis, Domine, sed nomini tuo da gloriam." 6 Herzog's Realencyklopadie, xviii. p. 1 00. TESTIMONY OF THE CHUEGH OF ROME. 115 that faith is a gift of God, which is only bestowed of grace ; and that God, when He rewards a man's good work, crowns His own gift." This is Thomist theology ; and he who controverts meritum de congruo, impugns Nominalism indeed, but no part of the doctrine of the Eomish Church. Equally inaccurate is Krummel's affirmation,1 that John Hus is Protestant in his doctrine of justification. His own excerpts prove that Hus maintained the Catholic doctrine merely. For, as I have already said (above, p. 91), all the characteristics of justification as a work of grace enumerated there, are asserted by the realist teachers of the mediaeval Church ; but they understand by the main idea of justification something different from what the Eeformers understood, and so also there is a difference with regard to the faith which pertains to justification. It cannot, however, matter much whether the Eeformation doctrine of justification was enunciated previous to the Keformers or not. For it was not from this theological doctrine that the Eeformation proceeded. It is enough for me at present that the practical self-estimate of believers, according to the standard of grace, — an estimate which excludes all value of merits, — an estimate used alike by Augustine and Bernard, — was clearly and plainly reached in the fifteenth century by Wessel and Staupitz. For this practical consciousness was the root of the Eeformation activity of both Luther and Zwingli. 20. And yet that concentration of attention upon grace, and that renunciation of all claim to merit, of which we have been speaking, is not confined merely to single distinguished in- dividuals within the Catholic Church : in a certain sense it constitutes a constant and characteristic feature of the Eoman Catholic Church itself. Whenever she places herself in the attitude of prayer, it is inevitable that in the expression of her religious discernment, in thanksgiving and in petition, all the benefits of salvation should be referred to God or to Christ ; the daily need for new grace, accordingly, is not expressed in the form of a claim based upon merits, but in the form of reliance upon God.2 But consciousness of sin, the worthlessness of merits 1 Oeschichte der bohmischen Reformation, p. 388. 2 Hymni ecdesiastici, prcesertim qui Ambrosiani dlcuntur. In Georg. Cassandri Operibus (Paris, 1616). p. 177. Ob hoc redemtor qusesumus, Ut probra nostra diluas, Vitse perennis commoda Nobis benigne conferas. 116 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. before God, and the utter need of sin-pardoning grace for our salvation, are expressed and taught in the strictest way in a prayer of the Eomish Canon of the Mass, which naturally, on account of this connexion, has supreme significance for the Church : Nobis quoque PECCATORIBUS, famulis tuis, de multi- tudine MISERATIONUM tuarum sperantibus, partem aliquam et societatem donare digneris cum . . . omnibus sanctis tuis, intra quorum nos consortium NON ^ESTIMATOR MERITI, SED VENICE, qucesumus, LARGITOR admitte. When this testimony of Eoman Catholicism is considered, it is fitted to cause surprise, that its point of view should have been practically resorted to so comparatively seldom, and only in instances so isolated during the centuries of the middle ages. On the other side, too, the Eomish opponents of the Eeformation in the sixteenth century were well aware that this manner of estimating self was either of obligation, or else that it represented the highest degree of piety, and one to be sought after.1 I do not think it probable that such a line of thought in these circles was first of all brought again to recollection by the cir- cumstance that the Eeformers laid so great stress upon it. Eather even before the controversy broke out it had already come into prominence quite distinctly among theologians who p. 186. Virtutis infer copiam, Qua conferas clementiam, Oblitus ut peccaminum Dones quietem temporum. p. 189. Infunde nunc piissime Donum perennis gratiae, Fraudis novae ne casibus Nos error atterat vetus. p. 193. Ob hoc redemptor quaesumus, Reple tuo nos lumine, Per quod dierum circulis Nullis rnamus actibus. p. 216. Da tempus acceptabile Et pcenitens cor tribue, Convertat ut benignitas, Quos longa suffert pietas. p. 221. O crux ave, spes unica, Hoc passionis tempore Auge piis justitiam Reisque dona veniam. 1 Compare "Wimpina, Anacephalaeosis haeresium ii. 9 ; Literae pontificiee Pauli III., de modo concionandi (by Reginald Poole) in Laemmer's Die vortri- dentinisch-katholische Theologie, p. 163, 168. Compare also Gerhardi Con- fessio catholica, p. 1558, seq., — but with discrimination. TESTIMONY OF THE CHURCH OF ROME. 117 are far removed from the circle of the Eeformers. I think I may venture to conjecture that towards the end of the fifteenth century, contemporaneously with the fall into discredit of the monkish work-righteousness, and the complete disappearance of the Nominalist school, there began a general recurrence on the part of men to this fundamental Augustinian principle of the religious life ; and particularly that the leaning of the Witten- berg theologians towards Augustine was originally only a branch-movement in that general agitation of the Church. George Cassander, in a passage I shall immediately cite, refers to the fact that not only the Parisian theologian, lodocus Clich- toveus (ob. 1543), but also the theologian of Louvain, Adrian of Utrecht (Pope Adrian vi.), obviously following Bernard (p. 100, note, ad fin.), plainly pronounced against the value of meritorious works, making use of the figure employed in Isa. Ixiv. 6.1 But Cassander himself, at the close of a series of testimonies, adduces the evidence of these contemporaries to show that the universal Church had occupied this standpoint from the very beginning. He says, "With regard to the righteousness which consists in obeying the commandments of God, the universal Church declares that she depends chiefly upon faith in the forgiveness of sins, upon the mercy of God, through the instrumentality of Christ's blood, being in herself impure and imperfect." (Here follow testimonies taken from all ages of the Church.) " It appeared to me good to write this, in order that the Church of the present might be vindicated from reproach, as if she attributed too much to this active righteousness and to the merit of good works, and treated with ingratitude and contempt the merit of Christ, and also in order that the Protestants might more easily be able to attach themselves to 1 The task I am immediately occupied with prevents me from investigating specially this change I have indicated in the Church's tone. Still I have not the slightest doubt that towards the beginning of the sixteenth century one could find, over and above the two theologians that have been named, several other orthodox Catholic divines who also revived the Augustinian tradition in this fashion. Even Erasmus belongs to this class. Accordingly, we must fix in some other way the value of Wessel and of Staupitz than by calling them forerunners of the Reformation, and even Reformers previous to the Reforma- tion. The latter designation, in particular, is altogether to be set aside ; for it is untrue. These men reformed nothing either in the doctrine or in the institutions of the Church. But neither ought they as forerunners of the Reformation to be separated from the other Augustinians and realists, to whom they are more closely allied than to the Reformers. 118 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. the unity of the Church in this essential point of justifica- tion before God." l That this expectation was not realized is to be attributed to the following circumstance, apart from the causes that may lie below the surface. The real position of the public doctrine which the Eeformation had to do with, was on neither side apprehended or stated with historical accuracy and truth. The theological opponents of the Eeformation, who were exclusively Eealists, utterly ignore the fact that the Nominalist school, throughout an entire century and a half, had maintained Pelagian doctrine in connexion with merita de congruo, and had over-estimated merita de condigno as compared with the merit of Christ ; that, as a school, Nominalism had received just the same public recognition with Eealism ; and both scientifically and practically had exercised a more widely extended in- fluence. The Eeformers, on the other hand, level against scholasticism, as a whole, the charges of Pelagianism, which are in reality true of the nominalist doctrine only.2 And yet, even if these causes of mutual misunderstanding had been removed in time, the two parties would still have failed to adjust their 1 De articulis religionis inter Catholicos et Protestantes controversis consultatio ad Ferdinandum I. et Maximilianum II. (1564.) In his collected Works, pp. 924, 925. 2 Compare, for example, Apologia Conf. Aug. p. 61. " Scholastic! secuti philosophos tantum decent justitiam rationis . . . quod ratio sine Spiritu sancto possit diligere Deum super omnia ... ad hunc modum docent, homines mereri remissionem peccatorum, faciendo quod in se est," p. 63. *' Quod fingunt discrimen inter meritum congrui et meritum condigni, ludunt tantum, ne videantur aperte Trc\ayiavi£ftv. Nam si Deus necessario (!) dat gratiam pro merito congrui, jam non est meritum congrui, sed meritum con- digni." This latter remark of Melanchthon at once shows that he has no understanding of the matter, for the Nominalists, in respect of both sorts of merit, deny any sort of necessity so far as God is concerned (p. 91). It is in the adoption (" faithful to the confession ") of these unhistorical assumptions, however, that the views of Protestant historians, reviewed above, have their origin, as if mediaeval theologians at once separate themselves from the doc- trine of the Catholic Church merely in virtue of the fact that they assign no value to meritum de congruo, and derive from grace everything that is good in man. Another scientifically inaccurate assertion of Melanchthon — connected with the previous one — is to be found in p. 175: "Adversarii dicunt peccatum ita remitti, quia attritus seu contritus elicit actum dilectionis Dei, per hunc actum meretur accipere remissionem peccatorum. . . . Prseterea docent confidere, quod remissionem peccatorum consequamur propter con- tritiooem et dilectionem." On the one hand, even attritio as actus informis, presupposes grace ; and, on the other, contritio, as being actus car itateformatus, presupposes gratia gratum faciens. In the progress from the first to the second grade, and even on the second grade itself, the idea of meritum is not at all resorted to. TESTIMONY OF THE CHURCH OF ROME. 119 differences by means of that common confession. For, just in order to leave room for merits, the followers of Home tolerated the incongruity between the religious estimate of self that is gained when we judge ourselves exclusively in the light of divine grace, and the dogma of real justification. The Eeformers, on the other hand, found themselves warranted and driven to bring the theological doctrine into harmony with the practical consciousness of grace. Can any one rationally deny that the actually righteous person, in placing his confidence without any regard to his own merits (non cestimator meriti) for the attain- ment of blessedness solely in God's forgiving grace (sed Venice largitor), solicits such a sentence of God as shall mercifully (de multitudini miserationum tuaruni) regard as righteous one who is conscious that, so far as his own merits are concerned, he is unrighteous (nobis peccatoribus) ? Since such a subjective re- nunciation of all claim to merit is enjoined (non cestimator meriti), there must necessarily be assigned to this synthetic judgment of justification (venice largitor — nobis peccatoribus} , a scope and significance reaching, so far as God is concerned, beyond that real change in man whereby it is possible for him to produce good works as merits. It is on the observation of this fact that the Eeformers base their undertaking theologically to distinguish justification from regeneration, and to place the former as a divine sentence passed on the sinner before his actual renewal through the Holy Ghost. Of course the business of the Eeformation is not exhausted in this attempt at a reconstruction of the doctrine ; but such a reconstruction also is a necessary feature in that reformation of the church's life which Luther and Zwingli brought about by means of the leading idea of a religious estimate of self, in the light of God's grace alone. The Eoman Catholic Church, adhering to the doctrinal decisions of the Council of Trent, still continues to oscillate between the one view and the other. In her communion, people are assured of their ability to accomplish good works in statu justifications per gratiam, whereby they satisfy divince legi pro hujus vitce statu plene (what a contradiction !), and actually merit eternal life as a reward ; but, at the same time, they do not forget that these merits are still only God's gifts of grace, so that one cannot attach value to them as being one's own 120 THE MEDIAEVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. works (Sess. vi. deer, de lustificatione, cap. 16). Hence the pledge of the continued religious solidarity of the Western Church is given by no means indistinctly in the closing sentences in this doctrinal decree, although obscured by their reference to merits, which is as deliberate as it is illogical : Absit ut Christianus homo in se ipso vel conftdat ml glorietur, et non in domino, cujus tanta est erga omnes homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quce sunt ipsius dona. Et quid in multis offendimus omnes, unusquisque sicut misericordiam et bonitatem, ita severitatem et judicium ante oculos habere debet, neque seipsum aliquis, etiamsi nihil sibi conscius fuerit, judicare, quoniam omnis hominum vita non humano judicio examinanda et judicanda est, sed Dei, qui illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum et manifestabit consilia cordium ; et tune laus erit unicuique a Deo qui, ut scriptum est, reddet unicuique secundum opera sua. In contrast with this, the fundamental fact of the exclusive importance of grace is unreservedly laid down in the exhortation to the dying which the official agenda of the Eomish Church1 pre- scribe, to the effect that the dying must repose their confidence upon Christ and His passion as the sole ground of salvation. This ordinance is the origin of the jocular saying current among the Lutherans in Wiirtemberg, that every Catholic becomes a Lutheran before his death : the sober fact is, that the Romish Church, in dealing with her members at this point, sacrifices her own particular pretensions to the universal Christian truth. 1 Agenda Coloniensis ecclesice (Colon. 1637), p. 108; Agenda sive Rituale, Oanabrugeme (Colon. 1653), p. 171. CHAPTEE IV. THE KEFOKMATION PRINCIPLE OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH IN CHRIST. 21. THE circle of thoughts, the historical development of which I am at present engaged in tracing, undergoes in the first instance, at the hand of the Eeformers, an important modification in respect of form. In the mediaeval system of doctrine, the treatment of the satisfaction or merit which Christ gave or acquired towards God on behalf of the human race or of the elect, was carried out in a purely objective way ; the influence of this work upon man was always only alluded to in that connexion, and treated with doctrinal fulness, on the other hand, in an entirely different part of the system, in the doctrine of justification. The Eeformers, on the contrary, not only take together the two thoughts in their immediate reci- procal relation to each other, but at the same time fix the chief interest upon the thought of justification, and seemingly assign to the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction the position of a subsi- diary doctrine, which has the function of explaining the asser- tion they make, that justification is conditioned exclusively by faith. This formal change in the way of putting the problem is, however, an indication of a change in the nature and con- tents of the thought of justification. When Luther at once places it in a position of central importance, and emphasizes his own view of it as the decisive and indispensable truth, he means by justification through faith in Christ a subjective religious experience of the believer within the Church, and not an objective theological dictum in the Church's system of doctrinal beliefs. In this respect Luther's apprehension of justification differs in kind from the Eoman Catholic doctrine that bears the same name to such an extent that the customary 121 1 22 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. procedure of the old polemical theology, and of the modern science of comparative " Symbolic " in comparing with one another the evangelical and the Eoman Catholic views of justification, as if they were antitheses framed with direct reference to each other, is, at the outset, mistaken, fruitless, misleading. Tor by justification through Christ solely on condition of appropriating faith is meant an experience of the believer complete in itself and continuous. What the Roman Catholic doctrine understands by justification, on the other hand, on account of the machinery declared to be necessary, — the sacraments and active fulfilment of the laws of God and the Church, — can never possibly pass as a simple experience into the soul of the believer. Nay, rather the assurance of being justified before God, even if it be awakened for a moment by means of absolution, is forbidden to the ordinary course of everyday life as being presumptuous. The difference in kind between the two thoughts, though they bear the same name, appears too in their complete diversity, and mutual irrelevance in application and function. The Roman Catholic doctrine of justification is meant to explain how and by what means an actually righteous person, who can be judged as such in con- sistence with truth even by God, is produced out of a sinner. The meaning of the religious experience of justification, on the other hand, in the Reformation sense, is that the believer (who as such is regenerate and a member of the Church, and who through the Holy Ghost is capable of producing good works, and actually engaged in them), on account of the abiding imperfection of these good works does not find his standing before God, his righteousness and the ground of his abiding assurance of salvation, in them, but only in the mediatorial and perfectly righteous work of Christ appropriated by faith. It accords only with this definition of the thought that Luther, as well as Melanchthon, the Formula Concordice as well as the Apology for the Augsburg Confession, that Calvin as well as Zwingli strive to establish in it the consolation of pious consciences, the quieting of souls anxious about their salvation. It is only as a subsequent and secondary matter that the Reformers direct their attention to the position to be assigned in the theological system to the thought that has been religiously and practically experienced. This last undertaking, however, was not carried CHANGE OF TREA THE NT. 1 23 out by Luther and Melanchthon with the clearness and in- dependence of the religious and practical employment of that truth that were to be wished, and it will remain to be considered whether and how far succeeding dogmatists have succeeded in finishing the task which their great predecessors had left uncompleted. In the order of the doctrines, that of Christ's satisfaction had naturally to come first, then follows the doctrine of the awakening of faith or of regeneration, then the doctrine of justification, the imputation of Christ's righteous- ness, and then (not before) the doctrine of the habitual renewal of the justified, so that he becomes fitted for good works. In this shape, now, the evangelical doctrines of justification and regeneration come into contrast with the Eomish doctrine of justification or regeneration ; and here, first of all, does a comparison between these doctrines and that of Eome become possible. This being so, it is absurd to measure the two doc- trines of justification by one another, although they bear the same name; for the compass and extent of the Eomish doctrine are covered only by two or three doctrines of the evangelical system taken together. But the reason why the thought, which on the part of the Eomish Church is conceived as a unity, is analysed on the part of the Evangelical Church into several distinct notions, is explained by the successors of the Eeformers always merely from the religious need on the part of the regenerate for justification by faith, but never from objective considerations of the systematic connexion of Chris- tian doctrine. It will appear also, that in the objective doc- trinal exposition of the thought of justification by faith, the Lutherans were precisely those who failed to pay attention to all the conditioning elements under which the religious con- ception was brought by Luther. When, accordingly, school- tradition raised itself to a position of supreme power in the Lutheran Church, the imperfectly expounded thought of justi- fication by faith came to be unintelligible just in proportion as men treated it, in the first instance, as an objective doctrine, and made its religious value to depend upon acceptance of the formula. And when afterwards Pietism undertook anew to bring back the doctrine to subjective praxis, or actual religious and moral experience, that was not done in the churchly spirit of the Eeformation, but in a spirit of separation and sectarian- 124 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. ism hostile to the Church. Since, finally, the efforts of the Evangelical Church of the nineteenth century have gone back upon the Eeformation, and believe that they have regained the regulative principle at once of Christian life and of theological creed in the distinctive truth of justification by faith, it might probably seem as if no obstacles had to be overcome in the historical investigation of the question, what the Eeformers, and particularly Luther, actually maintained. But, unfortunately, the state of the case is far otherwise. For the repristination of Luther's standpoint in our day has been able to avoid neither the pietistic nor the scholastic distortion of that doctrine from what it originally was to his religious intuition, and on that account the historical and the theoretical ascertainment of the churchly sphere of vision within which Luther connected justification exclusively with faith in Christ's satisfaction, are alike problems still unresolved, because no one has yet ap- prehended them.1 The widely comprehensive study of the history of theology and of dogma on which, as it was pursued during last genera- tion, we have to congratulate ourselves, was not as a whole regulated so much as it ought to have been by regard to those points of Church history which were fitted to direct it, and this defect makes itself felt particularly in the manner of apprehend- ing and interpreting the theology of the Eeformers. When once we depart from that method of treating Church history, which proceeds upon the theory that in the changes and in the advances of theological science the logically necessary develop- ment of thought must be traced, we have no longer any other point of view left to us than that which makes the religious and scientific experiences of the theological subject to form the ; sufficient basis for his particular theological views. For second or third class men this standard may suffice : for by it the individual's development will be dependent on the position of the Church as he finds it. But such a standard, as it is custom- arily resorted to, is not sufficient for an understanding of the theology of the Eeformation. The individual subjects, Luther, 1 1 have already, however, in an exposition of Andreas Osiander's doctrine of justification (Jahrbucher fur deutsche Theologie, ii., 1857), stated what are the points of view which always approved themselves to me as the right ones for the apprehension of the matter. CATHOLICITY OF THE REFORMERS. 125 Zwingli, Melanchthon, Calvin, are indeed recognised by us as reformers precisely by this feature, that they set themselves against the course of the Church and of theology as it had been going on up to their time, and so were not dominated by it. But we, for our part, cannot so appreciate them, as if they had put themselves in an attitude of contrariety to the tendency of the Catholic Church itself which had come down to them in history. For in that case we ourselves should not be able to distinguish between their dignity and that of their contem- poraries,— the Anabaptists, — Schwenkfeld, — Faustus Socinus, — and we should at the very outset be conceding the justice of the Eoman Catholic criticism, that the fathers of the evangelical churches were heretics just as much as these founders of sects and leaders of schools. But we are satisfied (without going further into the matter) that the Eeformers as such neither had any wish to found a new religion, nor, as matter of fact, did they found new churches, as if they believed that up to their time their religious tendency had not been at all operative in the Western Church. Nor yet do we consider the Eeformers in the light of prophets, as if they brought religious knowledge and the ordinances of the Church to a degree of perfection that had not been objectively possible before their time : for the Ee- formers expressly repudiated, so far as they were concerned, the claim to that effect made by the leaders of the Anabaptists. To what historical circumstances must we attribute it then, that the Church-Eeformers as such should have kept the ground of the Church, and that they should have confounded it neither with that of the sects nor with that of the schools ? In virtue of what principle was it that, in breaking loose from the Church in its Eomish form, they did not also complete their separation from the Catholicity of the Church ? The answer to these questions will not have been sufficiently given by pointing out the intention of the Eeformers to maintain current the idea of the universal Church. For the Anabaptists also, and the Socinians after their fashion, share this intention, and yet the distinctive marks to which each of these parties in its own way brings back the idea of the Church run completely counter to the doctrine that up till then had been current or implicitly taken for granted. The question amounts, therefore, to this, — Whether the Eeformers also, in accordance with a 126 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. traditional maxim, which was not altogether rejected even by their opponents, maintained the ground of the universal Church even after the Eoman ecclesiastical power had cast them out as heretics ? In fine, it amounts to this, — whether in this respect they actually are distinguished from the efforts of the Socinians and Anabaptists, seemingly analogous yet combated by them, or whether, together with these, they are to be ranked in one and the same class. 22. The Eeformation could not have got beyond her first movements of life in Germany and Switzerland, if in these countries the pretension of the Eoman Church, that she alone is tJw Christian community, had held good with unmitigated significance and strength. The power of the Pope and of the bishops would in that case have suppressed the Eeformation by the same means and with the same result in these lands also, just as actually was the case in Italy. It was possible to carry out the Eeformation in Gernrany and in Switzerland only because since the fifteenth century the consequences of the downfall of the papal power in these countries had entailed a pre- ponderance of the State over the Church, based upon the State's generally recognised right of advocacy for the Church.1 While this right had by Gregory vii. been degraded into the uncon- ditional duty of submission on the part of the State to the power of the Church, its public currency since the Babylonian captivity of the popes, since the schism and reforming councils had again approximated to that standard according to which the relation of State to Church had been treated in the Byzan- tine and Frankish periods of the Eoman Empire. As advocate of the Church, the Eoman Emperor figured in the chief place ; but the states of the Eoman Empire belonging to the German nation participated each according to its share in the rights of that position. While, accordingly, the Empire was generally recognised at the period of the Eeformation as being the Chris- tian community, in the wider meaning of that expression, the division of political power amongst the large number of states of the Empire rendered possible, in virtue of the assertion by these of rights over the Church, the agitation and propagation of particular religious views, which the latter by virtue of her 1 Compare Friedberg: Der Missbrauch der geistlichen Amtsgewalt u. der Jtecurs an den Stoat in the Zeitschriftf. Kirchenrecht, Bd. viii. p. 304, seq. CATHOLICITY OF THE REFORMERS. 127 constitution excluded. The Eeformers, without exception, adhered to the Christian Society they found in the Eoman Empire ; the Anabaptists, on the contrary, entirely repudiated it, and sought to establish, as the Christian one, an altogether new order of society. Now, the Roman Empire had from a very early period been distinguished as a Christian society by a distinctive feature that more properly belongs to a church, namely, by the imposition of a dogmatic creed. The imperial edict of Gratianus, Valentinianus, and Theodosius De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica of the year 380 (the first in the Justinian codex), which was still the unchanged basis of public law at the time of the Eeformation, treats as Catholic Chris- tians all those persons who share the profession of Dam- asus, Bishop of Eome, respecting the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, and brands all others with the name of heretics, regarding them as exposed to the wrath of God, as well as to temporal punishment at the pleasure of the Emperor. The Eeformers did not divest themselves of this, the mark that distinguished the Empire as the Christian community : for though they sought to bring about changes in the then existing ecclesiastical order, as well as in that view of the scheme of salvation which was current in their time, they never dis- puted the doctrine of the Trinity. The very omission of that doctrine from the oldest text-books — from Melanchthon's Loci Communes and from Farel's Sommaire (published originally in 1524), far from implying any repudiation of it, rather indicates an intention to leave unaltered and untouched in the recon- struction of the practical doctrines of salvation a doctrine they looked upon as sacred, an unshaken mystery of the Christian faith. In fact the public Confessions — those of Augsburg and Smalkald, for example — expressly declare acceptance of the Mcene doctrine. Not only did the Eeformers continue con- sciously and deliberately to be catholic in virtue of this : their strict conformity with the principles of the Christian religion, so far as these had been avowed by the Eoman Empire, also made it possible for princes and rulers, as such, to tolerate them, to protect them, and even to make common cause with them. Such co-operation between the authorities and the Eeformers on the basis of Christianity that the Eoman Empire offered, also secured to the latter their continued 128 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. claim to be members of the universal Church — a claim which is more than once put forward in the Confession of Augsburg. For, apart from the Roman Empire, no universal Christian church then existed ; and the Empire, by having fixed upon what was to be regarded as the distinctive test of Catholic Christianity, had given to all who answered that test a certifi- cate of membership in the Christian Church. Both points are conveyed in the project of an oecumenical council, a project under the protection of which the Reformation established itself so securely that it could no longer be rolled back when the council itself actually came to be held. For in the case of the Reformers the appeal to a general council was equivalent to a continued claim to have part in the universal Church as embodied in the Roman Empire, their renunciation of the Pope's authority notwithstanding ; and the promise obtained from the Emperor at the close of the Diet of Spires (1526), to the effect that he would cause the religious controversy to be settled by a council, actually concedes in a provisional manner to the Re- formation full rights within the Church, so long as the states of the Empire so comported themselves as they could answer to God and the Emperor : thus at once entirely suspending the binding character of all such developments of dogma as up to that time had not been confirmed by any general council with the Emperor's approval It may well be granted that this principle upon which the controversy in the Western Church was to be settled was a legal fiction ; for the imperial power brought itself to submit to it only because the political situation was unfavourable ; and the reforming party also, as soon as it had gained a firm footing and had acquired all the forms of a church constitution, refused to accept the conditions under which alone a general council of the Church could have been convened in the ordinary way. At the same time we must remember that it was also in virtue of a legal fiction that Constantine, for example, in his time received into the Roman Empire the new religion of Christ, while contrasting it as the old religion with the heretical sects. As, at all events, the history of the Reformation, in spite of its various political vicissitudes, was dominated by this half-churchly principle of law until, by the religious peace of Augsburg, it acquired positive political rights of its own in the Empire ; the result of its course was, CATHOLICITY OF THE REFORMERS. 129 that the same regard to the position of the Church in history which regulated Luther's undertaking, — and after his peculiar fashion that of Zwingli also, — pervaded as a characteristic and fundamentally important element all their reforms of the Church. However deeply one may feel the imperfection and partial erroneousness of the constitution of the churches of the Eeformation, it is still true, above every other thing that can be said with regard to the Keformers, that in their reconstruc- tion of the Church they gave a position so decisively important to the religious influences — especially to the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments (which were always considered as the ultimate divinely appointed bases of the Church), precisely in order that they might thereby get something to set over against the specifically state character of the Komish Church. At the same time they thoroughly and effectually maintained the comprehensive character of the Church as against the essentially sectarian character of the Anabaptist organization and the essentially school character of that of the Socinians. For their whole doctrine of the plan of salvation, as well as their marly diverse efforts at a church constitution with the help of the state, are dominated by the thought that the whole is before the parts, and that the in- dividual comes to possess faith and to be in a state of salvation only as a member of the Church ; while Anabaptists, and Socinians, would have the church they aim at to consist of the aggregate of actively holy persons, or of those acquainted with the saving doctrines of Christ. What other interpretation can wre put upon that fundamental position of Luther — that God bestows the Holy Spirit only through the Word and Sacraments — than as meaning that faith and Christian life are inconceivable except within that religious society which is always in existence previous to any manifestation of individual life, and which is always actively operative in those her essential features, wherever the individual attains unto faith ? But a similar meaning is conveyed by the practical principle, under the guidance of which Zwingli placed his whole undertak- ing,— the principle, namely, that the political authority in Zurich was the authorized representative of the Christian Church, and that therefore the ordinances of that authority in the interests of Christian religion, regarding soundness of public 9 130 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. teaching, simplicity of worship, salutary discipline of the in- dividual, must be obeyed. But these ordinances commended themselves to the sense of the Church as a whole, because they were in accordance with Scripture. The community of believers, therefore, the body intrusted with God's Word and Sacraments, was, in Luther's view (although he could not like Zwingli regard it as a body exercising civil rights), neither a visionary imagination nor a new sectarian product of his own making ; on the contrary, it stood forth as the imperish- able kernel of the imperial Church that had become historical, — to a part in which the Eeformers had and maintained their right at the very time when they took in hand to give force to the fundamental characteristics of that Church against the adventitious deformations that had taken place in her doc- trines and life. It must at once be admitted that the Keformers themselves hardly ever expressed a clear consciousness of the fact that, by their recognition of the doctrine of the Trinity, they were holding the legal standing ground given them by the Eoman Empire. They only knew that in virtue of this confession they were maintaining the ground of the Catholic Church.1 Neither can it be doubted that the said doctrine was originally accepted by the Eeformers in virtue of Church tradition, and not in virtue of the specific authority of Scripture. It was their constantly widening separation from the Eomish Church that first made it necessary for them to base this doctrine also on Scripture as soon as its defence (chiefly on account of Michael Servetus's denial) came to be a work of special importance to them. But then, as Servetus disputed the use made by the Church of the notion hypostasis or person, precisely because these words 1 Compare Luther : Die drei Symbola oder Belcenntniss des christlidien Glaubens von Luthern, seinen Glauben zu bekennen, aufs Neue in Druck gegeben. Walch, x. p. 1198. Preface : "I have ex abundanti caused to be published together in German the three symbols or Confessions which have hitherto been held throughout the whole Church ; by this I testify once for all that I adhere to the true Christian Church which, up till now, has maintained those symbols, but not to that false pretentious church, which is the worst enemy of the true Church, and has surreptitiously introduced much idolatry along- side of these beautiful Confessions." Luther's attitude in the sacramentarian controversy also was to all intents and purposes determined by the (certainly erroneous) impression that the doctrine of the real presence of the body of Christ in the sacramental bread is upheld by the unvarying tradition of the Church. See his letter to Duke Albrecht of Prussia in 1532. DeWette; Luther's Brie/e, iv. p. 354 ; Walch, xx. p. 2096. CATHOLICITY OF THE REFORMERS. 131 are foreign to the Bible, the Eeformers could not help con- ceding a measure of doctrinal authority to the Church on this point, though in a carefully restricted and guarded way.1 This view, however, leans towards that tendency which led George Calixtus, at a later period, to declare the consensus of the first five centuries of the Christian Church to be authoritative for the interpretation of Scripture. The fact is, that the Eeformers, in their doctrine of the person of Christ and of the Trinity, followed this consensus, in the first instance, because they still kept their footing on the ground of the Catholic Church as recognised by the Eoman Empire. But it was a mistaken and useless attempt on the part of Calixtus to seek to impose that standard as a rule of primary value upon the Lutheran Church ; for that Church had already for a whole century emancipated her dogmatic consciousness from resting on a fic- titious harmony of ecclesiastical tradition, even although the task of interpreting Scripture by Scripture did not admit at that time of being thoroughly carried out. If, however, the Eeformers originally did not fully calculate the political importance to the Eeformation of their adherence to the doctrine of the Trinity, the authorities at least who attached themselves to the Eeformation movement were very 1 Melanchthon expresses himself on this matter in a tractate of the year 1539, De ecclesia et auctoritate verbi Dei (C. R. xxiii. p. 595 seq.). He will have it that the authority of the Church ought to contribute towards our under- standing of the Johannine Prologue, on the principle that the Church ought to be heard, Matt, xviii. 17. Audiamus igitur docentem et admonentem ecclesiam, sed non propter auctoritatem ecclesice credendum est, cum videlicet admoniti ab ecclesia intelligimus hanc sententiam vere et sine sophistica in verbo Dei traditam esse . . . Auditor admonitus ab ecclesia, quod VEK&UHS. significet personam, scilicet Filium Dei, adjuvaturjam ab ecclesia, et . . . articulum credit non propter ecclesice avctoritatem, sed quia videt hanc sententiam habere firma testimonia in ipsa scriptura. — Calvin (Inst. Chr. Rel. i. 13, 3.4), too, admits that the technical forms of the doctrine of the Trinity are not directly taken from Scripture ; but after having shown them to be in accordance with the sense of the Bible, he justifies their continued use by the Church on the ground that the very erroneous ideas which compelled the Church to give a scientific shape to these ideas, continue still to render them necessary. This view is much more judicious than that of Melanchthon, and is in harmony with the greater strictness of the principle of adherence to Scripture which charac- terized the second generation of the Reformation. George Major also, De origine et auctoritate verbi Dei (1550), recognises catholicus consensus in interpre- tation scriptures, only he refuses as much as his teachers did to avail himself of it as an absolute guide upon the point in question. Even although it multum valet ad conjirmandas mentes piorum, yet it should only be allowed to have some weight on account of its conformity with Scripture as interpreted by itself. He therefore places Scripture above dogmatically orthodox tradition. 132 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. distinctly aware of the rights and duties which pertained to them in virtue of the public law of the Empire. The evangelical authorities of Geneva and of Berne gave most distinct evidence of this when, with express reference to the edict of Gratian, and to subsequent imperial edicts against heretics, they sentenced to death Michael Servetus (1553) and Valentine Gentilis (1556) for having denied the doctrine of the Trinity.1 It was the same consideration that led the Elector of Saxony to imprison Johannes Campanus, who, in 1530, had made himself notorious in Wittemberg by contro- verting the doctrine of the Trinity ; for the statements said to have been made by him at the same time regarding the cessation of sin in converted persons, and the needlessness of the law to such, although they betray an Anabaptist tendency, would not have sufficed to bring down on him such punishment.2 Con- versely, the supreme power in Zurich gave in 1528 striking evidence that, in spite of its sympathy with the Eeformation, it was still Catholic when it caused to be beheaded for Icesa majestas one Max Weerli of Thurgau (a district under the same government with Zurich), who, adopting the epithet habitually used by the Romish Church, had characterized as heretics the " gracious lords " of Zurich.3 The theologians Calvin, Mel- anchthon, and Beza indeed base the right of punishing anti- Trinitarians upon a general obligation which the civil magis- trate owes to the Church ; appealing to examples taken from the Old Testament, and laying no stress on the positive law of the Empire. It cannot, however, be doubted that their general proposition is framed upon the positive law, and that the proofs drawn from the Old Testament are conclusive only to those whose sphere of vision has been already prescribed for them by the imperial enactment. And, under certain circumstances, the theological supporters of the Eeformed Church in Switzerland, when their impugned orthodoxy re- quired to be defended, could persuade themselves to put it expressly under the protection of Gratian's edict. An example of this is found in the preface to the Second Helvetic Con- 1 Compare Trechsel: Antitrinitarier vor Faustus Socin. i. p. 237 ; ii. p. 328. Compare also ii. pp. 358, 359, where Gentilis himself affirms the principle that heretics, as being teachers of false religion, deserve capital punishment. 2 As above, i. p. 27. 3 Compare Hundeshagen: Beltrdge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik, i. p. 99. LUTHER'S IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. 133 fession, which was published in 1556, while the process against Gentilis was pending.1 But since the Eeformed Churches could not prove themselves to be orthodox by the standard of the Eomish Church, although they could do so by that of the Eoman Empire, they accordingly separate the anti-Trinitarians as heretics from themselves, on the ground that they went beyond the rights of Christian society, so far as this was at all recognised as the basis of the universal Church, as distinguished from the narrower circle of that of Kome. Such was the historical position in which originally Luther and Zwingli essayed the reformation of the Church; the former by regulating and renovating the religious and moral relations of the Christian life by means of a right understanding of the doctrine of the sinner's justification in Christ, the latter by introducing more immediately into the Church of Zurich the authority of the Word of God as alone operative towards the Church's faith and life. In declaring themselves to have kept within the limits of the Christian fellowship of the Eoman Empire, from which the Anabaptists were withdrawing themselves in their sectarian effort towards the formation of a community of actual saints ; in re-introducing into Christian life the Church's original scheme of salvation in accordance with the principles of the Gospel, they felt within themselves that they were acting in the spirit of the " Catholic Church." As matter of fact, however, it was not merely in an ideal sense that they held the priority of the Church to every saving manifestation in individual persons ; they actually established, as the practical standard in accordance with which the religious life of the Church should be constantly renewed, simply that thought in accordance with which the self-estimate of the most conspicuous characters of the middle ages was formed, and in which, as a whole, the loftiest and purest piety of the mediaeval Church finds expression— the thought, namely, that with the Christian, whether he be conscious of relative perfec- tion or of relative imperfection, grace alone, and not merit, is the ground of his acceptance with God. 23. What Luther's thought of justification by faith practically meant, is made clear by Chemnitz's testimony and by Luther's 1 Niemeyer : Collectio Confessionum, p. 462, seq. Compare Trechsel j as above, ii. p. 375. 134 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. own explanations in those sermons and tracts which date from the time previous to the beginning of the controversy about absolution. The preference I give to these last above all other writings of Luther, I found upon the fact that he suffered himself to be led by the attacks of his adversaries to a change of form in his position that is not immaterial to the proper apprehension of the question. Chemnitz's testimony 1 ought, however, to be placed in the foreground, because it is in every respect classical, and because it gives us the most adequate means of fully ascertaining the range of Luther's view. He says, " The main point of controversy at present agitated be- tween us and the papists relates to the good works or new obedience of the regenerate; whether, namely, the regenerate are justified through that renewal which the Holy Ghost works in them, and by means of the good works which proceed from that renewal : in other words, whether the newness, virtues, or good works of the regenerate are the things in virtue of which they can stand at the judgment of God, for the sake of which God is propitiated and made gracious, upon which they can lean, and in which they can trust when the hard question comes to be answered, whether we be the children of God, and have been accepted to everlasting life." Chemnitz then points out that Paul, in the Epistle to the Eomans, attributes to Abraham justification by faith, even while representing him as regenerate and adorned with good works. " If, accordingly, in true repentance faith lays hold of and appropriates to itself Christ's satisfaction, then has it some- thing which it can oppose to the. law's accusations at the bar of God, and so bring it to pass that we be declared just. It is indeed also true that believers through their renewing by the Holy Ghost have an actual righteousness ; but inasmuch as that righteousness has only commenced in this life, inas- much as it is imperfect and still impure by reason of the flesh, 1 Examen Cone. Trid. (Genev. 1641), p. 134, seq. 140. Chemnitz's point of view as stated in the text is constantly recurring also in his article De justi- ficatione. Bellarmine (De justificatione, ii. 2), in attacking this representation of the question at issue as a falsification of it, himself fails accurately to reproduce Chemnitz' dilemma. For the latter does not consider merely the question propter quod Dens hominem in gratiam recipiat, as Bellarmine says in summarizing Chemnitz, p. 129, but also the question propter quod Deus hominem renatum justum censeat. LUTHER'S IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. 135 we cannot stand in God's judgment with it, nor on its account does God pronounce us to be righteous." Now, Luther's sermons, belonging to the years 1515-1517, in which the thought of justification through faith attains to clear statement, are, so far, perfectly correct in this respect, that Luther constantly bears in mind the fact that he is speaking to the Christian Church, and not to a miscellaneous number of sinners who require first to be converted. On this account it is that he represents the assurance of justification by faith as the religious regulating principle of the entire life of the Christian in its subjective phases, — a principle which pervades the whole course of it, — never as a mere phenomenon which ought to manifest itself at the close of the work of conver- sion in the sinner. For, properly speaking, those sermons have nothingtodo — do not concern themselves at all — with the conver- sion of sinners. Luther, accordingly, fairly takes for granted in them that his hearers are really striving after and attaining unto good works ; rebuking at the same time, however, such con- fidence in valuing these and such superficiality in the estimate of sin as is sure to pervade the whole Christian life and to mar its worth towards God. When people regard only their out- ward sins, and make no account of sinful concupiscence, as being venial, they are prone to believe themselves acceptable in virtue of their individual good works, and to think they may put confidence in them, although these become really null through pride. But it is all the other way. No one, not even the most perfect, can be free from the fear of hell. The fear of the just is at all times a mixture of holy and of slavish fear, but they attain ever more and more unto the former, until they come at last to fear nothing but God.1 While the work- righteous do not fulfil the law in the spirit, for in their hearts, at least, they have sin and concupiscence ; the saints, in like manner, have their secret sins (which have only begun to be subdued through grace) plainly revealed before their eyes ; they cannot, therefore, pride them elves on their external works.2 These indications of the imperfection of the good works of the regenerate, were systematically developed and theologically established by Luther in his Resolutionen uber die dreizehn 1 Loscher, Reformationsacta, i. pp. 777, 748, 252. 2 As above, i. pp. 772, 777. 136 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. Sdtze gegen Eck of the year 1519.1 In this tract he appeals first of all to the declarations of Scripture (1 John i. 8 ; Isa. Ixiv. 6 ; Eccl. vii 20; Eom. vii. 15 ; GaL v. 17 ; Ps. cxliii. 2) ; then rejects the idea of venial sin as inapplicable in judging of the case in hand ; and declares that even though sin be for- given in baptism, it' still remains as concupiscence, and assuredly not as an indifferent thing ; it must still be struggled against and overcome ; further declaring that the contrary doctrine implies a dualistic theory of the relation between body and souL Since, accordingly, even in the works of the regenerate, God's law still remains unfulfilled; since, further, it is impossible by one's own efforts to gain acceptance with God, the believer is pointed to the way of finding acceptance through Christ's mediation. He fulfilled1 the law which we had been able only to break, and He makes us sharers in His fulfilment of it, covering us, like the mother bird, with His wings (Matt, xxiii 37), so that even we, by His fulfilment of it, fulfil the law. "The more we do, work, strive, we only increase the unrest of the soul which we are seeking to quell. That unrest can effectually be stilled only by the knowledge of God's grace and mercy freely manifested to us in Christ, and of the merits of Christ imputed to us. The law having been fulfilled by Christ, it is no longer needful that we should fulfil it (that is, of course, for our justification) ; all that is required is, that we should cling to the fulfiller of the law, and become like Him, for Christ is righteousness, sanctification, and redemption."2 The manner of that justification through Christ, on which the regenerate must base their assurance of salvation, had already been clearly defined as being by imputation in a Disputation vom freien Willen of the year 1516.3 "The righteousness of believers is solely of God's imputation, as we read in the 32d Psalm, 'Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity.' Hence every saint, as we see from Col. iii 3, 4, is consciously a sinner, but unconsciously righteous ; sinner in actuality, but righteous in hope ; in himself a sinner, but righteous by the imputation of the merciful God." By means of this thought of the righteousness of Christ 1 As above, iii. pp. 756-768. Walch, xviii. 882-903. 2 As above, i. pp. 244, 743, 762. 3 As above, i. p. 335. LUTHER 'S IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. 137 applied by the solemn sentence of God to believers, and imputed to them for good, the practical end of comforting the troubled conscience is gained. If it is the case that one who has been born again of the Holy Ghost has power indeed to do good works, and gradually to gain the victory over his own sins, while yet, by reason of the imperfectness of his attain- ment, he can base neither upon it nor upon his state of regenera- tion his assurance of salvation, then he must fall back upon the value in God's sight of Christ's perfect righteousness, which as having been wrought for our benefit — with a view to the purchase of the forgiveness of sins to the Church — is by God's grace imputed to each individual believer as the ground of his acceptance. The stand-point and the main elements of this religious self-estimate are just those which we find in the cases of Bernard, of Staupitz, and of Wessel. Luther's view varies from the views of these men in the following minor details. First of all, Luther constantly looks at the comparative im- perfection of the works of believers, while his mediaeval antecedents directed their attention chiefly to the relative perfection of such works wrought in the believer by grace, although bidding men disregard their meritorious value. This difference has reference only to the practical application of the one thought which lies at the foundation in both cases, and which, according to the circumstances of individuals, and the prevailing ethical tendencies of the age, is always calculated to counteract alike self-righteousness and scrupulosity in the consciousness of salvation. That Luther always fixed his attention on the latter antithesis, was the natural outcome of his own personal needs ; but he must also, at the same time, in doing so, have met with a certain disposition in his con- temporaries, that dissatisfaction with self which is the in- dispensable prerequisite of all religious reformation. The other detail in which Luther differs from his other mediaeval .predecessors can be explained as follows : — While they as well as Luther trusted in God's grace as the principle of the religious life, they were able to satisfy themselves with a general view of it, representing to themselves the good works of the regenerate (perfect in their kind), as in continuity and congruity with grace. But as Luther invariably viewed good works in the light of their imperfection, and therefore in their 1 38 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. incongruity with the grace of God, he naturally required a more concrete view of God's grace as the counterpoise of imperfect works. This he found in the development of the thought of justification through Christ. But our apprehension of the matter by Luther's help would be incomplete were we to disregard the following feature in his view. Even in his earliest utterances he maintains that the faith of the regenerate is not merely the receptive organ for the appropriation of justification through Christ, but is at the same time also the active instrument of all Christian life and action. Faith is the earnest of " Christ in us," as well as of " Christ for us." " Where faith is in the heart, there in like measure is Christ also present, on whom we trust in that faith ; but where Christ is present, all can be won. Faith attains what the law enjoins. As righteousness brings forth good works, so Christ through faith sufficeth thee that thou mayest be just. Then thou livest, doest, sufferest, not for thyself, but for Christ ; wherefore is nothing thine — everything is Christ's alone. The righteousness that is of faith is indeed bestowed without works, yet still it is given with a view to works ; it is a living power, and cannot therefore remain inactive."1 This view is not insisted on merely for the purpose of guarding against the mistaken inference that the inclination to continuance in sin might possibly be conjoined with faith in Christ's merit.2 Luther needed this twofold view of faith also in order to secure for the moral works of the regenerate that unconstrainedness, the absence of which betokens effort after work-righteousness. The becoming attitude of the regenerate person is accordingly distinguished from effort after work-righteousness, by his trust in Christ, in such a manner that faith supplies to him, not merely the assurance of his salvation, but also the spontaneous impulse to well-doing.3 In the period preceding the Eeforma- 1 As above, I pp. 230, 761, 778. 2 As above, i. pp. 284, 742. 3 As above, i. p. 752 : " They are the men of God who are led by the Spirit of God, who, having learned the control of the outer man, do not consider it except as a preliminary ; they then put themselves in preparation for what- ever work they may be called unto. If they are led by God through many sorrows and humiliations, without knowing whereunto, they yet intrust them- selves to God alone, for they do not now rely upon any work henceforward, and their works have no value in the beginning, but only at the end ; it is not they who lead, they are led. For they do not act from any ability of their own, nor yet do they form purposes for themselves, but, on the other FAITH IN RELATION TO PENANCE. 139 tion controversy, Luther was just as firm in invariably re- presenting the imputed righteousness of Christ as preceding the imparted righteousness, as he is in distinguishing between the two ideas.1 So that we must not lay any special stress upon the fact that occasionally there occurs a deflection into the Catholic usage of language ; as, for example, when justi- ficatio in spiritu is identified with mvificatio novi hominis, but is distinguished from the forgiveness of sins which precedes it ; or when on one occasion even the imputation of Christ's righteousness is made to depend upon its actual infusion.2 24. If it seem desirable or necessary, in order to bring out more clearly Luther's thought about justification by faith, to compare it with some feature of Eoman Catholic Christianity, then we must cite, not the Romish doctrine of justification, but rather the sacrament of penance. For as the evangelical act of faith in his justification through Christ establishes the believer's assurance of salvation against the abiding conscious- ness of sinful imperfection, in like manner in that sacrament the joint actions of the penitent and the priest serve to procure for the believer who has fallen from grace the forgiveness of his sins — that divine sentence of acquittal which restores him to the state of grace. Luther's attack on indulgences led directly to a controversy about the deeper bearings of the sacrament of penance, — to which sacrament the institution of indulgences is in fact only an appendage ; and the overthrow of the sacrament of penance which Luther achieved in the course of the controversy, consists simply of logical deductions from his practical fundamental principle of justification by faith, which he ever resorted to as regulative, even at the period when he still, for a short time, continued to leave un- assailed the traditional sacramental praxis in its outward forms. hand, they are frequently broken off from their purpose, and are made to do something different from what they had proposed. Yet still are they content in this, and wait patiently for God, while those who are seeking to work out their own righteousness are in despair, not knowing the result of their toil. For they would fain have their work valued and established before acting ; in this case, therefore, the character of the doer follows his deed, in the other it precedes it." 1 Compare also as above, i. p. 288. 2 As above, i. pp. 770, 742. Kostlin takes the same view: Luther's Theologie, i. p. 137. 1 40 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. But if now the sacrament of penance is an integral part of the very life of the Church,1 the analogy, the opposition, the con- currence of the Lutheran thought of justification by faith, be- comes unintelligible if one does not always represent it to one's self as a practical experience of the living member of the Church of Christ. It is when they come to consider the form of the sacrament of penance that the polemical divines of the Eomish Church might be able to recover from their astonishment on finding that the evangelical system of doctrine maintains a free judgment on God's part — the pronouncing of sinners to be righteous — to be the antecedent ground of their regeneration, or, in other words, the determining principle of their real trans- formation into children of God. For in the sacrament of pen- ance also the restitution of righteousness in the case of the believer who has relapsed into sin, is, ostensibly at least, the result of absolution pronounced by the priest as God's representative. In other words, the judgment pronounced — that the sinner is no more a sinner — is in point of time made to precede that infusio gratice justificantis which is expected to follow. Now, in the praxis of the sacrament of penance the contritio which precedes absolution is made to appear as the proper work of the penitent, in order that he may be predisposed to receive grace. Of course the theory has never conceded that hereby a meritum de congruo is acquired which obtains grace as a reward; and Melanchthon's criticism2 directed against that view is uncalled for ; nay, rather the Catholic doctrine distinctly asserts that contrition is produced by antecedent grace. Practically, however, the procedure prescribed in the sacrament of penance leads penitents not to bring their repentance from a consciousness of grace, but to regulate it by the law ; and those who are earnestly minded will be led by such a standard, and by the exhortation to bring into consideration every 1 Compare Kostlin as above, i. p. 213. " The doctrine of penance con- stitutes the central point of the controversy. We must again remember that what we are now considering is really that penance which he who already has entered the Christian Church, and has been received into the covenant of grace, has anew to exercise on account of the sins into which he is continually relapsing. This was what had to be considered in connexion with the question of indulgence : not the repentance of one who now for tJie first time embraces the faith and becomes partaker of salvation" Compare a similar remark, p. 206, upon Luther's (first) sermon De Panitentia. 2 In the Apologia Conf. Aug. p. 175. See above, p. 123, note. FAITH IN RELATION TO PENANCE. 141 separate sin, to a degree of self-introspection and of detestatio peccatorum, which is aimless in itself, simply in order to attain to the due measure of disposedness for gratia justificans. Luther's exposition is directed against this tendency insonmch that he raises the value of absolution and of faith in absolution above the striving after a mechanical completeness of contritio.1 Even while still holding by the Catholic sacrament of penance, he declares himself to this effect : If assurance of the forgive- ness of our sins depended on our sense of the completeness of our repentance, we should by that road draw ever nearer to despair and not to assurance. When, therefore, a sinner is dis- tressed in his conscience, believing himself to be tainted with all evil, what he must do is to repose faith in the priest's sentence of absolution, inasmuch as the priest has by commission and authority of Christ power to absolve. In connexion with this matter, Luther accentuates very strongly the principle that it is always faith in Christ which justifies, and that the sacra- ments, as Augustine says, are effectual, not because they are received, but because they are received in faith ; that repent- ance is not so necessary as faith ; that one had better not think of resorting to this sacrament of penance unless he be sure of his faith ; and that it is abused if the priest is unable to establish the faith of the penitent. The importance here attributed to faith is, from the circumstances of the case, very far from meaning that the process of absolution is to be regarded as merely a reflex of subjective elevation of spirit ; for here faith is reposed upon Christ's sentence of absolution received through the priest, and thus upon the power of the keys given by Christ to His Church : hereby it is indirectly referred to all that Christ has done in founding the Church. If, now, anticipating a little, we remember how, in the pietistic form of Lutheranism, we anew find men in the position of inquiring whether their faith be sufficiently strong, and whether, in order to certainty of forgiveness, a deliberate continuousness and particular shade of sorrow be required, not only is it indubitable that Luther's view is just as much opposed to the 1 Sermo de Poenitentia, Loscher, i. p. 574. fiesolutiones disputationum de virtute indulgentiarum (against Tetzel), as above, ii. pp. 262-265. Sermon von der Busse (the second of the year 1518), ib. p. 512. Erklarung an den Card. Cajetan, ib. pp. 464-472. De captivitate ecclesice Babylonica, Opp. Lat. Jen. foL 276 b. Walch, xix. p. 98 seq. 142 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. pietistic as to the common Catholic misrepresentation of con- tritio, as a feeling that is to be deliberately worked up ; it is also manifest that sound consciousness of his standing within the Church excluded the possibility of such pietistic questionings, so far as Luther was concerned. He who belongs to the Church as an active member of it, even though he may on the Catholic theory have fallen from grace by mortal sin, needs only, through the revival of his faith, to lay hold of that free gift of the forgiveness of sins, or of absolution, which is lodged with the Church as the abiding fruit of Christ's obedience, and which is applied to individuals by his ministers, or even by any individual Christian man whatsoever.1 Although, however, Luther in his writings of the year 1518 that bear upon this subject, accepts the current forms of the sacrament of penance, in order to remodel that institution in the direction we have indicated, and to substitute for its mechanical unspirituality or aimless self-torture a purely religious regula- tion of the consciousness of salvation, still the tendency of the practical religious principle which he had set on foot lay, even at the beginning of the controversy, beyond the limits of that sacrament. Of the ninety-five theses directed against Tetzel, the two first run as follows : — " When our Lord and Master Jesus Christ says Do penance, etc., He means that the whole life of His faithful ones on earth ought to be a continual and unceasing penance. — And such language on His part neither can nor ought to be understood as referring to the sacrament of penance, that is, to confession and satisfaction, as those are exercised through the intervention of the priestly office." 2 What leads him to this proposition is the practical uselessness of the distinction between mortal and venial sins;3 the more im- mediate explanation of the meaning of that statement is to be found in the view taken of another matter connected with the sacrament of penance. It is asked — What is the condition 1 Compare his Zweiter Sermon von der Busse (as above, p. 526) : " Thus thou seest that the whole Church is filled with the forgiveness of sins." 2 As above, i. p. 439. Erster Sermon von der Busse, p. 572. Conclusiones contra Eccium, as above, ii. p. 321. The general idea is very far from being new or unfamiliar. See S. Bernardi Sermones, in Quadragesima, iii. 3 : Errant plane, qui paudssimos dies istos ad poenitentiam sujficere credunt, cum cerium sit, totum vitce huius tempus ad pcenitentiam institntum. 8 Zweiter Sermon von der Busse, as above, ii. p. 524. Conclus. c. Eccium, p. 321, FAITH IN RELATION TO PENANCE. 143 upon which it is possible for a person who has fallen from grace to seek forgiveness at all in the sacrament of penance, when as a sinner he must be supposed to be quite incapable of seeking it ? In answer to this, Luther affirms1 that the sorrow of repentance, and grief, and despondency, on account of sin, presuppose the secret working of divine forgiveness and restor- ing grace. Even when God appears to condemn the man, He is beginning to declare him righteous ; while He is wounding him, it is His will to heal him ; whom He slays, him He makes alive. So that when man feels himself near unto condemna- tion, grace is already at work upon him, and while he apprehends an outpouring of wrath, the mercy of God is actually laying hold of him. Therefore, when tempted to despair, he must seek peace in the Church's power of the keys, in order that by means of Christ's promise, declared unto him by the priest, and by means of faith in that promise, he may attain to certainty of that forgiveness which really had been granted before the absolution was pronounced. In all this, Luther seems to say nothing that is not implied in the Catholic doctrine, that repentance is a result of grace. But in reality this view goes directly in the teeth of the Catholic discipline, inasmuch as that view of the origin of repentance, which had previously been current only as a theory, is here brought to bear in a practical way. For one gains assurance of grace only by faith. If, therefore, repentance has its foundation and its value in grace, then it must proceed upon the faith that is conscious of that grace, and it cannot be regarded as a legal work. Now, herein the theoretically assumed anti- thesis between the state of sin and the state of grace in the peni- tent melts away. For if, on the one hand, the believer's well- doing is defiled with sin, and that sin yet looks for forgiveness through the mercy of God,2 then, on the other hand, the distress on account of sin shown by one who has fallen from grace, is really a proof of his gracious condition, and is elicited by a very distinct sense of the worth of that goodness to which sin is opposed. For, as Luther maintains in various utterances of the years 1517-1518, only that repentance is genuine which proceeds from love of righteousness and of God; for the 1 Resolutiones, as above, ii. pp. 196-202. 2 Concl. c. Eccium ; see above, ii. p. 321. 144 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. repudiation of sin has force and genuineness only through the positive presence of its opposite; the penitence which flows from contemplation of particular sins, from legal fears, and from apprehension of future woe, only makes men hypocrites and greater sinners than before.1 If, accordingly, Luther will have it that repentance be ex- tended over the whole life, such an exhortation must apply to him who, being in a state of grace, continues in the love of God and of goodness even when he falls into sin ; or who, at least, recovers it anon ; who, accordingly, not merely leads a life of well-doing, as far as is possible for the continued imperfectness of this earthly life, but also duly repents of his sins. And here in these circumstances comes into action, as the religious regulating principle of practical life, the faith of justification through Christ — whether that justification be declared by a priest or by a brother; or whether it be appropriated in the immediate contemplation of the atoning work of Christ. For faith directed to these matters is the Christianly religious recognition of our dependence upon God in ethical respects. This faith, accordingly, on the one hand, appropriates the assurance of salvation to the man who is troubled with a sense of sin, and, on the other hand, secures him against self- right- eousness, and against the tendency to think lightly of his faults, or to make small account of sin. Further, it is in itself the subjective motive for the doing of those good works to which the believer feels himself called in his redemption ; and it nowhere is found in its genuine form without exerting this influence. But in order that this faith may operate easily, and, as it were, spontaneously, it is requisite that the believer, throughout the whole compass of his religious feeling and 1 Sermo de Pcenitentia (as above, ii. p. 569) : Impossibile est ut odias all quid vero odio et perfecto, cujus contrarium non prius dilexeris. Amor semper odio est prior et odium natura et sponte fluit ex amore . . . odium mali propter bonum. Sic odium peccati et detestatio vitas praeteritae nulla cura, nullo labore quaesita veniunt sua sponte . . . Po3nitentia debet esse dulcis et ex dulcedine in iram descend ere ad odium peccati. Amor enhn est vinculum perpetuum quia, voluntarium, odium temporale, quia violentum. Igitur persuade homini primum ut diligat justitiam et sine magisterio tuo conteretur de peccato ; diligat Christum et statim sui prodigus odio habebit se ipsum. So also in his Concl. c. Ecc. (ii. p. 321) : in his letter to Staupitz of May 30, 1518 (de Wette, i. p. 116). Exposition of the Ten Commandments (Loscher, i. p. 641). The letter to Staupitz shows that Luther was indebted to him for this important knowledge. FAITH IN RELATION TO PENANCE. 145 moral conduct, should feel himself to be within the Church, which, as founded by Christ, " is filled with the forgiveness of sins." But it is not this subjective function of faith, as the power capable of producing good works, that is the real occasion and object of the divine sentence of justification ; on the contrary, the objective ground of the justification of the believer thus living and acting within the Church, is the grace of God as it is effectual through Christ and his work of reconciliation ; while faith is the organ by which the regenerate person falls back upon the grace of God, as made effectual by that media- torial work, and becomes conscious within himself that that grace is available also for him. Objectively, this faith never exists in the life of the believer unaccompanied by the desire to produce good works, and a measure of capability to produce them; subjectively, however, when the believer by faith consciously seeks and finds the assurance of salvation in Christ, he altogether disregards the value of those works, whatsoever be the perfection or imperfection which he feels to belong to them.1 This subjective separation and antithesis between faith and works, does not, however, mean that faith belongs to the understanding only, and works alone to the will, for faith also is an act of the will — an act of obedience to God. But in faith the will rests immediately upon what the grace of God has wrought and revealed ; while in good works it goes forth into the world, following in them God's purposes and commands. We shall see further on why in this connexion, thus understood, the thought of justification can be expressed only in the form of a divine sentence. Meanwhile, it is obvious that in the position described, the believer represents to himself God's sentence only in such a way as to think of himself as the sinner who is the object of God's declaration of justification. The synthetic judgment in this form will by and bye prove itself to be the necessary condition under which the thought of justi- fication or forgiveness of sins solves the moral difficulty and 1 Compare Melanchthon's luminous statement (Dedamatio de calumnia. Osiandri, C. R., xii. p. 11) : Etsi enim hac consolatione films Dei ipse corda erigit et vivificat, ac spiritum sanctum in hunc, qui tide sustentatur, effundit, jam domicilium et tern plum Dei est homo renatus, tamen anteferenda est obedientia filii Dei his ipsis divinis actionibus quanquam excellentibus, et retinenda consolatio, propter mediatorem tibi imputari justitiam. 10 146 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. hopeless logical contradiction which present themselves in real repentance as conceived of by Luther. 25. In his practically religious view of the believer's justi- fication through Christ, Zwingli coincides with Luther in such a way as to be at one with him in essential particulars, while the diversity of view which may be remarked as existing between them only confirms the identity of their religious tendency. If, indeed, one sets out with the intention of finding in the writings of the Eeformers, in the first instance, a doctrine of justification, or even assumes that to be possible; or if our knowledge of the position of these two men as Eeformers were to be held to be completed by an explanation and comparison of their theological systems merely, we could not maintain the assertion we have made against Schneckenburger,1 Zeller, and Sigwart. In saying so much, I disregard the fact that the first of the three I have mentioned rests his proof of the divergence between the Lutheran and Eeformed theological systems too much upon the sporadic use of very secondary authorities, without ever taking his bearings from the practical attitude within the Church assumed by the Eeformers. The second is even so unfair as to bring Zwingli's Theologoumena into com- parison with the " Lutheran Dogmatic," as that is to be learned from familiar text-books ; 2 while the third, by exaggerating Zwingli's connexion with Picus of Mirandula, makes Zwingli's reformation movement utterly unrecognisable. I quite agree with Schneckenburger in thinking that the doctrine of justifica- tion is neither the common palladium of the Lutheran and Eeformed Confessions, nor the ultimate fundamental bond of union between them ; for that doctrine, though indeed defined alike by both, is set forth in different connexions, — a circum- stance which ought to be kept in view as not unimportant in our comparison of the two doctrinal systems. Since, however, systems of doctrine are not causes, but rather effects, of Church reformation, since the reformation of the Church arose rather out of a definitely expressed practical religious consciousness on the part of its leaders, whereby a change was wrought in the attitude of Christian communities, or bodies of men, towards the thing which up till then had been understood by the name 1 Zur kirchlichen Christologie, p. 45. 2 Zeller, Das theologische System Zwingli's, p. 174. ZWINGLI'S AGREEMENT WITH LUTHER. 147 of Church, our verdict upon the identity or diversity in principle of the tasks undertaken by Luther and Zwingli will depend upon our answer to the question whether they are at one with each other in the view taken by them of that particular subjective religious principle which was the lever that set the Eeformation in motion. In comparison with this, it will then seem a matter of secondary moment that these two men should have cherished and pursued different principles regarding the extent and method of the Church's renovation, and regarding the division of theological doctrines, according to the several premisses that their special theological education and religious development afforded them, as well as according to the different local circumstances of their respective spheres of labour. With regard to this, I may venture to cite Hundeshagen's masterly estimate of Zwingli,1 and take along with me the parallel between Luther and him there wrought out, in order to show, in accordance with my task, that Zwingli no otherwise than Luther makes the life of the believer within the Church to be religiously regulated by reference to the righteousness of Christ — to the reconciling efficacy of His life and death. If we are to proceed rightly and truly in this matter, we cannot adopt that method which has been chosen by those who have hitherto treated of Zwingli's theology, the method, namely, of culling from all possible writings of Zwingli detached passages about his idea of faith, about the relation of faith to the transeunt or immanent righteousness of Christ, about the meaning of Christ's satisfaction, and about divine election, etc., and thereupon setting up the discrepancies that occur, as if they were radical departures from the teaching of Luther. Such procedure betrays the fundamental mistake into which those writers have fallen — the mistake of supposing that in the question before us what we have first to consider is a theological doctrine, and not the statement of the believer's dominant verdict passed upon himself from a religious point of view. For theological doctrine will always of necessity represent the relation between the objective and subjective factors of justifica- tion in the shape of succession in time ; the characteristic mark of a purely religious apprehension of the matter, on the contrary, 1 Beitrage zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik, vol. i. p. 163. 1 48 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. is the simple realization as present of all objective factors in the subjective consciousness. Now, in order to discover this aspect of Zwingli's idea of justification, we must restrict our- selves to the Auslegung und Grunde der 67 Schlussreden oder Artikel (1523) ; also the Commentarius de veraet falsa religione, taking along with these his sermon von gottlicher und mensch- licher GerechtigJceit (against Grebel and Manz, 1523). Now, those sixty-seven articles are quite a model of a Christian con- fession of faith, in giving such a view of all that Christ is to believers, as, while well arranged, is at the same time free from the trammels of theological system ; this particular structure thus guarantees that, with regard to the question which at present occupies us, we shall find the religious point of view, as such, followed out. Upon the opening proposition that Christ, as the only Way to blessedness, constitutes the substance of the Gospel (1-5), follows that view of Christ which represents Him as the Head of the Church in which the Gospel is preached (6-16), as the sole High Priest and Mediator, whose sacrifice is not to be repeated, and whose honour is insulted by invocation of the saints (17-21) ; and, with the twenty-second article, that Christ is our righteousness, and that our righteous- ness is not founded upon works of our own, we reach the climax of the whole representation, which from -that point proceeds to the criticism of particular ordinances, with special reference to abuses which had sprung up within the Church. In the mutual relation of the articles 19-22, Zwingli's Auslegung develops the views which must be recognised as determining his place as a Reformer. In the Commentarius also, Zwingli, in his representation of the matter at present in hand, gives it the form of direct religious dealing with one's- self, although the scientific aim of his book might have led him away on another track. After having explained the word religion, he defines God as the all- working First Cause of all things, in- vestigates the position of man in relation to God, explains the thing religion in general, and then, in the locus de religione Christiana, lays hold of the relation of Christ to the believer as pignus gratice Dei, in such a manner as to show from a com- parison between Christ's worth and the wants of the believer, who is always hampered with sin, that practically Christ is to the believer the fully satisfying present ground of salvation. ZWINGLI'S AGREEMENT WITH LUTHER. 149 No exception can be taken to this view of the matter from the fact that the thought of Christ's satisfaction is developed here as well as in the Auslegung ; for this satisfaction is used merely to explain the principal fact, that the believer finds his salvation in Christ alone. That this is the practical bearing of Zwingli's line of thought in the Schlussreden and in the Auslegung, is shown by the circumstance that Christ's title as Head of the Church is treated before his title as Mediator of reconciliation. The latter title is thus taken up only in so far as it presents itself to the member of the Church, or to the member of Christ the Head. ' \- • If now it has thus been shown that Zwingli undertakes to exhibit, in the very light in which Luther exhibits it, the sub- jective religious certainty of the believer that Christ is his righteousness, it ought not to be forgotten, on the other hand, that, as the obverse of this view, he undertakes in the Auslegung to refute the doctrine of the saints' mediation. Such an attempt is never met with in this connexion in Luther's writings. Here again one might perhaps begin to suspect a radical discrepancy of view between the two Eeformers ; all the more so, because it is well known that Herzog and Schweizer would fain make the divergence to consist in this — that Luther's Eeformation activity was determined by reaction against the Judaistic perversion of the Christian life through work-righteousness, while Zwingli's, on the other hand, was determined by recoil from its paganistic perversion through saint-worship. Zwingli's Auslegung, however, which ought to be the chief authority for this statement, gives no just ground for it ; for he justifies his re- jection of the cultus of the saints (which is based on the assump- tion of the meritorious character of their works before God) on the ground that there could not possibly be any such merit j1 and on this matter his assertion differs in no respect from the fundamental principle that Luther had at heart. If accordingly his repudiation of saint-worship does not rank as co-ordinate with his repudiation of work-righteousness, but is subordinate to it, then Zwingli's tendency to the former is seen to be only an accidental result elicited by special circumstances 1 Werke (edited by Schuler and Schulthess), i. p. 280 : " So now, merit having been demolished, the Papists need no longer molest the saints for their intercession." 150 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICA TION. from a fundamental idea that was common to him with Luther. Zwingli then proceeds to show 1 that we — believers like all other creatures — must despair of ever fulfilling the law regarded as the eternal and immutable will of God; for who that still lives in the flesh could possibly be so entirely at one with God as to have love to Him always and above all things ? Of course, even the law is a sort of gospel, for it is only useful to us as enabling us to know the will of God in its requirements, but the Gospel, properly so called, is the tidings of God's grace through Christ, who, as God-man Mediator, has fulfilled the law for us, endured the punishment which we had deserved, and appeased the wrath of God. If Christ, then, is our right- eousness, and the pledge of God's grace towards us, any merit in our works which are due to God is not to be spoken of — unless, indeed, we would have it that Christ died in vain. Nay, more, inasmuch as on nearer view we find that in all our good works there is imperfection and sin, we should, in the alarm of our consciences, be led to despair of our salvation, and to regard ourselves as outcasts from God's presence, were we not enabled in faith, that is, in perfect confidence, to rely upon the fact that Christ has fulfilled the law for us, and borne all our work and all our wickedness, and that through the grace of which Christ is the pledge we are made righteous, and brought into a state of peace with God by faith. For renunciation of all claim to merit in ourselves is nothing more nor less than faith. " For that man should ascribe nothing to himself, but simply believe that all things are governed and ordered by the providence of God, can come only of an attitude of complete trust and self-surrender towards God ; can come only of a firm assurance in faith that God is doing all things even when we do not see His hand. Such is faith, which grows and increases as soon as it has been sown ; not that the increase is ours, but of God. . . . And the more faith grows, the more also does our activity in all good things grow ; for the greater thy faith the fuller is the presence of God within thee — the greater also in thee is the working of everything that is good." 1 Anslegung der Schlussreden, i. p. 262 sqq. Von gottliclier und menschlicher Gerechtigkeit, i. p. 431 sqq. Commentarius de vera et falsa religione, iii. p. 180 sqq. ZWINGLPS AGREEMENT WITH LUTHER. 151 This manner of describing faith by reference to the truth of God's all-working providence, does not exclude the significance of Christ as a Saviour, but actually includes it, as in fact the means whereby that providence reaches its effect. " Christ is made unto us of God wisdom — wherefore each individual ought to keep to His way, and not devise a new one for him- self. He is made unto us also righteousness, for no one may come to God who is not righteous, and neither can any man be righteous in himself. But Christ is righteous, and He is our Head ; we are His members, and thus as members draw near to God, through the righteousness of the Head. He is also made our sanctification, for He has sanctified us with his own blood. He is also made our ransom, for He has redeemed us from the law, from the devil, and from sin. . . . Thus are we made free from the law — not in order that we may no longer do that which God commands and wills, but we are more and more set on fire with the love of God, ... so that we now do what God wills. . . . The believer is thus redeemed from the law, in order that he may no longer fear its condemnation, . . . but he actually fulfils the commandments out of love, not by his own strength, but because God works in him the love, the resolution, and whatsoever good thing he does : and in all that he achieves he is well aware that it is not his work ; and that whatever is accomplished is the work of God." Now, this attitude of the believer who is conscious of being a member of Christ, is entirely in accordance with Luther's delineation of it, inasmuch as faith, which appropriates the righteousness of Christ, counteracts the anxiety of the conscience that has been awakened by the law's demands (compare also iii. p. 195), and renounces all merit of works, which yet by the power of God do proceed from faith, through the Holy Ghost -1 1 Compare the first Confession of Basle (Niemeyer, Collectio conf. p. 83) : " We acknowledge the remission of sins through faith in Jesus Christ the Crucified. And although this faith manifests itself unremittingly in works of love, reveals itself and proves itself thereby, yet we do not attribute our righteousness or the propitiation for our sins to those works, which are fruits of faith, but simply to our genuine confidence and trust in the shed blood of the Lamb of God. For we frankly confess that all things are given unto us in Christ, who is our Righteousness, Sanctification, Ransom, Way, Truth, Wisdom, and Life. Wherefore the works of believers are not done as a satisfaction for sin, but simply as evidence that they are in some measure thankful to God, the Lord, for the great goodness shown towards them in Christ." 152 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. and the coincidence between Zwingli and Luther extends also to their manner of regarding pcenitentia as a work that is the proper business of the whole lifetime.1 While Christ, on the one hand, represents pcenitentia as a common task incumbent on us all ; and the Gospel, on the other hand, connects the forgiveness of sins with the atoning work of Christ, the two really coincide with one another, because that self-knowledge which leads us to despair over our sins, is just as much brought about in us by Christ as our assur- ance of God's pity rests upon His work. As, however, we are never without sin, the Christian's business of self- improve- ment must always be accompanied by self-examination and by the forgiveness of sins. Est ergo tota Christiani Tiominis vita pcenitentia : quando enim est, ut non peccemus ? In contradis- tinction from this, the pcenitentia enjoined by the Pope, and usually performed at Easter, is pure hypocrisy — for it rests exactly upon ignorance of one's own heart, and superficial views of sin, and ceases as soon as it has been gone through.2 26. It is well known that the counter-reformation of the Eomish Church was invariably, in the first instance, directed to the purpose of bringing back to the confessional those who had joined the evangelical Church. This shows that the Eomish Church is aware that her power over the consciences of Chris- tians is founded specially upon her sacrament of penance. The reformation of the Church, accordingly, was possible then, and is intelligible to us now, only by means of a clear perception of that religious consciousness of Christ's significance, which, as an immediate and inevitable consequence, leads men to see the superfluity and hurtfulness of the Eomish practice of penance. Zwingli, like Luther, was a reformer of the Church only in virtue of the fact that, in the thoughts which we have been tracing, he possessed a lever, by means of which he could over- throw and abolish the religious authority of the Eomish priest- hood, by means of the direct authority of Christ as Mediator of reconciliation, and as the Church's Master. For this purpose his idea of God's universal working in providence did not suffice 1 De vera et falsa religione (loci de evangelio, de pcenitentia), iii. p. 191 sq. 2 Compare articles 50 to 54 of the 67 Schlussreden, and the Auslegung that relates to them. "Christ has borne all our pains, and done all our work. Whoever therefore attributes to works of penance what is due to Christ alone, is in error, and does despite to God " (Art. 54). THE PRINCIPLE OF THE REFORMATION. 153 him, useful though it had been found to be, for maintaining the religious dignity of Christ as against the futile worth of men's own works and the mediation of saintly intercession, and characteristic though it be as a feature of his entire theology.1 But Sigwart's assertion is erroneous and misleading, when he says that the universal operation of God is the fundamental principle of the Zwinglian doctrinal system, and that Zwingli represents God as being the supreme good of the universe in the sense that from Him alone every good thing, all being and life, all faith and all blessedness, immediately do proceed.2 For the idea of God's universal activity is no specifically Christian idea, and however true it may be that in Zwingli's employment of it it has a directly religious, and no merely philosophical significance, it still stands in no immediate or direct relation to the Christian Church. If, then, Zwingli is a Church-reformer, and if he constructed his religious system of doctrine in the interests of Church reform, we might naturally expect that as theologian also he would take up another attitude towards the doctrine of God than that which is attributed to him by Zeller and Sigwart. Those writers ought to have kept well in mind the words of Zwingli at the beginning of his locus de religione Christiana, in his Commentaries de vera et falsa religione (iii. p. 179): Habet hcec cetas ut eruditos multos, qui passim velut ex equo Trojano prosiliunt, ita multo plures gui se omnium cen- sores faciunt ; ac dum per impietatem renascens verlum accipere nolunt, pietatem tamen simulantes, falsis confictisgue suspicioni- 1 Compare his Auslegung der Scldussreden, i. p. 276. 2 Sigwart, Ulrich Zwingli, p. 39. Zeller virtually expresses the same view Theol. System Zwingli's) because, adopting Schneckenburger's recipe, he allows the thought of eternal election, as the reformed principle of doctrine, to be taken for granted as arising out of Zwingli's craving after absolute certainty of salvation (p. 24 sqq.) Sigwart (p. 3 sqq.) is very well worth reading on this point. Although, however, he tries very hard to understand Zwiugli as a reformer before forming an estimate of him as a systematical theologian, he is not successful, and so falls back to the level of Zeller's view, which is characterized throughout by this feature, that it measures the theology of a religious reformer of the Church by the standard that might be applied to an ordinary teacher of a theological school. One can judge from this how far Stahl (die Lutherische Kirche und die Union, p. 13) is right in characterizing Sigwart's book as an "unprejudiced" representation. Extreme parties are notoriously always alike in this matter of freedom from prejudice, and on this occasion Stahl has carried it so far as to spare himself the trouble of any thorough-going study of Zwingli's works, thereby hoping to exercise a more unbiassed judgment on the value of the Reformation which Zwingli originated. 154 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. bus piorum aures implevit. A Hi enim, dum strenue docemus, ut omnis fiducia in Deum patrem nostrum sit habenda, procaci suspicione prosiliunt, cavendum esse a nobis ; omnem enim doc- trinam nostram ad hoc tender ey ut Christum exterminemus, et Judceorum more, ut unum Deum credimus, sic unam solummodo personam credendam inducamus. Alii vero, dum propensius omnia Christ o tribuimusy vereri se dicunt, ne nimis temere nimium ei tribuamus. Utrique tamen sic pronunciant, ut ipso judicio videas eos esse ml audacter ignaros vel scienter impios. From this it appears that the fact of God's universal operation is with Zwingli the ultimate ground of salvation and the ulti- mate support of faith, only in so far as it includes in itself the Person and work of Christ as the definite and more proximate ground of salvation, and as the immediate object of faith : so that to him God's universal operation is the ultimate first cause only as being the at once religious and scientific principle of the Christian's view of the universe — only in so far as the almighty God is also the subject of that wise and righteous care and deliberate ordering of the entire universe, which is directed towards the design of bringing men into fellowship with God by means of His Son, — a fellowship unto which man was originally created.1 The thought that the all-working God guarantees by His eternal election the salvation of men, is accordingly the principle of Zwingli's theology only in so far as it is inseparably conjoined with the positive Church doctrine that the community of the elect has its being simply in Christ ; but both these views are gained by means of that teleological view of human history which is dominated from the very beginning by the thought of Christ as divine. If, then, we find occasionally in the writings of Zwingli statements which are interpreted by Zeller and Sigwart to mean that " the elec- tion by God of the individual is the proper object of faith," or, that " it is only election that justifies and blesses," the view taken by those critics, that Zwingli therein of set purpose re- duces to unimportance the significance of Christ,2 is, at the very outset, condemned by Zwingli himself, and, indeed, in no very complimentary terms. 1 De providehtia Dei (iv. p. 98). Compare the sketch of the train of thought in this tract of Zwingli's which is given in my Geschichtl. Studien zur Christl. Lehre von Gott. Art. ii. (Jahrb. fur deutsche Theol. xiii. p. 94 sq.) 2 Zeller, p. 24 ; Sigwart, p. 158. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE REFORMATION. 155 The emphasis laid upon the thought of God's universal opera- tion with reference to the elect naturally leads to certain divergencies between Zwingli and Luther on other points ; as, for example, in the view taken of the sacraments : but the concentration of religious consciousness on Christ's righteous- ness, which characterized the Keformation movement, is not to be regarded as having been brought about by Zwingli and Luther by divergent methods, merely because the former strives to deepen the significance of Christ to the believer by pointing out the solidarity that exists between the all-working God and the Mediator of salvation. The assurance of justification by faith through Christ, as it is laid hold of by the believer who already has a standing in the Church, and is striving to do the will of God, is to both men alike the common lever by means of which they seek to achieve the reformation of the Church ; l for the Eeformers coupled with that subjective assurance of salvation the fundamental view of the Church as being the fellowship of believers who have been sanctified by God ; and, as a consequence from this view, repudiated the importance for the salvation of the individual traditionally ascribed to the Church's legally constituted organs, as well as the authority conceded to them. That the Church was essentially the communion of saints or believers, was of course for the then Catholic Church indisputable, for it was the doctrine of the 1 The notion to the contrary effect (which is widely spread amongst Lutherans) is also attributable to Melanchthon. He tells the Elector John, with reference to the conference at Marburg, amongst other inaccuracies and exaggerations, that " Zwingli and his companions speak and write improperly upon the question how man is reckoned just in the sight of God, and do not sufficiently urge the doctrine of faith, but speak in such a manner as if works (provided only they follow upon faith) were that very righteousness " (C. R. i. p. 1099). Still worse is the calumnious tone he assumes in a letter to Martin Gorolicius, Pastor in Brunswick : " Ego agnovi coram auditis antesignanis illius sectce, quam nullam habeant Christianam doctrinam. . . . Nulla est mentio fidei justiftcantis in omnibus Zwinglianorum libris. Cum nominant jidem non intelligunt illam, quce credit remissionem peccatorum, quce credit nos recipi in yratiam, exaudiri et defendi a Deo, sed intelligunt historicam " (C. R. ii. p. 25). Particularly, in his communications to the Elector John and to Duke Henry of Saxony, he represents the Marburg articles (upon which the two parties had both agreed) at once as a victory for Luther and as a matter of indiffer- ence. At the same time, in his letter to his friends the preachers at Reut- lingen (i. 1106), he refrains from such expressions regarding the articles, because these were connected with Zwingli. This entire proceeding puts the conscientiousness of Melanchthon in a bad light. That defect is the result of his want of independence of theological judgment. The evil results of it are still felt, even at the present day, in the Lutheran Church. 156 THE REFORM A TION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. Apostles' Creed ; and the Eeformers, in giving currency to this view of the Church's constitution, kept strictly within the in- dubitable limits of ecclesiastical tradition. As, however, the peculiar shape which the polity of the Church had, as matter of fact, taken, had led to an impression that the congregation of the faithful existed only as a result of the clerical functions of government and of administration of the sacraments, men were at that time accustomed to understand by the Church (out of which salvation was impossible) that aggregate of constitutional rights and sacramental privileges which is lodged in certain representatives through whose instrumentality alone every saving privilege must be held, and all assurance of salvation regulated. But as the subjective consciousness of salvation was maintained in the Eeformers, in reciprocal connexion with their idea of the Church as the fellowship of believers, considered as deriving its rules directly from Christ in entire independence of the sacramental authority of the priests, there naturally resulted a change also in the view they took of the means of grace, as these had hitherto been recognised within the Church ; and with that change their attitude towards the existent in- strumentalities of the Church as matter of fact became different. He who in faith lays hold of Christ as the decisive ground of salvation, as the sure counterpoise to all consciousness of abiding sin, as the religious principle that regulates all man's striving after God, forthwith requires to be assured of fellowship with his fellows, who (just as he knows himself to have been) have been regenerated by the grace of God to be the people of Christ, but does not require the support of any Church mechanism, and much less a mechanism in which a privileged class, standing in the place of God, grants salvation to the laity. By showing the authority assumed by the clergy (more especially in the sacrament of penance) to be uncalled for and unjustifiable — by means of this positive view of the real nature of the Church — the Eeformers achieved the Eeformation ; in other words, they so brought their followers to a right position of subjective certainty of salvation, that the original idea of the Church came at once to have a leading place amongst those that swayed their spirits.1 And though in this train of leading 1 Such a phenomenon as Martin Boos is evidence enough that the clearest persuasion of justification by Christ through faith does not necessarily lead THE PRINCIPLE OF THE REFORMATION. 157 thoughts the traditional practice of confession continued to be allowed by Luther, still it was practised with an altogether different significance, in such a way that the absolution was not intended to be a solemn sentence passed in the plenitude of divine authority, but simply that general announcement of the good news of salvation through Christ, upon whom all faith and all believing communion rests. But Zwingli also in the same direction, a few years afterwards, in his Schlussreden, resolved the sacrament of penance into the receiving of spiritual counsel and encouragement at the hand of those intrusted with the cure of souls, without departing from his own type of doctrine. If, then, it is asked what was the leading principle of the Keformation, and of that entire phenomenon within the Church which arose from it — Protestantism to wit, — it is not at all sufficient to describe it with any such vague and bald for- mula as that it consisted in assigning value to the religious disposition, above every outward expression of it, and above every outward means of producing it.1 For justifying faith, as the Reformers understood it, is a frame of mind that is essen- tially determined by regard to the historical (and thus objective) appearance of Christ. The peculiarity, however, of the Church- reformation achieved by Luther and Zwingli, is by no means at once expressed in that subjective consciousness of justifica- tion through Christ by faith, however perfectly and truly apprehended. We cannot hold it up as the principle of the Reformation and of Protestantism at all, unless we take it in its close reciprocal connexion with that objective conception of the Church which regards it as being before everything, and before all legal ordinances, the divinely-founded community of believers. In order to express accurately the one principle of the Church-reformation, we must take both these together in their inseparable connexion and reciprocal influence ; on the to the adoption of Reformation principles, if the view of the fellowship of believers, which is intimately connected with that persuasion, be not insisted upon as against the Roman sacrament of penance. Boos did not gain his assurance of justification in Christ without seeking and finding fellowship with like-minded persons, even among members of the evangelical Church. But he did not become a Reformer, because he maintained this fellowship with believers only as a subordinate matter to his fellowship with the Roman Church, to which last he remained faithful all his life, in spite of all persecu- tions. This is the reason why the awakening which he caused within the Roman Church vanished without leaving a trace after he had gone. 1 Thus Zeller, as above, p. 10 ; and also Baur. See above, p. 47. 158 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. one hand, the thought of the certainty of salvation in the individual believer — a certainty which is independent of and rises above all mentionable instrumentalities, being determined solely by Christ ; and, on the other hand, the thought of the community of believers under Christ — a community appointed and foreordained by God. That this line of thought dominates the whole of Zwingli's work as a Eeformer is shown with all possible clearness in the outline of the Schlussreden, given above (p. 153), and in their Auslegung. Luther demonstrates the connexion of these two views to be the main point of his whole religious teaching by his fundamental propositions, to the effect that no one attains unto faith unless as having a standing in the Church by means of the Word of God, and that God has given this key of the kingdom of heaven to the community of believers.1 With respect to the theory of the Eeforrnation, the several schools of modern theology very naturally split at once. It is therefore perfectly unintelligible to me how a theologian who is avowedly defending Church-Protestantism, and striving against any degradation of the Church to the level of a school, such as is carried out by the extreme left and the extreme right, can fail to comprehend, in his view of the leading principles of the Eeforrnation, the evangelical idea of the Church.2 For that which is to be the chief thing in the final result must also be thought of in the first principle ; otherwise it cannot be recog- nised as an end, but, at most, as only an incidental phenomenon. Of course one must in that case get rid of the apocryphal schema of two principles — the material and formal — whether of Protestantism or of Eeforrnation theology ; Dorner does not say very clearly whether it is to the former or the latter of these that the said principles belong. The two thoughts 1 See in the shorter Catechism his explanation of the third article : " T believe that it is not of my own reason or by my own strength that I believe in Jesus Christ my Lord : it is the Holy Ghost that by the Gospel has called me, with His gifts has enlightened me, through genuine faith has sanctified and sustained me, just as He calls, gathers together, enlightens, sanctifies, and sustains by Jesus Christ, in true, proper faith, all Christendom. Within which Christendom He daily gives to me and to all believers abundant forgive- ness of all our sins." 2 I refer to Dorner (History of Protestant Theology}, whose very copious sketch of Luther's sphere of Reformation ideas only in two passages (pp. 1 38, 273) touches upon the thought of the Church ; a thought which is nowhere brought into prominence in the section entitled Darstellung des evangeliscJten Princips als Kirchenbildenden (p. 212 sqq.) THE PRINCIPLE OF THE REFORMATION. 159 which he designates by that name serve as principles neither for the one nor for the other. The material principle of the Keformation and of Protestantism has been already named.1 It is certainly of the utmost importance to it that it should be in harmony with Scripture ; but not of so great importance that it should be in harmony with that exclusively, and have nothing to say to ecclesiastical tradition.2 Even Zwingli' s accentuation of the exclusive authority of Scripture in the teaching of the Church, does not exclude the fact (which must unavoidably be assumed before we can historically understand the influence he exercised) that his interpretation of Scripture is both directly and indirectly dominated by influences of tradition. The exclusive recognition of Scripture as the source from which all knowledge of divine truth is to be derived, as above and against all tradition, is the fundamental position only of evangelical theology, which has its feet firmly planted on the ground of the Eeformation Church ; and it came to be wrought out in the course of the German Eeformation as the sole rule for the Church only when all hope of compromise with the Eomish Church was seen to be delusive. But then, again, neither is the doctrine of justification the fundamental prin- ciple of the Eeformation theology either of Luther or of Zwingli. How is it possible (leaving other points out of sight) to deduce from that thought Luther's doctrine of the Supper, or the stress which he laid upon it ? Or how does this fit in with the asserted dominant position of that doc- trine in his theology? Luther's theological first principle is rather the thought of the abiding revelation of love as the essence of God in Christ ; and this — as has been shown above (p. 159) — is the case with Zwingli also, subject of course to the modification which is produced by the introduction into all his teachings of the idea of God's universal operation. The partisans of a radical school- theology are naturally unable to discern how the reformation of Luther and Zwingli, that originated in considerations of religion, was determined by positive Church and Christian conditions. Those, on the other hand, who loudly proclaim the fact that they belong to the 1 Hupfelct concurs in this view, die Lehrartikel tier Augsburgischen Con- fession, M«arburg, 1840. 2 Compare Apol. Conf. Aug. pp. 71, 99, 141. 160 THE REFORMATION IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION. Lutheran Church, but in reality are attached only to the interests of a quasi- conservative party within that Church, are very strenuous in denying the identity of the Reformation activities of Luther and Zwingli, on account of the differences which separated them — differences which are to be found in subordinate details of the religious confession they uttered of their belief in justification through Christ by faith. This is not the place to correct all Stahl's recent misrepresentations of Zwingli, made with the view of showing his total diversity from Luther ; for the antitheses set up by Stahl l between the views of the two betray defective knowledge of Luther's views, as well as prove that no fair and thorough-going study has been devoted to the works of Zwingli, whom he traduces. I limit myself to the following points, which bear more immediately upon the subject in hand. In the first place, it is not true, what Stahl affirms, that by the works, the merit of which he denies, Zwingli chiefly means ceremonial observances merely, and outward literal compliance with the law ; and is by no means explicit in denying to those really good works which are wrought with pious intention, all merit and all share in pro- curing the salvation of the soul (p. 26). The 22d of the 67 Schlussreden sufficiently meets this slander; affirming, as it does, that the works we do as believers are so far good as they are Christ's, while, so far as they are ours, they are neither right nor good. In the explanation of this article in the Auslegung, Zwingli refers to what he had said on the twentieth article ; but in that he expresses himself with the utmost cor- rectness upon the idea of merit. In the second place, it is not true, what Stahl asserts, that Zwingli hardly at all contemplates faith in its aspect as appropriation of the redemption wrought by Christ (p. 25). This assertion is contradicted by his exposition of the 19th and 20th articles throughout, by his locus de religione Christiana, in the Commentarius de vera et falsa religione, and by the article de remissione peccatorum, in the Expositio fidei Christiance — his last work.2 In the third place, it 1 Die Lutherische Kirche und die. Union, from p. 23 onwards. 2 iv. p. 60 : Confirmatio, satisfactio et expiatio criminum per solum Christum pro nobis impetrata est apud Deum. Ipse est enim propitiatio pro peccatis nostris. . . . Cum ergo ille pro peccato satisfecerit, quinam fiunt, quseso, participes illius satisfactions et redemtionis ? Ipsum audiamus : Qui in me credit, hoc est qui in me fidit, qui in me nititur, habet vitam aeternam. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE REFORMATION. 161 is not true, what Stahl asserts, that Zwingli himself never appro- priated justification by faith in the sense in which it is now held by the Lutheran and Eeformed Churches, and recognised by them as the kernel of the evangelical reformation, and that if a lively sense of the significance of justifying faith had ever been present with him, he could not afterwards, when he developed his doctrine of predestination, have denied to faith (as he has done) all share in the work of our salvation (p. 27). Stahl here refers to certain passages of the treatise de providentia Dei (iy. p. 122 suns Scotus. Anything, therefore, in the expression above quoted that re- minds us of Scotus's way of handling the idea of atonement ought to be judged of just as we judge of those echoes of a doctrine of divine arbitrariness, aimless and lawless, in the predestination of individuals, which, in his anamnema de providentia, occasionally interrupt a quite differently framed teleological development of the Divine providence, and a 206 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. teleogical judgment of sin in general and of reprobation in par- ticular.1 They who refuse to make an allowance for the fact that in this class of expressions Zwingli has for once wandered from his own. proper views in accordance with a tendency that in his time was very prevalent, ought, in like manner, to reject as really worthless Luther's doctrine of the propitiation of God's wrath through Christ, because he sometimes represents the wrath of God as the reflex of the sinner's evil conscience, and denies its actual existence in God. 33. The Eeformation thought that Christ's death had the value of a vicarious punishment, and had reference to the propitiation of the wrath of God, found a suitable form of expression already laid to its hand in the current phrase satis- factio. That the Eeformers borrowed the expression from no other than Anselm, is an unwarranted assumption, which only tends to encourage the very prevalent mistake of supposing that the doctrines of Anselm and the Eeformers, as they are alike in name, are also in essential harmony with each other. Just as little does the use made of the idea meritum by the Eeformers imply their intention of concurring in the doctrine of Duns Scotus on that topic. The circumstance that they treat satisfactio and meritum as synonyms, shows on the contrary that, in stating their own doctrine, it never occurred to them to explain themselves as to the relation in which it stood to the similar yet divergent theories of their predecessors. The last edition of Calvin's Institutio presents a characteristic illustration of this. With that dogmatic precision which is peculiar to him, he originally explained the propitiation of Divine justice by the penal death of Christ only by means of the conception of satisfaction (lib. ii. cap. 16).2 In his exposition of this doctrine he carries out unhesitatingly the principle that the law is the expression of the essential will of God. That he does so in this connexion does not affect the position of his doctrine of predestination, in which God's dealing with individual men is, in Luther's style, regarded as independent of every law (lib. iii. cap. 21-24), although Calvin 1 Compare Jahrb.fur deutsche Theologie, xiii. (1868), p. 96. 2 Baur, indeed (Versohnungslehre, p. 334), denies that Calvin deduces the satisfactory character of the death, of Christ from the idea of the Divine justice ; but see lib. ii. cap. 16. 2, 3. Baur's subsequent characterization of the theology of Calvin is also incorrect. CALVIN ON THE MERIT OF CHRIST. 207 at the same time exerts himself to avoid the idea that God is exlex.1 The antecedent necessity of a satisfaction to God's justice is not lessened by the statement (ii. 12. 1) that Christ's incarnation was not simply and unconditionally necessary, but only in virtue of God's active saving purpose. Certain external circumstances, however, led Calvin, in the edition of 1559, to append to his doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ a special chapter (the seventeenth) upon the theme Recte et proprie did, Christum nobis promeritum esse gratiam et salutem. For in the year 1545 Camillus Eenatus, in the church at Chiavenna, and in 1555 Laelius Socinus, in epistolary correspondence with Calvin, had come forward with the deduction, which naturally flows from the Scotist sphere of thought^that if the will of God works in an absolutely unconditioned manner, the bestowal of grace is to be attributed to God only, and not to the merit of Christ.2 These Italians, who had abandoned the equilibrium of Church tradition, approached their scholastic criticism upon Christian doctrine entirely from the traditions of the school of Scotus,3 and therefore also they know of no other form of Christ's saving work than that of merit, and thus direct their attack precisely to this view of the idea of atonement. Calvin, then, finding himself impelled to vindicate against them the thought of Christ's merit, thus expresses the counter- position of his opponents, — that the assertion of Christ's merit throws the grace of God into the shade ; and that, therefore, Christ must be regarded as the instrument and servant of grace, not as its author. Now, Calvin concedes that the conception of merit would be inadmissible if one meant thereby to set up Christ simply and by Himself over against the Divine judg- ment. But in the affirmation of Christ's merit there is not assumed a primary principle (a power that works independently of God) ; the merit of Christ is subordinated to the ordination of God, who is the ultimate first cause. In this logical relation there exists no contradiction ; and it is no inconsistency to assert that in the unconditioned operation of the mercy of God towards the justification of men the merit of Christ intervenes. Against the claims of human works, the free grace of God and 1 Compare Jahrb.fur deutsche Theol. xiii. (1868), p. 105 seq. 2 Trechsel : Antitrinitarier, ii. pp. 97, 167. 3 Compare Jahrb.fur deutsche Theol. xiii. (1868), p. 271. 208 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. the obedience of Christ militate alike. For " only by the good pleasure of God could Christ merit anything," and " thus, since Christ's merit depends upon God's grace alone, it is not less fitted than the latter to confute man's claims to a righteousness of his own.". From "the subsequent portion of the chapter, it appears that Calvin regards as meritorious the doing and suffering of Christ, which he had previously represented to be satisfactory ; in this he plainly has not the purpose and mean- ing to say anything formally divergent from his previous doctrine. And to show that this is the case is my primary object. With Calvin himself this double representation of Christ's work as satisfaction and as merit has no other significance than it has when the others use these expressions convertibly as synonyms. For the historian, however, it is worthy of notice that Calvin's two lines of thought do not coincide. Just because Calvin's expression is true in the sense of Duns Scotus — Christus nonnisi ex Dei beneplacito quidquam mereri potuit, it becomes all the clearer that in this proposition is implied a different conception of God from that which lies at the founda- tion of the doctrine of satisfaction. And if ex sola gratia dependet meritum Christi, this at the same time indirectly says to the expert in the subject that it has no reference to the justice of God, which dominates the idea of satisfaction. The fact is that Calvin, by his vindication of the idea of Christ's merit, has made a divergence into that Scotism which, in so far as it bears on the point in question, is otherwise utterly diverse from his own way of thinking, as well as from that of the other Eeformers. For the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction rests upon the craving for harmony between God's mercy and God's justice ; and it presupposes the Divine providence — that Will which in con- formity with a purpose organizes and directs nature and history, with special care over the Church of the elect. In this field of knowledge Calvin leaves no room for any action of the Divine good pleasure, private arbitrariness, and reasonable- ness ; and that he deduces the doctrine of predestination from • the Scotist doctrine of the absolute power of God over the creatures, leaves that department of God's providence quite untouched.1 The chapter upon Christ's merit in the 1559 edition of the Institutes, has not the effect of giving to the 1 Compare Jahrb.fiir deutsche Theol. xiii. (1868) p. 108. CHEISTS PASSIVE AND ACTIVE OBEDIENCE. 209 conception of God as embodied in the doctrine of predestination preponderance over the doctrine of providence ; for no line of connexion is drawn between those two thoughts. That chapter, therefore, is only a casual appendage to Calvin's system of doctrine, and, so far as he himself is concerned, has no positive or characteristic meaning. 34. When Luther laid the conception of God's love, and Zwingli and Calvin the conception of God's goodness, and the plan of His providence culminating in the Church of the redeemed, at the foundation of the doctrine of reconciliation ; when at the same time they estimated the atoning work of Christ by reference to that justice of God which finds its expression in the eternal moral law, the Reformers opened up a field of vision that disclosed a view far beyond the unregulated and casual arbitrariness which, as implied in the idea of God of which Thomas and Duns display only different grades, dominated the mediaeval view of the doctrine of reconciliation. It implies a more worthy conception of God to think of Him as the moral power which satisfies the highest human interests with an orderly system of ends, and with an order of public law that is in harmony with His very being, than to think of Him as the highest subject of private law and of private morality, and to regard that method of reconciliation which Christian tradition presents to us only as having been in God's judgment the most suitable, without confirming this assumption by a comparison with other possible modes of procedure. This advance in theology made by the Reformers bears witness at the same time also to a religious and moral elevation above the level of the Christianity that had been at work in the middle ages, — an elevation the importance and influence of which is shown even independently of the dialectical treatment which the doctrine of reconciliation received at the hands of the Reformers, and of their immediate theological successors. To the number of those fundamental views to which I would apply this remark, belongs the view which regards Christ's doing as having laid the foundation of the reconciliation He effected between God and sinful men, along with or even more than His suffering. If there is anything that is fitted to destroy all appearance of agreement between the Reformers and Anselm, it is this point. Anselm bases the atonement upon U 210 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. the death of Christ, regarding that as an opus supererogatorium in contrast with the moral life of Christ, which was but His duty (p. 32). The employment of the idea of merit had enabled Thomas and Duns to find the atoning value of Christ's passion in the whole duration of His life, inclusive of His death (pp. 57, 61). Anselm's modern admirers might indeed have discovered in Abelard (p. 37) that anticipation which is want- ing in Anselm, of so important a characteristic feature of the Reformation doctrine, if only he had not been so badly recom- mended by his reputation for rationalism. I do not mean to say by this that the Reformers had taken the hint from Abelard;1 I only wish to show that Abelard's agreement with the Refor- mers in this point betokens in him a religious depth of view which puts to shame all talk of his rationalism ; and that in seeking historical lines of connexion we ought to have a re- gard to completeness, and not be guided by the caprice of party likings and dislikings. The style in which Luther, in an Epistle-sermon in his Kirchen-postille (Walch, xii. pp. 312-317), estimates Christ's active fulfilment of the law is not yet in accordance with the doctrinal treatment that afterwards became customary, which co-ordinates the active and passive obedience of Christ, and attributes to the former as well as to the latter a vicarious value for men to the end of their justification. Luther rather regards Christ's obedience to the law as the genus under which is included as a species His vicarious endurance of the curse of the law. As thus the passion of the guiltless One directly serves the end of delivering believers from the curse of the law, the positive fulfilment of the law is the conditio sine qua non of the accomplishment of this end ; particularly because in the former is necessarily implied, so far as Christ is concerned, self-renunciation — that is, suffering. The endur- ance of the curse of the law has its value only in universal obedience to the law; and the active fulfilment of the law already implies for Christ, who essentially is the Lord superior to all law, that suffering which is finished only in death. In Luther's view, Christ is regarded as Lord over the law, not 1 John "Wessel also distinguishes between sat'isfacere and satispati in the works of Christ. Compare Ullmann, Reformatoren vor der Reformation, ii. p. 497, note. CHRIST'S PASSIVE AND ACTIVE OBEDIENCE. 211 merely on account of His divine nature ; for in this line of thought it is far from being taken for granted that the Divine nature itself is exempt from the law as a rule. Here, in fact, there comes in a modification of the idea of the law, which is characteristic of Luther's view of the Christian life, although it has come to be the occasion of doubtful subtleties. For here he understands by the law, not the moral law, which is the concrete correlative of moral freedom, but that rule of life, accompanied with threatening and promise, which counts upon fulfilment from selfish motives, and which one must transcend in order to attain to full reasonable freedom. Law, then, in Luther's view, signifies the moral law in the form of legal injunc- tion. Christ now is above law in that sense, and is not bound thereby, because He always with His unselfish disposition goes beyond its sphere ; but this disposition He has as the Man who at the same time possesses Divine nature. Now, indeed, it seems to be imperative to conclude that Christ, as one whose disposition is in perfect conformity with the pure moral law, could not become subject to law in its legal form, that His moral obedience towards the law, as accompanied with threat- ening and promise, is a contradiction in itself, and that if He willingly fulfilled that law which appeals to the personal advantage of him who fulfils it, He fulfilled it only apparently. These deductions Luther conceals from himself by means of the paradoxical antithesis : " He did it voluntarily ; and neither feared nor sought anything for Himself therein. But in respect of His outward works He was like all others who did it un- willingly and of constraint, so that His freedom and willingness were hidden from the eyes of men (?) just as their constraint and unwillingness were also concealed, and thus therefore He sub- mits Himself to the law, and at the same time is not under the law. He does as they do who are under it, and yet is not on that account under it ; with His will He is free, and therefore not under it ; by the works which He willingly does He is under it. But we as sinners are in will and in works subject to it ; for we with constrained will do the works of the law." This mode of apprehending the problem is connected with the question under what practical point of view it is that Luther estimates Christ's obedience to the law considered as a legal code. With him the point is by no means, as in the case of 212 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. his successors, that a condition of our justification founded upon the righteousness of God is fulfilled by Christ's active obedience to the law ; but that a pattern is set up for the life of justified persons, inasmuch as they in the Spirit of Christ voluntarily fulfil the moral law, and thereby are freed from that juristic view of it which counts upon selfish observance. Since in our state of sin we could not shake ourselves free from the latter form of it, the independence of the state of grace in relation thereto is secured, by the fact that Christ's voluntary submission to the compulsion of the law has invali- dated that constraint for all those that are Christ's. This reference of Christ's active obedience does not influence the doctrine of reconciliation. In view of that doctrine the following has to be considered. When Luther defines the law to which Christ voluntarily submitted Himself, and when he exemplifies it in Christ's submission to His parents and in His circumcision, he brings into prominence, in connexion with the legal compulsion of the law, the obvious narrowness of the sphere of life to which it refers, and to which Christ was supe- rior in virtue of that destiny of which He was conscious. His obedience to the law thus shows itself, like His endurance of the curse of the law, in the light of endurance of the restraints of life — as suffering — and therefore Luther places both these elements in such close continuity that he takes into account only the suffering of Christ which extended throughout His whole life, and not in connexion therewith His doing as a con- dition of justification. If, now, it might appear as if this view did not distinguish itself much from the mediaeval view of Christ's merit, this would result from under-estimation of the difference which is implied in the application of the idea of the law to an understanding of Christ's work. But yet it is clear that Luther, with his paradoxical statements respecting Christ's obedience to the law, of the meaning of which he has himself no clear understanding, postulates rather than shows the existence of a connexion between the doing and suffering of Christ. If Luther, on other occasions,1 appreciates the value towards our salvation of Christ's obedience, of his fulfilling of the law which is the will of God, he does so in the sense that His doing and suffering had for their motive the love which is 1 Compare Kostlin, ii. pp. 404, 405. CHRIST'S PASSIVE AND ACTIVE OBEDIENCE. 213 prescribed by the law as all-comprehensive obedience. If, now, this serves to bring it about that our standing with God is no longer determined by regard to the law, provided that we believe in Christ, then in this connexion it is no more the artificial conception of the law which we find in the Epistle- sermon that is maintained ; rather is the view opened up which the formula concordice presents upon this point of doctrine. For its elaboration, however, still other influences were at work. How slight was the emphasis that, in the first theological period of the German Reformation, was laid upon the satisfac- tory character of the active obedience of Christ may be inferred from the fact that Melanchthon in his published writings regards only His penal suffering as the part of Christ's obedience which availed towards our justification.1 Zwingli also definitely dis- tinguishes the two only in the tract von gottlicher und mensch- licher Gerechtigkeit (i. p. 433) : God has given His Son for us as fulfiller of His will, who has been able to comply with His entire command, and pay the debt of all our sins, and is the sure pledge by which we come to God. Calvin's view, on the other hand, running through all editions of the Itistitutio (3 ed., Lib. ii. 16, 5), reverts to the same connexion between active and passive obedience in the doctrine of reconciliation, as is to be traced in Luther's Epistle-sermon. His achievement of righteousness for us rests upon the whole course of His obedi- ence ; the ground of the forgiveness which frees us from the curse of the law is spread over the entire life of Christ ; as soon as He assumed the form of a servant, He began to pay the price of our liberation. Death is merely the close of this series of prestations. For as the sacrifice in its death must be voluntarily offered (for its value is rooted in love as the motive) it is only His general active obedience that guarantees the significance and efficacy of His suffering unto death. On the other hand, Calvin brings into prominence, in connexion with the obedience of His life as a whole, only the instances in which He submitted Himself to that which ran counter to His own proper destiny in life — wherein, therefore, He relatively 1 In two passages, however, of the Pastille (C. R. xxiv. pp. 216, 242) there occurs also an assignation of value to obedientia activa along with satisfactio as contributing to justification. 214 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. suffered ; as, for example, in being made under the law (Gal. iv. 4), and submitting to the baptism of John (Matt. iii. 15). Calvin is distinguished from Luther only in so far as he does not in general terms refer the active obedience of Christ to the law, but to a less definite aspect of the will of God ; and that, therefore, he adduces as a particular proof of obedience His submission to the law as that is expressed by Paul. Finally, it is worthy of remark that public documents originating in Calvin's sphere of Eeformation activity, the Heidelberg Cate- chism (Qu. 36, 37) and the Confessio Helvetica posterior (cap. 11), are the first that recognise the active obedience of Christ along with, or even before, the passive obedience, as a ground of justification. The meaning of this is, that the two ought to be regarded in the light of one another, the active obedience and the perfect holiness of life as the general ground that gives value to the suffering, the graduated suffering as the constant manifestation of the sinless life.1 35. If, accordingly, the Eeformers have laid down very defi- nite fundamental ideas and suggestions upon the value of Christ's personal prestations, with a view to the reconstruction of the doctrine of reconciliation, they have neither clearly realized to themselves the scientific task they had in hand, nor set about its solution in connexion with the doctrine of justifi- cation. Even Calvin, although he of all those connected with the Eeformation movement has accomplished relatively the most finished work in this field, and in this respect far surpasses Melanchthon's services, has not firmly fixed the links of that chain which constitutes the religious confession of the Eeformers and dominates their harmonious theological effort. Such an attempt at exact systematic exhibition of the doctrines of Christ's satisfaction and of our justification was, however, undertaken by Andreas Osiander, but in a direction, and with instrumentalities and postulates, which show his connexion with the Eeformers to be very slight, and which thoroughly justify the explicit repudiation of his doctrine by Melanchthon, Calvin, and the genuine Lutherans. But as his opponents rested satisfied with the rejection of his theory without any exertion on the part of any of them to solve the systematic problem in 1 Compare Schneckenburger, Zur Icirchl. Christologie, p. 65. CJrsimus, Ex- plkatio catechesis; ad. qu. 16 (Opp. i. pp. 92, 93). OSIANDER'S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION. 215 the line the Eeformers had taken, and with the postulates sup- plied by them, certain elements in Osiander's doctrine, where he attaches himself to Luther, have exercised an important influence upon the doctrinal principles of Lutheran theology precisely in the view which he himself first originated. Although accordingly his theory, as a whole, must be looked upon as something outside of the genuine Eeformation, Osiander, in several respects, has undoubtedly contributed his share toward the development of Lutheran orthodoxy.1 Osiander, who, from the year 1522, laboured at Niirnberg in furtherance of the Eeformation of Luther, from the beginning had held that idea of justification as making the sinner really righteous, on account of which he was so vigorously assailed when he developed it in a thorough- going way in the year 1551, during the period of his activity at Konigsberg in Prussia.2 But as he coincided with Luther in the principles that works are not the grounds but the consequences of justification, that all religious truth is to be derived from Scripture only and not from tradition, that the influence of the external word of God precedes that of the internal — he was equally persuaded that he was only following Luther when he regarded justification as a real operation of Christ within the believer. Luther unde- niably had given to him, as well as Brenz, some occasion for thinking this (p. 176), but it was not Luther's prevalent and deliberate view that Osiander, in defending himself, laid hold of as exhibiting the proper tendency of that Eeformer.3 The following is the line of thought in Osiander's tract :4- — As we are all born children of wrath, we need for our salvation that God should again become gracious unto us, again quicken us 1 In what follows I reproduce the substance of my essay, " Ueber die Reclitfertiyungslehre des Andreas Osiander" in the Jahrb. fiir deutsche Theol. ii. (1857) pp. 795-829. 2 Compare Heberle, Osiander's Lehre in ihrer fruhesten Gestalt. Stud. u. Krit. 1844, p. 386 sqq. Wilken, A. Osiander's Leben, Lehre und Schriften, Iste Abth. 1844, p. 5. Moller, A. Osiander, 1870. 3 Compare Osiander's Excerpta qucedam dilucide et perspicue dictorum de justificatione fidei in commentario super Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas reverendi patris Domini Martini Lutheri, 1551 (republished with additions in the Con- fessio de Justificatione}. 4 De Unico Mediators Jesu Christo et Justificatione fidei Confessio. Eegiomonte Prussia (24 Oct. 1551). Compare the previous Disputatio de Justificatione, hab. ix. Kal Nov. 1550 ; the principal heads of which are to be found ex- tracted in Gieseler, Kirchengeschichte, iii. 2, p. 275 sq. 216 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. from the death of sin, and make us righteous. To the accom- plishment of this end we, as sinners, can contribute nothing ; therefore God has raised up the Mediator, Jesus Christ. But in the idea of Mediator it is implied that He deal separately with both parties. Therefore He has reconciled God first of all, having borne the punishment of sin in His death, and also ful- filled the law in man's room and stead. Hereby He has brought it about that God is willing to forgive men their sins, and that He will not impute to them the imperfection of their moral walk if they believe. This done, the Mediator next directs Himself to men, with the announcement of forgiveness of sins and with justification. Both are contained in the gospel, which takes effect upon sinners when the conditions of repentance (which is awakened by the law) and of faith are fulfilled. The gospel is the external word of God which, in the first instance, offers to man the forgiveness of sins that has been obtained from God in virtue of Christ's passion and fulfilment of the law, and afterwards offers to believers the inner Word, which is Christ, and which makes the believer righteous. The external word, which comes by hearing, is the vehicle of the inner Word, which is able to force its way through the understanding and memory into the heart. For the inner Word — the substance of the gospel — is not merely the eternal gracious decree regard- ing sinners, but it is the very Word which is with God, and which is God ; which as the wisdom of God is the eternal self- knowledge of God in exercise, and which in Jesus Christ has been made man. When then the outwardly preached gospel shows itself as the power of God, it implants in the heart of man that inner Word, which is Christ Himself in His divine nature, which in the believer grounds his actual righteousness before God, and with which the Father also and the Holy Ghost are inseparably associated. Osiander apprehends this goal of Christ's mediatorship in individual believers in a manner that corresponds to his representation of man in his original state before the fall.1 Pointing to 2 Cor. iv. 4, CoL i. 1 5, Osiander explains that image of God in which man was created to have been the eternal idea of the God-man, by means of which the 1 As set forth in Osiander's tract, An filius Dei fuerit incarnandus, si pec- catum non introivisset in mundum, item, de imagine Dei quid sit. Montereg. ?r. 18 Dec. 1550. OSI ANDERS DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION. 217 various theoplianies were made to the patriarchs, and which was realized in the Person of Jesus Christ. God's determination to make man in His image implies that His personal intercourse and influence with man, which He accomplished by means of His Christ- foreshadowing theophanies, constituted part of Adam's normal existence. From this intercourse with the Son of God Adam derived His Spirit, and was filled with the knowledge of God and with trust in Him. But the knowledge of God is eternal life (John xvii. 3), and eternal life is the Word, the Son of God (John xiv. 6) ; the Word, therefore, the Son of God, and consequently also the Father and the Holy Ghost, dwelt in Adam ~by grace. As Christ by nature is God and man, so Adam by nature is man, but by grace is partaker of the divine nature. Osiander deduces this original condition of man's being from the consideration that the state of grace in the redeemed man has such high attributes, and that Christ's mediatorship only restored to man the destiny which had been lost by sin. Hence his explanation of the righteousness that is bestowed on be- lievers through Christ naturally corresponds with this view of the state of grace which belonged to the original destiny of man. In this train of thought Osiander himself brings prominently forward two divergencies from the view then current among Lutheran theologians. In the first place, he distinguishes de- cidedly between the ideas redemtio and justificatio, and makes the former only to be the result of the historical work of Christ ; while in that religious realization of Christ by faith, which at the time of the Eeformation dominated reflection upon this subject, the two words are used as equivalent. Now, when Osi- ander, starting from a systematic order of ideas, sharply distin- guishes the effect of Christ's work upon God from that upon man, his meaning is, that the former, which had been accom- plished more than 1500 years before, might well be called our redemption, but not our justification. For to justification our faith is necessary ; and to believe, one must exist. But we were not living then ; and therefore we could not be justified by Christ's twofold fulfilment of the law. But, on the other hand, he regards it as quite conceivable that one might be redeemed and freed previous to being born ; as, for example, in the case where our ancestor is freed from slavery. *In the 218 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. second place, he limits, in accordance with this distinction, the idea of justificatio to the daily renewed influence of the Medi- ator upon individual believers as such, and ranks the idea along with regeneratio, renovatio, and mvificatio. At the same time, he frankly admits that justificare in the Bible is sometimes exactly equivalent to injustum aut reum justum pronunciare, sive ille Justus sit, sive non. But, as a rule, he would explain the Pauline usage of the word as meaning aliquem, gui non Justus sed impius est, re ipsa et in veritate justum efficere. He decides for the Catholic view in this definition, as also in his reference of justificatio to the end that it justum ad juste agen- dum movet, et sine quo nee Justus esse nee juste agere potest. On the other hand, he abandons the Catholic view in so far as it gives to man's own works any claim to justification. He will have it regarded as only a metaphorical expression, when occa- sionally the works and fruits of righteousness are called by the name of righteousness itself. The righteousness which is to be established in man by God is no empirical doing and suffer- ing ; it is a state that is raised above the vicissitudes of these, and is not increased by well-doing. In view of the fourth chapter of the epistle to the Eomans, he insists that faith, which is imputed as righteousness, means faith in so far as it Dominum Jesum Christum, verum Deum et hominem totum et indivisum appreliendit et in sese includit ut ita Dominus Jesus CJiristus ipse justitia nostra sit. Only in this way can we avoid the blas- phemous error regarding God into which the Lutheran doctrine falls, when it asserts that God declares us to be righteous on account of our faith, as on account of an action which has value in itself, although we are not righteous, and although God does not at all make us righteous, but leaves us just in the same condition as before. Only on the supposition that this (Osi- ander's) view is true, does God find real ground for his judg- ment upon believers. 36. Amongst the opponents of Osiander,1 Victorinus Strigel rightly perceives that the distinction between justificatio and 1 Censurce der furstlich-sachsisclien Theologen zu Weimar und Coburg auf das Bekenntniss Andreas Osiander' s von Rechtfertigung des Glaubens, Erfurt, 1552 (containing three tracts prepared by Meuius, Strigel, and Schnepf, and signed by them along with others, e.g. Amsdorf and Jonas). Matth. Flacius, Verlegung des Bekenntnisses Osiandri von der Rechtfertigung armen Sunder durch die wesentliche Gerechtigkeit der hohen Hajestat Gotten allein. Magdeburg, 1552. CRITICISM OF OSIANDER S DOCTRINE. 219 redemtio depends upon an identification of justificatio and regeneratio. If it be right to make this identification, Osi- ander is certainly correct in saying that we cannot be justified before our life begins. But if justification should not be con- nected with the death of Christ, neither should redemption. For the individual (who is always the subject of discussion in these questions) cannot be redeemed until he is made captive ; but captivity under sin begins, in the individual, only when he is conceived and born. It was not difficult for Osiander's oppon- ents to show exegetically the identity of redemption and justi- fication. But Flacius, moreover, brings it into prominence that they are synonymous ideas : forgiveness of sins is not merely the doing away of guilt incurred by violation of the law, it is also the imputation of the fulfilment of the law. This is quite correct if one realizes, in the religious way in which the Ee- formers did so, what are the operations of Christ upon the believing subject. But as Osiander started the question with regard to the objective systematic arrangement of these steps — an arrangement which Luther and Melanchthon had not discussed — the question with the Lutherans came to be, whether they could, against Osiander, maintain the connexion or identity of those ideas, even when Christ's historical work was separated from the saving experience of believers, as it takes place from time to time ? Is there any other schema besides that which Osiander employed — that Christ by means of his historical prestations has influenced God, — has determined Him to be gracious towards sinners — and that He presently accomplishes the justification of believers, whether that be represented as actus forensis or as actus causativus ? Strigel puts forth another schema, asserting that by Christ's death and resurrection " eternal redemption and justification were prepared for the whole human race, and the promised treasure won in Christ for the world as a whole" but that to individual believers this is applied as they come into being. Just as by Adam's sin the wrath and curse of God came upon the whole human race, but overtake individual persons only when they come into being ; so in like manner 1500 years ago by Christ "was the human race redeemed, sanctified, and justified, though these benefits are applied for the first time to particular individuals when they believe in Christ and are baptized in His name." This result 220 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. certainly establishes the identity of redemption and justification and seems fitted to mediate between Melanchthon's divergent expressions (p. 178), in which it is atone time asserted that the believer is already justified, and, at another time, that justifica- tion follows the act of faith. Strigel thus founds the individual's assurance of faith upon the change wrought by Christ on the attitude of God towards the human race, and carries it back to an arrangement of the whole plan of salvation previously made by Christ. This important result remains unrealized when Osiander separates in point of time Christ's mediatorial functions and opposes them to each other in point of fact. Or then, when he regards the achievement of propitiatio Dei by Christ, and redemtio hominum by Him as amounting to the same thing, he thereby, in contravention of his own view, and in conformity with the Reformation usage of language, expresses a change not only in God's disposition, but in his attitude towards men ; and he has nothing to answer to Strigel's remark, that if Christ has redeemed the human race, He in doing so has determined God to regard it no more as sinful, but as righteous, so that thus every individual in his own time may, by means of his faith, experience within himself redemption, or justifica- tion by the sentence of God. The ground of Osiander's untenable distinction between redemption and justification was that he considered justification to be a real change in the sinner. But that assertion he attempted to support by means of an obvious misunderstanding of the Lutheran view. Osiander's opponents could with perfect justice repudiate the charge made against them, as if by jus- tification they intended such a judgment passed by God upon the sinner as leaves him inwardly unchanged. Melanchthon,1 Schnepf, Flacius, are at one in affirming that with the declara- tion that the believer is righteous, is immediately connected the working of the Holy Spirit towards illumination, towards reno- vation of life, towards new obedience. But this mere assertion of the co-existence in the believer of two things which have reference to quite diverse purposes (p. 172), must at once have presented itself as a weak point of the Reformation-doctrine. The theological defectiveness of this supplementary formula 1 Antwort auf das Buck Herrn A. Osiander's von der Rechtfertiyuny dee Memchen, Wittenberg, 1552. C. R, vii. pp. 892-902. CRITICISM OF OSI ANDERS DOCTRINE. 221 comes all the more clearly into prominence when Flaeius, Strigel, and Schnepf try to explain the priority of the thought of justi- fication to that of regeneration, in general only on the ground that an analytical sentence of justification such as Osiander attributes to God, does indeed suit the human measure of justice, but that, notwithstanding this, the synthetic imputation of righteousness to the sinner is befitting in God precisely, because of its contrariness to the human standard. Thus to forego the rationality of one's own view is at least very rash ; but at the same time is an indication of the haughty indiffer- ence with which these epigoni of the Eeformation held them- selves back from all serious effort in theological work. They were satisfied to appeal, against the identification of justification and regeneration, to that religious consciousness by which the Eeformation saw itself directed to distinguish between these two ideas. They accordingly vindicate the forensic interpretation of justification by reference to the cravings of the troubled conscience after a ground of righteousness that shall stand firm, independently of the subjective life ; and they meet Osiander's attack with the charge that he by his doctrine gives a false security to man, and that he surely never could have passed through those experiences which had pointed Luther to seek justification through Christ's merit. Here again Melanchthon, the theologians of the Principality of Saxony, and Flacius are quite agreed. The religious difference between Osiander's standpoint and that of the Eeformers undoubtedly comes to be clearly seen in this dispute. For although Osiander, following his purpose, again and again declares that the believer bases the conscious- ness of his acceptance with God, in view of the imperfection of his own works, upon the value of Christ's obedience,1 he yet declares in one passage of his " Confession " that God regards 1 Confessio, c. 4 : Posteaquam thesaurus redemtionis— in externo verbo nobis offertur, apprehendimus eum fide ad justificationem nostri, scientes, quod eundem in verbo interno, quod in corde nostro manet, certo habeamus, ac de eo in omnibus certaminibus conscientise contra omnes portas inferorum confidere, gaudere, ipsoque uti possimus. P. 2 : Cum peccatum sit remissum, et tamen aclhuc in nobis hsereat, debet ipse (Jesus) obedientiam suani, qua legem implevit, nobis donare, ac pro nobis ponere, ne nobis imputetur, quod legem nondum possumus adimplere, sed adhuc quotidie peccamus et offen- dimus. S. 2 : Quamvis legem etiam post resurrectionem non pure et per- fecte impleamus, tamen hujusmodi defectus, infirmitas et debitum nobis non imputatur sed condonatur, et impletio Christi pro nobis substituitur. 222 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. the believer as righteous on account of his habitual righteous- ness, on account of "Christ in him;" and that with God the sins of the believer are no more than an impure drop in the purest sea.1 From a later expression, indeed, we may conclude that the discrepancy between the two thoughts was not clear to him, for he allows them to become mixed up with each other.2 But as matter of fact, not merely does it follow as a necessary consequence of his premisses that the believer will overcome the consciousness of his imperfection by reflection upon his habitual righteousness, it fails to follow from his view of Christ's historical work, that the believer can regard him- self as justified by His obedience. For as His work of redemp- tion is not to be understood as also justificatio, the believer gains by reflection upon the value of Christ's obedience only the assurance that God regards him no longer as unrighteous. But if he desires to be accepted by God as positively righteous, the believer, on Osiander's principles, can attribute this com- pletion of his consciousness of salvation only to Christ's right- eousness dwelling in him, upon which also, of course, God's corresponding judgment must proceed. As Osiander, in his theory, proceeds upon a different reli- gious judgment of self from that which the Eeformers follow, so also in speaking of the relation between God and men he is entirely opposed to them in the ethical and metaphysical views which he adopts. When his opponents not only had repudi- ated the charge that by their view of justification they ex- cluded the supposition of a real change in the sinner, but had even pointed out to Osiander that they also maintained, as a result of God's sentence of justification, a real union of Christ and the Holy Spirit with the believer, he still continued his opposition against their representation of the manner in which this union is brought about. In his Widerlegung der Antwort 1 Q. 3 : Christus implet nos justitia sua, — ita ut Deus ipse et omnes angeli, cum Christus noster et in nobis sit, meram justitiam in nobis videant. — Et quamvis peccatum adhuc in came nostra habitet et tenaciter adhaereat, tamen perinde est, sicut stilla immunda respectu totius purissimi maris. Et propter justitiam Christi, quse in nobis est, Deus illud non vult observare. 2 In Osiander's Widerlegung der ungegriindeten undienstlichen Antwort Philipp Melanchthon's (Kbnigsberg, 21st April 1552), we read : " Thou must not rely in this life upon thy obedience nor upon thy purity, but upon the obedience and purity of my Son, who has perfectly fulfilled the law for thee ; for His righteousness is not imputed to thee by me because it works in thee any works, be they great or small, but only because it is in thee by faith." CRITICISM OF QSIANDER8 DOCTRINE. 223 Melanchthon's, he complains that the latter, even while con- ceding the indwelling of Christ in us, understands it to be effective merely somewhat as the sun exercises influence upon the field, but does not regard it as an actual indwelling of Christ in His completeness, in His two inseparable natures. This complaint, in harmony as it is with his view of man's original condition (p. 2 1 7), brings clearly before us Osiander's conception of the ethical destiny of man. In like manner he affirms in his Confessio also that the law requires of man that righteousness which is the eternal essence of God Himself. Menius, however, in refuting so exaggerated a demand upon men, omits distinctly to state what in his opinion is the real meaning of the law. But it is obvious that what he holds is, that the righteousness in conformity with the law, which Adam lost and which is restored in regeneration, has not the nature of a habit except in the form of an act of will. But Osiander opposes to this view the following dilemma : Omnis justitia, proprie de justitia loquendo, aut est divina justitia et essentia Dei, aut est Jiumana justitia, et qualitas creata, nullo autem modo actio aut passio. Human righteousness, says he, is produced by instruction, discipline, laws, penalties ; but the righteousness which the law of God demands and yet cannot produce is Christ Himself in His Divine nature, — in other words, it is God Himself, the eternal Divine Being, and no other ; else would we be glorying in a created righteousness. But the indwelling of Christ, with whom the Father also and the Spirit are united, causes the obedience and well-doing of believers with the same natural necessity wherewith Christ's own obedience is produced by His Divine nature. Osiander's theory thus has its ultimate origin in a tendency to withdraw from the conditions of man's free will, as something super- natural and divine, all religious assurance of salvation, and the corresponding task of moral life ; while the theology of the .Reformation, on the other hand, assumes without questioning that all religious change of character — all regeneration by God's Spirit — takes place in the region of the human will. Osiander thinks that by means of the notion of substance he can express a more intimate connexion between man and God than is possible by means of the notion of cause, the applica- tion of which to the relation between the Divine Spirit and 224 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. the regenerate man appears to him too bald. Had this point of controversy been more fully gone into, even Melanchthon would hardly have succeeded in so defending his own views as to avoid that appearance. But unless we suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by the mysticism which attaches to Osiander's view, it is impossible not to see that the causal view of the problem, while it certainly does not exhaust it, does not, at all events, destroy it. On the other hand, whoever regards the notion of actio as altogether inadmissible here, and treats the notion of righteousness exclusively either as divina essentia or as qualitas creata, leads in his view of justification to a con- fusion of the Divine with the human essence in the same degree wherein he denies that peculiarity which distinguishes the human will from other created powers, whereby it is capable of receiving into itself the influence of the Divine Spirit. Osiander, however, shrinks from fully developing the conse- quences which the abstract metaphysical view of justification might seem to admit or to necessitate. He affirms, indeed, that in nova regenerations attrahimus essentialem justitiam Christi, quce est Deus ipse, quemadmodum in prima nativitate peccatricem naturam Adami contraximus. But that the divine- human Being of Christ has become to the regenerate another nature, must not lead us in our judgment of ourselves to assume a deification of the believer. Although the regenerate be partakers of the Divine nature, Osiander reminds us that we are and remain creatures still, however gloriously we may have been renewed. We ought never to allow ourselves to regard as our own God's righteousness in us. The figurative expressions of Christ's indwelling in believers, and of the garment with which they are clothed, are to be taken as denoting only a mechanical outward relation of God's right- eousness to human persons. Christ's righteousness, which thus must be regarded as something foreign when it occurs in the believer, must accordingly be imputed to the believer.1 It 1 Confessio, M. 3 : Cum Christus per fidem in nobis habitat, turn affert suam justitiam, quse est ejus divina natura, secum in nos, quse deinde nobis impu- tatur ac si esset nostra propria, inao et donatur nobis, manatque ex ipsius humana natura tanquam ex capite etiam in nos tanquatn ipsius membra et movet nos, ut exhibeamus membra nostra arma justitise Dei. Widerleyung Mdanchthon's:—" If we by faith become living members of Christ then do CRITICISM OF OSIANDER'S DOCTRINE. 225 is obvious that such practical departures on Osiander's part from his theoretical principles were forced upon him by the ethical spirit of the Eeformation. But with that concession Osiander has invalidated all those arguments in favour of his doctrine, which are based upon the ostensible necessity for finding actual Divine righteousness in the believer. In it especially is prescribed a quite different judgment of self on the part of the believer from that which is involved in the expression quoted above (p. 222), to the effect that God sees nothing but righteousness when Christ's righteousness dwells in the believer, and that sin disappears like an impure drop in the pure sea of righteousness. Osiander's interest thus was plainly divided between two opposite points of view, which so counteracted one another as to wreck his speculative doctrine, which aimed at a thorough- going consistency of thought. The Eeformation doctrine having left on Osiander the impression that it weakened the motives to well-doing, he sought by means of his assertion of real justification to unite in one thought religious pacification and impulse to moral action. But he had gone too far in the Eeformation school of religious judgment of self, not to feel the importance of that imputed righteousness of Christ which meets the believer's consciousness of sin. But here the oneness of his consciousness of justification which he had striven to attain was broken up. Tor the immanent righteousness of Christ appeared indeed as the believer's own power with reference to his good works ; but, in so far as it had to be imputed in order to supplement the imperfection of these, it presented itself as a foreign element in the sphere of his own life. While then Osiander was able only in one case to draw from himself the logical conclusion that God sees in the believer nothing but righteousness' since Christ essentially dwells in him ; and that sins are lost sight of in this habitual righteousness, as the impure drop in the purest sea ; we can now understand why it is that involuntarily he has more fre- we become partakers also of His essential righteousness, for He dwells in us. But we are not completely obedient thereunto ; in fact, our obedience has hardly made any beginning ; but it ought to grow from day to day, and will be made perfect in the resurrection. Meanwhile, God imputes to us His essential righteousness, simply because it is in us, irrespective of the fact that we are not perfectly obedient as we ought to be." 15 226 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. quently adopted the Reformation doctrine, that the obedience of the Mediator handed down to us in history is imputed to the believer for the forgiveness of sins. 37. Osiander follows Luther's tradition in yet other respects. And as he was the first who brought into consistent shape the doctrine before us, it is easy to understand how he, by his way of setting forth Luther's thought, should have exercised a lead- ing influence upon the form given to that doctrine by the Lutherans. The distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ, originally due to Luther (p. 210), was first of all so applied by Osiander that to each of these a separate end was attributed (p. 216). The endurance of the punishment of sins by Christ is the condition under which God in His grace is ready to bestow forgiveness of sins upon men ; the fulfilment of the law in man's place serves the end of supplementing the imperfection of the obedience of believers in such a way that that imperfection can no longer be laid to their charge.1 Pro- perly speaking this distinction of Osiander stands in no relation of subserviency to the deliberate tendency of his doctrine ; for the latter tends to indicate that the deficiency of the believer's obedience finds its supplement in the value of Christ's sub- stantial righteousness that dwells in him. Flacius and Menius, on the other hand, make use of Osiander's suggestion on this point for filling out the Lutheran doctrine. Now, it is worthy of notice that these men, and also the compilers of the formula concordice following in their footsteps, assert the distinction and co-ordination of the passive and active obedience of Christ as contributing to the two ends of vicarious endurance of punish- ment and vicarious fulfilling of the law, just as distinctly as they also assert the coincidence of obedience and suffering in the life of Christ as alike conditions of justification or forgive- ness of sins.2 Thomasius explains the former distinction 1 The distinction was first laid down by Osiander in his " Constitution of the Nurnberg and Brandenburg Churches " (1 533). 2 Compare the citations from the writings of Flacius and Menius to be found in Thomasius : Das Bekenntniss der luiherischen Kirche von der Versoh- nung, pp. 56-71. Formula Concordiae, Art. III. : Epitome (p. 584) : Christus obedientia sua, quam patri ad mortem usque absolutissimam praestitit, nobis peccatornm omnium remissionem et vitam aeternam promeruit. Sol. decl. (p. 685) : Ipsius obedientia, non ea tantum, qua patri paruit in tota sua passione et morte, verum etiam, qua nostra causa sponte sese legi subjecit eamque obedientia ilia sua implevit, nobis ad justitiam imputatur, ita ut OSIANDER'S INFL UENCE ON L UTHERANISM. 227 between the passive and the active obedience as arising from the design to find a basis for forgiveness of sins, and justification as " the negative and the positive side " of the salutary result that was contemplated (as above, p. 43), but attributes the latter distinction "to the mode of representation peculiar to that time, which was characterized by the tendency to bring into prominence by means of clear co-ordination the concurrent momenta of one and the same thing" (p. 81), so that by look- ing at the obedience and suffering of Christ together " the two sides " of the thing are again made to appear one. The theo- logian of Erlangen has not in these observations disclosed the sense of the Lutheran doctrinal idea. It is true that the theo- logians of the seventeenth century distinguish between the non- imputation of sins and the imputation of righteousness as " the two sides of the same thing;" and, in distinguishing them, refer them back to separate parts of Christ's obedience. But Flacius, Menius, and the formula concordice treat the two con- ceptions as synonymous, as indeed is shown by the allegations of Thomasius himself (pp. 41, 56, 57). But further, the dis- tinction as well as the collocation of the two forms of Christ's obedience corresponds to certain quite distinct conditions and assumptions of the doctrinal system that received its impulse from Luther, which have not been noticed by Thomasius ; and the instinctive acuteness of the former theologians does not deserve the reproach which the latter teacher of dogmatics, of all people in the world, casts upon them as having in accord- ance with the spirit of their age revelled unduly in dialectics. For, by Luther's assumption that the Divine law is the rule which regulates the relation between man and God which holds good from the beginning; and by the assumption that men have incurred guilt towards the law in such a way that they could never by themselves either become free from debt or yet be in a position to offer that obedience to the law on which their acceptance with God depends, it is necessary that not only the debt of guilt towards the law but also the legal obliga- tion of man towards God should be abolished, in order that the new gracious dispensation of justification or forgiveness of sins Deus propter totam obedientiam, quam Christus agendo et patiendo . . prsestitit, peccata nobis remittat, pro bonis et justis nos reputet et salute seterna donet. 228 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. may take effect. If, now, Christ as our substitute is destined to fulfil the conditions under which God's justice and the law cease to regulate the relation in which those who are to be redeemed stand to God, it follows that Christ must meet the claims of the law alike when these demand that we should be punished, and when they demand to be fulfilled by us ; thus a double obedience to the law is necessary on the part of the Mediator. For, were it seen that only human guilt had been done away by Christ's passion, then would the demand for fulfilment of the law press upon those who had been redeemed from guilt as heavily as before ; the dispensation of redemption would include the dispensation of the law as means towards the end of complete justification. If, on the other hand, the dispensation of grace excludes such a view of the force of the law for justified persons, then must justification be preceded by the vicarious fulfilment of the law in order to the dissolution of the legal relation with God. The distinction between the two forms of Christ's obedience and the diversity of their reference are thus perfectly rational in relation to the premisses and to the purpose of the doctrine.1 But these things being determined, the problem is not yet exhausted ; indeed the thought, which in the original religious apprehension of justifi- cation by faith is the dominant one, has not yet found expres- sion in them — the thought that Christ is our righteousness, and that His obedience is imputed to us. This betokens the need of recognising Christ, who gives perfect obedience to the law, as the direct Mediator of positive gracious acceptance ; but in so far as His twofold obedience to the law satisfies the Divine jmtice, He is as yet recognised merely as the indispens- able condition in order that grace may take effect. To show Christ's twofold obedience towards the law serves accordingly only to lay the foundation for the thought that for Christ's sake the existing legal relation between those who are to be redeemed and God has been abolished ; but in this negative result it is not implied that a new relation of another kind is formed through Christ. This end is attained by that assertion of the oneness of Christ's obedience which is made by the 1 Tollner (Der thdtige Gehorsam Jesu Christi, p. 563) formulates these pre- misses quite accurately : " The double obligation that lies upon men arises from the fact that as men they are bound to give the obedience that they have hitherto failed to give, and that as sinners they are bound to suffer." OSIANDER'S INFL UENCE ON L UTHERANISM. 229 opponents of Osiander and by the formula concordice. As obedience to the law, Christ's twofold work meets the legal de- mands of God and discharges them ; but, on the other hand, as voluntary moral obedience towards God, Christ's doing and suffering have the effect at once of guaranteeing the operation of God's grace and of representing the pattern of the contem- plated new relation in which those who are to be redeemed are to stand, which, on condition of their faith, is imputed to them as their righteousness, and precludes the measurement of their new obedience by the strict rule of the law. That this profound train of thoughts has not been thus clearly set forth by its authors cannot justly be urged against this interpretation of it ; the inadequacy of the representation only shows that with regard to this point the epigoni of Luther, while not yet deserted by that creative play of phantasy which is always the first means of progress in scientific knowledge, do not take their dialectic task sufficiently in earnest. Now, on comparing this train of thought, which the Lutheran doctrine through the formula concordice has attained, with Osiander's analogous view, a certain divergence cannot be overlooked. Osiander's distinction of the active and passive obedience of Christ is not, in sense, covered by the Lutheran distinction which resembles it in sound. If, according to Osiander, the active obedience of Christ, while it satisfies the law at the same time, lays the foundation for the completion of the believer's ever-defective new obedience, he has taken together in this what the Lutherans regard partly as the negative effect of His active obedience to the law, and partly as the positive effect of His whole obedience to God. The superior maturity and clearness of the Lutheran formula is obvious. In making distinctions with regard to time and place between the Mediator's works in their references to God and to men, Osiander had appropriated the doctrine of Luther and Melanchthon, so far as it had been deliberately wrought out ; particularly with reference to this point, — that justification as a result is brought about upon the individual by means of God's word, the gospel of forgiveness of sins (pp. 170-1). As the Re- formers had satisfied themselves with this way of explaining justification, while not even Melanchthon wrought out the doctrine of atonement by Christ which had been formulated by 230 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. himself as the objective antecedent to the doctrine of justifica- tion (p. 202), Osiander,by adopting Melanchthon's formula, goes beyond the circle of vision of his predecessors, just in so far as after his own fashion he has marked off the respective boundaries and mutual relations of the reconciliation of God and of the justification of men. However far Osiander's Lutheran opponents thought they had occasion to enter into his way of regarding the matter, they also were unable to discover any other objective intermediary between the general result of Christ's work and the justification of the individual than the so-called means of grace. Thus Menius says that " the right- eousness which Christ has earned for us by His obedience, He causes to be presented, offered, and given to every one through the preaching of the gospel, and through the holy sacraments. Whoever, therefore, believes in the promise, really receives these treasures of grace." But faith itself also exists only as operation of the Word of God received by hearing. We ought not to be surprised that the Lutherans never got beyond this formula. For it had Luther's authority on its side, and the epigoni of Luther had not learned from Melanchthon anything of the discipline of accurate theological thinking. Must not the question have pressed itself upon them how those processes to which they pointed stood related to the idea of the Church ? Does the Church take its rise first of all from those who are justified through the instrumentality of the gospel and the sacraments ? or do not rather the means of grace presuppose the existence of the community of believers ? For, after all, the gospel — the keys of the kingdom of heaven — are intrusted principaliter to the Church, and the sacraments cannot even be thought of apart from it. Or, in conformity with the structure of the Catholic idea of the Church, are we to understand the exercise of the means of grace to be a function peculiar to particular officials previous to the existence of any community of believers ? If this is really not to be thought of, must not then the idea of the Church at once be placed in direct relation to the redeeming acts of Christ, in order that the operation of the means of grace towards the justification of individual believers may have what, in the evangelical sense, is its necessary presupposition? If Christ by His obedience once purchased righteousness for us, who, then are " we," unless the OSIANDER S INFL UENCE ON L UTHERANISM. 231 community of believers regarded as the totality that is previous to the individual ? While now that motto of the original believing consciousness of the Eeformation again comes out here also (as indeed it never became extinct in the doctrinal tradition of Lutheranism), the problem is thus reduced to narrower limits than in Strigel's proposition (p. 219), that Christ 1500 years before established redemption and justification for the whole human race. Strigel's view, accordingly, is just as hard hit by a remark of Melanchthon, his master, as is that declaration of Osiander against which it is directed. Melanchthon charac- terizes it as a frightful proof of impiety in Osiander that he extends the forgiveness of sins, as the general result of Christ's passion, to all men, instead of limiting it to believers ; because the wrath of God abides upon those who do not believe in the Son. According to such a view the sins of men would be for- given first of all only at the very moment of their actually achieving faith.1 But how is it, then, with that immediate effect of Christ's passion, which Melanchthon notwithstanding always regards as justificatio and reconciliation without limiting it as Osiander does to placatio Dei (p. 179) ? Either this latter effect must be asserted with reference to the whole human race with the reservation that it finds its limits in application to individuals, or then justificatio and reconciliatio must from the outset be regarded as referring to the community of believers. The circumstance that in the Lutheran theology adequate clearness has never been attained on this point, must be at- tributed, I think, amongst other causes, to the influence of Melanchthon's unsystematic method, which continued to prevail among the Lutherans, — and all the more immoveably too as they were persuaded that by their rejection of his doctrine of the Supper they had escaped the influence of the man they suspected. Flacius, particularly, who in respect of the contents of his doctrine is a highly important intermediary between Luther and the formula concordice, betrays precisely, by the very negligent form of his writings against Osiander, how little 1 C. K. viii. p. 580 : Osiander divellit remissionem peccatoruin a justitia. Expresse ait, omnibus hominibus esse remissa peccata, sed Neronem dainnari, quia non habeat essentialem justitiam. (I do not know where Osiander has said so.) Hie primum maiiifesta et horribilis impietas est, dicere omnibus hominibus, etiam non credentibus, remissa esse peccata (John iii. 36 ; Acts x. 43). — Quare turn primum remittuntur hominibus peccata, cum fide statu- unt sibi remitti ilia propter mediatorem. 232 REFORMATION IDEA OF RECONCILIATION. he had grown away from the influence of Melanchthon. That an acuteness which displays itself in sporadic instances can be associated with general heedlessness respecting the systematic laws of doctrinal exposition, can be observed in other instances also among Lutheran theologians in the development of the doctrine of reconciliation. These, by this latter peculiarity of their procedure, show even now that they are more faithful to Melanchthon than they themselves are aware ; but precisely in a trait of character which is one of the weak points of that Eeformer. At the same time the Lutheran opponents of Osiander who did not know how to avail themselves of the thought of the Church, with a view to the adjustment of the doctrine in dis- pute, can claim our lenient judgment all the more because even Calvin did not realize to himself with sufficient clearness the importance and difficulty of the problem which had been pointed out to him in Osiander's erroneous solution of it. This shows itself at once in the circumstance that Calvin in his doctrine of justification supposes that he can dispose of Osiander in a perfunctory way. He therefore simply brings assertions against assertions. These are true in themselves ; but, as proof is wanting, knowledge is not advanced by them ; nay, rather it is in a measure thrown back. I may here call it to mind that Luther was able -to throw himself into the line of Osiander's ideas, because he manifestly felt how unsatisfactorily he himself had given expression to the connexion that subsists between regeneration and justification (p. 174); in like manner Osiander is not vanquished, because Calvin (iii. 11. 6, 11), like Melanch- thon and the Lutherans generally (p. 220), asserts the concur- rence of the two states without investigating the bearing of justification upon regeneration as an end, and the consequent necessity of their coincidence in the individual believer. Still more unfavourable for the course of the development of the doctrine is Calvin's procedure in pointing out that Osiander's assertion of a crassa mixtura Christi cum fiddibus, is confuted by his view of the unio mystica of the regenerate with Christ.1 Calvin, in invariably giving preference to this 1 iii. 11. 10: Conjunctio ilJa capitis et membrorum, habitatio Christi in cordibus nostris, mystica denique unio a nobis in summo gradu statuitur, ut Christus noster factus donorum, quibus prseditus est, nos faciat consortes. — Qtiia ipsum induimus et insiti sumus in ejus corpus, unum denique nos secum QSIANDKR'S INFL UENCE ON L UTHERANISM. 233 comparison, has given occasion to the supposition, which Schneckenburger in particular has deliberately stated (p. 191), that he too, like Osiander, regards God's judgment of justifica- tion as proceeding upon the real union of the believer with Christ. But Calvin's thought ought not to be brought into direct parallelism with the similarly-sounding thought of Osi- ander. For Calvin's unio mystica indicates the individual's membership in the Church as the condition under which he becomes conscious within himself of justification through Christ's obedience (p. 191); the indwelling of Christ, as Osi- ander understands it, is a predicate of the individual believer as such, upon whom the means of grace have taken effect in accordance with Christ's intention to his being made righteous, and so to his membership in the body of Christ. How then could Calvin show that he set up a spiritualis conjunct™ in opposition to the crassa mixtura of Osiander, when the latter would hardly at all have accepted this representation of his view ? The spiritual and moral sort of union with Christ could have been proved as against Osiander's pretended physical indwelling of Christ in the believer, only if Calvin had ana- lysed the thought (which he was indeed cherishing), that the individual subject can be thought of as recipient of the Holy Ghost, and as possessing the consciousness of justification through Christ only on condition that he be viewed as a member of the community of believers, and that this last be regarded as the object of Christ's redeeming purpose. But in his chief dogmatic work Calvin has not determined upon the last-mentioned thought, and the first he has weakened of its full effect, in so far as in the last edition of the Institutio he has shifted the doctrine of the Church from the place which it occupied in the earlier editions, and which of right belongs to it (p. 187). efficere dlgnatus est, ideo justitise societatem nobis cum eo ease gloriamur. Sed Osiander hac spiritual! conjunctione spreta crassam mixturam Christi cum fidelibus urget. CHAPTER VI. THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION AND JUSTIFICATION AS HELD BY LUTHERANS AND CALVINISTS I AND THE SOCINIAN CONTROVERSY. 38. OUR interest in the orthodox doctrine de Christo media- tore would be materially lessened were we to omit to confront it, in the form it assumed in the seventeenth century, with the deliberate and determined resistance offered to it, with the help of all scientific appliances, by the Socinians. For in this polar opposition of the contending parties — both of which alike claimed to be loyal to Christ and Scripture, but which in fact had no points of contact except in the controversy about Chris- tian truth — is seen the entire compass of the influences of that Christianity which at that period had separated itself from the political unity of the Western Church. The dispute, however, between the orthodox party and the Socinians was fruitless, because neither on the one side nor on the other was the root of the controversy laid bare. Lutherans and Calvinists main- tain the idea of atonement as a whole, and Socinians deny it, because Christendom is regarded by the former as a religious community, by the latter as an ethical school.1 The concep- tion of the Church as the fellowship which logically and really comes before the individual believer, and outside of which no subjective religion and no religious knowledge of God are possible, stands in immediate reciprocal connexion with the thought that Christ has reconciled men with God, and thereby founded the Church, and within it opened up to sinners access to God. The Socinians deny this idea, having no need for it, because in Christ, as the Founder of a school of morality, they 1 Compare my Geschichtl. Studien zurchristl. Lehrevon Gott; Art. iii. (Jahrb. fur deutsche TheoL xiii. p. 280-283.) THE SUBJECT DEFINED. 235 merely look for that guidance and impulse towards moral self- culture which each one appropriates to himself as he may be able, without previously having been joined in fellowship with others of his kind. But this fundamental practical opposition (remained obscure. And in fact the Socinians were on their side persuaded that they were, as men then expressed it, build- ing up the Church, while they were only making a school. Still more unfavourable to the clearing up of the controversy was the circumstance that the tendency of Church progress amongst the successors of the Keformers was impeded, and all proper insight into the conditions of the existence of a Church rendered impossible to them by the growth of an excessive devotion to a theology of the schools. It is indeed true that on their side the true idea of the Church was never allowed to fall out of sight ; but as the school element in the Church and the theo- logical element in religion were over -valued, they came to present too close a resemblance in point of form with Socinian- ism ; so that it was not possible to recognise the fundamental error of the merely scholastic view of Christendom which char- acterized the latter system. The Socinians who valued the theoretical side of Christianity only as instrumental for the ethical guidance of the individual subject, acquired in conse- quence of this a large-hearted toleration for theoretical aberra- tions, which resembles the normal universalism of a truly churchly consciousness. The orthodox party, on the other hand, appeared to have lost all interest in the universal Church in that narrowness of sympathy which characterizes a theo- retical school. Thus the two tendencies produce a superficial impression precisely antithetic to their essential character ; and thus insight into the contrast of their principles is made all the more difficult. The construction of the Eeformation churches was originally guided by the thought of the unity of the Church. Only, in opposition to the political form which that thought had as- sumed in the Eoman Catholic doctrine and practice, it came to be requisite to define it as a necessary object of faith by means of characteristic marks, in which the Divine origin of the fellow- ship of the redeemed should be recognisable ; and at the same time, in opposition to Anabaptism, to secure an orderly consti- tution in the Church. With respect to the former point, the 236 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM fellowship of persons set apart by God was connected with the preaching of the word of God " according to its simple mean- ing," and with the administration of the sacraments as these had been instituted ; while, with reference to the other point, the office of preacher was recognised as that which is ordi- narily intrusted with the administration of these divine means of grace. The champions of Catholicism also laid claim to the word of God ; and in order to secure its authenticity as con- veyed through human instrumentalities, the whole constitu- tional structure of the Romish Church was postulated. But the Reformers denied to their opponents the "simple mean- ing" of the word, establishing it in a much simpler way. For in a dissertation by Luther among the Articles of Torgau, which served as basis for the Augsburg Confession, the following is the explanation given wherefore the word of God is regarded as one of the conditions of the Church's existence : — that " in it is clearly, properly, and rightly taught and set forth what Christ is and what the gospel; what is true repentance and fear of God ; how forgiveness of sins is to be attained ; what the authority and power of the keys in the Church is."1 In the other document from which the Augsburg Confession was compiled — the Articles of Schwabach, to wit — the Church had been described as consisting of all believers in Christ who accept and teach all the preceding articles of doctrine, and also the objective saving efficacy of the Sacraments ;2 but in the seventh Article of the Augsburg Confession the pura doctrina evangelii is restricted to a narrower range of fundamental articles of faith.3 And if, along with the due administration of the sacraments, only the pura doctrina evangelii in the already defined sense of that word was demanded as the human guarantee of God's saving operation towards the found- ing of the Church, it follows that a theoretically defined repre- 1 Corpus fieformatorum, xxvi. p. 193. 2 L. c. p. 157. 3 If a single glance informs us that the Articles of Torgau, which were first discovered and published by Fb'rstemann (in the Ifrkundenbitck zu der Gesch. des Rekhstages zu Augsburg im Jahre 1530, iBterBand. 1833), are almost word for word the basis of the second part of the Augsburg Confession ; a glance also is sufficient to satisfy us that the formula in the seventh article is drawn from the same source, and not from the Articles of Schwabach, which are fol- lowed in all other respects in the first part of the Augsburg Confession. Thus it is only fair to explain that formula according to the connexion in which it occurs in the article of Torgau. THE SUBJECT DEFINED. 237 sentation of the supper was not included, but only recognition of the objective value of the sacraments presupposed. This fundamental religious doctrine of the Church has been explained by Melanchthon in the Apology for the Confession, and repeated in the 2d edition of the Loci Theologici (1535). This doctrine of the Church was undeniably incomplete ; those distinctive marks of its Divine origin were simply put forward as the most necessary and most important criteria, in order to show the continuity of the Church in the Keformation and its distinction from Anabaptism. The distinctive marks under which the fellowship of the saints set apart by God's Word and sacraments is self-acting in its kind and towards its end, — in other words, the ethical idea of the Church, — was left untouched in these definitions. And yet this completion of the idea of the Church was needed in order to establish by regular deduction that existence as a law-ordered fellowship which was pointed to by the office of preacher.1 The fundamental mark of the Church as active is indicated when Luther in his treatise Von Conciliis und Kirchen (1539), amongst the seven charac- teristics of the Church, along with the Word of God, baptism, the supper, the keys, the function of preaching, the cross, in the sixth place reckons prayer.2 For this is that confession of the name of God (Heb. xiii. 15) by which the community of the saints exercises its priestly character. Melanchthon has repeatedly touched upon the same thought in academic decla- mations and disputations.3 But, in order that the invocation of God in the Church may rightly be gone about, he insists upon the true doctrine of the articles of faith as a necessary means; and yet further on he assigns the significance of a leading characteristic to this instrumentality which is subordinate to the active destiny of the Church. This fatal change of position betrays itself in the circumstance that the dogmatico-religious doctrine of the Church which, in the 2d edition of the Loci Theologici, follows the type of the Augsburg Confession, is in the 3rd edition (1543) superseded by a representation of the 1 Compare my dissertation upon Die Begriindung des Kirchenrechtes im evangelischen Begriff von der Kirche (Zeitschrift fur Kirchenrecht von Dove und Friedberg, viii. (1869) pp. 220-279). 2 Walch's edition, xvi. p. 2803. 3 Decl. de vera Dei invocatione, C. R. xi. p. 660 : Precatio proprie discernit ecclesiam ab omnibus gentibus. Diap. de invocatione Dei, xii. p. 529, cf. p. 8. 238 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. idea of the active Church, which is not an object of faith, but to which one is bound to attach one's-self. It is from the stand- point of empiricism and of practical utility that the Church is defined as ccetus vocatorum, profitentium evangelium Dei, — in quo articuli fidei recte docentur, — amplectentium evangelium Christi et recte utentium sacramentis. And it is only in account- ing for the value of these active characteristics that the con- stitutive dogmatic characteristic is indicated; which is that God per ministerium evangelii est efficax et multos ad vitam ceternam regenerat.1 This change of view was brought about when it came to be clearly felt that union with the Eoman Church was no longer attainable, and when the impression gained ground that it was accordingly imperative to vindicate the true Church against the false, and to insist upon the duty of joining the former as being intrusted with the pure gospel. The bare way, however, in which Melanchthon now proclaimed the pura doctrina evangelii as the main characteristic of the Church betokens the scholastic style which distinguished the prceceptor Germanice from the rcformator ecclesice. It is far from being unimportant for the praxis of the Church that Melanchthon, while denying her political nature, should have found no other analogy for her real character than that of a school.2 In correspondence with this thought is the marked way in which he devotes chief care to the maintenance of purity of doctrine. Luther, in his treatise Von Conciliis und Kirchen, had nobly judged of diver- gencies between pure arid impure doctrine, while the foundation was still adhered to by saying, that those who build thereupon wood, hay, and stubble shall find their work destroyed by the fire of Holy Writ.3 But Melanchthon, insisting as he does repeatedly in his declamations on purity of doctrine always, 1 Corpus Peformatorum, xxi. p. 825 sq. : A similar definition of the Church is given in the Examen ordinandorum, C. R. xxiii. p. 38 sq.t and in the Repe- titio confessionis Augustance (Conf. Saxonica), C. R. xxviii. p. 407 sq. 2 L. c. p. 835 : Concedendum est, ecclesiam esse coetum visibilem, neque tamen esse regnum pontificum, sed coetum similem scholastico ccetui. — Erit aliquis visibilis ccetus ecclesia Dei, sed ut coetus scholasticus. Est ordo, est discrimen inter docentes et auditores. — P. 837 : Non contemnamus docentem ecclesiam, et tamen judicem esse sciamus ipsum verbum Dei. — C. R. xii. p. 367 : Conspicitur ecclesia ut honesta aristocratia seu pius ccetus docentium et discentium christianam Ka.Tr)xr)a'lvi Q.ui dispersus eandem tamen verse doctrinse et pise invocationis vocem sonat. 3 Walch, xvi. pp. 2663, 2785. THE SUBJECT DEFINED. 239 after the style of the old Church, regards Satan as the author of every divergence.1 In treating the matter so, he is very far from using a mere form of speech, for even with regard to Greek philosophy he contrasts the orthodoxy of Aristotle with the teachings of Epicurus and Zeno which had the devil for their author.2 From his imperious demand that errors in doctrine should forthwith be brought to the test of Scripture and judged by it, and from his fanatical expectation3 that God would then destroy the false teachers, Melanchthon was not broken off by his melancholy experiences at the hands of his own pupils, some of whom were audacious enough to direct even against himself those very rules regarding the necessity of purity of doctrine. For as early as the year 1536 Conrad Cordatus pressed him hard on account of his unfortunate expression that good works were conditio sine qua non justificationis* And Flacius, in the controversy with his master on the Adiaphora, held to Melanchthon's principle with a tenacity which proved him a loyal scholar^ in everything save respect for his master. In fact the whole movement of Lutheranism as against Mel- anchthon up to the time of the formula concordice, as well as the final decision of the Lutheran against the Eeformed 1 C. R. xi. p. 272 sq., 598 sq., 703 sq., 758 sq., 775 sq., xii. p. 365 sq. 2 Decl. de Luthero et cetatibus ecclesice, C. R. xi. p. 784 : Ludit hoc modo diabolus non in ecclesia tantum, sed etiam in artibus. Ut cum philosophia recte constituta esset in doctrina Aristotelis et Theophrasti, postea pravse natures studio novitatis petulanter quaesiverunt novas opiniones et quasi a media et regia via aberrantes, contraries errores amplexae sunt. — Nee accu- sanda hie tantum vanitas humanorum ingeniorum, sed etiam daemonum malitia, quibus voluptati est, odio Dei veritatem involvere tenebris. 3 Loci Theol., C. R. xxi. p. 836 : Quis igitur erit judex, quando de scrip- tures sententia dissensio oritur, cum tune opus sit voce dirimentis contro- versiam ? Respondeo : Ipsum verbum Dei est judex, et accedit confessio verse ecclesiae. — Et cum major pars hunc verum judicem et hanc veram con- fessionem non audit, Deus ecclesise judex tandem dirimit controversiam, delens blasphemes. Declamatio de judiciis ecclesice, C. R. xii. p. 138 sq., p. 142 : Deus ipse defensor est veritatis, et tandem delet impias sectas. 4 See above, p. 177. — In this case, however, which touched himself so nearly, he had the impression that there was no need for a speedy settle- ment of the controversy. On the 15th of April 1537 he writes to Cordatus with the view of getting rid of the controverted question : Si controversies, quae in ecclesia motae sunt, adeo tibi videntur faciles, ut subito eas assequaris, gratulor tibi hoc acumen. Ego fatebor, etiamsi hebes dicar, mihi videri valde difficiles, ac animadverti, plerasque disputationes a multis parum dextere intelligi (C. R. iii. pp. 343, 344). Unfortunately Melanchthon was not able to impart this insight to his disciples, who threw themselves into the doctrinal controversies that arose, and rent the Church, with the greatest nonchalance. 240 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. Church, were consequences brought about simply by the idea of the Church set up by Melanchthon himself, and by the scholastic concern for oneness of doctrine. The reaction of scholastic narrowness against the Catholic tendency of the Ee- formation is accordingly so far from being inexplicable that, in point of form, it can be understood only as the result of Mel- anchthon's influence. Finally, it was Melanchthon too who gave the signal for the Lutheran Church, which was narrowing itself into a theological school, no more to recognise in the communion rightly administered God's gift of grace, in the reception of which Churches dogmatically separated had to show forth in a practical way their confession of the unity of the Church, but only the token of adherence to a particular Church.1 Melanchthon's disciples strengthened the doctrinaire element in the Eeformed Church also, where, indeed, it had already been brought into prominence through Calvin's indi- viduality, but first reached its full development in the contro- versy against Arminianism. As the Lutheran and Eeformed Churches, alike in their con- fessions and in their theology, upheld the general idea of re- conciliation through Christ, and belief in the oneness of the community of saints described by the well-known leading characteristics, their title and right to a Church character is established. Both branches of the Keformation Church mani- fest, in their theoretical statement of the doctrines of reconcilia- tion and justification, such a measure of agreement, and their points of difference upon these heads are so subordinate in importance, that these last almost entirely disappear when confronted with Socinianism. So that it is imperative to treat the Lutheran and Eeformed theology together in the following exposition ; an opposite procedure would be inconsistent with the just principles of historical arrangement. Of course, in pursuing this path, I shall have to come to an explanation with Schneckenburger on more points than one.2 That acute writer certainly did not intend, by widening the distance be- tween the Lutheran and Eeformed doctrinal notions, to pro- 1 Conf. Saxonica, C. R. xxviii. p. 417 : Films Dei vult, hanc publicam sumtionem confessionem esse, qua ostendas, quod doctrinae genus amplec- taris, cui coetui te adjungas. 2 Schweizer (Eeformirte Glaubenslehre, ii. p. 376 sq.) blindly follows him, not to the advantage of the clearness of his own representation. THE SUBJECT DEFINED. 241 mote the alienation of these confessions. Although he was a Lutheran and therefore, as will afterwards appear, did not fully understand the special peculiarities of the Eeformed type of doctrine, he was very far from seeking, by an exaggerated view of certain divergencies between the two, and by tracing out their antitheses, to lower the value of the Eeformed as against the Lutheran doctrine. On the contrary, he often prefers the former to the latter, because he thinks that it favours the ten- dencies of modern, that is, Schleiermacherian theology ; or that it conveys an impulse to the investigation of the problems dis- cussed in that theology. His representation of the Eeformed doctrine of reconciliation leads in more points than one to the conclusion that the opposition to Socinianism, which, to the consciousness of the Eeformed theologians, appeared to be thoroughgoing, is not in reality so, but that their development of doctrine is distinguished from the contemporary Lutheran development by a secret leaning towards Socinian principles.1 These conclusions rest partly upon inaccurate and imperfect observation, and partly upon the attribution of exaggerated value to casual and isolated aberrations ; but partly, too, upon the historian's desire to find a distinct difference in kind be- tween the two evangelical confessions, and one that shall be observable in all practical points of the theological system. Schneckenburger has undertaken this task with the disposition to look complacently upon the peculiarities of all manifesta- tions of the human spirit within the sphere of the Christian life. But, in the instance before us, the result is, that between Lutheran and Eeformed Christianity, though they stand upon a common basis, a definite difference of kind is made out, while Calvinistic Christianity and Socinianism are made to come so near each other that they appear to be mere varieties. Such a view is certainly in direct opposition to the consciousness of the orthodox Eeformed Church, neither was it asserted by the earlier Lutherans at all so broadly as by Schneckenburger. From this consideration may be derived for the following dis- 1 Here the reader must remember the drastic character which Schnecken- burger, in his Comparative Dogmatik, makes out to be the prevailing prin- ciple of Reformed Christianity, compared with his criticism upon the Socinian system, " which is framed entirely in the interests of morals, and constructed from the practical standpoint." — Vorksungen uber die Lehrbegr. der kleineren protest. Parteien, p. 60. 16 242 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. cussion a measure of caution with regard to Schneckenburger's combinations ; and this can only be confirmed by the detailed proof that the Lutheran and Keformed view of the doctrine of the atonement, while standing together in specific opposition to Socinianism, at the same time prove that the two evangelical confessions, with respect to the doctrine as a whole, differ from one another only as varieties. 39. Both evangelical confessions coincide, in the first place, in their definition and explanation of the idea of satisfaction as applied to the work of Christ. The line of thought taken by the Eeformers (see above, p. 198) is so carried out as, in the first place, to separate the work of Christ, which formerly had been brought into view as the means of justification, from that result, and to place the doctrine de officio Christi or de Christo mediatore over against the doctrine de justificatione as its general historical prerequisite. This procedure, however, is earlier resorted to, and in a more decisive manner, by Calvin's successors, e.g., by Peter Martyr and by Zanchi, than by the Lutherans. Among the latter, Hutter, for example, treats of everything under the locus de justificatione; and Gerhard, under the head de officio Christi, gives only in general outline what he afterwards investigates more thoroughly as the causa meritoria j ustificationis. Here may be detected the influence of Melanchthon, in whom regard to the systematic construction of the doctrine was outweighed by the religious view of the connexion of justification with the historical work of Christ ; while the systematic tendency of the Eeformed theologians betrays the influence of Calvin as their pattern. But their common doctrine is, that God in His love or grace towards the sinful human race, which had become liable to eternal destruc- tion, sent His Son into the world, in the unity of the Divine and human natures, in order to redeem men from sin, or to re- concile them with Himself, and that the essential or inherent justice of God prescribes the special work whereby Christ approves Himself as the mediator of salvation. The justice of God of necessity demands the punishment of sin ; in other words, in the case in question, it demands the eternal con- demnation of the human race. If, then, their preservation unto everlasting life is to be secured to men through Christ, this purpose of God's grace can be realized only on condition NECESSITY OF CHRIST'S SATISFACTION. 243 that satisfaction be given to the penal justice of God by the suffering of a substitute in the room of sinners. For this work Christ as God-man is qualified, because, as the Sinless One, He was under no obligation to suffer and die, and because His innocent. passion, by reason of the Divine and therefore infinite value of His Person, constitutes the equivalent for the infinite guilt of sin. His vicarious endurance of the punishment that was due to sinners is accordingly that satisfaction suited to the righteousness of God, which makes it possible for God, through the God-man, to confer upon men the grace of forgive- ness of sins and of justification. But the idea of satisfaction includes in itself that Christ by His suffering and death en- dured the wrath of God which is due to sin, and that thereby he appeased and removed that wrath. Now Schneckenburger represents it as the general Eeformed doctrine, that Christ's satisfaction is not the causa meritoria of our salvation, but simply the causa instrumentalis of the execu- tion of God's saving decree and of the application of salvation ; thus implying that the satisfaction wrought by the historical Christ only has reference to our subjective need.1 Hereby Schneckenburger desires to indicate that the strict notion of satisfaction, as referred to the justice of God and deduced from it as necessary, has no firm basis in the Eeformed theology, and is no characteristic feature in it ; but that whenever it finds expression it is always either directly or indirectly again withdrawn. That this is logical in the Eeformed system Schneckenburger infers from the relation in which the Person of Christ stands to the leneplacitum of God, — to that act of mere good pleasure which ordains the union between the Logos and human nature ; and also from the circumstance that, pro- perly speaking, the Divine nature of Christ is represented as the factor that offers satisfaction, while the human nature is regarded as the selfless medium by which God gives satisfac- tion to Himself. If, then, Christ's human activity finds no in- dependent place in the chain of God's decree and personal 1 Zur IcirchL Christologie, pp. 48, 49, repeated from the TheoL Jahrb. 1844, p. 248. Schweizer (Glaubemlehre der ref. Kirche, ii. p. 376) and Ze'ller ( Theologie Ztvingli's, p. 75) have copied this assertion. The meaning of this view of the Reformed doctrine of salvation is that, properly speaking, it fol- lows the type of Abelard, to which indeed, on all essential points, Schleier- macher also recurs. 244 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. activity, the above-mentioned denial of the meritorious value of Christ's satisfaction is intelligible. This view has points of resemblance with John Gerhard's assertion l that the Socinian opposition to the interpretation of Christ's work as causa meri- toria justificationis was at least occasioned by the thought of God's mere good pleasure in Calvin's dogma of eternal election and reprobation. For, as Gerhard assumes, it would be Cal- vinistic to argue, si alsoluta Dei wluntate salvandi electi sunt ad vitam ceternam, utique etiam absoluta Dei voluntate peccata illis remittuntur, ml certe remitti potuerunt, neque opus erit Christi satisfactione et merito. That this deduction really applies to Calvinism, at least in respect of a certain tendency in it, Gerhard proves on the one hand by Calvin's own confes- sion that the idea of the meritum Christi is correlative to that of the leneplacitum Dei, for Christ as man could have no merit over against God's righteous judgment ; further, by an expres- sion of Wolfgang Musculus in the Loci communes (loc. 26, de justific. cap. 3.), and by the declaration of Conrad Vorstius against the strict conception of satisfaction. Gerhard then, in his criticism upon Calvinism, satisfies himself with asserting a tendency implied in it that is fitted to supersede the strict conception of satisfaction ; while Schneckenburger goes so far as to find in the avoidance of the idea of the causa meritoria a tangible result of that tendency. But, with regard to Gerhard, he ought not to appeal to Vorstius, who indeed took the limited assertion of God's mere good pleasure that Calvinism makes, as an occasion for developing that thought after the manner of the Socinians, as a principle for the entire system of doctrine ;2 but was on that account proscribed by the Eeformed Church. The expression made use of by Wolfgang Musculus, moreover, is misapplied in the deduction that Gerhard draws from it. For Musculus, after having defined the justice that is necessary for God, is merely so clumsy as to represent the grace which is just as necessary for God as an arbitrary exception from that justice, illustrating it by the arbitrary exercise of the right of pardon by earthly potentates ; but, as a Calvinist, he is far from deducing as a consequence from this, that the 1 Loci Theol, ed. Cotta, torn. vii. pp. 33, 34. 2 Compare what is said of him by Schweizer in the Theol. Jahrb. vols. xv., xvi. NECESSITY OF CHRIST'S SATISFACTION. 245 actual pardon of the sinner by God in Christ is independent of the satisfaction offered by Christ to the righteousness of God. Faustus Socinus l has also borne witness to him in this, when he appeals to the view of grace as mere good pleasure that Musculus took. With regard to Calvin's quite casual investigation into the idea of the meritum Christi, it has already been shown that it has no relation to his doctrine of election and its explanation in the mere good pleasure of God.2 SchneckenburgerV argument also, to show that in the Ee- formed theology there prevails a tendency against the recep- tion of the strict idea of satisfaction, is not happy ; for it is simply erroneous to say that the Eeformed theologians re- present Christ's satisfaction, not as the causa meritoria, but as the causa instrumentalis justificationis. Schweizer (as above, p. 378) oddly cites, as testimony to that idea, Keckermann, who, on his own showing (p. 376), ought to be regarded as unconnected with the Eeformed system. I may add that Keckermann, as is usual, represents fides to be the causa in- strumentalis justificationis. Henry Alting regards Christ's work as causa meritoria as well as causa instrumentalis. But, more- over, that thought which we are told was foreign to the theologians of the Eeformed Church, is expressly defended by Bucanus, Piscator, Amesius, Maccovius, Maresius, Witsius, Fr. Turretinus; and its substance is taught by all. For nothing could be further from the truth than to say that the thought of God's arbitrary good pleasure, which is the fundamental principle of the Socinian system, also dominates the Eeformed theology as a whole, and thus renders indifferent all ideas of the means employed in the plan of salvation. Eather on the contrary, in the Eeformed theology, only the doctrine of twofold predestina- tion is wrought out in accordance with that idea; but this doctrine, with Calvin, just as with Luther, is originally some- thing incidental in the system, and without influence on the other doctrines, particularly without influence upon that of the atonement. The doctrine of reconciliation remains without change even in those Eeformed theologians who, following in 1 De Christo servatore, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 187. 2 Gerhard's opinion is confuted also by Henr. Alting : Theol. problematica nova (Groning. 1662), p. 609 sq. Fr. Turretinus : de satisfactione Christi (Lugd. Bat. 1696), p. 7. 246 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. the footsteps of Beza and Gomarus, undertake to incorporate the doctrine of twofold predestination in that of Providence, and thus to elevate it to the dignity of the fundamental principle of the system.1 It is undeniable that Arminianism, by referring the idea of God to the standard of indulgent reasonableness, induced many of the opponents of that system to put the idea of God under the point of view of the dbsolu- tum dominium, which is free from every inner moral necessity ;2 these efforts, however, always as matter of fact, have reference only to the problem of election and reprobation, and Voetius 3 expressly testifies that theologians like Twisse by no means intended to throw doubt upon the explanation of the necessity of punishment or of penal satisfaction as arising from the essential justice of God. Voetius, moreover, in his discussion against Twisse, on the question whether Christ's satisfaction was necessary by reason of the immanent penal justice of God, the jus divinum naturale sen absolute necessarium, or by reason of the justice established by decree and law, has decided in favour of the first alternative,4 and hereby has clearly enough 1 Compare my geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott. Art. ii. (Jahrb. fur deutsche Theol. xiii. (1868), p. 108 sq.) 2 Amyraldus ; dejure Dei in creaturas. Comp. Jahrb., as above, p. 120 sq. W. Twisse ; vindicice gratice, potestatis ac providentice Dei. Amstelod. 1632, ed. nit. 1648. Compare Gass, Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik, i. p. 472. 3 Voetius : Dejure etjustitia Dei (Disputationes theol selectee, i. p. 372). 4 L. c. p. 342, cf. Maccovii Loc. commun. p. 162. It cannot be denied that the application of the idea of God's arbitrary will to the doctrine of double predestination has been the occasion, in the case of many Reformed theologians, for giving wider scope to the Scotist conception of God. In this sense Polanus (Syntagma theol. lib. ii. cap. 26) distinctly says, quidquld Deus fieri vult, eo ipso, quod vult, justum est. In the same direction Szydlovius ( Vindicice quces- tionum aliquot difficilium et controversarum in theologia. Franeq. 1643), in harmony with Duns Scotus, has argued that God might have made the contents of the moral law quite opposite from what they are. (Compare Jahrbiicher fur deutsche Theol. xiii. p. 115; Voetius, I. c. i. p. 388 sq.) In accordance with the same testimony, Twisse deduced God's penal justice as flowing with only hypothetical necessity from His decree. Still, as this tendency in Reformed theology is only a subordinate one, the testimony of Voetius vouches in the case of Twisse for the fact that the validity of the doctrine of satisfaction was neither purposely nor accidentally weakened by it. In the same way must we judge also of those expressions in which, as in the case of Zwingli (p. 204), the proposition of Thomas occasionally occurs, to the effect that God might have accomplished redemption in some other way than that which He actually chose. Thus Calvin (In Ev. Joh. cap. 15, v. 13) : Poterat nosDeus verbo aut nutu redimere, nisi aliter nostra causa visum fuisset ; — Zanchius (De Incarnatione, lib. ii. cap. 3 ; Opp. torn. viii. p. 45): Servare nos poterat solo suo imperio, peccata simpliciter per solam suam misericordiam condonando ; — Peter Martyr Vermili us (Loci communes, ii. 17, NECESSITY OF CHRIST'S SATISFACTION. 247 indicated the standard of Keformed orthodoxy. Moreover the validity of the doctrine of satisfaction in Eeformed systematic theology is not affected by the circumstance that the Person of Christ as a historical fact is subordinated to the "beneplacitum Dei. For that this fact is just as contingent in the order of the universe as sin to which it is opposed does not prevent the course of its operation from being regulated in accordance with the necessary justice of God. The world also, and the human race, exist only in virtue of a sovereign decree of God ; but, being in existence, they are bound by a law which corresponds to the inalienable necessary immanent right of God.1 If Christ then, as the union of. the Divine and human natures, exists only by the leneplacitum Dei, it does not result there- from either actually or necessarily, or probably that the Ke- formed theologians display a tendency to refer His prestations for the salvation of men to an arbitrary Divine standard. Finally, it has no visible effect upon the idea of satisfaction, that occasionally, as Schneckenburger shows (pp. 47, 48), the Divine and not the human nature of Christ is chosen to form the basis of that thought. For even if that view occurred more frequently than it does,2 still the thought of a reconcilia- 19). The sentence which Schneckenburger quotes (Zur Jcirchllchen Chrls- tologie, p. 49, note) under Alsted's name, but without mentioning the title of the book, amounts to the same thing : Satisfactio ad procurandam salutern electorum fuit necessaria, non absolute, siquidem deesse nequivit Deo sapientissimo alius servandi modus, sed ex hypothesi beneplaciti Dei. This sentence does not come from Alsted, but from Henry Alting (TheoL didactica, Opp. Heidelbergensia, i. p. 81). Yet Alting himself in his Explic. Catech. Palat. (Opp. iii. p. 215), and elaborately in the TheoL problematica nova : loc. 3. probl. 25 ; loc. 12, probl. 35, decides against such an admission, represent- ing God's penal justice as a natural attribute, against the line taken by Twisse. At the same time, it is worthy of notice that, like Voetius, he does not regard as heterodox the divergent view taken by those who hold the hypothetical necessity of the Divine justice, because, with respect to the chief matter, namely, the recognition as matter of fact of the necessity of Christ's satisfaction in order to the work of redemption, harmony prevailed none the less between the different parties. But the expressions made use of by Calvin, Zanchi, and Peter Martyr cannot be regarded as of greater import- ance, for they also, with the utmost deliberation and fulness, affirm and support the idea of satisfaction. 1 Voetius : /. c., i. pp. 342, 373. 2 It is an expression of Cocceius (De Feed, et Testam. Dei, cap. 5, 92) that Schneckenburger quotes : Ita mysterium illud maximum (pactum aeternum inter Patrem et Filium) patescit, quomodo in Deo justificemur et salvemur, quomodo Deus sit et qui judicat et qui spondet atque ita judicatur, qui absolvit et qui intercedit, qui mittit et qui mittitur. Item hoc, quomodo Deus sibimet ipse satisfecerit suo sanguine.. 248 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. tion of God by Himself is, in accordance with the prevailing type of doctrine, connected with the necessity which arises from God's righteousness ; for that mere good pleasure which dominates the double predestination is, as matter of fact, kept far away from the region of the doctrine of the atonement. 40. In the second place, the two confessions have in common the thought that satisfaction is given to the Divine justice, or to the law regarded as the expression of that justice, and as the eternal rule that regulates the relation between man and God, by the suffering and death of Christ, as well as by his ful- filling of the law ; in other words, by the obedientia passiva et activa Christi (see above, p. 214). At least the divergence of John Piscator upon this point, although he found supporters in the Eeformed party, is to be regarded merely as an episode which rather helped than hindered the essential oneness of the Lutheran and Reformed theologians upon this point. At the same time it is particularly instructive, with reference to Piscator's denial of the satisfactory significance of Christ's active obedience as well as with reference to the attitude which his opponents assumed, to keep sight of the fact that the school theology of both confessions did not regulate its business of intelligent distinction by a historical understanding of the original religious chain of thought. Piscator's view,1 that only the suffering and death of Christ had a satisfactory significance, without doubt betokens the continued influence of the tradi- tion of Melanchthon's view (p. 213), which through the instru- mentality of Ursinus2 continued to be influential in the German Eeformed Church. For, amongst the supporters of Piscator's opinion whom I find cited by Gerhard, Matthew Martini, Ludwig Crocius, and Urban Pierius in Bremen, Pareus in Heidelberg, Goclenius in Marburg, are out-and-out Melanch- thonians. Piscator's assertion turns upon the thought, which, 1 Not having had access to his Theses theol. (Herborn. 1618), I draw for materials upon Gerhard : Loci tJieologici, torn. vii. p. 61 sqq; Anton. Walaeus: L. c. (opp. i. p. 398 sq.)i and Baur : Geschichte der Versohnungslehre, p. 352 sqq. 2 Schneckenburger (p. 65) conversely cites Ursinus as a witness for the fact that, even previous to Piscator, the satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience had been recognised by the Reformed theologians. But the expressions cited by Schneckenburger from Ursinus are separated from their connexion. When that is taken into account it becomes plain enough that Ursinus regards active obedience only as a preliminary to the penal satis- faction, and comprehends the status humiliationis under the idea of His passion. Compare Explic. catech. opp. i. pp. 93, 231, 232. PISCATOE ON THE ACTIVE OBEDIENCE. 249 as a matter of religious experience, dominates the whole Eefor- mation course of thinking, that forgiveness of sins and justifi- cation are synonymous terms for the same thing. While the formula concordice still adopts this usage of language (p. 227); but, on the other hand, attributes a satisfactory significance to the active obedience of Christ, the historical position of Piscator's doctrine is rightly determined only when contrasted with the doctrine of the formula concordice, and only thus can the state of the question be suitably ascertained. Now, the arguments which Piscator drew from the design of the law, from the design of satisfaction towards our consciousness of salva- tion, lastly from the function designed for Christ, are not all of equal value. (1.) The law obliges either to obedience or to punishment. Christ has freed us from the punishment which we had deserved on account of our sins ; thus there was no need that Christ in our room and stead should give obedience to the law. (2.) If Christ fulfilled the law in our place, then we are not required! to fulfil it; the consequent is absurd, therefore the antecedent also is so. Gerhard rightly rejects both arguments, alleging against the former that sinners by the endurance of punishment for their transgression of the law are not released from fulfilling it, and therefore their substitute had to undertake both. As against the second, it holds good that the vicarious fulfilment of the law by Christ has the effect of abolishing it in the case of believers, only in so far as it was the original condition of salvation, but not in so far as it is the universally binding standard for the Christian life. From the design of Christ's satisfaction for our consciousness of justification or forgiveness of sins, Piscator draws the con- clusion (3.) that the death of Christ would have been super- fluous had He given satisfaction by His holy life. (4.) As the thing on account of which sins are forgiven is what is contained in the satisfaction, but sins are forgiven by reason of the death of Christ, it follows that this last alone is satisfactory to God. Piscator vindicated this argument to the religious and moral self- consciousness against the ob- jection that the imperfection of the obedience of believers needs to be covered by the perfect obedience of Christ. He says (5.) that this imperfection of believers is not imputed to them but forgiven on the same ground — the death of Christ, — 250 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. which cleanseth altogether from all sin, and thus also from the sin of that imperfection. To meet this, Gerhard brings into the field a distinction which makes its appearance simultane- ously among Lutherans and Eeformed,1 to wit, that justification consists not merely in the forgiveness of sins, but also in the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and that the latter is founded upon His active obedience to the law. Inasmuch as God in the justification of sinners could not contravene the eternal rule of the law, it was necessary that that justification should proceed upon a perfect fulfilment of the law ; and this fulfilment, not being possible for the sinner, had to be ac- complished by Christ in his room and imputed to the sinner. Here, in passing, I notice that that distinction is still unknown to the formula concordice ; but inasmuch as its vindication, by reference to the two co-ordinate kinds of Christ's obedience, is likewise something new, this train of thought calls for special examination. Upon this point, accordingly, Piscator is not so easily refuted as on that which has been already considered. Piscator's most fruitful assertion is, however, (6.) that Christ by His active obedience could not have given satisfaction vicariously for us, because as man He was Himself legally bound thereto. But in so far as Christ stood under the law (Paul being witness), that has reference only to the curse of the law, which Christ endured in His passion. Undoubtedly the active obedience of Christ to the law had also a bearing upon His satisfaction, but only the indirect one, that without Christ's sinless life His passion would not have had its satis- factory value. Now, in these last sentences Piscator has not indeed fully and characteristically formulated the Eeformed type^of doctrine, but in them he represents one interest which is maintained by the Eeformed theology and disallowed by the Lutheran. Pre- cisely in this thought, he has Ursinus 2 as his forerunner, who 1 Gerhard, p. 69. At p. 260 he appeals to "Weinrich and to Balduin. To a like effect Bncanus ; Institutions Theol. 1604 : and previous to him George Sohnius (ob. 1588) ; Methodus Theologies and Exegesis Aug. Confessionis (opp. ed. 3. 1609). 2 Explicatio catechetica ad qu. 16 : Quatuor modis Christ as homo perfecte fuit Justus seu legem implevit — (1) suaipsius justitia ; solus enini perfectam obedientiam, qualem lex requirebat,*prsestitit; (2) solvendo pcenam suffici- entem pro peccatis nostris. — Prior vocatur impletio legis per obedientiam, qua ipse fuit conformis legi ; posterior impletio legis per poeuam, quam pro PISCATOR ON THE ACTIVE OBEDIENCE. 251 only failed to express it quite so antithetically. In uncom- promising opposition to this view is that of the Lutheran theologians, who deny Christ's obligation to fulfil the law for His own part, on the ground that as true God he was not subject to the law but superior to it as Lord. Of necessity, therefore, must the obedience actually rendered to the law by the God-man, be regarded solely as a work done in the place of men. The two views stand in direct dependence upon the division between the two parties on the doctrine of Christ's Person. If, in accordance with the Lutheran view, by the incarnation of the Logos the humanity of Christ was made to participate in all Divine attributes, and therefore also in superiority to the law, then the fulfilling of the law, as an act of exinanition on the part of the God-man thus constituted, can have value only for those on whose account He took the exinanition upon Himself. If, on the contrary, in accordance with the Eeformed' view, the Word of God is made man by foregoing the exercise of specific Divine attributes, then it is not inconsistent with Christ's divinity, that as man he does what belongs to all men and so also renders obedience to the law. But the chief representatives of Eeformed theology by no means hesitate on this account to say that Christ's active obedience is yet also vicarious on behalf of His people. In support of this they adduce two arguments of unequal breadth and force, of which the second is not invariably conjoined with the first. Alsted, Keckermann, Amesius, Walaeus, Witsius affirm, that inasmuch as Christ became man only for our be- hoof, therefore even His individual fulfilment of the law per- tains to His satisfaction and His merit.1 Bucanus, Polanus, Arnesius, Yoetius, Heidanus, Witsius affirm with growing distinctness that Christ's whole activity as Mediator, His en- durance of death as well as His obedience, are based on the nobis dependit : (3) in nobis iinplet legem suo spiritu, dum videlicet per spiritum sanctum nos regenerat, et per legem informat ad obedientiam in- ternam et externam quam lex a nobis requirit, et quam in hac vita inchoamus, integram vero prsestabimus in vita eeterna ; (4) implet legem Christus docendo et repurgando earn ab erroribus et corruptelis (opp. i. p. 93). In his Theses de Persona et Officio unici Mediatoris Jesu Christi (I c. p. 744 sq.) also, Ursinus gives clear expression only to the satisfactory value of Christ's pas- sive obedience. 1 Amesius : Medulla i. 21, 24 : Quamvis hsec obedientia legalis a Christo jam homine facto jure creationis exigebatur, qiioniani tamen non pro se ipso, sed pro nobis factus est, pars fuit humiliationis et satisfactionis et meritiillius. 252 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. consideration that from the very first He is fulfilling His destination as Surety and Head of all those who are to be redeemed.1 For this thought Calvin had paved the way, in so far as he had subordinated the priestly to the kingly office of Christ, and made the former to depend on the latter (p. 189). By this it is meant that Christ's actions have atoning efficacy, because He by His personal dignity is qualified as the party who has to act in the room of the elect who belong to Him. The necessity of this connexion lies here, that not merely the efficacy but also the purpose of Christ has reference to the elect, who from all eternity are chosen by God in Him as their Mediator and Head, — in other words, so that He from all eternity is designed by God to be the instrumentality whereby grace shall take effect upon the elect. Thus the typical character of Eeformed theology gains its perfect expression herein, that the subject of the mediatorial work is characterized (as had already been done by Thomas Aquinas, p. 54) as caput ecclesice. But hereby it becomes possible to assert a vicarious value, not merely for Christ's innocent suffering, but 1 Bucanus : Institutiones theol. xxxi. 27 : Justitia Christ! — aliena non est, quatenus nobis destinata est. — Est etiam nostra ilia justitia, quatenus illud ipsum ejus subjectum, nempe Christus, noster est. Polanus : Syntagma vi. 27, p. 781 : Secundum quam naturam Christus est nobis a patre datus caput, secundum eandem est mediator inter Deum et nos. Atqui secundum utram- que naturam est datus caput. Ergo. Major propositio est certissima, quia mediatorem esse est officium illius, qui a Deo caput constitutus est ipsi ecclesise. Amesius : i. 20. 1 1 : Pendet totum hoc mysterium (satisfactionis pro peccatis) ex eo, quod Christus sit constitutus talis mediator, ut sit etiam sponsor et commune principium redimendorum, sicut Adamus f uit creatorum et perditorum. 12 : In eadem Christi humiliatione fuit etiam meritum, qua ordinatur ad nostrum commodum. Ostenditur hoc omnibus illis scripturae locis, quibus dicitur obedientia sua nobis procurasse justitiam. Voetius : Disp. theol. ii. p. 229 : Obedientia activa a Christo praestita est pro Christo, quatenus singularis ille homo erat legi divinse subjectus, pro nobis, quatenus sponsor erat, et omnium salvandorum personam sustinebat (supra : ecclesiam suam repraesentans), ac pro iis omnem justitiam legis implebat, quam illi implere non poterant. — Heidanus : Corp. Theol. Chr. loc. ix. (torn. ii. p. 79): Christus tanquam semen mulieris contriturum semen serpentis, ut sanctificaret reliquum semen, factus est secundus Adam, in quo omnes censemur. Ut quicquid ille ut secundus Adam pro nobis fecit et passus est, id perinde sit, ac si nos id fecissemus et passi essemus. p. 105 : Christus hie considerandus venit ut persona conjuncta (juxta 2 Cor. v. 15) ut secundus Adam et caput redimendorum. — Witsius : De (Econ. Fwd. Dei, ii 5, 11 : Christus ut dominus et caput et novus Adamus origo et fons hsereditatis derivandae in fratres, habet obedientiam universse legis Dei. Per earn tota multitudo eorum, qui ad ipsum pertinent, justi constituuntur, ie. censentur jus habere ad vitam seternam, ac si quilibet eorum in propria persona illam obedientiam prae- stitisset. PISCATOR ON THE ACTIVE OBEDIENCE. 253 also for His fulfilment of the law, irrespective of its obligation upon Himself. Lutheran theologians have avoided this line of thought ; but I do not see why they should not have adopted it. Only external causes can be assigned to explain why they did not actually do so ; perhaps because the idea was rendered sus- picious in their eyes by its connexion with the thought of election ; or perhaps because among Eeformed theologians them- selves it found expression too late ; and even when it was brought forward, was not stated with sufficient clearness to break through the ban of confessional exclusiveness that had already become so inveterate. But yet, if the Lutheran doc- trine of the Person of Christ defines Christ's Kingship as an attribute of His incarnation, the fact of His exinanitio is no reason why, in His intention of founding the Church by His twofold obedience, He should not already be regarded as its active Head. That this thought was never attained, arises from the want of talent for system in the Lutheran divines. That talent should have exhibited itself in linking together indi- vidual truths in relation to the final end contemplated ; but, in place of this procedure, the Lutheran theology always ad- vances only by means of the ideas of cause and effect. On this account also it never brings into view the way in which each one of the offices of Christ is reciprocally conditioned by the two others, but contents itself with such an account of them as can only be regarded as a preliminary chronological arrange- ment of the matters to which they have respect, after which the real work of coming to a comprehension of the oneness of Christ's mediatorial activities should only begin. In mitiga- tion of this judgment, the circumstance must of course be con- sidered that even the Eeformed theologians do not handle the systematic method in a thoroughgoing way. Precisely in their representation of the three offices of Christ have they failed to make use of the advantage Calvin gained for them in ranking the kingly above the priestly office of Christ. They avail them- selves rather of the same external scheme and sequence which the Lutherans adopted, following the chronological order of the life of Christ ; and for this reason even with them the idea of Christ as caput ecclesice is not so clearly and thoroughly ex- pounded as was to be expected. Still less did the Lutherans LIBRARY ST. MARY'S COLLEGt 254 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. detect the value of that idea towards an understanding of Christ's mediatorial work. It could not but have been for the advantage of these had they taken it up. For, so far as the Lutheran explanation of the exclusively vicarious significance of Christ's active obedience is concerned, it is little in harmony with the other principles of the Lutheran Church. That God is the Lord of the law, and that the God-man is therefore not bound to fulfil it on his own behalf, is a view unworthy of the Lutheran theology. Here indeed the Scotist idea of God inex- plicably shows itself — an idea which the Lutherans are on other occasions so skilful in avoiding, — and the presence of which in Calvin's doctrine of predestination gave occasion to a Gerhard very unwarrantably to misrepresent the Eeformed doctrine of atonement (p. 244). It is the old story of the mote and the beam ! Luther of course as Nominalist knew nothing other than that God is exlex ; but the Lutherans, in rejecting Luther's doctrine of predestination, repudiated precisely this view ; and at the very foundation of their doctrine of reconciliation lies the clearly expressed thought that the law is expressive of the eternal will of God Himself. Is it not then rather in harmony with this fundamental proposition that Walaeus (p. 398) sets right the Lutherans in their inference from Matt. xii. 8, that Christ as God is lege superior, by adding, nee tamen propterea potuit se ipsum dbnegare, quia natura dimna sibi ipsi lex est ? The divinity of Christ would, according to this, be precisely the reason for saying that the God-man cannot, so far as He is concerned, do otherwise than live in conformity with the law. What I wish to be inferred from this is, that the opposition between the theologians of the two parties with reference to the interpretation of Christ's active obedience betokens no immove- able specific difference between their doctrines, but is merely accidental and not essential.1 The criticism which Schneckenburger (p. 61 sqq.) bestows on the Eeformed theologians' line of thought which we have been discussing, does not come to the point, but loses itself in erroneous deductions from certain assumptions of Eeformed 1 At the same time, it was because Lutheranism had once failed to take up that idea, and made Christ, considered as man, to appear throughout His earthly life merely as an individual among other individuals, that a praxis of pietism, such as Zinzendorf wrought out in his community, became possible only withiu the sphere of the religious development of Lutheranism. PISCATOR ON THE" ACTIVE OBEDIENCE. 255 Christology; and this because he entirely overlooks the fact that the standard for estimating Christ's historical work is His position as caput et sponsor electorum. The remark is a just one, that the vicarious value of Christ's active obedience is not proved against Piscator merely by pointing out that Christ is not man on His own behalf but only for our sakes. For this destination would still be Christ's even if, like Piscator, we were to regard His perfect obedience merely as the condition which was indispensable before He could endure punishment in our room and stead. But by His destination as caput et sponsor electorum, Christ is so qualified that His actions on behalf of His Church can be regarded just as if they had been done by the Church herself. In the further course of his criticism, Schneckenburger certainly takes notice of the thought of the unio fidelium cum Christo. He calls to mind the assumption (to be again referred to) that Christ merited gloria for Himself and at the same time for those others who are one with Him, and to whom therefore His merit can be imputed ; but he thinks that this fellowship with Christ is only regarded as a result of Christ's meritorious fulfilment of the law, to which fulfilment, however, no vicarious value can be assigned, since His people, as such, are bound to fulfil the law. But these remarks are not in harmony with the sense of Eeformed theology. The actual union of the elect with Christ is explained as resulting through His efficacia (in the Holy Spirit) from His satisfactio and meri- tum, because He, in the deliberate discharge of His offices, is represented at the outset ideally as the the Head and Surety of those who are to be redeemed, on the ground of the elective decree or of the everlasting covenant.1 That He in that capa- city fulfilled the law in the room and stead of the elect is moreover not disproved by the stress laid on their obligation towards the law. For, as the older theologians clearly enough explain, the vicarious value of Christ's active obedience ren- dered to the law as the condition of attaining to blessedness for one's-self, serves to do away with this function of the law for the elect. Thus it is possible at the same time to assert the duty of obedience on the part of the elect to the law regarded as part of the Divine order of grace. There is thus no contra- diction between the two positions, that the law is abolished as 1 Compare the testimonies cited above (p. 252). 256 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. a covenant of life by Christ's vicarious fulfilment of it, and that God causes those whom He has graciously chosen to attain to eternal life in the way of fulfilment of the law. 41. Gerhard had rebutted Piscator's exception to the vica- rious value of Christ's active obedience by drawing the dis- tinction that justification comprehends the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and that the former proceeds upon the vicarious value of Christ's death, the latter upon that of His life (p. 250). This formula, in which Thomasius of Erlangen recognises the genuine meaning of justification (p. 227), is indeed to be found in Lutheran as well as in Eeformed dogmatic theologians ; but as it goes against the usus loquendi of the Eeformation period it has by no means met with universal acceptance. Gerhard himself (torn. vii. pp. 260, 261, Loc. 17, cap. 4, sect. 199) is compelled to admit that the two benefits are to be distinguished not in fact, but only secundum rationem; that is, in accordance with a very superficial mode of viewing the matter ; and Quenstedt is of the same opinion. Baier (Theol. Pos. iii. 5, 11) appealing to Htilsemann indicates at least that if those benefits are to be distinguished, then in logical order imputatio justitice precedes the remission of the guilt of sin ; and the same view is taken by the Reformed divines Polanus (Syntagma, p. 840), H. Alting (Theol. probl. nova, p. 726), and F. Turretine (Compend. theol. conscr. a L. Riissenio, p. 427). That priority of the forgiveness of sins to the imputation of righteousness, which Thomasius vindicates, is only the superficial view of an apparent progress from the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quern. For if we bring this wisdom of the schools to the test of actual compari- son with the phenomenon of consciousness which has to be explained, we find that that consciousness embraces the two propositions, " I am free from guilt " and " I am pronounced righteous," regarding them as perfectly identical The dis- tinction, therefore, is not made from any regard to the subjec- tive consciousness of justification, but only from regard to the co-ordination between Christ's active and passive obedience to the law, so far as these may be considered as possessing satis- factory value. Thus Gerhard's argument against Piscator appears to be irrelevant. The satisfactory value of the active as compared with the passive obedience is to be recognised OBEDIENCE, SATISFACTION AND MERIT. 257 from the corresponding distinction between forgiveness of sins and imputation of righteousness. But the believer is not con- scious of these two things as separate attainments. Thus the believer cannot be convinced of the necessity of the other distinction. If the assertion of the satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience unanimously made against the school of Melanch- thon cannot stand the appeal to consciousness as a test, it is still involved in another regard as a consequence of premisses which are acknowledged by both branches of the theology of the Eeformation. But in spite of all the acuteness of the theologians of the seventeenth century, the consideration of this point has not been clearly brought out ; much less have their present successors showed themselves capable of supply- ing the deficiency. The thought in question is often enough expressed by the elder theologians, but only in an apologetic connexion, without having its place assigned to it in systematic theology; because it does not convey anything immediately implied in the religious consciousness. F. Turretine, for ex- ample, enunciates it with great precision (as above, p. 425) : Objectio: Ergo nos non tenemur ad obedientiam activam, quia Christus earn pro ndbis prcestitit. Mesp. Negatur consequential. Sequitur quidem, nos ad earn non teneri eundem infinem,sc.ut per earn vivamus : sed non obstat, quominus teneamur ad idem obsequium Deo prcestandum, non ut vivamus, sed quia vivimus, non ut jus acquiramus ad vitam, sed ut juris acquisiti posses- sionem adeamus.1 I have already (p. 228) in speaking of the doctrine embodied in the formula concordice pointed out the value of this thought. Though the believer be conscious that through Christ he has forgiveness of the guilt that he has incurred by transgression of the law, yet the gracious nature of the righteousness before God of which he is at the same time conscious, is not securely placed unless he be at the same time aware of his release from that legal obligation imposed by the eternal law, in accordance with which righteousness or eternal life is attained by means of the fulfilment of its commands on 1 See above, p. 255, a similar observation with reference to Schnecken- burger. Compare Gerhard, L. c. p. 71 (against Piscator) : Ab onere perfectse et ad vitam seternam adsequendam praestandse obedientise Christus perfectis- sima sua obedientia nos liberavit. 17 258 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. the part of men.1 By this consideration, taking for granted the common presuppositions, is confuted Piscator's assertion that Christ by His vicarious passion has only freed us from the curse of the law. For that would mean that, after the abolition of our guilt towards the law we should anew have to seek eternal life under Christ by means of a fulfilment of the law in accord- ance with legal principles. Thus on the presupposition that the law as an expression, of everlasting righteousness legally binds men in the beginning (in the foedus operum) to obtain everlasting life by means of actual fulfilment of its injunctions, and on the further presupposition that the dispensation of grace under Christ makes the forgiveness of men's transgressions of the law to be the permanent basis of the believer's life, then the author of this dispensation must at the same time stand security that the law as the legal condition of the attainment of everlasting life shall make absolutely no further claim on believers. But, assuming that the dispensation of grace cannot at all contradict God's eternal justice and the law which is its expression, and assuming that Christ's fulfilment of the law must be understood as exsecutio et explicatio and not as abrogatio et dispensatio, it then necessarily follows that Christ in the place of men as sinners has fulfilled the law's demand for punishment, and in the room of men as men has fulfilled the demands of the law as a covenant of life.2 Christ's satisfaction to the wider and to the narrower demands of the law as the ground of our justification, is deduced, as is well known, from God's justice. But by our justification is 1 How little this thought is allowed by the dogmatic theologians to attain to its full dignity in their systems is shown by the fact that Walaeus and Quenstedt, for example, while expressing themselves as I have indicated regarding the necessity of satisfaction through Christ's active obedience, at the same time make this distinction — that the passive obedience abolishes our punishment, the active obedience our guilt (culpa) — a distinction which is either utterly unintelligible, or which goes far beyond the limits of ortho- dox theology. Compare Walaeus, L. c. pp. 397, 399 : Quenstedt, P. iii. pp. 282, 284. 2 Rodolf : Catechesis Pal. Illustrata, p. 338 : Jus ad vitam pendet ab im- pletione legis. p. 340 (In Christo) Deus nos justificat imputata ea justitia, quam lex primaria intentione exigit, quae alia non est, quam perfecta legis impletio. Altera ilia, quae in passiva obedientia sita est, secundario demum et supplendo prioris defectui a lege postulatur. Assertion! nostrse inde fides constat, quia justificatio nostra fit sine legis rescissione, quin potius cum legis stabilitione. Adde, si Deus sola peccatorum remissione nos justificaret cen- sendo, nos nihil omisisse, hactenus solum essemus non injusti. OBEDIENCE, SATISFACTION AND MERIT. 259 intended the direct result of God's love and grace. Christ's satisfaction, therefore, to the Divine righteousness can be regarded only as indirect — only as a conditio sine qua non of the justification of believers. In so far as Christ's prestations are reckoned as satisfaction given to the law on behalf of believers, we have an explanation why God's forensic righteousness ceases to be the standard ; but the bringing in of His positive justi- fying grace as a new standard is still left unaccounted for. Theologians often enough have failed to put this point clearly to themselves. But, it may be noticed, that the formula con- cordice (p. 226) meets it ; for along with the co-ordinated forms of the passive and active obedience of Christ, which have satisfied the demands of the law, it embraces both in one voluntary obedience which Christ, active even in His passion, yielded to the will of God, and which is graciously imputed to believers as their righteousness. It might have been expected, as a logical consequence of the doctrine of the Person of Christ, that while the God-man as the representative of men, fulfilled by His doing and suffering the conditions that the justice of God had imposed as necessary to the justification of believers, the obedience of the whole life of the 6M-man (flowing as it did from love to men) should, at the same time, be regarded as representing the love and grace of God, and that to this obedi- ence should have been attributed, not merely the matter, but also the form-giving power of positive justification. Only thus would expression be given to that balance in the interpretation of Christ's priestly functions which is required by the doctrine of the two natures. But, as the doctrine has actually been developed, whether by Lutherans or Calvinists, the Divine nature of Christ comes into play in His passion only as a feature that gives it value, and in His action only as a con- dition of its perfection ; but neither in His action nor in His passion is it regarded as the acting subject, as it is considered to be in His prophetical and kingly offices. In spite of all their zeal against the scholastic view, that the human nature of Christ was the subject of His earthly doing and suffering, the view of the evangelical divines amounts to nothing different. So far, therefore, as God's grace is taken into account as contributing to the progress and efficacy of Christ's doing and suffering, the opinion of these theologians goes no further than to affirm that 260 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. it is God's grace that brings the God-man into being, and that imputes His acts to believers unto righteousness. But the im- manence of God's love is not set forth even in the love and obedience of Christ ; nor is that immanence allowed to have its due place in the connexion of the doctrine. Eather is the obedience or righteousness of Christ, as the matter which is imputed to believers, brought under the idea of merit and set over against GocPs purpose of grace, which is the form-giving power that causes its application to individual believers, and which comes into exercise only through the kingly functions of Christ. The evangelical divines originally make absolutely no dis- tinction between satisfactio and meritum, and the prestations made to the justice of God, which, strictly speaking, fall under the notion of satisfactio, are designated also as meritum, without any consciousness of a difference. This use of language con- tinues to prevail among the Keformed theologians also. But the formula concordice had at one time distinguished the active from the passive obedience of Christ, and referred them to dis- tinct grades in the demands of God's justice ; and, at another time, had comprehended the opposite phenomena of Christ's suffering and doing under the one head of Christ's loving obedience towards God (p. 226). Hereby the negative was dis- tinguished from the positive condition of justification. Now, although the indifferent use of the ideas of satisfactio and meritum might possibly be continued with reference to the negative condition of the satisfaction of God's justice, it be- tokens a true instinct that the forensic idea of satisfactio is sup- pressed when the righteousness or obedience of Christ, which is viewed as the material cause of justification by grace, comes to be spoken of. In place of it is found throughout, from a veiy early period (as in Selnecker, for example), the exclusive use of meritum to denote the positive condition of justification. This is very clearly seen in the case of Gerhard. Although he does not deliberately separate between the two ideas, he first takes the title causa meritoria justificationis to embrace the whole compass of Christ's work, then designates the negative condition involved in Christ's twofold fulfilment of the law in- discriminately as satisfactio and as meritum ; and then proceeds to set forth the positive condition of justification under the OBEDIENCE, SATISFACTION AND MERIT. 261 title Per quod Christus justitiam cor am Deo valentem promeruerii (loc. xvii. 2. 55) : Tota Christi obedientia, tarn activa quam passiva ad illud meritum concurrit. Quamvis enim scepe morti Christi redemtionis opus tribuatur, id ideo Jit, quia nusquam illuxit clarius, quod nos dilexerit ac redemerit Dominus, quam in ipsius passione et morte, etquia mors Christi est finis et perfectio totius obedientice. Plane dSvvarov est, activam obedientiam a passiva in hoc merito separare, quia in ipsa Christi morte con- currit voluntaria ilia obedientia et ardentissima dilectio, quarum prior patrem coelestem, posterior nos homines respicit. From this we can understand how a deliberate distinction between the two points of view comes in. Of course it must be a notional distinction. Amesius (Medulla, i. 20, 13), where I find it for the first time, expressly says it does not hold good, re ipsa ita ut in variis et inter se differentibus operationibus debeant quceri, sed varia ratione in una eademque obedientia debent agnosci. This distinction, however, has not been duly applied by Amesius. He refers the satisfactio to the endur- ance of punishment, the meritum to the active obedience, with- out distinguishing between the two aspects of the latter as active fulfilment of the law, and as the totality of fulfil- ment of the will of God. Not before the climax of theological development is a tolerable explication of the matter reached by Quenstedt.1 For in No. 1 the result of satisfaction is 1Quenstedt: P. iii. cap. 3, membr. 2 sec. 1 thes. 26: Satisfactio et meritum Christi non sunt to-oSwa/LtoGvro. Nam 1. ilia com pen sat injuriam Deo illatam, iniquitatem expiat, debitum solvit et a pcEnis seternis liberat, — hoc restituit nos in statum benevolentiae divinse ; mercedein gratuitam seu gratiam remissionis peccatorum, justificationem et vitam ae tern am peccatoribus acquirit ; 2. ilia se habet ut causa, hoc ut effectus. Ex satisfaction enim meritum ortum est. Satisfecit Christus pro peccatis nostris et pro po3nis illis debitis et ita promeruit nobis gratiam Dei, remissionem peccatorum et vitam seternam ; 3. satisfactio facta est Deo unitrino ej usque justitise, non nobis, licet pro nobis facta sit. At non ipsi Trinitati, sed nobis Christus aliquid meruit et merito suo acquisivit ; .' 4. actus exinanitionis, ut legis impletio, passio, mors sunt simul satis- factorii et meritorii, actus vero exaltationis, ut resurrectio, ascensio in cesium, sessio ad dexterain Dei non satisf actorii actus sunt, sed solum meritorii, eo ipso resurrectionem ad vitam nobis promeruit et ccelum reseravit ; 5. Satisfactio ex debito oritur, sed meritum opus plane indebitum ac liberum est, cui ex adverso respondet merces. He was anticipated by Feuerborn (Syntagma primum sacrarum disquisi- tionum : Marburg, 1642), and followed by Hollaz (Examen theol. P. iii. sec. 1, cap. 3, qu. 76) : — both imperfectly. Voetius, on the other hand (Disputationes theol. torn. ii. p. 229), repudiates the distinction drawn by Amesius. 262 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. is taken too narrowly, and the passive obedience is regarded only as the matter of that idea, while at the same time it re- sults from No. 4 that His vicarious fulfilment of the law also falls under the idea of satisfaction. On the other hand, follow- ing out the formula concordice, it ought to have been brought more clearly forward under No. 4 that both kinds of obedience are in their co-ordination satisfactory, and in their conjunction meritorious. Moreover, under No. 2 the relation between the two ideas is not happily expressed in the schema of cause and effect, if No. 5 is right in affirming that the same transactions, according to their diverse references to God, are distinguished by means of that pair of ideas. But since the freeness of Christ's obedience, which betokens merit, is the characteristic feature that transcends the congruence of that obedience with the law, and is not excluded by the idea of satisfactio, the satis- factory value of His prestations is rightly recognised rather as the conditio sine qua non of their meritorious value. Moreover, in No. 4 account is taken in an awkward way of the meritori- ous value of those acts of Christ's exaltation which do not belong to the priestly office, and therefore do not fall to be considered at all The chief scientific deficiency, however, of the whole treatment of this subject lies in the fact that the idea of merit is not elucidated at all ; in particular, that no ac- count is given of the attitude of God to which the idea of merit corresponds. The theologians of that epoch have none of them set this task before them, because it was inconceivable to them, in virtue of their whole religious feeling, that Christ's merit could be of any advantage to God ; non ipsi Deo, sed nobis Christus meruit. Even those who are distinguished by their acquaintance with the scholastic theology of the middle ages, betray no suspicion of the importance of the conclusions of Thomas and Duns respecting the idea of merit and its applica- tion to Christ. With reference to this point it is easy to see that the so-called Protestant schoolmen of the seventeenth cen- tury do not come up to the scientific spirit and 6lan of the schoolmen of the middle ages. At the same time the problem remains in this position, that it falls to be considered whether the good pleasure of God which, according to Calvin (p. 208) and Polanus is the condition of the validity of the merit of Christ, and is thus the correlate of that idea, gives adequate OBEDIENCE, SATISFACTION AND MERIT. 263 expression to the grace and love of God when placed along- side of the idea of His justice. To the Lutherans also, in accordance with their Christological premisses, the idea does not occur that the merit of the God- man has a reflex influence upon Himself, or that§ He earned any advantage to Himself. The older theologians of the Eeformed Church, — Calvin, Beza, Keckermann,1 concur in this, partly because Christ is man not on His own account but only for the sake of sinners ; partly, as Beza observes, because of His Divinity, which makes Him worthy of eternal life from the beginning. On the other hand Zanchius (De Incarnatione, Opp. viii. pp. 173, 174), Gomarus (In Ep. ad Philip. Opp. i p. 531), Voetius (L. c. ii. pp. 279, 280), assert that Christ not only as man merited exaltatio or gloria for Himself, but also as God merited the plenior glorice patefactio which was veiled by the incarnation or humiliation of the Logos. This view then is possible according to the Christological premisses of the Ee- formed theologians. H. Alting (Theol. proll. i. 43) mediates between the two views in such a way as to make it appear that Christ achieved merit in the first instance only for us, and for Himself only in so far as He fully dedicated His whole being to the object of attaining our salvation. I believe I may venture to assert that the divergence of the Eeformed type of doctrine from the Lutheran on this point ex- tends no further than to this feature. The other points upon which Schneckenburger traces differences between the two schools are either not controverted, or find but little support, and that not from important Eeformed theologians. He gives it out as essentially a Eeformed view, that not merely Christ's actual obedience unto death, but also the habitual sanctity of His nature, as the opposite of original sin, had a vicarious value so as to be imputed to us. For this is adduced (Schnecken- burger, p. 66) the answer to the 36th question in the Heidelberg Catechism : quod sua innocentia ac perfecta sanctitate mea peccata, in quibus conceptus sum, tegat. Now, even assuming that by this is meant Christ's habitual as distinguished from His actual purity (a thing of which I am not quite sure), the thought would be very far from being a specifically reformed one. For Gerhard (Loc. xvii 2. 56) also teaches that the 1 Cited in Schweizer's Bef. Glaubemlehre, ii. p. 381. 264 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. hdbitualis humance naturae Christi justitia a merito nostrce justitice minime exulabit. Schneckenburger appeals on this point to Ursinus also, the compiler of the Heidelberg Catechism, who writes in the Doctrines Christiance Compendium, sive Com- mentarii Catechetici (Genev. 1584), p. 479 : Imputatur nobis et prior ilia legis impletio, nempe humiliatio et justitia humance Christi naturae, — propter obedientiam ml satisfactionem ipsius.1 But, when looked at more closely, this sentence resolves itself into another point of difference that has been formulated by Schneckenburger, as separating the Reformed type of doctrine from the Lutheran. For he maintains that it is Reformed doctrine to include also the assumtio carnis as an act of obedi- ence on the part of the Logos in the imputed and therefore substitutionary righteousness of Christ. Schneckenburger (p. 68) certainly calls attention to the fact that this act does not suitably come under the idea of substitution, for in the sphere of human duties there is nothing analogous to this act. But, just for this reason, is this, view hailed by him as a breach made in the idea of substitution, which, as he thinks, has no very firm footing in Eeformed theology. Now, it cannot be doubted that in addition to the later theologian Eodolf (Catech. Palatina illustratat Bernce, 1697, p. 214), Ursinus had already hinted at the same view. He says (Opp. i p. 232) : Justitia nostra est sola satisfactio Christi prcestita legi pro nobis, seu poena, quam sustinuit Christus pro nobis, atque ideo tota humilia- tio Christi, hoc est assumtio carnis, servitutis, penurice, igno- minice et infirmitatis, passionis et mortis tolerantia. By adding ea enim satisfactio cequipollet vel impletioni legis per obedientiam vel pcence ceternce propter peccata, ad quorum alterutrum lege olligamur, — he indicates his standpoint (pp. 250-1), according to which he attributes vicarious value to the passive obedience only. If then he includes in the category of suffering and of punishment even the act of the incarnation of the Logos, that is certainly an isolated view. I meet with it also in M. Mar- tini (Christiana et Catholica Jides, Bremae, 1618, p. 259), who, as 1 The edition of the lectures of Ursinus upon the Heidelberg Catechism, from which this quotation is taken, is one that was prepared by his hearers, and called forth a corrected edition by Pareus (first published in 1591), which is inserted in the Opera (ed. Quirin. Renter. Heidelb. 1612) ; and in this authentic text the expression referred to by Schneckenburger is not to be found. Compare Walch : Bibliotheca theol. sekcta, L p. 520. OBEDIENCE, SATISFACTION AND MERIT. 265 a follower of Piscator, views the fulfilment of the law of love by Christ as a duty of the creature, therefore not as vicarious, nor as an element of the exinanitio. But to the question quomodo sancta Christi conceptio nostra peccata tegit ? his answer is quatenus in ea consideratur Domini altissimi exinanitio, in qua tota et sola posita est satisfactio pro peccatis nostris. But this is no more than a momentary exaggeration ; as substratum of satisfaction only the exinanition in suffering of the incarnate one avails. For at p. 294 we read Christus proprie etper se ex- inanitus, quatenus homo: and at p. 298 it is said, si exinaniri sit privari aliquo bono, incarnatio non est exinanitio. Very little weight is thus to be attached to that view which the proper representatives of Eeformed orthodoxy manifestly declined to adopt, from the very consideration stated by Schneckenburger. For the view in question is incorrect just when tried by that very theory of the pactum ceternum to which he refers us for a right understanding of it. For the pactum of the Logos-Son contemplates the obedience of the Incarnate One ; the incarna- tion itself, however, as the first act of humiliation, is regarded as an act equally independent with the pactum itself, and accordingly does not fall within the compass of that obedience which it first makes possible.1 Finally, the extraordinary view which Eglin (De magno insitionis nostrce in Christum mysterio, Marburg, 161 3) propounds in exaggerated opposition to Piscator (Schneckenburger, 128, 129), — that Christ's vicarious obedience continues even in his status exultationis — is not a Eeformed one, and has exercised absolutely no influence. It does not recur anywhere else ; and Gomarus (as above) shows its falsity with the observation that the meritum Christi consummatum est in terris in statu humilitatis. Schneckenburger has ignored the fact that these views occur 1 Cocceius : De Fcedere et Testamento Del, cap. 5. 93 : Posito seterno decreto Patris et Filii, postquam hie ex muliere natus et caro factus est et servi formam accepit, eo ipso factus est sub legem, servus, debitor obedientise a nobis prse- standae. Gomarus : In Ep. ad Phllipp. (Opp. i. p. 531) : Meritum Christi in humilitate et obedientia consistit ratione secundi gradus humilitatis (obedi- ence to the law as contradistinguished from the incarnation) cui soli Paulus opponit exidtationem tanquam prsemium. — This completely overthrows that point of view from which Schneckenburger regards the Reformed theory of the obedience of Christ. Its subject is not the Logos-God who humbles Himself, but the God-man that exists as the result of the humiliation or in- carnation of the Logos. 266 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. only in an isolated way amongst Reformed theologians, because they had to serve as his proofs that Reformed theology as a whole, in the reaction against Piscator, betrays a tendency to resolve the significance of Christ's passive into that of His active obedience (p. 64 seq.) As this resulted from the consi- deration that it is only the Divine intention of the God-man that gives value to His passion, and that therefore the latter really appears as the climax of His active obedience, Schneck- enburger believes that he can detect in the Reformed doctrine the idea that the active obedience avails as vicarious only in so far as it is more than vicarious, and overflows to others with the Divine power that actuates it. This is for him proof of the assertion which had been previously made, that Reformed theology from the beginning is based upon the idea (formally defined by Schleiermacher) of a living fellowship subsisting between men and God — a fellowship which Christ brought about by means of His peculiar manifestation of life. And such a train of thought he holds is inadmissible in the Lutheran system (p. 69). But this is a very surprising misapprehension of the real state of the case. The Lutheran doctrine is no less deeply interested than the Reformed in combining in that one active obedience which shows itself in suffering and death, and for the end of the positive justification of -believers, the two co- ordinate species of Christ's obedience which are satisfactory in relation to God's justice and to the law ; and this it is which the Lutherans actually and designedly denote by the term meritum (pp. 260-1). Both systems, moreover, notwithstanding the diver- gence of their Christologies, alike set forth the God-man as the subject of Christ's obedience thus summed up. But both theological schools see in the merit of Christ only an indirect bearing on the establishment of a living fellowship with God, which they associate directly with the prophetical and kingly offices of the exalted God-man. Nay, it is precisely by the Reformed theologians that these functions are placed under the idea of efficacia, and so brought into very clear logical contrast with the contents of that meritum. This may be gathered from that third form of Christ's fulfilment of the law which Ursinus enumerates (see above, p. 250), but which Schnecken- burger (p. 69) has quoted in a mutilated and therefore obscure form, and has applied in an inaccurate way. For even the THE APPLICATION OF GRACE. 267 view that Christus nobis justificationem meruit does not mean that a direct unbroken line is traced from Christ's obedience to the result of that obedience in believers. Meritum has still a direct bearing upon God, though this thought does not find ex- pression in either school. Only under the correlated idea of prcemium, i.e. from an act of God that logically corresponds to the meritum Christi, is Christ in his state of exaltation quali- fied to procure for individuals the Divine gifts of grace, to the bestowal of which God suffers Himself to be induced by the meritum obedientice Christi.1 42. In no element of the doctrine of justification and reconcili- ation does the divergence between the exhibition of matters that dogmatic theology gives and the religious conception of the order of things, so plainly appear as in the way in which the data of the status exaltationis Christi are applied by the dog- matic theologians. The interval of time between the acts of obedience rendered by Christ, pertaining as they do to the past, and the present effect on believers ;— -an interval which does not exist where justification by the obedience of Christ is realized in the religious consciousness — must be filled up by the aid of these data. Now in that region the theologians of both confes- sions have in common all that relates to the status exaltationis in the schema of the three offices of Christ. To the priestly office belongs the intercession of the heavenly High Priest, which secures the continuance of that merit towards God which He earned during His earthly life ; but, as a whole, the applicatio gratice, or, as the Eeformed divines call it, the ejficacia, falls under the kingly office of Christ, insomuch as His efficacy by the Holy Spirit, who is the organ of that activity, is at the same time the actual exercise of His Divine lordship over the Church. The indirect exercise of the prophetical office through 1 The assumption that the Reformed Christology has at bottom the tend- ency to reject the idea of satisfaction, and to call into prominence the idea of a living fellowship between men and the God-man, Schneckenburger has attempted to base upon the above quoted (p. 247, note) utterances of Cocceius. I only remark that Cocceius is not prepared for such a consequence as Schneck- enburger draws. At least he says (cap. 5. 95) : Neque putamus Christum, quatenus secundum Deitatem mediator est, Patri minorem esse, sed sponsio- nem hanc et adductionem hominis lapsi in earn gratiam in qua stamus, adeo non esse infra eminentiam divinitatis, ut non dubitemus cum les. 42. 6-8, earn gloriam et laudem divinitatis omnibus creaturis incommunicabilem as- serere. — Gloria Dei est esse justitiam Israelis ; hanc gloriam non dat non Deo, 268 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. the instrumentality of the ministri verbi divini is subordinate to the exercise of the kingly office. The opposite directions of His mediatorial activity towards God and towards men, which Osiander was the first to formulate, are not distributed over both the states of Christ's life, but are both contemporaneously included in the state of exaltation. For the rest, the Eeformed divines, by their view of the exaltation of Christ, have esta- blished a closer and stricter connexion between Christ's merit and justification than has been done by the Lutherans. In Baier's much esteemed Compendium Theol. Posit, (first pub- lished in 1686), the treatment of the qfficium sacerdotale is fol- lowed by the description of the officium regium, which, in the Lutheran style, according to the assumption of the communi- catio idiomatum, is first exhibited in the regnum potential, and afterwards in the regnum gratice. The latter is exercised by Christ in gathering together and sustaining His Church by means of the Word and sacraments, and in furnishing it with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In order now to experience in one's -self that saving efficacy of the Mediator which, as merit and as promise, is de se indeterminata ; in other words, in order to complete the effect of Christ's merit, which is not yet finished, one must believe. Thus the doctrine of faith comes next. But as believer the sinner is born again and converted ; thus we must proceed or revert to the doctrines of regeneration or conversion. The cause which moves God to the conversion of a sinner is the merit of Christ ; the instrumentality whereby God effects it is the word, baptism, and, in their sphere, the ministers of the Church. The immediate purpose and result of regeneration, as of faith, is justification. Thus follows the doctrine of that justification to which a man who as believer is regenerate, yet presents himself as a sinner, who, at the moment when he exercises that act of faith which decides his conversion, experiences the judgment of God imputing to him the righteousness of Christ. This series of thoughts progresses only in the schema of efficient causes ; and even these are not brought before us so completely as they might have been. Had it been otherwise, many difficulties would have been ob- served regarding which the Lutheran theologians unfortunately show too little concern. The Eeformed divines, on the other hand, had it before THE APPLICATION OF GRACE. 269 them to secure justification as the purpose of Christ's merit, as the dominant form of all God's gracious dealings with indi- viduals, by means of their view of the exaltation, and par- ticularly of the kingship of Christ. This is gained, in the first instance, by means of a view respecting the value of Christ's resurrection, which is possible on the assumption that Christ as our Head is the subject of satisfaction and merit. He thus died for us, because our sins were imputed to Him ; so His resurrection is His and our justification from our sins.1 This is supported by Eom. iv. 25, and by the prevailing impression left upon the mind by the New Testament usus loquendi regarding the resurrection of Christ by the Father. But this does not preclude from regarding the resurrection as at the same time an independent act of Christ and as His entry on His kingly office. (Amesius.) That the Lutheran theology did not adopt this combination, but attributes to the resurrection merely the second meaning, and concedes to it only a remote bearing upon the purpose of justification (Quenstedt), was caused by the circumstance that it counted as a step of His exaltation the descensus Christi ad inferos. But for this ob- stacle, it is difficult to see that any inner motive could have led the Lutherans to object to the other thought of Christ's resurrection. For Luther has given the impression of the intimate connexion between Christ's resurrection and His death among other expressions in certain phrases which can adequately be explained only by reference to that view of Eeformed theologians.2 And those who strictly follow the authority of the formula concordice must adopt that view.3 Calvin, on the other hand (ii. 16. 13), upon this point ex- presses himself exclusively in the Lutheran sense, connecting 1 Polanus, p. 753 : Secundus fructus resurrectionis Christi est justificatio nostri coram Deo ... est actualis ejus absolutio a peccatis nostris, pro quibus mortuus est. Excitando eum a morte ipso facto eum absolvit Pater a peccatis nostris ei imputatis et nos etiam absolvit in eo. Amesius, p. 101 : Finis resurrectionis fuit (4) ut se et justificatum et alios justificantem osten- deret. P. 123 : Sententia justifications (2) fuit in Christo capite nostro e mortuis jam resurgente pronunciata. Mastricht, Theol. theoretico-practica, p. 703, repeats word for word these sentences along with their context from Amesius. Witsius, iii. 8. 4. Compare Schneckenburger as above, p. 99. 2 Kostlin, ii. p. 423. 3 F. C. p. 684 : Justitia ilia, quae coram Deo credentibus imputatur, est obedientia, passio et resurrectio Christi, quibus ille legi nostra causa satis- fecit et peccata nostra expiavit. 270 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. with the resurrection of Christ only His operation in trans- ferring the power of His death to us. I now place in contrast with the train of thought developed by the Lutheran Baier that of the Calvinist Arnesius, who in precision is equal to the other, and in genius and talent for combination excels him as well as the greater number of his party, so far as I know them. By the well-known reference of Christ's resurrection to the justification of those who belong to Him as their Head is, in the first place, explained the assump- tion uniformly made by Eeformed divines, that Christ's King- ship extends, in the first instance, to His Church, or at least that, as dominion over all, it is applied for the benefit of those who are His. Amesius then makes the priestly intercession and the prophetical sending of messengers to be elements of the kingly character of Christ, so that thus the pleading of His merit in our behalf finds an emphatic certainty. The doctrine of the application of the mediatorial work of Christ to par- ticular men next follows. Being brought about by the instru- mentality of the Holy Ghost, it in the first instance depends upon the Father's decree of election which has given to the Eedeemer certain men to be redeemed ; in the second instance, it depends on the purpose wherewith Christ gave satisfaction for these. Thus our deliverance from sin is determined in God's decree, but at the same time communicated to Christ, and in Him to us, before it actually is received by us. The application of grace to this end takes place accordingly to the same extent to which Christ embraced and carried out the pur- pose of redemption. For the decree of election, to the con- sideration of which we have now passed, relates to those definite individual men in their connexion with the body of Christ who is the Head of this new humanity, just as the creation of natural humanity in Adam was one act. The applicatio consists of the following parts : Union with Christ in effectual calling, and Participation in the benefits of redemp- tion that are found in Christ, In so far as the calling of the elect is effectual as conversio or regeneratio, there pertain to it objectively the preaching of the gospel (with preparation by means of the law), inner appropriation by the Holy Ghost, and its implanting in the will, which subjectively appears as the act of faith. In faith is attained that condition upon which THE APPLICATION OF GRACE. 271 participation in Christ's benefits depends ; these consist partly of changes in relation, to wit, justification and adoption, partly in the real change of sanctification. Justification is the judgment whereby God declares free from sin and from death, and accepts as righteous the believer for the sake of Christ, whom he lays hold of by faith. This judgment was (1.) existent in God's thought in virtue of the decree of justification ; (2.) declared in the resurrection of Christ ; (3.) virtually (that is to say without being unfolded in the subjec- tive consciousness) pronounced in that first relation, which results from implanted faith, i.e. in the primary union with Christ which corresponds to subjective faith (according to Eom. viii. 1) ; (4.) expressly pronounced by the Spirit of God, who bears witness in us of our reconciliation with God. Justifica- tion, as a relation to God, is objectively complete in one act ; although, as regards its appearance in the subjective assurance, and as regards the sense of its presence, it has diverse degrees. This is a self-consistent and definite exhibition in which not even an apparent contradiction results from the two propositions (Amesius, p. 124), that faith precedes justification as its cause, and that faith presupposes justification and is its consequence. For justification as contained in the subjective consciousness presupposes faith, but as an objective act of God it precedes faith, and is operative in the believing subject before he is conscious of its presence, because it is previously contained in God's electing decree, in Christ's redeeming purpose and in His resurrection. In this exhibition, moreover, justification is regarded as a synthetic judgment upon the believer as sinner. Of the four steps in the sentence of justification, as they are to be met with in Amesius, the first two, in mente Dei and in resurrectione Christi, are, without any doubt, synthetical. That the fourth step, justification in the consciousness of the believer, is not analytical, follows from the assumption of the third step which virtually presents justification in the unio cum Christo in regeneration.1 The relation to Christ, which arises from 1 Medulla, i. 27. 9 (p. 123) : Sententia justification is (3.) virtualiter pro- minciatur ex prima ilia relatione, quse ex fide ingenerata exsurgit. This is explained by the following sentences from cap. 26 (p. 119) : Ratione recep- tionis Christi vocatio dicitur conversio, regeneratio. — Passiva receptio Christi est, qua spirituale principium gratise ingeneratur hominis voluntati. — Hsec enim gratia est fundamentum relationis illius, qua homo cum Christo unitur. 272 ORTHODOXY AND SOC1NIANISM. regenerating grace in the act of faith, is the very same as that which is denoted in the idea of justification. If thus the unio cum Christo is formally justification, it cannot be thought of as preceding the judgment of justification with self-contained reality ; rather if regeneration is regarded as bestowed on the elect, then is the sentence of justification, which is virtually made known in the act of regeneration, synthetic even at this stage, and therefore also necessarily so at the fourth. Now, it is again a deduction drawn by Schneckenburger (p. 57), the correctness of which would be acknowledged by no orthodox Eeformed divine, that justification, as Schleiermacher maintains, properly speaking, resolves itself into that one eternal act of election which is the effective imputation of Christ to humanity in general (!), which realizes itself subsequently as faith begins in individuals. To this Maccovius (Loci communes, p. 608), appealing to Worton (de reconciliations), as well as F. Turretine (Compendium, 452 sq.), have already answered that the decree of justification and its execution are to be distinguished from each other. For the attention they bestow on the ultimate ground of salvation is as far as possible removed from making the Reformed divines indifferent with regard to the historical instrumentalities by which it is brought about ; though certainly Lutheran theology, from its regard to the latter, has become in- different to the methodical exposition of the former. Turretine, for example, also recognises justification as a historical act per- formed on the individual (p. 453) : (1.) In momenta vocationis e/icacis, per quam homo peccator transfertur a statu peccati ad statum gratice et unitur Christo capiti suo per fidem. Hinc enimfit, utjustitia Christi illi imputetur a Deo, cujus merito per fidem apprehenso absolvitur a peccatis suis et jus ad vitam con- sequitur, quam sententiam absolutoriam. (2.) Spiritus in corde pronunciat, quum ait, confide fili, remissa sunt tibi peccata tua. This representation, moreover, is in complete harmony with the third and fourth steps of justification which are assumed by Amesius, and which are not only distinguished from one another by the unvarying usus loquendi as justificatio activa and passiva, but also referred to one another as mutually comple- — Receptio activa est elicitus actus fidei, qua vocatus in Christum recumbit ut suurn servatorem. This line of thought is not found in Calvin, who, agreeably to the Reformation character of his contemplation of the consciousness of justification, expressly limits justification to Ames's fourth step. THE APPLICATION OF GRACE. 273 mentary.1 In order to understand this relation of the ideas, however, we must disregard Schneckenburger's observation (p. 57, note), that when regeneration is represented as justifica- tion, justification must be taken to mean the actual change whereby the sinner is really made righteous. He ought rather conversely to have concluded that if regeneration or union with Christ is identified with justiftcatio activa, it is precisely thereby declared to be not a real change, but an ideal relation to Christ ; and that it first of all acquires its significance as a real change when in accordance with the nature of the case justificatio passiva, — i.e. consciousness of justification, presents itself in the subject. A misapprehension of a similar sort, but of a more clearly marked character, appears however in Schneckenburger's asser- tion,2 which has already been proved to be incorrect, that it is the unanimous opinion of Eeformed theologians, in opposition to Lutheranism, that the sentence of justification as judicium secundum veritatem holds good with regard to the believer, not as a sinner, but as unitus cum Christo ; so that it is an analytical judgment expressing the import of the regeneration that precedes it. I have already (p. 192), when speaking of Calvin, confuted this assertion which Schneckenburger supports only by references to a few theologians, without consulting the lead- ers of the Eeformed school. But the same view is held by Dortenbach also,3 at least with reference to a section of the Eeformed divines, of whom he mentions Bucanus, Witsius, van Til, in addition to Eodo'lf, Melchior, Hulsius, F. Turretine, who are referred to by Schneckenburger. He adds also Claude Albery,4 — not felicitously, however. For he, the counter- part of A. Osiander in the sphere of the Calvinistic Churches, was on this very account censured by an assembly of divines at Berne (1588), and thus does not belong to the number 1 It is true that justification, which on God's side is a single act, manifests itself in subjective experience as a plurality of acts. Non est indivisus actus a parte nostri et ratione sensus, qui fit per varios et iterates actus, prout sensu ; iste potest interrumpi vel augeri vel minui ratione peccatorum in- tercurrentium (Turret. Comp. p. 453). Compare Schneckenburger, ii. p. 73. 2 Kirchl Christologie, p. 55 sq. Compar. Dogmatik, ii. p. 12 sq. 3 In the article Sundenvergebung in Herzog's Real-Encykl. xv. p. 238. 4 Professor of Philosophy in Lausanne ; wrote de fide Cafholica (1587;. (Compare Schweizer : Centraldogmen, i. p. 521-526.) His principle is— justitia nostra coram Deo qualitas patibilis in nobis inhserens, coniunctione cum Christo effecta, et vitiosae qualitati originali opposita. 18 274 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. of recognised representatives of the Eeformed doctrine. With regard to Bucanus, it is obvious that he had no intention at least to teach in the way that has been indicated (Institu- tiones theol. Loc. 29. 11. 12), although by one or two sentences he may give rise to an appearance of such a tendency. That appearance vanishes whenever the connexion is observed, and the old gentleman receives indulgence for a certain want of skill. He lays down two steps of justification (sect. 1 7) whereby the elect (sect. 20) are declared righteous, first as sinners, then as believers. This is the first, but by no means sufficiently elaborated form of the distinction which has already been adduced from Amesius and Turretine. Bucanus next (sect. 18) proposes the question how God can declare the unjust to be just in the face of his own prohibition (Prov. xvii. 15). To this he answers awkwardly enough that God is above the law, that the person to be justified, who with respect to nature is a sinner, is a chosen one with respect to grace, and finally, that he must be a penitent sinner. Here undeniably are the elements of a divergence into Osiander's tendency ; but sect. 1 9 shows that they do not find any consistent application. Bucanus does not give up the assumption of the two degrees — the jus- tification of the sinner to whom faith is given in consequence, and the justification of the believer. He indeed expresses the difference between them by saying that God in non renatis nihil invenit prceter homndam malorum colluviem, in renatis vero sua etiam dona complectitur Deus; but he winds up by saying in a harmonizing way that God utrosgue tamen eodem modo justificat, namely, by imputation of Christ's merit, not therefore by a judgment upon the value of His own gifts of grace in the believer. In Witsius (De (Econ. Feed. iii. 8, 22) I find the sentences, in virtue of which Dortenbach indicates the stand- point of the Eeformed theologians named by him, to the effect that in regeneration we are liberated from the crimen profani- tatis et Jiypocriseos ; non potest Deus homines aliter considerare, aliter declarare, quam reapse sunt. These sentences, however, are incomprehensibly misapplied to a purpose which they by no means serve according to their context. For the fundamental principle of the Divine judgment (judicium Dei secundum veritatem est, Eom. ii. 12), is applied by Witsius partly to gross sinners, and partly to the actively righteous, to the regenerate THE APPLICATION OF GRACE. 275 who are slanderously accused of impiety and hypocrisy, like Job. For the latter in particular he coins the absolutio a crimine profanitatis et hypocriseos not, as our untrustworthy reporter represents, for believers as a whole. Witsius adds that this justification of the righteous, presupposing as it does the sanctitas et justitia inhcerens which an individual possesses by the grace of God, is totally distinct from the justification of sinners, prout in sponsore censentur. This last he represents, in the familiar way, as an imputation of the righteousness of Christ, as a synthetic judgment upon sinners ; but he is at the same time convinced that God in this procedure also judges secundum veritatem. This affirmation he proves simply on the ground that it is an actual righteousness which God imputes, and that God knows that that righteousness was not wrought by us but by Christ in our room, to the end ut nos illius merito juste coronari possimus. Quod tarn verum est, ut summa sit totius evangelii (sect. 38). John Melchior (Fundamenta Theol. Didascalicce, Opp. ii. p. 108-110) develops the following line of thought : men were destitute of the righteousness prescribed by the law, while no righteousness can be accepted by God which does not receive the approbation of the law. For God's judgment is secundum veritatem. Whereupon the wisdom of God devised a plan for acquitting the unrighteous while yet He should maintain His justice — i.e. should judge in confor- mity to the law. In accordance with that plan, Christ as our Surety had to fulfil the law, so that He was justified, and has acquired the right, as God's righteous servant, to justify His own, or through His own obedience to exhibit many as righteous. Men come to the participation of this righteousness of Christ by means of faith, to which therefore especially justification is attributed. Non enim amplius pro injusto potest haberi, si quis sit in Christo, cui nos fides inserit. Quodjudicium Dei de fideli- lus in communionejustitice Christi jam constitutis vocatur justi- ficatio. It is obvious that Melchior does not intend to diverge from the usual doctrine ; but, unless we judge unfairly of his line of thought, we shall not find that as matter of fact he has gone beyond bounds in the two last sentences. For the judicium secundum veritatem takes place with reference to the state of faith, not in so far as that state is an operation wrought by the Holy Ghost on the analogy of the legal right- 276 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. eousness of Christ, but in so far as faith fulfils that condition under which Christ's fulfilment of the law, which is the only possible object of God's truthful judgment, can be imputed to the sinner. F. Turretine receives from Schneckenburger (pp. 16, 24) the testimony that he approaches most nearly to the Lutheran type of justification (compare above, p. 272) ; yet to him also are attributed divergencies towards the pretended Reformed interpretation of the doctrine. The allegations, how- ever, taken by Schneckenburger from his Theologia elencktica, ii. p. 705 sq. (Lugd. Bat. 1696), are neither complete nor trustworthy. The view-point of the judicium Dei secundum veritatem, which proceeds upon the rule that God can declare no one to be righteous unless he have a perfect righteousness, is never intended by Turretine to represent the imputation of Christ's righteousness as something impossible, or that needs to be supplemented ; nay, rather he applies that fundamental principle precisely to this case. Qui destituitur propria justitia, aliam debet habere qua justificetur. The imputation of the righteousness of the vicarious surety to those whom He repre- sents thus constitutes thejudiciumsecundumveritatem. Of course to this result attaches the condition of unio cum Christo. But when Turretine anew defends the Tightness of God's judgment of imputation against the charge of fiction, he does not appeal to that unio cum Christo, thus not to " Christ in us," but to the relation of suretiship in which the validity of the action of one as legally representing others constitutes the type of Christ's work as our substitute. Finally, his attaching to justification the condition of unio cum Christo (p. 713) does not render invalid the thought justificatur impius, for renovatio per gratiam does not precede justification but follows it ; and the believer, in spite of his faith, must be regarded with respect to justifica- tion as impius, quatenus opponitur operanti, adeoque impius partim antecedenter, partim respective ad justificationem, non autem concomitanter, minus adhuc consequenter. In opposition to Schneckenburger I have to remark that this sentence has nothing to do with any reference to judicium secundum veri- tatem. Of course the justificandus is from one side repre- sented as " already a regenerate person ; " but it is not at all in this aspect that he is brought before the judgment of God, but only as impius. Schneckenburger (p. 1 5) appeals for support THE APPLICATION OF GRACE. 277 to Eodolf also (Catechesis Pal. Illustrata) : but wrongly, for he omits the decisive sentences of the author he cites. Eodolf, just like Turretine, says that imputatio non denotat fictionem mentis et opinionem, sed verum justumque judicium, quo Deus judicat eos, gui credunt, esse in Filio, atque adeo justitice et omnis juris ipsius, ut capitis et fratris primogeniti, consortes (p. 340). Hujus imputationis fundamentum est (1.) sponsio Christi. Quidquid Filius Dei legi subjectus fecit, id voluntaries sponsione loco electorum fecit et passus est; merito igitur id ipsis imputa- tur; (2.) unio electorum cum Christ o per spiritum fidei tarn arcta ut unumfiant corpus. Quapropter in Chris to fecisse ac tulisse censentur, quod fecit tulitque ipsorum vice Christus (p. 341). Schneckenburger, by citing only the second condition as the fundamentum imputationis, without bringing forward the pre- vious fundamentum, or the subsequent elucidation, has really falsified the evidence of his witness. Solomon van Til (Theologice utriusque compendium, cum naturalis turn revelatw, ed. quarta, 1734), discusses justification after regeneration, and certainly might seem in some sentences to regard the former as an analytical judgment proceeding upon the latter. Sicut homo cum dono fidei in regeneration accipit immutationem status, ita quoque novam subit relationem, qua relatus ad amorem Dei concipiturut conciliatus, amicus, id quesummo jure prop ter ejus communionem cum Christo (ii. p. 160). By this, however, is expressed, not the object, but the condition of justification; for the latter is described as & judicium fori divini, quo a reatu ab~ solvitur redemtus Jidelis propter satisfactionem Christi prcestitam, et jus mice seu justitice imputatur propter meritum Christi, dum censetur per fidem arctissimam habere communionem cum Christo. Subsequently (p. 164) we read again: totum funda- mentum justitice judicii divini in justification fundatur in credentis conjunctione cum Christo. But, as at the same time, objectum justifications ponitur improbus, the synthetical charac- ter of the sentence of justification is placed beyond all doubt. Only in the judgment of grace passed on the sinner is at the same time introduced a judgment of righteousness which has regard in the first instance to Christ's work : but on account of the fellowship we have with Him in faith, omnia quce Christi sunt, jure censentur nostra.1 1 1 have not been able to gain access to the Systenta controversiarum theo- 278 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. In fact, the Eeformed thought that Christ is the subject of satisfaction and of merit, as Surety and Head of the Church, leads further to the remarkable conclusion that the justification of the individual believer is not merely regarded as an act of grace (which to the Lutherans is its only value), but, at the same time, as an act of God's justice. If Christ as Head of the Church has suffered in their room, the sins of the elect being im- puted to Him ; if, therefore, also, as Head of the Church, He was declared free from its sins, then it is only just that the forgive- ness of sins should be transferred to the individual member of His Church. Just as had been signified by van Til, H. Alting says (Loc. comm. i. 14, Opp. i. p. 117): Consideratur homo electus fiifariam, prout est in se et natura sua et prout est in Christo satisfaciente. Priore modo Deus justificat impium, posterior e justificat eum, qui est ex fide Jesu. Uludfacit pro sua ergo, nos gratia, istudfacit pro justitia sua, qua satisfactionem a Christo acceptam credentibus imputat. So also Cocceius : (Summa Theologice, cap. 48) : Imputatio justitice sive imputatio fidei injustitiam est judicium Dei justum, quod illi, qui credunt in Christum et in eo sunt}propterjustitiam Christi capitis etfilii injndicium non venire, dono Dei debeant, tanquam si earn oledientiam patrassent et nullum peccatum commisissent. There was no need, therefore, that Schneckenburger should adduce, in support of this thought, only so late a writer as Beveridge (p. 23, 24), who, moreover, in his purpose of practical edification, puts it in connexion with the condition suppose* queje remplisse les conditions, qu'il exige dans son alliance, and so glides into an Arminian point of view. But Schneckenburger ought to have formulated that thought more distinctly than he has done. For actual unio cum Christo is indeed represented as a con- logicartim of Anthony Hulsius, from which. Schneckenburger (ii. p. 16) quotes the following sentences in support of his assertion : Certum est, cum justifica- tur, eum non esse peccatorem in statu peccati, sedjldelem et consequenter justum justitia inhcerente. From the proofs of inaccuracy in quoting, which on this occasion I have discovered in both Wurtemberg theologians, I shall wait to see whether any one will contradict me when I assert that the statement by Hulsius has no reference to the present question of the condition of the sinner's justification through Christ, but to the case of the acquittal of the righteous person (touched on by Witsius, p. 274), which is called by Braun (Doctrina Faderum, iii. 9, 21) justificatio secunda : Secunda est Inhcerens, im- perfecta et mutabilis, Jitque non tantumjlde, sed operibus, et quidem per sancti- ficationem ad obtinendum testimonium sanctitatis, ut absolveremur ab hypocrisi — in so far, that is, as the devil accuses the just as he accused Job. THE APPLICATION OF GRACE. 279 dition of the true and righteous judgment of God, but its cause is the ideal oneness in virtue of election with Christ, who gives satisfaction. In this way is the interest maintained which Reformed theologians no less than Lutherans feel in the affirmation of the proposition quod justificatur impius. Were it not so, one could at all events retort upon the Lutheran doctrine, precisely in the terms in which Schnecken- burger has spoken of the Reformed view — that it places the doctrine of regeneration before that of justification, in order to indicate that this judgment of God presupposes that man is in an actual state, which is the opposite of the state of sin. And yet this is not the case ; for the interpretation of regeneration as a presupposition of justification is guarded in a very special way. Baier, for example (theol. pos. iii. 4. 2. 3. 12. 15), recognises a widest sense of the word regeneration ; embracing conversion, justification, renovation ; and a narrowest one, in which it is equivalent to justification, qua confertur jus filios Dei fieri (the justificatio activa of Reformed divines). According to another less narrow idea, regeneration is made equivalent to renovation or sanctification. But what Baier actually understands and explains under that heading is just the donatio fidei as a condition of the justificatio peccatoris, and to this does he limit the equivalent ideas of nova creatio, vivificatiot spiritualis resuscitatio. Accordingly he admits, indeed, that in this is implied mutatio aliqua spiritualis ; but as he defines this with respect to justification as being the proximus finis et effectus justificationis, as he regards the vires spirituals which are bestowed in regeneration as relating merely ad credendum in Christum vitamque adeo spiritualem inchoandam, while he makes real renovation to be dependent on justification, it is easy to see what the purpose of the doctrine is. As actual conscious justification is intelligible as a new relation of the sinner to God only on condition of faith, and as the bestowal of faith is a real change of the will, it is important to attenuate the latter as much as possible in relation to justification. For indubitably the first mentioned formal change cannot be ex- hibited at all without a material change of the sinner, and such a change lies already in the directing of his will to Christ. But this aspect of the process is not regarded as the matter but only as the condition of the judgment, whereby the new relation 280 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. of the sinner to God is first established. Inasmuch, then, as it is impossible to avoid representing the act of faith as the initial stage of the new life, it does not follow that it is to this value of faith that regard is had in the sentence of justification. But the Eeformed doctrine is conditioned in the same way. It also cannot think of regeneration or union with Christ, merely as the mere empty schema of a relation, which is intended when it is represented as a step in the pronunciatio justifications. For the direction of the will to Christ, which pertains thereto, is an efficax conversio voluntatis.1 But by this is always meant a condition, and not the object, of justification. I do not at present enter into the question whether and how the difficulties that cluster round this point could be avoided or otherwise put to rest. At all events, no one party ought to reproach the other with the fact that in determining the relation between justification and, regeneration, it has betrayed or even dropped out of sight the common interest of both parties in the former of these. 43. On the other hand a most pertinacious controversy, be- tween the two schools, is raised by the question regarding the extent of Christ's purpose of salvation in relation to the actual result of that purpose. The Eeformed party assert that both are equal in extent, that the merit and efficacy of Christ alike refer only to the elect, even although the power and worth of Christ's merit was sufficient for the salvation of all The Lutherans, on the other hand, teach that Christ's saving pur- pose had the same universal extent as His power ; that He purposed to give satisfaction for all, even for the reprobate, but that the efficacy of His work is limited to the elect, who by faith fall in with His purpose of salvation, and appropriate to themselves His work. This opposition of views not merely served in its time as a theological Shibboleth, but even divided the popular religious consciousness; although both of the 1 Schneckenburger (Comp. Dogm., ii. p. 12) thinks that it is impossible for a Lutheran to say what is natural to a Reformed divine : justificatio sequitur jidem ut ejus effectus. But Baier and Gerhard say : — Finis et effectus Jidei proximus est justificatio. According to p. 13 it is only the later and pietisti- cally inclined Lutherans who, after the Reformed manner, understand by regeneration the donatio jidei. But this is not merely the opinion of Quen- stedt and Baier ; it is also that of Gerhard, who has no locus de regeneratione, but places that de panitentia before that de justificatione, comp. his Loc. 17, cap. 3, sec. 3. EXTENT OF CHRIST'S REDEEMING PURPOSE. 281 opposing views, when externally regarded, are equally strongly supported in the New Testament, and although the same con- trariety had exhibited itself between Thomas and Duns (p. 64), without extending its influence beyond the limits of the school. In the influence of this opposition of different schools upon the religious and church consciousness in the evangelical confes- sions, we have thus a striking proof how the importance given by religious interest to school questions has complicated the church-development of the Eeformation. But this contrariety, like most of the divergencies that have been already noticed, was caused by the circumstance, that the systematic impulse in the theology of the Keformed Church operated with a strength which the Lutherans did not experience. The de- fectiveness of the latter as regards their interest in systematic theology, was inherited from Melanchthon (p. 231), since even in method they made no use of the pattern that had been set before them by Calvin, who was the one systematic theologian of the later Eeformation period. This is not the place to come to a conclusion upon that dogmatic difference. I will only point out how desire after unity of system was operative both in the one and in the other assertion. On both sides it is equally recognised as the result of the Divine redemption, that it is appropriated by a part of the human race — by the fideles, electi. Both parties moreover are at one in maintaining that this result was from all eternity contemplated by God, and that in fact the whole ordering of the universe and the whole of God's providence refer to this number of men and their benefit. But only the Keformed Church explains this connexion from the stand-point of the independence of God's willing and doing ; the Lutherans make the result, as also God's eternal decree regarding that result, to depend upon the independent decision of individual men with regard to faith and upon foresight of this. For, so far as His inmost mind is concerned, God earnestly strives after the salvation of all men ; but His actual decree for the ruling of the universe is regulated by regard to the moral freedom of men with respect to their faith. Now, as faith is a condition of salvation, inasmuch as it recognises and appropriates the merit of Christ, the eternal election of future believers has its motive in the fact that. God foresaw the merit of Christ which should make the accomplishment of election 282 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. possible,1 although, indeed, from another point of view, God appointed this work of Christ from grace. Now, whether the doctrine of predestination precede or follow the doctrine of Christ's person and work with Lutheran theologians, it is a thing of course that the latter doctrine is not affected by the former, but conversely. For while God indeed has the desire (desiderium) to save all by the mission and exhibition of His Son, but yet that salvation takes place only in those who believe, in the exercise of their own independent will, there is a contra- diction between the result of Christ's work or the extent of justification and the purpose for which Christ was sent ; and the decree of election, regulated as it is by the option of men, is in contradiction with the purpose which precedes in the mind and wish of God. In short, the Lutheran assertion that Christ was designed to be pro omnibus et singulis Tiominibus, a destiny which, even by the eternal decree of God, is not realized, ren- ders it impossible that the carrying out of one Divine purpose can be recognised in the history of redemption ; and therefore the theology of the Lutherans in the seventeenth century never 1 Arminius was the first who from Eph. i. 4 pressed the doctrine of election in Christ. With regard to the meaning of the phrase, he expressed himself variously, designating Christ in virtue of His passion at one time as causa meritoria, qua gratia et gloria est parata ; at another time as causa meritoria eorum bonorum, quce decreto electionis Jidelibus destinata sunt (Compare Twisse : Vindicice gratia, potestatis ac providential Dei, p. 36). The former interpreta- tion was adopted by his followers (Schweizer : Centraldogmen, ii. p. 91) ; the second was insisted upon by his opponents as against the other (for it was no longer possible to avoid that passage from St. Paul). It is the interpretation given in the decision of the Synod of Dort (cap. i. 7) : Certam quorundam hominum multitudinem elegit in Christo, quern etiam ab ceterno mediatorem et omnium electorum caput, salutisque fundamentum constituit. Should this not be held to be sufficiently clear, then Gomarus may be consulted (Loc. Comm., v. p. 63) : Medium electionis est donatio Christi servatoris. . . . Apparet, electionem Christi aliorum ad salutem destinationem ordine non prcecedere, sed ut medium eijini subordinatum succedere. H. Alting (Loc. Comm., iv. p. 66) : Primum summumque mediorum omnium ad salutem prceparatorum est Christus. Sumus igitur electi in Christo ut mediatore, ut capite, cujus satisfactione inter- veniente Jfceret reconciliatio inter Deum et homines. This orthodox Calvinist view thus coincides with the Arminian, in so far as both contemplate Christ in connexion with the subject of election, in His quality as the Giver of satisfaction for sinners ; but they differ from one another inasmuch as God's plan of satisfaction through Christ is regarded by the Arminian s as the ground, and by the Calvinists as the consequence, of the elective decree. Now the Lutherans, having adopted the Arminians' unlimited conception of freedom (Schweizer ii. p. 209), have also accepted the Arminian assertion that Christ is the causa meritoria electionis. On the other side, in one circle of Reformed divines the view has been developed that election in Christ is valid for all those who in connexion with Him as their Head shall attain to EXTENT OF CHRIST'S REDEEMING PURPOSE. 283 became a system (although this title was sometimes made use of), but remained an aggregate of loci theologici. On the other hand, the Keformed assertion that Christ's saving purpose at the outset was limited to the persons in whom it comes to applicatio or efficacia, is in accordance with the systematic position that, in the course of the history of re- demption, guided as that is by God, His previous purpose must be recognised. If now the result of Christ's influence upon men be the formation and organisation of a part of mankind into the fellowship of the kingdom of God under Christ as the Head, this body must have been contemplated in God's eternal election. This fellowship, therefore, is the objectum applicati- onis gratice (Keckermann, H. Alting, Amesius). Christ, in fine, acts as the subject of satisfaction and of merit, because He is regarded as the caput et sponsor eleetorum, and directs His in- tention in accordance with this. Were this otherwise, says Amesius (p. 106), like Bucanus (p. 226), Christ's work of re- demption would be of ambiguous result; the Father would have appointed the Son unto death, and the Son would have final salvation. In fact, both by the rule ultimum in exsecutione est primum in intentione, and also by consideration of the circumstance that Christ's satis- faction does not establish but presuppose His dignity as Head of the Church that is to be redeemed, ; Amesius teaches (Medulla, i. cap. 25, sect. 27) : Electio unicafuit in Deo respectu totius Christi mystici, Christi et eorum, qui sunt in Christo, sicut creatio una fuit totius generis humani ; prout tamen secundum rationem distinctio qucedam concipi potest, Chrislus primofuit electus ut caput, ac deinde homines quidam ut membra in ipso. Witsius (De (Economia Feed. Dei, iii. 4. 2) : Electi sunt in Christo ut mediatore et propterea electo, qui uno eodemque actu sic ipsis datus est in caput et dominum, ut illi simul ei data sint in membra et peculium, servandi ejus merito et efficacia, et in communione cum ipso. Heidegger (Corp. Theol. Chr., loc. v. 28) : Electionis consilium ab ceterno dis- positum est per modum voluntatis, qua Deus in Christo hceredes justitice et regni sui apud se ipsum definivit. 29 : Ad eligendum quosdam Deum in .universum impulit amor glorice suce. . . . In specie autem amor personarum S. Trinitatis electionis intra Deum causa est. 30 : In ceterno illo testamento scriptus principalis hceres est Jesus Christus partim ut hceres omnium, partim ut hcereditatis sibi datce vindex et assertor. . . . Unde liquet hcereditatem filii esse homines quosdam sibi datos, ut per eum salvati glorice ejus consortes farent. . . . Elegit nos in ipso, Christo, in hcerede principali cohceredes, in principe salutis nostrce salvandos, in capite corpus. By this view of election, the tradition that descends from Luther and Calvin is, properly speaking, departed from. If the elect be represented a priori as a whole in Christ, they are then no longer the many individuals with whom the reprobi in the other act of God's will are to be co-ordinated. This deduction, however, has not been clearly brought out. Still I find that such a change of the idea of election, while it withdraws from Calvin, approaches the line inaugurated by Zwingli (Compare Jahrb. fur deutsche Theol., xiii. p. 94). I believe also that these theologians have rightly apprehended the meaning of the apostle Paul. 284 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. submitted Himself thereto, in uncertainty whether any one at all was to be saved by Him ; the whole result of this mystery would depend upon the unrestrained arbitrariness of men. And Bucanus (p. 396) points out that this seeming vocation of all, upon which the Lutheran assertion proceeds, really is not directed to omnes et singuli, but rather is indefinite. However this controversy may be decided with the aid of the exegetical and dialectic means at present available, and how- ever we may obviate the difficulty which the Lutherans felt with regard to the Eeformed view of the thought of election, in counterpoise to which view is the offensiveness of that estimate of human freedom which the Lutherans borrowed from the Arminians, the Eeformed theory at all events has this advan- tage : that it gives strong emphasis to the idea of the Church. Christ, in His doing and suffering, having been conscious, as Head of the elect, that He was doing and suffering for them and in their room, the formation of the Church is recognised as the direct end of His historical activity, even although yet other means secured by the activity of the exalted Saviour are neces- sary to the attainment of the actual result. The Church being represented as the immediate object of the efficacia — in other words, of those operations of the exalted Christ — the identity of the subject of exinanitio and of exaltatio (which in appearance are opposed) is put on a firm footing by the oneness of the pur- pose to which they related. Finally, on this presupposition the advantage is gained that the regeneration and justification of the individual cannot even be conceived outside of the Church, which, binding him up with Christ and the other members of Christ, embraces the individual in idea and in fact before he is at all conscious of his justification. Thus is the assumption made possible that the justificatio activa of the individual, whether it be represented as a transient act of regeneration or as an immanent act of God in foro cceli, is valid and effectual for all the elect in virtue of the general sentence of justifica- tion, previous to justificatio passiva and the consciousness of a change of state that the testimony of the Holy Ghost brings. At the same time, the objective validity of this fact for the individual is maintained, even though the subjective sense of it, the feeling of peace and joy in the Holy Ghost cannot be detected with equable strength and continuous duration. The EXTENT OF CHRIST'S REDEEMING PURPOSE. 285 Lutheran doctrine has not equalled these attainments. No doubt, it also, by referring to Christ's kingly and prophetical office in His state of exaltation, deduces the rise of the Church as an indirect consequence of the priestly activity of the God- man in His state of humiliation. But it does not accomplish this by exhibiting any relation of purpose. On the contrary, it only places Christ's two offices in chronological sequence, and arranges the facts contained in them in the order of the three offices. The Lutheran doctrine amounts to this, that Christ, who in the state of humiliation has given satisfaction for all men to God, in His state of exaltation gathers, main- tains, and equips with the gifts of salvation His Church, — in His office of prophet mediately by sending the ministri verli divini, and in His kingly office by the Word and sacraments, the vehicles of the Holy Spirit. That no mutual connexion between these two facts is traced must indeed be charged against the Eeformed divines as much as against the Lutherans. But this error is less fatal to the Keformed than to the Lutheran doctrine. For the Eeformed view of Christ's merit is brought into direct connexion with the purpose of founding the Church, and is dominated by the supreme idea of the regnum gratice Ghristi, and the applicatio meriti has for its ob- ject the Church, and the individual only as a member of the Church. This order of ideas could not be destroyed even though it was omitted to ingraft the mission of the ministers of the Word by Christ as a prophet into the active exercise of his kingship in forming and maintaining His Church. The Lutheran view of the matter, on the other hand, does not satisfy the interests of the Christianity of the Evangelical Church, and therefore tends to injure it. Inasmuch as the two facts are brought into close conjunction, that Christ in His state of exaltation sends the ministers of the Divine Word as a Prophet, and gathers and maintains the Church by Word and sacrament as King, it certainly seems, when viewed from one side, that the connexion of the thought of the Church with the doctrine of the meritum Christi is very strongly brought out. It seems as if we had only to note that the ministers are the mediate organs of Christ in His state of exaltation, the deposi- taries of the Divine Word, and the administrators of the sacra- ments, in which the merit of Christ is applied to believers, in 286 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. order to draw the conclusion that the community of believers is to be regarded as the immediate product of the official func- tions of the ministers, and as the mediate product, in His state of exaltation, of the God-man, who made them possible by His merit in His humiliation. But this is not the intention of the Lutheran doctrine. For the article " Of the Church " declares that vocatio ordinaria is the constitutive characteristic of the minister of the Word. Now the jus vocationis indeed pertains in the last instance to Christ, but ecclesia est minus principalis causa vocationis ministrorum (Baier). In other words, the Church is not merely the product, but also the efficient pre- requisite or the intermediate cause of the ministry of the Word. But why do we not meet with these conditions earlier, viz., in the doctrine of the application of grace, where it is much needed to prevent the wrong conclusion that has just been pointed out ? Because, we answer, theologians did not rise above the isolation of theological loci to a systematic arrangement of the thoughts that demand to be brought into mutual relation. Lutheran theology maintains indeed its evangelical character unstained in the proposition that the Church of believers is the immediate cause as well as the end of the ministerium ecclesiasticum (p. 184), that the latter accordingly is only a middle term in the notion of the Church. But this truth, which was never denied, falls short of its full effect in the Lutheran doctrine, because the idea of the Church is not brought directly into connexion with the doctrine of Christ's merit, and laid at the foundation of the doctrine of the applicatio gratice. What the Eeformed doctrine has done in this respect is quite the reverse of being anti-Lutheran in prin- ciple. The Keformed divines have only soared above the Lutherans, and advanced their common task from which the ktter shrank. But not merely does the evangelical character of Lutheranism fall short in this representation ; the churchly character of Christendom does so also. The applicatio gratice, — first the donatiofidei (regeneratio), then also pcenitentia, and, in conse- quence, justiftcatio come to pass, according to the Lutheran doctrine, in such a way that the individual sinner experiences the appropriate influence of law and gospel, which are set before him by the ministers of the word. As passing through EXTENT OF CHRIST S REDEEMING PURPOSE. 287 contritio he attains faith, i.e. confidence in the promise of grace and in Christ's merit, objective justification, as an immanent act of God,1 coincides, in point of time, with his consciousness of it, that is, with the awakening of consolatio conscientice and Icetitia spiritualis. In this view no account is taken of a feel- ing of fellowship with the Church of believers, without a pre- vious impression of which, however, no individual religious consciousness finds place, and without which that conscious- ness has no Church-quality. As rather the justificandus or justificatus, in spite of the instrumentality of word and sacra- ments, is confronted with God in a position of individual isolation, he is led by an inevitable craving to recognise his objective justification in the constancy of his Icetitia spirilualis, and so to an artificial tension of sentiment which at best can be gained in the smaller circle of persons who share his aspira- tions, i.e. in a state of sectarian separation ; and, even in that case, only with interruptions by moments of despair, or with the risk of lasting self-deception.2 Now, Schneckenburger 3 calls attention to the fact that the course of the Eeformed doctrine of justification, referring to the individual only in so far as he is counted a member of the Church, corresponds to those de- mands which Catholicism alone pretends to satisfy, and that too in a higher sphere of spirituality. Lutheranism, on the other hand, maintains the principle of individualism ; or, in its interpretation of justification, it represents the individual as an independent and special quantity determined by the transcen- dent judgment of God. But at the same time, Schnecken- burger notices that the Lutherans recognise the value of the external objectivity of the Church as the means whereby that 1 If such a Eeformed theologian, as, for example, Witsius (Lib. iii. 8. 59, 60), represents the objective justification of the individual in foro ccsli as taking place at the moment when the regenerate person attains to faith, he, at all events, distinguishes from this the insinuatio sententice Dei per spiritum sanctum. Conversely, Maresius (Syst. Theol. loc. 11. 57, 58), like the Lutherans, teaches that God's sentence and the consciousness of it coincide in time ; but to make up for this he represents the dispositive acts of striv- ing after righteousness, which fall within the justification of the individual, as proceeding from God ; and these, as they proceed from faith and pre- suppose the general sentence of justification passed upon the elect, betray the Reformed type of doctrine which quite excludes, the idea that God's objective sentence and the subjective consciousness thereof should coincide in time and in experience. 2 The Autobiography of Albert Knapp serves as a proof. 3 Zar kirchl. Christologie, p. 141. 288 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. judgment of God is conveyed to the consciousness ; and that herein this system also appears to approximate in a special manner to Catholicism. Further comparisons associated with this opinion I leave untouched, because in them are presented uncertain deductions from a statement which is itself incom- plete. For the more spiritual character which is ascribed to the Eeformed use of the idea of the Church as distinguished from the Catholic must be attributed to the circumstance that the justification of the individual is, in the Catholic view, made to depend upon the ecclesia reprcesentans — upon the legal guild of sacramentally privileged clergy; while in the Reformed sense it is made to depend upon the Church as the ecclesia elec- torum — upon the previous consideration that the individual possesses all the benefits of grace, and above all, justification only in the corpus mysticum Christi, within which the word of God and the sacraments assert their objective significance as indispensable Divine means for the realization of the idea of the Church. Between these two positions there is nothing but opposition. If now the Lutheran apprehension of the matter appears to approach the Catholic, because it makes the justifi- cation of the individual to depend upon these objective things — the word of God and the sacraments — the difference still holds good, that however distinctly the ministri ecclesice are here presupposed, yet those instrumentalities of the Divine activity are never at all identified with, or referred to, any em- pirical prerogative of the clergy. But as in the Lutheran repre- sentation of the doctrine it is not stated in the right place that the keys principaliter ecclesice traditce sunt, and that the sacra- ments cannot be conceived of apart from and previous to the communio fidelium, it is easy to understand why the continued obscurity on this subject causes the appearance of a community of interest between the Lutheran and Catholic conceptions of the matter, and in the case of many leads to an aimless grasp- ing at this phantom. But the negligent treatment of the idea of the Church on this point avenges itself in the way that has been already specified, in that the justification of the individual, although subordinated to the Church instrumentalities, seems to require to be maintained as a conscious possession in the way of isolated excitement of feeling. The defect of the Lu- theran doctrine on this point thus explains why, within the THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION REJECTED. 289 limits of Lutheranism, the problem of evangelical Church-life is always hampered, either alternately or simultaneously, with aberrations towards Eomanizing over-estimation of the ecclesi- astical office, or towards pietistic isolation and self-torture of individual Church members, as well as spiritual pride on the part of these in their narrower fellowship with each other.1 44. The divergencies between the two evangelical Confes- sions in the doctrines of reconciliation and justification do not betray any generic difference. For the tendency of the doctrine is in both cases the same, namely, to guarantee to the believer, standing in the Church or under the influence of the Church's means of grace, the right of religious intercourse with God, notwithstanding the presence of actual sin. The steps of the progress of the thought are identical in the leading points, and the differences in this respect partly arise from the diverse degrees of scientific zeal, and partly from, mutual misunder- standings which did not admit of being cleared up in the then state of exegetical knowledge and of dialectical culture. But the community of interest between the two confessions in these doctrines is seen most clearly when they are brought into con- flict with unchurchly and antiehurehly efforts to set aside the doctrine of reconciliation through Christ. These culminate in Socinianism, and have been worked out with the greatest tech- nical care by the founders of that school. But they have their origin within the circle of the Anabaptists. The phenomenon of Anabaptism, in the many forms in which it appears, proceeds, first, on the principle that Christianity must be realized as the fellowship of actively holy persons — of such holy persons as attain to the highest possible degree of^ freedom from all sin, or to inability to sin. In the second place, it results from this effort (analogous to Donatism), that the Church is represented as the sum of actively holy and sinless persons, but not as the prior whole within which the individual receives his Christian character. The mark of this principle is the rejection of infant baptism as worthless; and, from the cir- cumstances of the time, the practice of re-baptism of adults, 1 1 do not mean to affirm that the Church development of Calvinism has has been so normal that no similar aberrations have occurred within its sphere. The phenomena of Independency (analogous to pietism) have mani- fested themselves even much more extensively in it, but they connect them- selves with other points of doctrine and with special historical occasions. 19 290 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. whereby they made public profession of their adherence to the party. Thirdly, all our common Christianity that has existed up till now — the Christian state as well as the Church — is declared to be worthless, as being an inadmissible commixture of the kingdom of God with the world. In the expectation of the hyper-historical kingdom of Christ, therefore, a complete recon- struction of society, both religious and social, is aimed at; in the regulation of which the Scriptures of the Old and New Testa- ments are adopted as the law-book, and in the realization of which, at one time, abstinence from military service, from public offices, from oaths, was prescribed ; at another time, violent out- break was attempted. In all these points the revolutionary re- form that arose from the principle of mystic piety conflicts with the Keformation properly so called, which maintains the ground of the Christian fellowship of the Eoman Empire, which takes into account the interests of the universal Church, and which, finally, in its opposition to the legal character of Catholic Christianity, is all the less allied to the Donatistic pursuit of active sinlessness, which however really resolved itself into low views of sin, and therefore of the moral law. Anabaptism rather originates in motives which specifically belong to the stage of Christianity that preceded the Reformation, and each of which was tolerated by the Catholic Church of the middle ages. But, when mysticism no longer chose to continue as ecclesiola in ecclesia; when the principle of flight from civilly-organized society no longer chose to confine itself within the limits of the monkish orders, and to submit itself to Church authority; when active sanctity sought other aims than canonization by the Pope ; when, on the contrary, these forces sought to overthrow the Christian world, and to lead it back to a visionary ideal of pri- mitive Christianity ; then of course Anabaptism came into con- flict with the mediaeval constitution of Christian society at large. Since the Anabaptist sect is as guiltless of theology as it could well be ; since, as a revolutionary movement, it was propagated among the uneducated classes by means of practical watchwords only, — there are but few persons of theological culture in whose writings instructive consequences crop up, whereby they remove themselves still further from the com- mon convictions of Christendom. Thus when the task of active holiness was prescribed, and the significance of sin de- THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION REJECTED. 291 predated, the religious craving of man's nature sought in Christ only the pattern of doing and of suffering, not the mediator of forgiveness of sins. In this the Christian ideal that had been set up by the mendicant orders shows its continued influence as transmitted by German mysticism. In accordance with this Thomas Miinzer accentuates the exemplary character of Christ, but passes in silence over His significance as the Eeconciler.1 John Denk,2 on the other hand, got so far as to deny Christ's vicarious fulfilment of the law. Though he allows himself to be drawn to a repudiation of that only by a misinterpretation of the Eeformation doctrine, as if our fulfilling of the law were rendered superfluous by Christ's substitutionary work (p. 249), yet his denial has to himself the value of a principle. For he is of opinion that every one can atone for his own sins by assenting to his own condemnation, by mortifying his own flesh, and thus re-instating the law in its due place so far as he himself is concerned. And along with his rejection of re- conciliation in general through Christ, Denk abandoned his faith in the Divinity of Christ. The former view, and partly also the latter, passed from Denk to the Anabaptists of upper Germany, Jacob Kautz, Balthasar Hubmaier, Ludwig Hetzer.3 In like manner David Joris, the Anabaptist prophet, explains faith in the blood of Christ as the life of the spirit of Christ, as the experience of God's Almighty Word and everlasting power which is attained in faith.4 On the other hand the party of the Mennonites or Baptists, in which the wild Anabaptist movement was moderated, and therefore gained a more endur- ing existence, couples with the task of building up a com- munity of actively holy persons the recognition of the Eeform- ation principle of justification by Christ's perfect obedience as the sole ground of salvation to which good works belong, only as necessary results of faith. At the same time, the Quakers again, in whose society the later movement of the revolutionary sectarian spirit found rest in the seventeenth century, showed 1 Seidemann: Th. Miinzer, p. 120. Erbkam : Protest. Secten, p. 502 sq. 2 Heberle : Johann Denk und sein Buchlein vom Gesetz ; Stud. u. Krit. 1851, pp. 156, 168. 3 Heberle : Johann Denk und die Ausbreitung seiner Lehre; Stud. u. Krit. 1855, pp. 841, 849, 854. Keim: Ludwig Hetzer; Jahrb. fur Deutsche Theol. 1856, p. 267 sqq. 4 Nippold : David Joris von Delft; Zeitschr. fur histor. Theologie, 1868. Heft 4, p. 513. 292 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. themselves so hostile to the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, as to specify that doctrine as a distinctive mark of the church of Babylon.1 For the Quaker principle of the inner light, the operation of which, as Barclay admits, is independent of historical knowledge of Christ, excludes the possibility of attaching any real significance to His work, either in doing or in suffering. When, therefore, Barclay in his Theologice vere christiance apologia undertakes to show the harmony of the principles of Quakerism with Scripture, the ancient church, and the Keformers, the ambiguousness of his procedure becomes palpable precisely when it takes up the doctrines of reconcilia- tion and justification. For the Eeformation form of these doctrines is gainsaid as soon as it is formulated. God did not treat Christ on the same footing as sinners, He is only quasi in Christo nobis reconciliatus ; Christ's death therefore is only the offer of reconciliation, is only the type and symbol of that true redemption and change which Christ's spirit, the divine light, brings about within the man. This is also real justification, and though it is conceded to Protestantism that man is not regarded as righteous on account of works (which, however, he is capable of producing), Barclay betrays a radical misunder- standing of the fundamental principle of the Eeformation, and approximates the Catholic view regarding good works in justification as causa sine qua non? Previous to this the Mystics alongside of the Lutheran Church, and the Theosophers within it, had expressed themselves much as Barclay does. Not merely do they let the doctrine of the sacrificial death of Christ pass, it is even of some value to them as the victorious struggle with the evil principle; but that historical event is not regarded as the manifest and openly efficient cause of the change which every individual must undergo, but only as a more or less important presupposition of that inner experience upon which the decisive weight is laid by sectarian indifference to the historical central points of the Christian religion. Caspar Schwenkfeld 3 sometimes felt him- self able to regulate the consciousness of justification by refer- ring to the cross of Christ as the Reformers did; but the 1 Weingarten : Revolutionslcirchen Englands, p. 359. 2 As above: pp. 208, 375 sq., 381 sq. 3 Compare Erbkam : as above, pp. 431-443, 456 sq. Baur : Versohn- ungslehre, p. 460 *q. THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION REJECTED. 293 conflict between his main effort after active sanctity in those who were Christians, and his caricature of the Lutheran doctrine, as if it meant a merely historical faith and an imaginary righteousness, obscured that truth as a whole and made it ineffectual That lively religious realization of the doing and suffering of Christ, which overleaps the significance of Christ's state of exaltation and only rests upon that ethico- historical representation of Christ's historical works which takes place by the preaching of the word, is combated by him ; and against it he maintains that redemption and satisfaction, as well as all other gifts of Christ, must by faith be sought in the spiritual and reigning Christ, in whom everything is summed up and everything is to be found ; from Him it must really be derived and conveyed into the ministerial work and office. Kightly con- sidered, this amounts merely to a completion of the fundamental view of the Eeformation which has been accomplished by theology; it is no instance of a genuine contradiction. But this last it really is in the intention of Schwenkfeld, for as a Mystic he isolated himself from the historico- ethical and churchly surroundings of Christianity, and taking faith as the means of participation in Divine nature overleaped all historical intermediate agencies. The assumption that the true faith which comes immediately from God rests on God himself in Christ, that it is based upon Being and lays hold of eternal truth, gives so abstract and supernatural a tendency to piety, that it naturally gave the preponderance to the intuition of the exalted Christ over the consideration of His earthly life and death. But now if the soul in its religious exercise moves between a faith thus understood and the intuition of an exalted Christ, it is only consistent that Schwenkfeld will not hear of an imputed righteousness, but rather refers justification or righteous -making to the gracious dealing of God with man, with a view to his blessedness, from first to last, wherein the sinner is converted, regenerated, made devout, righteous, holy, and blessed. If in regeneration Christ imparts His own righteousness, His own piety, His own nature, and the fellowship of His being, it is easily explained why we seek them in Him not in His first state historically viewed, but in His other state, as He is now glorified in order to dispense heavenly blessings, and also has been appointed by God the 294 ORTHODOXY AND SOOINIANISM. Father to be Head of the Church.1 Tor the former stand- point is suited at most for the children who are satisfied with the milk of the word ; grown men need strong food, the know- ledge of the exalted Christ.2 John Denk and his followers abandoned the doctrine of reconciliation because it was practically indifferent and super- fluous to them ; Schwenkfeld was able to let it pass because he deprived it of its real practical meaning. In opposition to this circle of ideas Socinianism has in the first instance a theore- tical motive for its opposition to this doctrine, which indeed became operative in that direction only under certain practical conditions. All the arguments of Faustus Socinus against the doctrine of reconciliation by Christ as a whole proceed upon the idea of the unlimited arbitrariness of God, as conversely the Eeformation view of the doctrine is based upon the assump- tion of a relation of God to men regulated a priori by law. The former idea of God is that of Duns Scotus, the theologian of the Franciscan Order. Now I have shown in another place3 that this theological principle, the serious effects of which upon the doctrine of reconciliation had already been hinted at by Duns as possible (p. 69), took effect in this direction through Bernardino Ochino upon Lselius Socinus, and through him again upon his nephew Faustus. Duns, however, had only hinted it to be possible in God's unfettered arbitrary choice that a mere man might make atonement for all, or that each man might do so for himself ; in all other respects he had categorically adhered to the profession of the Church's faith in 1 The coincidence between Schwenkfeld and Andreas Osiander upon this point is clear, and obviously betokens a common origin. Yet the view of Osiander the theologian is practically conditioned and limited by his con- nexion with the Church, in a very different way from the view of the anti- churchly sectary. 2 I do not enter upon the analogous trains of thought of the Theosophers, Valentin Weigel, and Jacob Bohme, for these pursue merely theoretical interests, and not those of religious fellowship. The biblical colouring of doctrines which are at once dualistic and pantheistic surely does not oblige us to incorporate them in a history of theology, for theology must always have as its characteristic feature the purpose of serving the religious community, however that may be represented. Neither do the protests against the idea of imputation, and the allegorizing interpretation which seeks the appeasing of God's wrath in individual experiences, which these men put forward each on his own behalf possess any critical value for the treat- ment of the orthodox form of the doctrine of reconciliation. 3 Geschichtl. Studien zur christL Lehre von Gott. (Art. iii., Jahrb. fur deutsche Theol xiii. p. 268 sq., 283 sq.) THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION REJECTED. 295 the atonement by the God-man. Now the fact that Faustus asserted that hypothesis to be the actual and necessary fact presupposes a complete breach on his part with the universal faith of the Church. But to this his uncle was brought, like himself and so many other Italians, by the state of Christian society in Italy. Here the empire had not regained the power it had lost to Gregory vn. and Innocent in. ; here, therefore, the Komish Church presented itself as the only possible form in which Christian society could be organized. It dominated the masses of the people, which was not prepared by any expectation of Church reform for accepting Eeformation in- fluences from Germany and Switzerland. Men who had received a literary education were almost the only persons that were accessible to these influences ; but these were almost invariably prevented by the state of public opinion, and by the unshaken power of the agencies of the Church from form- ing themselves publicly into congregations, and were thus compelled to meet only in secret. Their part in the Eeforma- tion therefore, even though it originally directed itself towards the ethical central points of that movement, found neither the stimulus nor the restraint which were needful, and which are guaranteed by the public activity of the general church con- sciousness. This is the reason why amongst so many of the Italians, who attached themselves to the Eeformation, it was not the churchly spirit, but, on the contrary, either Anabaptist sectarianism or the inclination to scholastic criticism of all dogmas, or both together, that was cherished. For, to the interests of the school, criticism of the doctrine of the Trinity and of the doctrine of reconciliation lies quite as near as the construction of the right idea of justification. The idea of Christian society, which the Socinians define and strive after under the name of church, is nothing but a school. The Eeformers had defined the Church as the fellow- ship of believers or saints, the marks of which fellowship are the preaching of God's word and the right use of the sacra- ments, by means of which instrumentalities God accomplishes and secures the existence of sanctified believers. As a condi- tion of the Church (in subordination to the word of God) was also required the recognition of those theological truths which betoken the right understanding of God's word, and without 296 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIAN1SM. which therefore the exhibition of the contents of the Divine word comes to nothing. But it was always firmly maintained that this pura doctrina evangelii is only a mark of the Church, and that participation in that function of the Church does not necessarily imply that one actually belongs to the number of persons set apart by God. In opposition to this line of thought, now, the Eacovian Catechism maintains : Qu. 488 : Ecdesia visibilis est costus eorum hominum, qui doctrinam salutarem tenent et prqfitentur. Qu. 489 : Salutaris doctrina, quam qui- cunque ccetus habet ac profitetur, est vera Christi ecclesia. . . . Tenere salutarem doctrinam, cum ecclesice Christi sit natura, signum illius, si proprie loquaris, esse non potest, cum signum ipsum a re, cujus signum est, differre oporteat.1 This thought is thus antithetically elucidated by Faustus : Though it is neces- sary to salvation that one should be within the true Church of Christ, it does not follow that he must set himself to seek out the true Church, but only that he should set himself to dis- cover the saving doctrine of Christ. He who attains to this will also find out the others who possess this doctrine in common with himself. For it is not enjoined upon anybody to learn the doctrine of salvation from the true Church. For the true Church itself can only be recognised by its saving doctrine, which therefore must previously be recognised and possessed as such ; and hereby participation in the true Church is already attained.2 Now the fellowship, the essence of which is a doctrine, and which therefore continues to exist onlyfso long as that doctrine expresses the convictions of the members of that fellowship, is a school. The doctrine, moreover, which is 'polemically and dialectically set forth in the Eacovian Catechism as the result of technical investigation of Scripture, makes only a school possible. It is thus an illusion, or a fiction, or an expression 1 Bibliotheca fratrum Polonorum, i. p. 323 sq. 2 The idea introduced into the common practice of the Lutherans by Melanchthon (p. 238) coincides almost entirely with this view. The editor of the Racovian Catechism, Oeder, Dean of Feuchtwangeu (1739), declares him- self to be in agreement with the definitions cited above, only stipulating that the Church consists of men, and therefore sana doctrina ad pascendam regendamque ecdesiam summe necessaria is to be regarded not as the essence but as the mark of the Church. But in so far as the Lutherans seek their orthodoxy in the affirmation that pure theological doctrine is the chief mark of the Church, they approximate most closely, by their attachment to Melan- chthon, to the Socinians. THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION REJECTED. 297 of embarrassment when Socinianism, which in these principles opposes itself to all churches, still at the same time embraces other churches with itself under the idea of the universal Church. For the other churches in fact affirm neither in form nor in substance the salutary doctrine of Christ as Socinianism understands it. It is also a mere illusion on the part of Faustus, in which he has been followed by modern theological radicalism, when he thinks that, by his denial of the doctrines of reconciliation and the Trinity, he is carrying out to its true consequence the reformation of Luther and Zwingli.1 For the school as such is not a thing higher than the Church ; two views of Christianity, which are specifically opposed and mutually exclusive, arise according as its destination is to be realized in the religious community or in the school of theology and morals. In fact the Socinian form of Christianity as a school has relationship only with the sectarian manifestation of Anabaptism. In both Christian fellowship is regarded ex- clusively as a product of special activity on the part of the members. Both, too, oppose themselves to the conditions of the Christian fellowship of the Eoman Empire. It is, there- fore, not an accidental circumstance that Faustus found a con- genial soil for his principles in the Anabaptist circles of Poland ; and although the community he founded, like the Mennonites, refrained from direct opposition to the power of the state, it never attained to any clear and undisputed prin- ciples respecting the right and duty of military service, and of investiture with public offices as long as it existed in Poland.2 That, on the other hand, Faustus strove after the abolition of Anabaptism in the Unitarian congregations all his life, and accomplished it shortly before his death (1603, at a Synod at Eakow) shows that he was able to direct the enthusiastic ten- dency of sectarianism into the path of scholastic moderatism, the theological apparatus of which was designed merely to put 1 I do not in this deny that the doctrine of the Trinity, which the Re- formers adopted, and the doctrine of reconciliation to which they and their disciples gave a new shape, admit of improvement both in respect of matter and of form, or that they demand it both exegetically and dialectically ; but I do deny that the significance of these doctrines for the Church character of the Reformation can be understood only when one imagines the purpose of the Reformation to have been fulfilled in the shelving of its problems by the Socinians. 2 Fock, Socinianismus, p. 704 sq, 298 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. on a secure footing the moral self-culture of the individual, the effort after ethical perfection in accordance with the com- mandments and promises of Christ as against the opposing pre- tensions of the universal faith of the Church. 45. If the tendency of Socinianism is ascertained to be this, then the positive motive power of its rejection of the Church's doctrine of reconciliation is also known. Accordingly, at the outset it must be doubted whether the Socinian arguments against it, however acute, reach so far as to prove the falsity and untenableness of the tendency of the Church doctrine. But unless we should state the issue thus, the controversy would appear insoluble. No standpoint could be reached from which both parties could be judged, and it would be impossible to draw any lesson from the history of the dispute. The peculiar Socinian view of the purpose and of the contents of Christianity is historically conditioned by that mediaeval doc- trine which regards God as the absolute Will, that is, the law and perfect rule of all things, whose attitude to man is deter- mined by no a priori fixed universal principle, and therefore is necessarily referred to the standard of judgment that the prin- ciples of private law afford. This is seen, in particular, in the principle stated by Thomas with which we are already acquainted (p. 52), that sin has the character of a personal injury or of a pecuniary obligation, and that God therefore, like any private individual, is entitled to forgive sins without anything further. Socinianism has brought this tendency to its full issues after its own fashion, having carried out the character of finitude, which this freedom from moral restric- tions implies, in other directions also, particularly by explain- ing away the eternity of God into a life enduring without beginning and without end. With the rights and reasonable- ness of God are confronted single men in their individuality, conceived as possessing a freedom equally devoid of all moral contents. By the man Christ Jesus they, according to a free determination of God, are led out of their natural condition away to immortality and eternal life. Christ contributes to this end, having as Prophet in His historical existence declared the commandments and the promises, and having also given the example of a perfect life, and ratified it by His death. Christ transcends the limits of the Old Testament, inasmuch THE ARGUMENTS OF SOCINUS. 299 as He reformed the Mosaic law, added to it new moral precepts and sacramental appointments, gave a strong impulse to the observance of these by the promises of everlasting life and the Holy Spirit, and assured men of the general purpose of God to forgive the sins of those who repent and seek to reform themselves. It is admitted that no man can perfectly fulfil the moral law; and justification, therefore, results not from works but from faith. But faith means that trust in the giver of the law which includes in itself actual obedience to Him so far as that is practicable to men. Now Christ, by His resur- rection, by His having obtained Divine power, guarantees to all those who in this meaning of faith attach themselves to Him, — in the first instance, actual liberation from sin according to the measure in which they follow the impulse He gives them to newness and betterness of life ; and, further, the attainment of the supernatural end set before them ; and also by the Holy Spirit, which He bestows, the previous assurance of everlasting life, with the commencement whereof the for- giveness of sins of the individual is complete. In this we have a palpable indication of the practical antithesis between Socinianism and Church Protestantism. In the latter the forgiveness of sins is regarded as the beginning, in the former as a more remote result of the Christian life. The opposition of Socinianism to the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction, which lies at the foundation of the former view, thus admits of ex- planation from this point ; but this Socinian estimate of the forgiveness of sins as an accident of the Christian life is at the same time an indication that in Christ the founder merely of an ethical school is discerned, and not the founder of a religious fellowship. And if this contrariety does not always show itself with clearness, if rather it must be allowed that Socini- anism establishes peculiar religious aims, regulative principles and conditions, the circumstance is to be accounted for by the fact that Socinianism, as being the first attempt at an exhibi- tion of Christianity as an ethical school, was still exposed to the influences of the view of Christianity which up to that time had exclusively prevailed, and from which it had in prin- ciple withdrawn itself. The arguments of Faustus Socinus against the Church view of Christ's place as a Saviour, are directed against the necessity 300 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. and against the possibility of the idea of satisfaction.1 The necessity of satisfaction in relation to sin, and to God's purpose to forgive sins, had been founded by the Church-theology on the consideration that God is necessitated by His Being to punish sin, and if He does not punish the guilty persons directly, He must yet punish their innocent representative. Faustus, on the other hand, from his diametrically opposed idea of God, maintained that He is at liberty to punish or to forgive sins : that His penal justice or His wrath and His pity are not habitual properties, but only momentary alternating acts ; that sin is analogous to an insult to honour, or to a pecuniary debt, and, therefore, just like these, can be remitted without further condition. If God under the Old Testament forgave sins with- out receiving satisfaction, He can do so also under the New ; and the parable in Matt, xviii. 21 sqq. evidences that absolute unconditioned mercy is a fundamental principle of action with God. All the less can God's justice be regarded as laying the foundation of the idea of satisfaction, because it is simply unjust to let the guilty go unpunished, and to punish the innocent in their stead. The impossibility of satisfaction is clear to him (1.) from the relation that it is asserted to have to the purpose of forgiveness. For here between the purpose proposed and the assumed means, a pure contradiction emerges. Eemission is conceivable only where a debt is presupposed ; but there is no longer any debt to be remitted where satisfaction has been given. Eemission involves in itself two conditions — that the debtor is freed from his obligation ; and that the creditor renounces his claim to satisfaction. Should, perhaps, Christ's satisfaction be judged of in accordance with the analogy of the legal proceeding of novation, then it is quite clear that the debt is not remitted, but the debtor only deceived. (2.) Satisfaction is unthinkable when viewed in connexion with the scheme of substitution which is applied. For (a.) pecuniary mulcts can indeed be paid by other persons than the debtor, because one person's money can easily become another's ; but not personal, corporal punishments, such as eternal death. Or their transference to an innocent person would be unjust. Undoubtedly it may be 1 De Christo Servatore, Lib. iv. 5. Preelections theologicce, cap. 18 sq. ; in the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum. I think it right to indicate the argu- ments only in their main points, and refer to the full statement in Fock : Socinianismus, 615 tsq. THE ARGUMENTS OF SOCINUS. 301 observed in history that sins not their own are imputed to men, and that men suffer in the punishment of a guilty person. But that always presupposes implication in the sin that is punished : at all events, companionship in another's punishment has not for an innocent person the character of punishment. The orthodox doctrine, finally, cannot support itself by the assertion that Christ as Head of the Church was qualified to take punishment upon Himself in room of His members. For that relation first came into existence in virtue of His resurrection ; but as an earthly Man, and with respect to His suffering unto death, Christ does not stand in any special connexion with other men, and His dying does not deliver His disciples from the necessity of undergoing death. (6.) Neither can the positive fulfilment of the law have any substitutionary value for others ; for Christ was bound to fulfil the law for Himself, and His obedience, no more than His passion, can be separated from Him in thought and transferred to others, (c.) The assertion, that Christ in our room has fulfilled the law and also endured the punishment, is inconsistent with the righteous exercise of the law, which demands either the one or the other, but not both together. (3.) Christ's suffering unto death does not as matter of fact come up to the necessities of the case implied in the idea of satisfaction. For (a.) satisfaction, as full payment of a debt, can only be thought of if every one who was liable to eternal death had found a special substitute. (6.) Christ as our substitute would have had to endure eternal death, against which His resurrection shows that He did not suffer such a penalty, (c.) That His passion did not amount to eternal death, cannot be explained by asserting Christ's Godhead, and the infinite value of His death that resulted therefrom. For, in that case, it were cruel in God to impose upon Him so bitter a passion ; when a much smaller degree of suffering would have been sufficient in room of the punishment deserved by us. But Christ's divinity cannot give any higher value at all to His passion, for His Godhead itself could not suffer. But even were this possible, and even if the divinity had suffered in Christ, still the infinite value of Godhead ought to be attributed only to the being of God, but not to the temporal acts or moments of suffering. But, finally, the infinity of punish- ment necessary for every sinner would demand an equal 302 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. number of satisfactions of infinite value. (4.) The connexion of the idea of imputation with that of satisfaction is superfluous and contradictory ; and so is the exhortation to have faith in Christ's satisfaction. For, assuming that Christ gave to God satisfaction for our guilt, the matter is then at an end. An imputation finds place in legal transactions only where no prestation has preceded ; but where, as in the assumed case of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, the prestation has been made, then an imputation (accepti latid) has no meaning.1 Just as absurd is the assumption that Christ's satisfaction requires our faith ere it can be valid. For either that act of His is perfect in itself, in which case its validity for the individual does not depend upon the circumstance of his believing it to have been done for him ; or, if the latter condition holds good, then is the satisfaction not complete in itself. (5.) The doctrine of Christ's satisfaction is inconsistent with the recognition of the duty of a righteous and law-abiding conduct of life, and opens up the way to sin, or, at least, to carelessness with respect to sin. While Faustus thus denies the validity of the idea of satisfaction at all points, it is not without interest to notice that he admits the idea of Christ's merit in a certain sense. Indubitably, if the strict sense of duty is to be accepted, then every merit of Christ, whether for Himself or for us, is excluded : Nihil fecit quod ipsi a Deo injunctum nonfuisset. Ifbi debitum, ibi nullum verum et proprium meritum. Thus the idea admits of application only in an improper sense, on the presupposition of definite divine decree and of divine promise. As, however, the latter adds nothing to our idea of the obligatory character of a course of action, it can explain the idea of merit only by bringing into consideration in an exceptional way, not the 1 De Christo Servatore, iv. 2 (p. 216) : Si pro ipso solutum est, ut acceptum illi feratur, nihil est opus. — Acceptum ferre significat pro soluto habere, licet vero solutum non sit. Accepti latio est per-sola-verba-obligationis liberatio. — Quodsi vel ipse vel alius pro eo revera solvat, accepti lationi nullus est locus. It is incredible, but a fact, that the expression acceptilatio is used by almost every one as synonymous with acceptatio, as if it came from a verb accepti- lare. For example, Schneckenburger (Lehrbegriffe der kl. prof. Kirchen- parteien, p. 18) speaks of acceptilation of Christ's merit in Duns Scotus. So already H. Alting (Theol. probl. nova, p. 726) injudicio forensi absolutio a reatu prior est acceptilatione persona et imputatione justiticR, where the forensic term is quite unsuitable, and only acceptatio personce in gratiam would be ap- propriate. The relation of the two ideas is also wrongly explained by Strauss : Glaubenslehre, ii. p. 315. CRITICISM OF THE ARGUMENTS OF SOCINUS. 303 obligation in duty, but the voluntary nature of the action criticised. This thought virtually amounts to the definition of the idea as laid down by Duns and by Calvin (p. 205). And even when Faustus contradicts the latter, applying like Thomas the strict -idea, of merit to the legal judgment upon an action, he is nevertheless in the admission of Christ's merit, which as matter of fact he makes, at one with Calvin. This is a new proof of what has already been said, that the ideas of Christ's merit and of His satisfaction are derived from quite different modes of viewing the question. That of satisfaction is derived from the presupposition of a reciprocal relation, regulated by purely legal considerations ; that of merit from the presupposi- tion of a reciprocal ethical relation which, however, is not viewed from the highest standpoints of law and duty. 46. The objections raised by Faustus against Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy have their consistency, first, in the pre- supposition which he makes that the doctrines of reconciliation and justification point to a relation between God and man that is apprehended in an exclusively forensic sense. From this point of view he thought he could discover a contradiction be- tween the ideas of Christ's satisfaction and the imputation of that satisfaction in faith, and also between the recognition of that thought and the duty of moral life. But the assumption itself is erroneous. The historical connexion is, that the Ee- formers by means of the thought of the imputation of Christ's obedience, sought to attain the religious regulation of the moral self- consciousness in away that should be at once individually true, and also in conformity with the conditions of Christian fellowship. The idea of justification has, in relation to faith, moreover, only the appearance of a forensic idea; for the circumstances under which it is always maintained that the unrighteous is pronounced to be righteous quite exclude the juridical standard of judgment. But as the moral obedience of Christ, which as moral obedience, as merit, is graciously im- puted to the believer unto righteousness, is at the same time as satisfaction set over against the retributive justice of God, the doctrine of atonement is developed in the line of the legal relation between God and men. Thus the doctrine of justi- fication, which in its highest sense is religious and moral in its intention, is only led up to by the doctrine of the propitiation 304 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. of God's justice, which, in the strict sense, is juridical. Such is the fact in Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy, which lias not been recognised by Faustus, and by means of which his two last arguments are .proved to be wrong. Secondly, his other objections proceed upon an idea of God which, while it is diametrically opposed to the idea of God maintained by the orthodox party, exhibits the opposite defect. From the premisses assumed by orthodox divines, even when they need considerable correction, certain features of the doctrine of satisfaction do not appear to be so very absurd as Faustus represents them to be. In particular, the assertion of Christ's twofold satisfaction to the law (which at a later period was combated by Piscator also on the same ground) is quite correct, on the assumption that the strict forensic position in relation to God had to be done away with by Christ, not merely so far as sinners were concerned, but for men in general ; not merely for the past, but also for the future. And, in general, if the problem is to understand Christ as the Bearer and Mediator of a public relation between God and men, the Socinian way of resolving that into merely private relations between God and individual men is undeniably at a disadvantage as compared with the tendency of orthodox theology. This shows itself all the more clearly in that John Crell was not able to avoid limiting in a very important respect his assertion of the potestas Dei by means of the idea of honestas universa, and in that the exception he makes from this in favour of God's full power to forgive sin cannot escape the charge of arbitrariness.1 But if the arbitrary freedom of God, which the Socinians assert upon this point is regarded as form without contents, it cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the orthodox assertions of the inevitable necessity of His penal justice to God in no way harmonizes with the formal conditions of the will ; and thus on this point subjects the idea of God to an appearance of natural necessity.2 The want of dialectic skill in establishing the 1 Compare the analysis of Crell's tract de Deo ejusque attributis in my Geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott. (Art. iii., Jahrb. fur deutsche TheoL, xiii. p. 259 sq.) 2 Compare in the above cited article, p. 291 sqq., the account of the attempts made by John Hoornbeek in his Socinianismus confutatus, and by Lambert Velthuysen in his treatise De pcena divina et humana, to reconcile the orthodox assertion with the claims of the idea of the freedom of the will CRITICISM OF THE ARGUMENTS OF SOCINUS. 305 superior principle, is manifestly equally great on both sides. But the evil consequences of this deficiency appear to be greater in their effect upon orthodoxy, inasmuch as the scien- tific problem it had to solve surpassed in difficulty that of the Socjnians, and inasmuch as the latter had the advantage of being assailants while the former had the disadvantage of being put upon the defensive. The unfortunate complica- tion of the orthodox principle shows itself in the following circumstance. The juridical construction of the idea of Christ's satisfaction was originally intended only as a condition for the religious and moral certainty of justification in Christ ; while the Eeformers recognised the providence, or grace, or love of God, as the leading resort of the entire religious consciousness, and His justice, to which satisfaction is required to be given, as the subordinate principle in accordance with which the be- stowal of grace through Christ had to be procured. In the theology of the period subsequent to them, this view of the relative value of the two ideas involuntarily underwent a change. The contemplation of God's habitual justice gained the preponderance over the view of His active grace. As God's saving purpose became limited to the narrower idea of grace towards sinners, and was not extended to that of help to men — to the idea of a dominant providence towards the creatures who were destined to become* the image of God— His law- giving and law-maintaining justice came to assert to itself the first place in the idea of His character ; and if grace towards sinners was not to appear as an exception opposed to the law, some scheme must have been devised such as that which is laid down in the doctrine of satisfaction. Thus the juridical condition of the doctrine of justification changed itself into the dominant principle of that doctrine. In the logically sound development of this principle in its application to the entire material of the doctrine, Keformed theologians have even been able to represent justification, not so much as an act of grace, but rather as an act of God's justice (see above, p. 278). We cannot therefore take it amiss in Faustus that, under the im- pression caused by this circumstance, he found the ultimate aim of the orthodox doctrine (which lay beyond the juridical train of thought) to be unintelligible, and inconsistent with the premisses. With this prominence given to the juridical idea 20 306 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. of God's justice, the doctrine of election undergoes no change at all. Even in its supralapsarian form, election has its full force, inasmuch as sinful man is regarded as its object ; the election of grace, regarded also as eternal, always regards man in the quality which, by the justice of God, is viewed as contrary to the law. The Lutheran doctrine, moreover, assumes nothing else but what Eeformed theologians denote by the term fcedus operum, — that men originally were set over against the law as independent persons with legal rights ; that their fulfilment of the law by their deeds had the promise of the reward of eternal life, and that a plan of grace on God's part was occasioned only by sin. All this denotes justice, in the juridical sense, as the fundamental idea of God, which unfortu- nately leaves unanswered only the question wherein it is that man's legally privileged independence finds its explanation ; for creation by God presupposes the thought of man's dependence even in so far as he is a moral power, or one endowed with free will. It is natural that all these difficulties should not have been solved at the outset by the Keformers. On the contrary, it was they who made the difficulties which their successors could not solve ; but at the same time the latter, as so often is the case, were unable to apprehend or to appreciate the theo- logical conceptions in which the high religious tact of the Keformers reveals itself. I refer, in the case before us, to the logical subordination of the thought of God's retributive justice to those of His love and of His providence. In this way it was that Faustus Socinus, in his true biblical idea of God's justice, which he brought up in opposition to the orthodox theologians of his time, had none other than Luther for his pattern (p. 202). The objections of Faustus, in the third place, against the juridical references of the doctrine of satisfaction proceed from the forensic and ethical ideas which are generally acknow- ledged. In this field lies his strength, and with respect to these arguments he has not been confuted by the orthodox. Most incisive is the assertion that obligation to punishment cannot be cancelled for the man who has made himself personally liable to it — that men, indeed, can indirectly be sharers in the punishment of another person as such, but only under condi- tion of a measure of companionship in guilt with the punish- able act of another; so that if an altogether innocent perspn CRITICISM OF THE ARGUMENTS OF SOCINUS. 307 suffers from the evil results of other men's sins, he cannot re- gard his suffering as punishment, the personal consciousness of guilt being absent. It is astonishing that the orthodox theo- logians attempted to evade the force of this objection to their doctrine, by diminishing the distance between the two modes of viewing the matter in the light of civil law and criminal law, when, with reference to the idea of sin, they did not know how to give sufficient emphasis to this distance. Sin must not be compared to a pecuniary debt, or to a private injury to honour, which one may overlook if one chooses, but is violation of public law, comparable to crime, which the legal authorities must punish. But the same Abraham Calovius, who judges in this way, consoles himself with the idea that if a pecuniary debt admits of being discharged by some other person than the debtor, such a possibility in civil law offers an analogy whereby the penal satisfaction of Christ may be explained.1 The idea also of the surety, which is current with Eeformed theologians,2 as an expression of the mutual relation that subsists between Christ and the elect, does not serve at all to explain the possi- bility of the transference of personal punishment from the client to the surety, since it has its place in relations that are regulated by civil law. Bold also, but not convincing, is the assertion of Eeformed theologians, that the vicarious fulfilment of the law in suffering of punishment and in action is not in contradiction with the law itself, for this way of fulfilling the law is not forbidden by the law. It is not therefore to be wondered at that even the orthodox side ultimately became convinced of the irrationality of this main point of the doctrine of satis- faction. In this sense the half-orthodox Cartesian Velthuysen declares, that only positive revelation in Holy Scripture estab- lishes the truth of Christ's penal satisfaction, and it is only with 1 Scripta Antisociniana, ii. p. 597 : Satisfactio in poena pecuniaria, si debitor eandem persolvat, est propria ; si alius quispiam nocentis nomine, est vicaria. — Per similitudinem vel analogiam accommodari possunt satisfaction! poenali, quae in civili proprie reperiuntur. P. 605 : Nihil obstat, quominus analogice et per quandam similitudinem explicetur satisfactio Christi natura civilis satisfactionis. 2 Heidegger : Corpus Theol. Christ. Loc. xxii. 31. Sicut debitor aes quidem alienum expungere tenetur, sed non ita, ut nonnisi ex peculio suo illud ex- pungere teneatur et non per sponsorem seu vadem expungere possit — ita pec— cator omninoDeo solutionem debet, et justitiam praestare tenetur, sed non ita ex peculio suo, ut aliena sponsoris satisfactio et justitia peccatori in judicio Dei imputata non sufficiat. 308 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANIBM. the courage of theological despair that Hollatz supports the authority of Holy Scripture in this regard by saying that what were unjust in men, if they were to punish the innocent, is exactly the reverse in God — a proof of His justice. And even then it was not possible to meet the further objection that, in Christ's suffering and death, the objective equivalent to the eternal death of all sinners is not found. If the difference in respect of quantity between the two things compared was un- deniable, then the infinite value of Christ's Godhead had to supplement the quantitative limitation of His suffering and death, so as to bring it up to an equality with the infinitude of the guilt and of the eternal punishment of all sinners. I may here call to mind that these lines of thought taken by Pro- testant orthodoxy, while they surpass in certainty similar asser- tions of Thomas, turn just as much as the latter upon a play with the negative word " infinite," the fruitlessness of which had already been pointed out by Duns (p. 60). For, that we do not penetrate to the full compass of the Divine will, its ends, its ways, and its means, and that we are not able to con- ceive the extent of sin and the infinity of punishment, does not serve to make Christ's divinity and the punishment of sin comparable and, much less, equivalent quantities. However much therefore the orthodox of both schools are confident that Christ's penal suffering corresponds to the strictest justice, — in the case of many, such as Amesius and Maresius, the Scotist word acceptatio occurs as an indication of an involuntary impres- sion that God, by an act of equity rather than strict justice, must constitute the equivalence, demanded by the premisses, between Christ's satisfaction and the law's demand for punish- ment. The objection, on the other hand, raised by Faustus against the satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience, to the effect that it represents only Christ's inalienable duty, could be admitted within the circle of Eeformed theology without disparagement to the substitutionary value of that prestation. This was possible in accordance with the view that Christ is the Head of those for whom He acted. Faustus, indeed, at the outset rejected this thought on the ground that such a title was not applicable to Christ before His exaltation.1 1 Here the difference between Duns and Thomas reappears between Faustus and the Reformed divines (pp. 66-7). DOCTRINES OF THE ARMINIANS. 309 At the same time, leaving out of view the biblico-theological controversy on this point, it must be admitted that Faustus exhibits with regard to it the method (which has been censured by previous critics) of linking on data one to another in an external way while no inward connexion is discernible between them. What in this respect is least satisfactory is the distance expressed by him between the merely human individual per- sonality of Jesus, which is equally removed from all men, and His position gained by His resurrection as Head of humanity invested with Divine honours. If the Eeformed position is not to be at the outset rejected, then the value of Christ's dutiful action, as available for the Church that was to be founded thereby, and His representation of the church before God cannot be denied; especially as in their application to His active obedience, either the ideas of satisfaction and merit are but vaguely distinguished, or the former demands to be so supplemented by the latter that the legal estimate of the matter passes over into the moral. Still the prospect of suc- cessfully overcoming Socinian criticism on this point is con- nected with the position of a new problem, which did not present itself to the older theologians in the form which it must necessarily assume, and therefore had not been at the out- set solved by them. 47. "The Socinian doctrine," says Baur (p. 414), "presents such a contrast with the church doctrine as of itself must have elicited a mediating theory;" and, according to him, such a theory is to be found in the tract of Hugo Grotius Defensio fidei catholicce de satisfactions Qhristi (1617). But the real course of theological knowledge on this point is not so com- pliant with the claims of Hegelian dialectic as this announce- ment would lead us to expect. Not only had Grotius no in- tention of mediating between those opposing views, or of discovering their higher logical unity ; he had rather the in- tention of vindicating the church doctrine against Socinian criticism. Why he was unsuccessful in this, why for the idea of penal satisfaction for past sins he substituted that of a penal example for the prevention of future sins, will be seen in the mistake in virtue of which Grotius made the transition from the orthodox premisses to those of Socinianism. His purpose is to confute the statement of Faustus that there is a 310 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. contradiction between the thought of the remission of sin and the vicarious satisfaction for sin as the condition of that remission ; and he wishes to show how the two are in harmony with each other. For this purpose Grotius lays it down (cap. 2) that God assumes towards men the position of the Head of a moral fellowship analogous to the family or the state. For only there has the thought of punishment and the remission of punishment any place. Hereby is excluded the double assumption upon which the Socinian solution of the problem proceeds. We are to proceed neither according to the scheme of private law, nor according to the idea of the dominium dbsolutum. For on these two analogies Faustus bases his representation of God as personally insulted by sin ; so that He is able without further condition to forgive it, as a creditor remits a debt, and as an absolute Master who is bound by no law can disregard an act of disobedience to his personal autho- rity. As the Head of a moral and legally ordered Common- wealth God is distinguished from the dominus absolutus, inso- much that He would be unrighteous were He, like an arbitrary master, to remit the punishment of the impenitent. If, how- ever, in this respect the position of God is similar to that of a judge, His position is not in all respects identical with that office, for a judge is subject to the law. But God is not so, in- somuch that for the common weal He may remit punishment or partially dispense from the obligations of the law ; and this does not belong to a judge as such. If now the presuppositions of the orthodox doctrine of satis- faction are in all essential points accurately laid down in this representation,1 the following elucidation of the case to be accounted for (cap. 3) at once departs from the line of orthodoxy. Satisfaction, regarded as the punishment of one, in order that the others may be suffered to pass unpunished, is to be considered (according to Grotius) firstly, in the light of the law that every sinner ought to undergo the punishment of eternal death ; but 1 The orthodox theologians do not distinguish so clearly as Grotius does between the characteristics of the dominus absolutus and those of the rector. Sin as a transgression of the law of God is yet at the same time regarded as a personal offence against God, just as in the Middle Ages. And therefore they continue to assign to sin an infinite value merely in respect of that rule for measuring the different degrees of injuries, the gravity of which is judged according to the value of the person injured, so that the gravity of a sin committed against an infinite person is itself infinite. DOCTRINES OF THE ARMINIANS. 311 Secondly, in the light of the fact that this law has merely a positive character, is not grounded on the very nature of God, but is a mere manifestation of His will. If now in accordance with this a remission of that punishment for believers be granted on condition of satisfaction, then there is not any abolition at all of the law in this, for it still remains in force for unbelievers. But all laws are capable of relaxation in so far as the opposite of what they require is not in itself something unbecoming or unjust. But this is not the case when the guilty are not punished. From the nature of sin it follows only that one deserves punishment, but not that it should be carried out upon him. If now God had for dispensing with that law the important end of maintaining religion thereby, and showing forth His own goodness, He committed no unrighteousness in doing away with eternal death as the punishment of sin. In this train of thought Grotius falls into an error. I do not lay any weight, [to begin with, upon the circumstance that he abandons the orthodox view of God's penal justice, regarding as he does the eternal condemnation of the sinner, not as- a necessary consequence of that function, but merely as a chance product of the will of God. But the proposition that the guilty are not punished, which is laid down as in opposition to that law, and yet as an arrangement that is not unjust in itself, but elicited by God's goodness and regard to the maintenance of religion, contains something quite different from what we are prepared for by the previous more limited exception from the law. In the last mentioned case, it is only asked whether the law which threatens all sinners with eternal death can be abolished for some, so that these last get off unpunished, and under the condition that their punishment should be trans- ferred to an innocent person. As Grotius hastens past this question to the far more comprehensive declaration, that in no case is it unrighteous to leave merited punishment unexacted, he enters upon the Socinian mode of view which on this ground affirms vicarious penal satisfaction to be superfluous in order to the remission of sins. On this 'account also he deflects the treatment of Christ's death as penal into a course which is foreign to the supposition which has hitherto been accepted. By means of examples taken from the Old Testament (cap. 4) it is shown that God 312 ORTHODOXY AND SOCIXIAXISM. has punished relatively innocent persons together with the guilty. The guilty person indeed in these cases does not remain unpunished ; but Grotius concludes that if, according to Faustus, it is not unjust to let a guilty person go unpunished and not unjust to punish any one for other people's sins, the two together cannot be unjust either, — namely to lay upon Christ the punishment of other people's sins, and, at the same time, let the guilty go free of punishment. For by this argument nothing more can be got than this sameness of time ; and thus already the traditional idea of satisfaction, which points to a causal connexion between the two data, is .aban- doned. Grotius next brings forward, after the Reformed fashion, as a condition for the transference of the punishment of others to the innocent, that both must be parties in a natural or definite moral fellowship. The transition to his peculiar view he makes by means of the principle that in the essence of punishment it is of necessity implied that it should follow upon a crime, but not that it should fall upon the guilty person alone, or overtake precisely him ; just as in the case with rewards or with vengeance. Moreover, all appearance of injustice dis- appears in the case of Christ, for He consented to take upon Himself the punishment of others. Finally, we cannot point to any inevitable necessity for God's having ordained this arrangement (cap. 5). The only question is whether God had sufficient ground for it. Such a reason Grotius finds in the thought, quod tot et tanta peccata sine insigni exemplo Deus transmittere noluit. For, on the one hand, God is benevolently disposed towards men, and therefore inclined to remit the punishment of sinners. On the other hand complete exemption from punishment would bring with it a contempt of sin ; and fear of punishment is the best deterrent from sinning. Both these considerations are duly respected in the punishment of Christ, which expresses God's hatred of sin, while the ^punish- ment of sinners is remitted. John Crell l had little trouble in proving the baselessness of this hypothesis, and vindicating against it the doctrine of Faustus. Particularly he shows it to be unjust to punish an altogether innocent person, and unthinkable that such a person 1 Responsio ad librum H. Grotii quern de satisfactions Chrisli adversus Faustum Soclnum Senensem scripsit (1623) : Bibl. Frat. Pol., vol. vi. DOCTRINES OF THE ARMINIANS. 313 should regard the evil imposed upon him in the light of punish- ment. The cases taken from the Old Testament show that God indeed punishes many even for the transgression of others, but always only inasmuch as these have some sort of active share in the action of the actually guilty, be it by counsel or by consent. Or, if God, in order to make an example, visits a family or a people for the crime of the head, and in doing so smites even innocent children, the evil in the case of these is afflictio but not pama. For also a reward that accrues to those who have not deserved it is in their case not prcemium but only simplex emolumentum. In fine, the weakness of the whole view of Grotius discloses itself when he tries, by a rule of Eoman law, to justify his own view against the thesis of Faustus, that forgiveness of sins and penal satisfaction are mutually exclusive (cap. 6). He subsumes Christ's punish- ment under the case that deliverance ought to result antecedents solutione aliqua ipso facto non liberante, where accordingly non solum solvit alius, sed etiam aliud quam quod est in dbligatione. This manner of meeting an existing obligation by the prestation of another person, who does not lie under obligation, and by the payment of some other value than the stipulated one, of course demands the concurrence of him who possesses the claim. With reference to Christ this is urged as applicable on the presupposition of the approval of the head of the common- wealth. But all this argumentation is idle, for it applies only to relations that are regulated by private law, while Grotius at the outset repudiates the consideration of God's attitude to men in the light of this standard. Finally it is only an unproved assertion, and one that does not admit of proof, that such a rule is valid also for the transference of corporal chastisement. It is quite clear that this hypothesis arrives at quite another conclusion from that which Grotius originally appeared to be aiming at. The orthodox doctrine, which he bound himself to defend, treats Christ's penal suffering as the equivalent for past sins ; Grotius refers it to new future offences. If the death of Christ be thus regarded as a penal example, as a deterrent warning, this interpretation of it is analogous to the Socinian one, that the death of Christ has saving value as an attractive example of moral earnestness and fidelity to duty sustained to the end. Even Baur (p. 431) acknowledges this fact, affirming 314 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. (p. 442), " that the church theory and the Socinian theory still remain unreconciled by the theory of Grotius, however natural it is that some mediating view should fall in between their antitheses." On the other hand he holds that the theory which reconciles these two views, and occupies a middle position, was brought to its adequate expression by the companions of Grotius, — the Arminians, Stephen Curcellseus and Philip van Limborch.1 I shall show that this middle theory does not overcome their mutual opposition, and thus is as little in correspondence with the assertions of the Hegelian theory of the development of ideas in the history of theology as is the theory of Grotius. For the idea of God, which is propounded by these theolo- gians, is hardly distinguishable from that of the Socinians.2 In particular the necessity of penal justice in God is denied. For the independence of God is held to make it possible for Him to renounce His rights without prejudice to His justice, especially if a strict exercise of the Divine rights is against the interest of the other party. Since, then, the natural attitude of God toward men is one of reasonable indulgence, He can therefore, if He will, forgive their sins without exacting satisfaction as a con- dition. The giving of the law by Christ is distinguished from that of Moses precisely by the fact that it is not accompanied by a strict demand of its fulfilment, but by the promise of for- giveness of sins and of eternal life. As this view of the essence of Christianity coincides with that of Socinus, both Arminians substantially repeat the arguments of Faustus against the idea of satisfaction. On this account the death of Christ is in the first instance subsumed under the prophetic office, as a guar- antee of the truth of His doctrine and as a motive to a law- abiding life ; this last inasmuch as it is at once the highest proof of God's love and the most brilliant example of moral character. To this is added what is likewise a Socinian thesis, that the death of Christ has the effect of making his resur- 1 Curcellasi Institutio Religionis Christiana (unfinished), Lib. v. capp. 8, 18, 19. Op. theol, Amstel. 1675. Limborch : Theologia Christiana, Amstel. 1686. ed. iv. 1715, Lib. iii. capp. 16-22. 2 The Arrninian doctrine of God is fashioned after the model of the treat- ment given to it by the Socinian Crell, through Episcopins (Institutiones theologicce). Compare my Geschichtl. Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott. (Art. iii., Jahrb. fUr deutsche Theologie, xiii. p. 267 sq.) DOCTRINES OF THE ARMINIANS. 315 rection possible, by which He opened heaven to His followers ; hereby the death of Christ is marked out as a means or con- dition of His kingly office. The Arminians, however, break off from their companionship with the Socinians, in so far as by their recognition of the sacrificial value of Christ's death, they attach themselves to the view of the universal church. This divergence from the Socinians is more strongly marked in Limborch than in the older Curcellseus. The latter follows the Socinian interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews, discern- ing the sacrificial act in the High Priestly intercession of the exalted Christ, so that His death, as the analogue of the slaughter of the sacrifice, is the preparation for His " appearing before God." If then the New Testament usus loquendi places the fact of Christ's death in immediate connexion with re- demption, this arises from the consideration that in Christ's passion is manifested the difficulty ^of His priestly activity. The expiation of sin by loving self-surrender to death and by the intercession of the exalted One is designed (of course assuming our resipiscentia) ne unquam propter peccata nostra severum Dei judicium subire cogeremur (v. 19. 14). But the death of Christ considered in itself has for Curcellaeus no other meaning than it has for Grotius — namely, ut ostenderet Deus guantopere peccatum odisset, et nos efficacius ab eo in posterum deterreret. For inasmuch as the sacrificial character of Christ must be judged after the analogy of the sacrifices of the Old Testament, Curcellaeus declares (sec. 15) that the thought of penal satis- faction has nothing in common with the idea of sacrifice. Pecudes quce mactabantur pro peccatoribus non luebant pcenas quas erant commeriti, — sed erant tantum ollationes, guibus studebant flectere Deum ad misericordiam, et obtinere ab eo re- missionem admissorum. Limborch, on the other hand, who in a special chapter (iii. 20) combats the Socinian view of the High Priesthood of Christ, removes himself in the same degree from his own predecessor. Curcellseus too is hit by Limborch's observation that the priestly function of Christ, if it is only exhibited in His in- tercession in His exaltation, is absorbed in His Kingship, and that the mere presence of Christ before God has no value toward that appeasing of His wrath on account of our sins, which is the Priest's function. In directer agreement with the orthodox 316 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. view, Limborch affirms, with regard to the sin-offerings of the Old Testament, that their meaning was, ut, in ipsas quasi ira Dei derivata, homo ea liberaretur, hoc est ut ipsis infligerctur mors violenta, cujus intuitu hominem peccato suo mortem meritum in gratiam reciperet. — Unde mors a Christo suscepta rationem habet gravis mali Christo impositi, quo poenam peccatis nostris commeritam quasi in se transtulit, et hac sua passione Deum placavit (sec. 5). But not merely by the repeated use of the word quasi is this view distinguished from the orthodox one ; it is so also by all the other statements of Limborch. This kind of penal satisfaction, which God in the plenitude of His power could impose upon Christ, has not the value of a presta- tion made to God's strict justice, which is utterly denied, but to His will, which is at once just and merciful (cap. xxii. 2), that is, to His reasonableness ; and it has decisive value towards this inclination of God in virtue of the divine dignity of Christ's person. But the value of merit in Thomas's sense (that is, in the sense of legal equivalence), is denied to this prestation (sect. 3), and is assigned to it in Duns's sense, inasmuch as God sanguinem ilium tanquam plenariam persolutionem pro peccatis nostris acceptavit, illoque se moveri passus est ad ple- nam nobis peccatorum remissionem dandam (cap. xix. 2). On the contrary, Thomas's view is echoed when we are told that the infliction of death on Christ is ratio fymines ad salutem per- ducendi convenientissima, utpote ad glorice Dei illustrationem et homines a peccatis ad sanctimonies studium convertendos maxime accommodata (xviii. 5). Although Thomas's sphere of vision is abandoned, when Limborch explains the last-mentioned thought in accordance with the view of Faustus and of Grotius, by means of the purpose of making a penal example, and by means of that view to eternal life, which Christ by His resurrection from the dead has opened up, the mediaeval colouring of this representation is still betrayed by Limborch in the following respects. First, and decidedly, in the character of the idea of God. As has been shown in another place,1 the Eeformers in their doctrine of predestination so applied the mediaeval idea of the dominium absolutum of God, that they set aside as invalid the com- promise between divine and human freedom, which was made 1 Jahrb.fur deutsche Theol. xiii. p. 116 sq. 124 sq. DOCTRINES OF THE ARMINIANS. 317 in the doctrine of merit. The greater stress laid upon the doctrine of predestination by the successors of Calvin implied in itself an accentuation of the divine arbitrariness which was prejudicial to the religious interest. For the religious interest demands that in some form or other it should be possible to presuppose a real fellowship with God. Accordingly Arminius and his successors modified the fundamental idea of the dom- inium absolutum Dei in creaturas by the mark of that cequitas whereby God arranges the moral order of the world from regard at once to His own dignity and to the natural constitution and position of man. Thus at once is the arbitrary freedom of God upheld against the conditions which Eeformation theology deduced from God's justice, and a claim on the part of man to freedom as against God is established, a claim which mediaeval theology recognised in the idea of merit. Now, although Lim- borch waves away the idea of merit as invalid, yet, secondly, his own doctrine of justification, as well as that of Cureellaeus,1 really amounts to the Catholic conception (lib. vi. cap. 4), Lim- borch admitting in pontificiorum sententia multa esse non im- probanda. With Limborch justification means God's gracious sentence in which He looks upon him who believes in Christ, — i.e. who obeys Him with respect to His prophetic priestly and kingly offices, who, therefore, is in a state of penitence and is bringing forth good works, as if this presently inherent though imperfect righteousness were perfect. This view so far shares the Protestant tendency in that justification, according to it, is fitted to awaken the confidence towards God which is for- bidden to Catholic Christians. But it is in agreement with the Catholic view inasmuch as it connects and refers the sentence of justification to the faith that manifests itself in works, and thus to the inherent righteousness of the believer. Limborch guards himself merely against the materialistic representation of habitus infusus. But the rejection which he at the same time makes of the idea of merit really extends only to the Thomist interpretation of it. It exactly corresponds, on the other hand, to the definition of Duns, that God justitiam, quam imperfectam judicat, gratiose accipit ac si perfecta esset (sect. 41). And this assumption is a necessary consequence of cequitas 1 Diss. de hominia per fidem et per opera justificatione. Opp. Theol. pp. 933- 318 ORTHODOXY AND SOCINIANISM. regarded as the general attitude of God towards men ; and is a proof of the place that it has in the mediation between God and men by Christ. In the difference between this doctrine, however, and that of the Lutheran and Eeformed theologians, one interest is perceptible which, although it is operative in the modern evangelical theology, is not brought to any definite examination. The positive expression of justification borrowed from Paul was always used at the Reformation and in subsequent orthodoxy as synonymous with the negative expression of for- giveness of sins ; and for this reason it was that the attainment of such a result by means of good works was utterly rejected. But then the original relation of that idea in the Bible is the relation to works. If justification includes blessedness in itself, and thus positively guarantees that final state of salvation which cannot be thought of apart from works, the natural relationship of these ideas asserts itself, and there results a style of doctrine such as the Arminians offer. It will thus be of im- portance for every system of dogmatics to decide whether by that idea the negative or the positive meaning is intended to be expressed. The way in which, as Baur says, the theory of the two Arminians has fallen into a middle place between the strong contrast of churchly and Socinian theology, thus becomes clearer than as it is represented by Baur. For he points out that they in their doctrine of reconciliation approximated to the Church theology, while in their doctrine of justification they followed the Socinians. Of course such a proceeding is very far from attaining to a higher unity of the contradictories ; but neither can one venture to call it a " mediating " position on any other field than on that of dispute upon the basis of private law. In the sphere of scientific knowledge, Anninianism would offer a lamentable middle course if no other sense could be derived from the actual state of the Arminian doctrine which has been thus interpreted by Baur. Now, the thought of justi- fication, as it has been defined by Limborch, is specifically dis- tinguished from the Socinian view, because it is regarded as taking place only in virtue of the worth of the general recon- ciliation accomplished by Christ's sacrificial offering. Herein Arminian theology, as it is set forth by Limborch, maintains the churchly character of its view of Christianity. But then, DOCTRINES OF THE ARM INI A NS. 319 as it does not matter so much in theory that the Arminian interpretation of the death of Christ approximated orthodox Protestantism, as that it coincides with the mediaeval interpre- tation, Arminianism has in hoth doctrines a unity of character, inasmuch as in both it goes back to the patterns of mediaeval theology. Along with this, indeed, in the case of the Armini- ans, is coupled a protest, all the more marked, against the hier- archical and sacramental apparatus of Catholicism. But if we confine our attention to the two closely connected doctrines of reconciliation and justification, then, in the theory of Arminian divines, it becomes plain that, as they found no higher media- tion between the orthodox and Socinian doctrine, the attempted middle course has led them to a connexion of thoughts which is not new but old — which does not lie in advance of the Ke- formation but behind it, and which at the same time is instruc- tive, in so far as it very thoroughly refutes any expectation that eveiy contradiction that emerges in the history of theology must forthwith find its solution in a logically higher unity. CHAPTEK VII. THE ENTIRE DISINTEGRATION OF THE DOCTRINES OF RECONCILIA- TION AND JUSTIFICATION BY THE GERMAN THEOLOGIANS OF THE ILLUMINATION. 48. THE criticism to which the doctrines of Christ's satisfac- tion and of its imputation were subjected by Faustus Socinus did not prevent these doctrines, which had been derived from the Church Eeformation, from reaching their full development for the first time in the century at the beginning of which So- cinus died. But the two opposing theories of the condition of the forgiveness of sins could neither of them obtain the victory, not only because they did not understand one another, but also because they had currency in separate communities. The debate that continued in the seventeenth century between the two parties, however, was not carried out without producing a recognisable effect upon both sides. The Lutheran and Ke- formed divines had undertaken the development of those doc- trines, on the assumption that they rested upon a rational as well as upon a biblical foundation. But by the Socinian argu- ments that assumption was shaken. At the close of the period of orthodoxy, therefore, occur admissions that the Divine plan of Christ's penal satisfaction is contrary to the rules of human justice, and that it is tenable only by the authority of the Bible ; but at the same time some did not shrink from recognising in the irrationality of the doctrine a special proof of its divine origin (p. 308). But, conversely, the later Socinians yielded to the force of the authority of the New Testament so far as to adopt the Arminian interpretation of the death of Christ, and renounce on this point the violent exegesis of Faustus.1 Thus, 1 This applies to the last important theologian of the party, Samuel Crell, grandson of John Crell ; also to George Markos, of Klausenburg, in Transyl- vania, author of a Summa Universes Theologies Christiana secundum Unitarios in usum auditorum theologice concinnata (1787). Comp. Fock, I. c. pp. 240, 261, 649 sq. CAUSES OF NATURALISM IN GENERAL. 321 as far as Church Protestantism was concerned, the orthodox doctrine of reconciliation remained unmoved to the middle of the eighteenth century, although for a considerable time pre- vious to that a variety of modifying circumstances had come into operation outside of the Church, by which the continued acceptance of this doctrine was threatened. But in the sphere of the German Lutheran Church which, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, showed itself accessible to the scientific influences that broke up this doctrine, the Wolfian philosophy itself contributed in the first instance rather to the strengthen- ing of the orthodox feeling. So late as the year 1737, the Wolfian, Jacob Carpov, establishes the right of distinguishing revealed from natural theology, by making the doctrine of re- conciliation in its Lutheran form, in its speciality as a truth that transcends the reason, the criterion of Divine revelation.1 Only a generation intervenes between this striking testi- mony to the acceptance of this doctrine, not merely by the Church, but also in scientific circles, and the efforts made by leading Lutheran theologians to do away with it, and to substi- tute for it principles of a Socinian tendency. And with these preparatory undertakings is connected the rejection even of the religious thought of the forgiveness of sins which was common to orthodox Protestants and to the Socinians. Without doubt a multitude of predisposing causes can be alleged to account for this radical change in theology. The question, however, ought not to be directed merely in a general way towards the possi- bility or necessity of this development : it is of particular im- portance that we should understand why it was that theologians in the Lutheran Church rather than any other men, should oppose themselves most entirely to the doctrine of reconcilia- tion, while theologians belonging to other parties took no part in this undertaking — not even the theologians of those parties which up to that time had chiefly assumed a heterodox atti- tude. How much the task of historical explanation of the theological revolution of the eighteenth century depends upon the limitation of the question, may be gathered from the way in which Baur expresses himself in his Geschichte der Lehre von der Versohnung (p. 479) : " So wide a breach had been made in the spirit's consciousness of the objectivity of the dogma, 1 Theologia Hevelata Dogmatica, torn. i. p. 29. 21 322 THE ILLUMINATION. that the spirit, now in disharmony therewith, could no longer rest till in pure subjectivity it had again set itself free from the fettering power of all those determinations. Herewith there commences in the Protestant Church itself a movement thoroughly conscious that its cause is good, and which advances with ever-increasing indifference towards orthodoxy. Thus Tollner's inquiry into the active obedience of Christ forms the point of transition to a new era." I am unfortunately not in a position to avail myself of this historical myth for my pur- pose. What spirit was in disharmony with the objectivity of the dogma ? Baur's previous historical sketch makes it pos- sible only to think of the spirit of the Socinians. Now, if I grant that the standpoint of pure subjectivity was not quite reached by that party, then the natural law of the spirit indi- cated by Baur, to the effect that every tendency of thought that has once been entered upon must be pursued to its utmost consequences, would prove itself correct, if the Socinians, after their founder had made the remission of the punishment of sin to depend on the moral activity of the subject, had gone on to show the utter inconceivability of such a remission of Divine punishment. The Socinians, however, who came into collision with the objectivity of the idea of atonement, not merely gave their spirit perfect rest in that regard, they even in the eigh- teenth century closed the mighty breach in their spirit's con- sciousness of the objectivity of the dogma, by reverting to the Arminian type of doctrine. But the Lutherans who, in the second half of the eighteenth century, could not rest until they had rid their subjectivity from the fettering power of all those determinations, previously to that had experienced no breach at all in their disposition to the doctrine of reconciliation, and thus were in no position to complete a movement imposed upon them by the accelerating force of a spiritual impulse once begun. These observations thus prove the necessity of setting about an explanation of the facts by quite other means. For, to demolish the dogma of reconciliation, it was not the "spirit" in general that was the efficient agent, but, as has been said, only a party among the Lutheran divines, who were assisted in their undertaking by no theologian of the Socinian, Eemonstrant, Reformed, and much less of the Eomish party. The most general reason why naturalistic and rationalistic CAUSES OF NATURALISM IN GENERAL 323 tendencies in theology were able to raise themselves against the supernatural and traditionary character of the Christian religion, is to be found in that strangest actual result of the religious movements of the sixteenth century, namely, in the manifold divisions of the Western Church. In the first stage of those movements distinct germs of a rationalistic tendency show themselves in the mystical individualism of the Anabaptists. This party was the congenial soil on which the rationalistic theology of Socinus could flourish. That party succeeded in establishing itself as soon as the prospect of the restoration of the Church's unity failed. Now, although the other portions of the Church which, by the support of political powers gained a secured existence, maintained no small measure of harmony one with another in their positive apprehension of Christianity, yet none of these ecclesiastical parties had that preponderance of authority, in virtue of which an ecclesiastical stamp had been impressed on all spiritual movements in the middle ages, even on those which were heretical. The philosophical sys- tems, therefore, which were elaborated in the two centuries subsequent to the Eeformation, led to such a culture of the reason as indeed, on the whole, asserted sympathy with Church Christianity, but no longer recognised the direct aim of serving the Church and proving all its dogmas. The divisions of the Church, however, not only lessened its influence upon the course of culture, it also had effects opposed to culture ; for religious war arose from the separation of Church-parties and their alliances with political powers. This worst kind of war overran successively France, Germany, Eng- land. Under the impression produced by this mischief, and recollection of its origin, there arose, in persons of fine moral sensibilities and of religious earnestness, indifference and even disinclination to the positive dogmatic development of Chris- tianity, and also even to its historical limitation. The diver- sity of dogmatic systems had brought in its train not merely learned strife and social alienations, but also along with war the demoralization of the people, — a result the opposite of what religion aims at. The impulse to seek a remedy for this was not satisfied, however, with striving after the primitive and dogmatically indifferent form of Christianity, because every Church pretended, in virtue of its own dogma, to be in har- 324 THE ILLUMINATION. mony with that; but it directed itself rather to the task of discovering that natural religion which stands above all posi- tive religions, because the theology of all parties pointed men to this neutral basis which was common to them all. In this a peculiar Nemesis visits Christian theology. In the very earliest stages of its history men had commended Christianity to the culture of the heathen by assertions that it was in cor- respondence with the natural inclination of the reason towards Monotheism, and that its law was no other than the natural moral law. It was, in fact, only in very limited philosophical circles of thought, — the later Platonic and the Stoical namely, — that these assumptions had a positive historical basis. They were therefore pressed too far when they were asserted to be objects of the common consciousness of the human spirit ; and, moreover, the specific diversity between the Christian thought and the similarly sounding thoughts of heathenism was over- looked, their analogy to one another being regarded as actual coincidence. Without the error being discovered, the theology of the middle ages, as well as that of Protestantism, continued to assert that the world's reasoning and observation, while still uninfluenced by special revelation, produces the same thought of God as that which Christianity conveys ; and that this thought, along with the natural consciousness of the law of love which each one possesses, constitutes the basis of theology, to which revelation adds only special and stronger securities of salvation. Do those men deserve reproach, from the stand- point of orthodoxy, who contented themselves with the natural bases of all religion after the special securities drawn from Divine revelation had come to appear as if they served pre- cisely for man's undoing ? They indeed only stretch further the fiction by which Christianity at first had made clear its universal significance for human culture, and by means of which the reasonableness of its contents (which were not dif- ferently stated then) had been scientifically demonstrated ; thus here also could the unreasonableness of its divided con- dition be proved ! The first literary advocacy of theological naturalism was undertaken (still in a disguised form), under the impression produced by the religious war in France, by John Bodinus,1 the 1 Colloquium heptaplomerea de dbditis rerum arcanis, written in 1588. CAUSES OF NATURALISM IN GERMANY. 325 jurisconsult, who was himself a Catholic. He is undeniably the representative of a tone that widely prevailed amongst his countrymen in the sixteenth century. From this atmosphere the Englishman, Edward Herbert of Cherbury, derived the impulse to the first open systematic exhibition of the contents of the religion of nature,1 which is, according to him, the use- ful kernel in every positive religion, and which at the hands of all of them has suffered many disfigurements. As we are exhorted to seek to disengage that kernel, it results that all revelation is superfluous, even though its reality be indisput- able. The substantial tendency of this master is carried out in the whole literature which is comprehended under the general title of English Deism, although, so far as the formal scientific standpoint is concerned, it is not idealistic after Herbert, but sensualistic after Hobbes and Locke. But the opposition to positive and churchly Christianity in all the many-sidedness of the themes discussed by it, makes Herbert's natural religion to be distinctly recognisable as the funda- mental type of all the phases of that literature. This con- nexion subsists, because the similarity of the occasion, namely, the repulsive impression of religious war, called forth cor- responding efforts. When, by the restoration of Charles, the religious war was brought to an end, and by the elevation to the throne of William of Orange its renewal was prevented, the deistic literature which belongs to this period attempts, by means of theory, to make impossible for the future all strife about religion. By simply referring to the work of Lechler, I may venture to excuse myself from giving special considera- tion to the literature of Deism, which, in fact, has for its pro- blem not the atonement but the possibility of revelation. Its chief result is shown in the final reduction of Christianity to the religion of nature by means of the very assumptions in accordance with which orthodoxy had, in the converse way, asserted the identity of the two.2 49. It cannot be doubted that this English opposition litera- 1 De veritate, prout distinguitur a revelatione, a verisimili, a possibili, et a falso: Paris, 1624. De religione gentilium, errorumque apud eos causis : London, 1645 ; Complete, Amsterd. 1663. , 2 Tindal : Christianity as old as the Creation, or the Gospel a republication of the Religion of Nature: London, 1730. Chubb: The true Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted : London, 1738, , • • — •••*•' . •'•• • • .. • - 326 THE ILLUMINATION. ture contributed in a certain measure to the development of German Eationalism. Subsequent to the introduction into Germany (1741) of Tindal's work by means of a translation, German theologians show their marked attention to this field of literature by numerous translations of deistical and anti- deistical works from the English, by notices respecting them, by independent polemic against Deism,1 and finally, by adop- tion of the model set before them. But this last result was only a consequence of a revulsion of feeling which had its suf- ficient causes in the state of culture at home. It is noteworthy that these did not arise from a preference for natural over positive religion, although one might be disposed to think so, judging by the analogies of France and England. For Ger- many by its thirty years' religious war had suffered much more severely than had France and England in their similar visitations, and she was not, like them, summoned together to an independent and energetic political existence, but under the form of the Eoman empire, which had become useless and untrue, continued to experience political disintegration. But instead of seeking in the religion of nature the healing of the differences between the religious parties, the man of greatest genius in that century since the peace of Westphalia, Leibnitz to wit, vainly exhausted himself only with projects for dog- matic union between the confessions of the empire. I will not here venture a decision, whether in this also we ought to detect a symptom of the weakness of the German people, along with the other symptoms which make the remembrance of that period so painful, or whether we ought not perhaps to recognise in it a token of that spiritual power which knows how to observe moderation, and due moderation. In any case it ought not to be overlooked that the German illumination never belies its descent from philosophical idealism; that it never exchanged this principle for the empirical and sensual- istic principle of England and France ; and that therefore it never through scepticism forgot its moral tendency, and that in this respect Kant's philosophy, whatever else may be its oppo- sition to the illumination, is at one with it. The special cause of the reaction towards rationalism on the part of the theology of the Lutheran Church in Germany 1 Compare Lechler, Geschichte des enylischen Deinmus, p. 448 sq. CAUSES OF NATURALISM IN GERMANY. 327 is the strong development which religious and ethical indivi- dualism received from Pietism and the Wolfian philosophy, in connexion with the fact that Church- consciousness nowhere found feebler expression than in the Lutheran confession. Even if a particular Church possessed fixity and continuity of historical existence, merely in virtue of the fact that it had perfectly reproduced the body of doctrine contained in the Bible in its confession drawn out on paper, the partisans of Lutheranism would still have no right on this principle to maintain that the Lutheran has precedence over all other Churches. For example, the thought of the Church is indeed rightly formulated as a whole in the Lutheran confessions ; but, at the same time, it is not perfectly developed according to the standard of the New Testament ; and the thought of election which dominates the religion of the Bible is in the formula concordice placed upon a slippery ground, from which of necessity it had to slide away, so that so far as the practice of Lutheranism is concerned it was as good as lost. But even if this were not so, it is at least childish to determine the value of a particular Church solely according to the theoretical superiority of the doctrine that passes current in it; for a multitude of other conditions must be realized before one par- ticular Church can assert an honourable place in comparison with others. The paper god which has been made of the con- fession of the Lutheran Church has neither prevented the deep fall of that Church, nor has it again brought about its restora- tion, nor has it as an object of admiration for ill-instructed worshippers established confidence in the maintenance of the Lutheran Church amid all the difficulties by which it is sur- rounded. It is not sufficient for the existence of an evangelical Church that the confession should be used as a doctrinal law for its pastors ; it is requisite also that it should be supported by the common feeling of all its members ; that it for its part should be able to excite and keep alive this common feeling ; finally, that this common feeling should by the constitution of the Church be authorized to exert itself in the maintenance of the Church. A legal independence of the Churches was neither attained nor aimed at by the Lutheran Church of Germany in its classical epoch ; for the preliminary task was never finished of leading the "common rude man" by the 328 THE ILL UMINA TION. preaching of law and gospel to conversion and faith. - But even irrespective of the right of congregations to have a part in the active shaping of the Church, the common mind of the Church did not attain to maturity, because the thought of the Church was not developed into perfection out of the general funda- mental idea, and was not brought into that connexion with the other fundamental thoughts of Protestantism, without which a sense of the value of religious fellowship is not elicited. Instead of this, preaching isolated the individual, while exhort- ing him to conversion by law and gospel, and while prescribing good works to him as necessary consequences of his faith, and as what thankfulness to God demands. The feast of the Supper isolated the individual, by the propositions that the sacrament is distinguished from preaching, inasmuch as through it pardoning grace is offered to the individual as such. The common praise of the Church was diverted from its proper purpose by a number of hymns, in which either the objective doctrine of the Church is laid down in rhyme, or a purely in- dividual contemplation of self is elicited and expressed in the singular number. And if one observes what sort of Church- consciousness is exhibited in this the single form in which the Christian congregation takes an active part in Lutheran wor- ship, the result is as follows. In the good Lutheran hymn- book of the Hanoverian Church,1 of all the hymns for Pente- cost, at which is commemorated the first public spontaneous action of the community of believers, there is only one that amongst other things reminds us that by the Holy Ghost the people of all languages are gathered into one by faith ; but this is only the echo of the mediaeval hymn. And even this allu- sion takes no notice of the fundamental fact of Pentecost, that in the spirit of God the faithful recognised and praised the great works of God, wrought through Christ, and by this act of confession took up their place in the history of the world in the presence of foreign witnesses. Instead of referring to this event, all the Whitsuntide hymns bear upon the regeneration of the individual, upon his enlightenment and consolation by the Holy Spirit, and upon the objective place of the Spirit in the 1 It -was gradually put together between 1657 and 1740, and represents an unbroken Lutheran tradition, for only a small portion of the hymns is of Pietisljic origin. CA USES OF NATURALISM IN GERMANY. 329 Trinity. The hymns also which, in that hymn-book, directly relate to the Church say no more regarding it than that it is founded by the word of God and the sacraments, and that it affords opportunity for hearing God's word preached. It is clear that a strong impulse to religious individualism is given by orthodox Lutheranism, and that it was not Pietism which first produced that tendency in the Church.1 Indubi- tably that element during the period before Pietism found its counterpoise in Church customs, which essentially consisted in regularity of attendance at Church, personal or bodily presence at the preaching of the word, and participation in the sacra- ments; quite in correspondence with what the hymns in the hymn-book say of the value of the Church. This Church habit essentially maintained itself even long after rationalism had taken hold of the minds of men ; it thus was not strong enough to prevent the revulsion thereto. Rather was it obviously favourable to the influence of rationalism that the members of the Church had no other Church consciousness than that they had to be patient hearers of sermons, and to take in their contents. If therefore the theologians and the preachers came to have rationalistic convictions, they were prevented neither by their own feelings nor by regard to their hearers from giving expression to their convictions in an official way, especially when the distance of the new theological conviction from the earlier one was very much concealed from both parties by the dignity attributed to the persons of those intrusted with the cure of souls. But, for this reason too, the theologians who first developed their rationalism, starting from the school of orthodoxy, made the transition without any shock ; for originally not only did they connect Wolfian philosophy with orthodoxy, but, at the same time, also they were subject to the influence of Pietism. From Pietism they had derived that concern for the moral treatment of the individual subject, which in rationalism 1 A Lutheran theologian, untinged with Pietism, once refused to allow me to draw the idea of prayer from the destiny of the elect Church els eTraivov TTJS dogqs Tys x<*Pl™s ™v Gfov (Eph. i. 6), but maintained that the primary aspect of prayer is the wrestling of the penitent spirit with God, In my opinion, however, this last is worth anything exactly in the degree in which it rises to the level of thankfulness for that grace, which also first renders penitential wrestling possible (see above, p. 143) — to that thankful* ness in which first the supplicant assumes his active attitude within the Church, Phil. iyf 6. „ - 330 THE ILLUMINATION. rejects the orthodox premisses ; but which even in Pietism had begotten indifference towards dogmatic strictness and the connexion of the Church-system. Pietism makes its appearance in many shapes. As a striving after personal holiness, and a peculiarly conditioned assurance of salvation, it moves between the extreme opposites of the churchly correct attitude of Spener and certain enthusiastic ecstatic manifestations.1 It is by Francke in Halle that the method of attaining to individual certainty of salvation is first worked out to that demand for penitential exercise which corresponds to the dogmatic premisses of Lutheranism in the locus de pcenitentia. But the thorough-going characteristic of Pietism is the great attention it bestows upon the religious and moral development of the individual in more intimate inter- course with those who are like-minded, — in the conventicle. Conventicles are innocuous to the Church only when the latter rests upon a very energetic and active community of feeling. Thus in Lutheranism, where the Church in this respect fell so far short of what was required of it, the Pietistic conventicles could only act in a disintegrating and destructive way against that whereby the members of the Church, as such, were still held together. Much less was it possible that from Pietism should proceed any reforming influence upon the church. The doctrine of the confessions, which was looked upon by official Lutheran- ism as the palladium of the existence of the Church, was indeed maintained in all essential points by the Pietistic theologians of the eighteenth century; and they are not guilty of the numerous heresies with which they were charged. Nay, more, I must repeat that the practice of penitential exercise, which was insisted upon by the men of Halle, really denotes an in- tention on their part to give effect to the Lutheran doctrine of pcenitentia, which up till that time had held a place merely on paper. But the attention of the isolated individual to his own religious and moral development, which has its roots in Lutheranism, seems to be only strengthened by this under- taking. Hence a line is taken up which is really hostile to the Church as a whole, inasmuch as it is no longer the general guarantees of the Church that constitute the framework for that individualism, but casual changing connexions with like- 1 H. Schmid : Oeschichte des Pietismus, p. 191. LEIBNITZ. 331 minded persons. The first advocates of rationalism in Germany, who at the period of their theological education also experi- enced Pietistic influences, were thus weaned from influences which a firm public churchism would have exercised. Of course the positive presuppositions and motives that produced theological rationalism were to be found in the Wolfian philo- sophy. Now, one may well ask the question, why the philo- sophy of Descartes, which at an earlier period amongst the theologians of the Low Countries had formed an alliance with orthodoxy, precisely as did the Wolfian at first among the theologians of Germany, did not, like it, lead to a heterodox development. K611 and others prove that the impulse thereto lay in Cartesianism also. But I cannot avoid conjecturing that the strong churchly public spirit, which both by reason of dogma and of constitution, was operative in the Eeformed Church of the Low Countries, and was still specially active on account of the struggle with the Eemonstrants, suppressed any inclination to rationalism which could arise from the Cartesian philosophy. 50. The rationalism of German theologians and their naturalism, which subsequently developed itself, spread their roots through the philosophy of Wolf into that of Leibnitz. But these germs of theological change are, in the case of Leibnitz, disguised beneath such a mode of contemplating the universe, as in its objective and universal character is com- parable with the theology of the Church, and was by its author deliberately brought into friendly connexion therewith.1 The absolute teleology of that world, which is the work of God, and which is the best that could have been produced, — a teleology in which the smallest occurrence extends its influence to the remotest issues, — finds its proper force only in the moral world, the civitas Dei. All beings are created by God as centres of special activity, in such a way that in each one of these the order of the universe is mirrored, while their operations are so directed that they represent the All in a finite way ; and ac- cordingly the principle of all their action and passion lies in their spiritual souls. The spiritual freedom of these is never the absence of determination, but the absence of constraint and physical compulsion; it is spontaneity. For the body, and, 1 Essais de theodlcee sur la bonte de Dleu, la liberte de Vhomme et Vorhjlne du mal. 1710. 332 THE ILLUMINATION. through it, the whole material world, has no determining and impelling influence upon the soul ; the appearance of this is produced merely by the circumstance that according to the parallelism that has been ordained by God between the move- ments of the soul and of the body, ideas representing the peculiar movements of the material world fill the soul. And the soul acts in accordance with these ideas, because at the same time in accordance with her own independent ideas she is able to exercise an activity on the world. This pre-estab- lished harmony of the factors that form the human individual thus guarantees the spontaneous freedom of that individual, in virtue of the conformity of all things with each other by the will and wisdom of God, — in virtue of the harmony between nature and grace, between God's decrees and our foreseen actions, between all portions of matter, between what is past and what is future. From this hypothesis, therefore, Leibnitz derives the most decided faith in providence, while at the same time he enjoins humble and trustful exercise of freedom in accordance with reason and with the moral law of God, on the understanding that all the future is, without a doubt, determined, although we know not what has been decreed by God or why it has been decreed. Faith in Providence animates also Leib- nitz's philosophical principle, — that the world, as it is, is chosen and created by God as the best, and that the fact of sift, and of its prevalence among men, cannot be alleged to the contrary. For evil, as compared with good, may be regarded as zero, if the actual magnitudes of the kingdom of God are taken into consideration. And, as God could not avoid making the things of this world imperfect, and thus making men so that it should be possible for them to sin; and as He has per- mitted sin actually to take place, He holds moral evil in His hand, not regarding it indeed as the direct means of good, but as the conditio sine qua non of what is best. That Leibnitz by these views does not abandon the strictest judgment of sin is proved by his recognition of the eternity of future punishment. Grotius and Hobbes, the originators of the science of natural law in the seventeenth century, who represented the State as the means, and the welfare of the individual as the end, regarded the idea of punishment within the State, accordingly, as having reference merely to the rela- LEIBNITZ. 333 tive purposes of reforming or of deterring individuals. Leibnitz was able to prevent this view from extending to the religious theory of the universe1 by means of his doctrine that the kingdom of God is an end to itself. From this it followed that, for the maintenance of order, there appertains to God a penal justice which has to regard merely retribution and not refor- mation. On the supposition of freedom, if a case occurs in which a will continues to persevere in sin, then the continuance of punishment for continued sin corresponds only to that fitness which satisfies wise observers, who in the ordering of the kingdom of God look for what shall betoken that it is an end to itself. The lot of endless punishment which falls upon some without any hope of reformation does not, however, give ground for any denial of the presupposition of the universe as being the best, for changes of individual parts to imperfection and to evil, — in other words, a perversion in certain parts — does not contravene the maintenance of the whole in the best condition, but in this case precisely subserves the ends of universal order. Leibnitz does not discuss the retributive justice of God in this application without recognising at the same time reward as one species of it as well as punishment. While he cannot avoid asserting this idea as the correlate of human freedom, he is still far from excluding thereby the Christian thought of grace ; for he expressly recognises the difference of grade be- tween nature and grace in that ordering of the moral world towards a definite purpose which he maintains. Hence it may be also inferred that Leibnitz still leaves room for the doctrine of reconciliation, and his theological disciples, therefore, have expressly defended that doctrine. Still, he determined the thought of sin, particularly the relation between actual and original sin, otherwise than had been done in the doctrine of the Church ; and in this way he so altered the premisses of the idea of reconciliation that the final rejection of the latter by disciples of Wolf is explicable. Leibnitz regards the generation of all animated being as a growth and recon- struction of an organic preformation, in which the germs of the soul lie previous to generation, as conversely he does not imagine any existence of souls without body. Accordingly he. 1 Grotius maintains indeed retributive punishment in relation to God's justice, while representing it as unsuited to the use of man. LIBRARY ST. MARY'S COLLEGE 334 THE ILLUMINATION. assumes that future human souls are contained in the semen, in such a way that from Adam downwards they have had existence in a sort of organism, and that, by a creative act of God, they are endowed with reason in the act of generation. From Adam onwards, therefore, human souls would have sin attaching to them; in relation to this sin, however, reason stood as a new perfection. By this'asseveration, Leibnitz gives a turn to the idea of original sin which essentially diverges from the line of Protestant orthodoxy. He proposes the question, whether original sin by itself, without exhibiting its effects in sinful action, is enough for everlasting condemna- tion ? For refusing to admit this result with respect to chil- dren who die unbaptized, he could appeal to authority in the Catholic and in the evangelical Church. But he thinks it a hard thing, moreover, to assert the eternal condemnation of those grown-up persons who, following the inclinations of corrupt nature, fall into sin without participating in any means of grace. For they have only done what they could not help doing. Leibnitz could not defend this position with the authority of evangelical theologians ; Catholic divines, however, who were solicitous for the salvation of the heathen, offered support for the affirmation that where knowledge of Christ is wanting, God bestows blessedness on those who, so far as their human ability went, busied themselves in what was good. Leibnitz, indeed, concedes that those who have opportunity for repentance, but still show no goodness of will, can have no excuse ; but he still raises the question why God should not bestow upon them goodness of will for their amelioration, but should even harden them in their evil will While now he traces this to the influence of the circumstances which as such arise from the general concatenation of causes, he is able to escape the dilemma of the election and reprobation of individuals only by explaining that those who, in respect of original sin, are all alike, are yet not equally bad in respect of their par- ticular freedom. Asserting an innate individual distinction between soul and soul, he finds that in respect of their natural disposition men incline more or less to diverse forms of the good and the bad, or to their opposites. In so far therefore as, in accordance with the arrangement of the whole world, men are introduced into different circumstances, which are favourable or LEIBNITZ. 335 unfavourable to the development of nobler qualities, they either fulfil a happy destiny by the grace of God, or come short of it. He is of opinion, therefore, that the election of an individual is not according to his excellence, but according to the con- veniency between his individuality and God's decree. Leibnitz, indeed, would have it to be understood that he propounds these views only as a hypothesis in defence of the doctrine of divine providence ; and he is very far from claiming any dogmatic value for them. But that he has abandoned the sequence of the Lutheran doctrine of original sin is shown also by the fact that he repudiates the assumption of the infinite demerit of sin in accounting for the eternity of punishment, re- marking that he has not yet sufficiently pondered that state- ment to be able to give a verdict upon it. To him humanity irrespective of Christ is nothing more than the entirely ho- mogeneous massa perditionis, in which the kind and degree of the actual sins of the individual are indifferent. He breaks the ban of this conception by concentrating attention on the relative position of individuals, which they take according to their peculiar disposition, according to the peculiar strength of their use of reason, and according to the circumstances in the moral world which have been ordained by providence. The thought of eternal punishment does not come up into view with him in connexion with passive and universal original sin, but as a threat that impends over continued actual sin. Finally, the thought of the world which, in spite of sin, is the best, because sin in comparison with the majesty of the kingdom of God appears as nothing, leads to a tone which is quite the opposite of that wherein the orthodox system manifests its credi- bility. Orthodox Protestantism has taken up and carried on the dualistic conception of the universe which prevailed in the middle ages, in the modification that life here and life beyond the grave are subject to quite opposite conditions. In accord- ance with this, ascetic literature kept up the impression that, in spite of redemption, we are always during our earthly life exposed to the hindrances of sin rather than raised above them, and that it is only in the future life that we are first to enjoy the manifest fruits of redemption. As that antithesis was neutralized, or at least considerably modified in Leibnitz's con- ception of the present state of the universe, the tone of ascetic 336 THE ILLUMINATION. melancholy which by rights at least ought to have accompanied the orthodox system, was wholly exchanged for a tone which, with all humility, combined cheerful and assured confidence in the providence of God. Perhaps the inclinations of the genera- tions which followed were alienated from Pietism, and also from orthodoxy, by nothing so much as by the circumstance that such a tone, through the influence of the philosophy of Leibnitz and of Wolf, became universal amongst the educated classes. For the tone of society is the atmosphere of the spirit's life ; and, just as all organic beings do not live in one climate, in like manner certain circles of thought lose all their convincing power when certain tones prevail. Leibnitz, also, in order to commend his theory of optimism, could not abstain from calling in fancy into regions which were un- fathomable by exact knowledge, and which supplied nourish- ment to the disposition which was opposed to orthodoxy, all the more because the latter in this respect laid down very definite limits. Orthodoxy recognises earth only as the arena of the spirit's history, and limits the individual's capacity for develop- ment to the earthly life. Leibnitz denies that this is an article of faith in the strict sense of that word, and can appeal to others who have preceded him in the assumption that sin continues after the present life. But, as he thinks that a morally good conduct of life is similarly carried on in the life beyond the grave, he gives occasion to suppose that conversion also is possible after death ; and in suggesting all the solar systems to be dwelling-places of blessed spirits, with a view to support his optimist conception of the world, he makes that conviction to depend upon the visionary and arbitrary conjec- ture, that in those unknown regions the quantitative relation between evil and good will be the reverse of that which one feels so painfully in the present earthly state, judging it by the usual standards. These are germs which attain to so luxuriant a growth in the illumination-period as to choke all serious judgment of the moral world upon principles of universal application. For, in truth, the thought of the world as the best is identical with that of the world as relatively bad ; but it follows from this that, in adopting the hypothesis of Leibnitz, one becomes in a measure indifferent to sin, and ceases to possess the absolute standard wherewith to judge it. DIPPEL AND CANZ. 337 These elements, however, contained in the TModic6e of Leibnitz, did not develop their destructive consequences until the Leibnitzian principles had been applied by Wolf to the problems of ethics in a more comprehensive way, but, at the same time, had been modified after a peculiar fashion. By other disciples of Leibnitz a still stricter conformity between his reli- gious philosophy and the orthodox system was brought about than is set forth in the TModicee. The identity of interest between orthodoxy and the Leibnitzian philosophy is particu- larly displayed in the defence with which J. G-. Canz in Tubingen met the assault made by J. C. Dippel (Christianus Democritus) on the Church doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ. This once notorious man, whose mysticism exhibits just as strong a tendency to merge into rationalism as that of the Quakers, introduces into the discussion a previously un- employed argument against the idea of Christ's penal satisfac- tion, and in this respect is the foregoer of the later theologians of the illumination. The pivots of Dippel's view * are the idea current among the enthusiasts of the final conversion of the wicked in the other life (" restitution of all,") and the transfer- ence to the relation between God and man of the relative idea of punishment which had become current for civil society in the Natural Law of that time. It is clear that that view of the final end of the human race favours the presupposition that i God's punishments as a whole are for reformation and not for retribution, that they have reference to the future amendment, and not to the past misdeed. Still, I conjecture that unless the culture of the time had offered as an assumption familiar to all the notion that the state and civil punishment have only relative significance, neither Dippel's mystical devotion to the task of active sanctification and of perfect victory over personal sin, nor his theory of Apokatastasis would have called forth that sort of criticism to which he subjected the doctrine of reconciliation. In particular, Dippel's assertion that God's purpose is to destroy sin, but not the sinner, corresponds to that relative idea 1 Dippel has briefly summarized his repeatedly expressed objections to the Church-doctrine of reconciliation in his Hauptsumma der theologischen Grundlehren des Democriti, 1733. They are to be found along with the refutation of them by Canz in Reinbeck's Betrachtungen iiber die Augsburgische Confession, fortgesetzt von Canz, 5 Theil ; pp. 476-498. 22 338 THE ILLUMINATION. of the state, which regards it as the means for the maintenance and well-being of individuals. In accordance with this, the traditionary attribute of God, which guarantees the destruction of the sinner, His wrath to wit, had to be partly denied, partly altered. Inasmuch as God is love, there is properly speaking no wrath in Him, or His wrath is nothing but a chastisement which flows from love, and which leads men to amend, although it does not take place without great pain. For as sins do no detriment to God's perfection, and cannot hurt or injure Him, but only bring disadvantage to man himself in his relation to God, God has no occasions to take heed of sins committed or demand satisfaction for them, but only in love will He direct His attention to them in order that for the future we to our own advantage may lay aside such bad behaviour. From the relation in which they stand to natural punishment, it can be inferred how positive punishments subserve this end as chastise- ments. The natural punishment of sin, which necessarily ac- companies it, and which therefore is only permitted by the love of God, is separation from God as the highest good, is spiritual death or hell God does not need to make hell ; he finds it already made as the consequence of sin. As long then as man continues in sin, and out of fellowship with the highest good, God Himself cannot make him happy. In order to this, or that the sinner may be delivered from natural punishment, God in proof of His active love threatens Him with those positive punishments, whereby one is weaned from earthly things and led to long after eternal blessings; and these punish- ments extend even to the other life. Christ's passion, accordingly, has not the intention of doing away with a wrath of God on account of sin which he has not, for He is love, and love and wrath are mutually exclusive, and God is quite ready to forgive the past which cannot be undone. Neither has it any reasonable meaning to say that Christ re- moved from us the punishments of sin. For its natural punish- ments cannot be separated from sin. That Christ should take them upon Himself were therefore conceivable only were He also to take our sins upon Himself, in other words, were He to do wickedly ; but this is absurd. The positive chastisements of sin, on the other hand, as the sole means of amendment, ought not to be removed from us, and Christ by His example rather DIPPEL AND CANZ. 339 taught us how to bear them with patience. Christ gave satis- faction to the love of God, having in His passion lent Himself as instrument to the Divine purpose of healing us from our sins ; that is to say, He bore our sins in His passion, He suc- cessfully withstood the temptation with which the devil, sin, and the world, assailed Him; as Captain of our salvation, accord- ingly, He opened up the way of salvation, presenting to us the model how we should overcome the temptation of indwelling sin ; and for this purpose He communicates to all who obey Him His life-giving Spirit. So that we are not acceptable to God through His imputed righteousness unless we be, at the same time, freed from the dominion of sin. For as the pur- pose of Christ's mediatorial office is sanctification and renewal, that end is mainly achieved in the appropriation of Christ's example in the destruction of the old Adam in each man. Christ's atoning sacrifice, on the other hand, avails us nothing unless we fully master the sin that dwells in us. While this change of the meaning of Christ's sacrifice, as if it were only a model of the conquest over sin in man, approxi- mates to the views of Schwenkfeld, the novelty consists in the conception of Divine punishments which is interwoven with it. Up to this time the threat of eternal condemnation, of hell, which was held out against sin, had been regarded as the positive punishment that God in His good pleasure had appointed ; and anything else that might possibly be regarded as punishment thereof was not taken into account — not in theological theory at least. Now, Dippel assigns quite an opposite place to these two, but does so at the expense of accurate thinking. It betokens a complete breaking-up of the order of the universe, if God finds ready-made, and acquiesces in, the condemnation of sin, if the so-called natural punishment accord- ingly is to be regarded as a naturally necessary result, and not as at the same time a positive Divine punishment. It is thus an obvious ambiguity in language to call this condemnation by the name of punishment while denying its retributionary character. In both these respects the dilettantism and superficiality of Dip- pel betray themselves. At the same time, while regarding hell as in a certain sense a naturally necessary visitation impending over sin, he was in circumstances to regard the otherwise discernible penalties of sin at once as positive, and as means of reforma- 340 THE ILLUMINATION. tion. In this respect he had obviously taken his cue from the Natural Law of his age ; although his conclusion that all God's chastisements aim at reformation was not what Grotius thought. This discussion hy Dippel of the two classes of punishment has the following bearing upon his rejection of the doctrine of recon- ciliation. As is done by that doctrine, it was his intention also to show how we are freed from the punishment of condemnation. But for this it is not Christ's merit but the amendment of indi- viduals that avails according to him; and so far as positive punish- ments also subserve this end, to them also is attributed the effect of delivering the sinner from the natural punishment of his sin. Dippel's lucubrations bear the stamp of individualism in every respect, in their tone as in their terminology, in their up-breaking of the orderly conception of the universe held in unity by the idea of God, as well as in the complete isolation of the ethical progress of the individual sub- ject. But hereby he put himself to a manifest disadvantage as against Leibnitz and his school. These regarded the thought of the civitas Dei, of the kingdom or city of God as the abso- lute ultimate end of moral order amongst mankind. From this consideration Leibnitz had defended the retributive justice of God precisely with reference to the conceivability of eternal punishment from which Dippel drew back. Finally, it was from Leibnitz's idea that Canz received the impulse to set forth the whole of dogmatic theology under the form of Natural Law.1 In this respect his opponent had the advantage of Dippel, as he deduced from the idea of the absolute theocracy, that not merely are there natural punishments for sin but also judicial punishments. The former convince man of the indi- vidual hurtf ulness of sin for himself, the latter convince him of the unreasonableness of his behaviour towards the common good of the kingdom of God, in having despised the supreme power and worked the disadvantage of many thousands. But the judicial punishments have not merely this subjective reference; they have, at the same time, the objective meaning of sublating that free consent to sin by which sin as such is constituted ; and which, once committed, continues to lie as a blot on the commonwealth. Only herein is the idea of punishment com- 1 De regimine Dei universali sive jurisprudentia civitatis Dei publica, 1731. Ed. novissima 1744. WOLF. 341 pleted ; for the threat of calamity in order to check future con- sent is rather prevention than punishment. Canz moreover finds no difficulty in the thought that Christ endured punish- ment of this sort in place of men ; he does not even take any notice of the objection raised by Dippel against it. Limiting himself merely to the purpose of defending his own opposite standpoint in fixing the idea of punishment, he did not carry his refutation so far as to point out the region in which Dippel's assertions might find something to justify them. The immature form of that refutation makes it all the plainer that the argu- ments against the dogma, which were now for the first time emerging, were at the very outset rebutted by means of a view, the authority of which was not merely traditional, but had received a special impulse at the hand of Leibnitz. 51. The rationalizing systematization of Leibnitz's philosophy by Wolf is, on the other hand, unfaithful to what were the most characteristic principles of that philosopher. Wolf abandons the idea of monads, anew regarding the relation between soul and body under a dualistic scheme. On this account also, he exchanges that conception of the universe, which is founded upon the inner conformity to purpose of the individual and of the whole, for the theory of the outward conformity to purpose, or rather subserviency to purpose of all details in succession.1 This particularly applies to that region of ideas which has to be attended to in the present problem, to wit, the moral and the social.2 Wolf draws the rule of moral action from comparison of the successive states of the indivi- dual, which are changed by his free actions. Those actions which make more perfect both our inward and our outward state are good ; what, on the other hand, makes both less per- fect is bad. This twofold determination of the value of actions holds good even irrespective of the connexion of things in God. As, rather, the result which proves actions good or bad rests upon natural necessity, the value of the motives of actions, according to the result contemplated, is dependent on the nature of things ; this then is the sufficient ground of the 1 Compare Kuno Fischer : Leibnitz und seine Schule, p. 522 sq. 2 In what follows I refer to Wolf's Vernunftige Oedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, 1720 ; Vernunftige Gedanken von dem gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen, 1721, 4th ed. 1736. Compare Erdmann : Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic, vol. ii. p. 197 sq. 342 THE ILLUMINATION. obligation to act well and not wickedly. Therefore the rule of action, the moral law of nature, issues in the formula : do what makes thee and thy condition or that of others more perfect ; refrain from doing what makes it less perfect. Progress in perfection is the highest good that man can attain ; the pro- spect which accompanies this progress is blessedness. Now, it is in the highest degree noteworthy that Wolf offers no proof that the task of individual perfection includes the furthering of the perfection of others. The reference of our free actions to the perfection of others is simply asserted in the formula of the law of nature ; and in laying down duties towards others, as well as in deducing the idea of society, recurrence is made to that formula without any proof being alleged in support of its construction. The error of ethical principle that is implied in this becomes perfectly clear when the society in which men with united energies seek to further their best interests is resolved into the idea of a convention of individuals who come to an agreement with one another. Wolf refers to this defini- tion not merely in order to explain the political commonwealth, but also in representing the family as the association of parents and children with a view to the upbringing of the latter. This individualism in morals particularly displays itself in the fact that the duties of man towards himself, — in other words, the actions which, in accordance with the law of nature, are necessary in order to one's own individual perfecting, — take the first place. This sphere is not transcended when duties toward God are laid down ; for the natural knowledge and recognition of God, as of One who binds us to the observance of the law of nature, establishes these duties in the sense that the perfections of God are employed as motives of action. Wolf, indeed, in his Theologia naturalis (torn. i. sec. 975), widens the field of vision by his statement that man, by the dominion of God over the creation, is bound in his actions to aim at his own perfec- tion and at that of other men, yea, even at that of the whole universe. But this idea remains without any rectifying influ- ence upon ethics, for the resort of the Leibnitzian conception of the universe is taken away from it. Now, in view of this peculiarity of the moral principle in the Wolfian philosophy, we can understand that the deliberate recognition of a supra- rational revelation in Christianity, which Wolf and a section CHARACTER OF THE ILLUMINATION. 343 of his scholars make, gave no pledge of its own endurance. The connexion of the dogmatic thoughts of Christianity counts upon a consciousness of fellowship in the Church which pre- cedes the religious and moral training of the individual, and includes it.1 If, on the other hand, the individual subject in the consciousness of the law of nature is so sure of himself that the thought of God, properly speaking, adds nothing thereto, then immediately the superfluity of the authority of revelation is experimentally proved, and the attitude of indifference assumed towards it ultimately incites to doubt and denial of the value and possibility of truths of revelation that transcend the reason. I venture to leave undiscussed the course of this development of thought amongst the theologians of the Wolfian school The denials of the doctrine of reconciliation, which immediately ensue, are based as characteristic inferences upon the principles, — that Christianity has only rational contents, that God brings men to blessedness even without special reve- lation, and that the nurture of the individual in virtue, and the exhibition thereof in righteous action is the chief thing even within Christianity. Hereby within the German Lutheran Church place is given to the Socinian view that Christianity is essentially the moral school for the production of individual virtue and dutifulness. This view, indeed, has not succeeded in displacing the tradition of Church doctrine and of the Church's requirements ; it has rather sought to adapt itself to the continued demands of the Church system, in spite of the obvious inconsistency ; but the representatives of Church tradition are at a disadvantage when compared with the Neologians, because they themselves main- tain only a dubious confidence in the goodness of their cause. On account of these circumstances, and also on account of the undeniably moral tendency which the leaders of the illumina- tion-theology evince, the historian is at once prevented from concurring in the party verdict that the illumination-theology is nothing but apostasy from Christianity. Such a verdict, as it is maintained by the leaders of exaggerated ecclesiasticism in the nineteenth century, is only another instance of the 1 See above, p. 188, note. In like manner Luther, Catech. Major (Hase : libri symb. p. 497) : Christio.norum communio mater est, hcec quemlibet Chris- tlanum parturit ac alit per verbum. 344 THE ILL UMINA TION. general experience that, in the immediately subsequent stage of culture, men are wont to show no understanding of that which went before, either exaggerating the errors of the latter in order to get for their own light as advantageous a back- ground as possible, or suppressing the peculiarity of those who went before them in order to recommend themselves the more by the brilliant halo thus gained. Thus Melanchthon blackened the scholastic theology, and the illumination- divines repre- sented the Eeformation as if its leading tendency were to carry out the free investigation of Scripture. Now that half a cen- tury separates us from' the time when the so-called "awakening" to positive Christianity contemptuously turned its back upon that of the illumination, the conviction begins to gain ground that the illumination-period has a positive value for the history of evangelical Christianity. A classical authority on this matter surely is Tholuck, who discerns in rationalism not an episode merely, causally unconnected with what precedes or follows, but a piece of history, a phase of development which was in some respects morbid but in others normal and natural.1 In agreement with this is the detailed critique of Hundeshagen, that the principles and requirements of the illumination are in the main neither opposed nor yet alien to the gospel, but rather have their origin in it ; and that the tendencies to humanism, — these indubitably Christian thoughts, — have come to hold a place outside of and opposed to the Church, because within the Church they were held down and suppressed, and not permitted to take their proper place.2 It cannot be denied that the stand-point of the illumination, the stand-point of individuality, guided by the reason, striving after relative virtue, and elevated above all conventional rules, is not fitted to nourish and promote religious fellowship as such. So far the theological character of this school is un- churchly, or less than churchly. But the illumination did not deliberately surrender that position of connexion with the Church in which it found itself; on the contrary, it main- tained it. Standing upon that ground it sought for the first time to give full force to the peculiar value of the moral indi- vidual, in setting aside all conventional hindrances — a task for 1 Geschichte des Rationalismus. Erste Abth. (1865), p. 1. 2 Beitrdge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik, L p. 474. % CHARACTER OF THE ILLUMINATION. 345 which very strong motives are offered in Christianity. The narrowness of apprehension of this task which characterized the school, indeed, had the effect of causing all the forms of church-fellowship which it found existent to be gradually set aside and invalidated. If, however, a